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This thesis aims to investigate the impact of ethnic differences on the religious life of 
Tamil-speaking Muslims in Singapore. More specifically, it examines in which 
contexts ethnic differences between Tamil-speaking Muslims and other Singaporean 
Muslims become salient. Furthermore, the effects of that salience both in practical 
terms, e.g. in the organization of religious life, as well as in discursive terms, i.e. in 
the way ethnic differences are conceptualized in the religious domain, are elucidated.  
Both anthropological and historical research methods were employed in order to 
address these questions. 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. After the Introduction, chapter 2 outlines 
the historical development of Tamil Muslim society in Singapore, with a focus on the 
colonial period, which will serve as a point of comparison for the contemporary 
situation throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 discusses the way Tamil Muslim society 
and community is imagined in Singapore, investigating in particular those aspects of 
Tamil Muslim society that delineate various social segments within a putative single 
Tamil Muslim community. The thesis then proceeds in chapter 4 to consider the 
institutions that structure and organize religious life among Singaporean Tamil 
Muslims, paying particular attention to the operation of Tamil Muslim associations. 
The use of the Tamil language and its impact on religious life in the form of 
preaching, teaching, publishing, and debating Islam is considered in chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 discusses the debates that have grown out of the salience of ethnic 
differences in the religious domain. The first part of the chapter considers the 
structural challenges Singaporean Tamil Muslims are faced with in the local context 





Islam in Singapore. The second part deals with the broader discourse on popular 
practice and identity that arises from the salience of ethnic differences, leading to the 
formulation of an essentialized ‘Indian Islam’ and an equally static image of an 
‘Indian-Muslim’ community. The final chapter presents some conclusions that can be 
drawn from the evidence discussed in the thesis. 
The results emerging from the thesis indicate that ethnic difference has a great 
impact on the organization as well as the imagination of religious life among 
Singaporean Tamil Muslims. Ethnic salience becomes most visible in two contexts, 
viz. that of popular practices and that of language use. It is the latter that has the 
greatest practical consequences on the organization of religious life, as it directly 
interferes with the capacity of Tamil Muslims to participate in certain normative 
Islamic practices. In contrast, it is popular practice rather than language that most 
strongly informs the imagination of difference between Tamil Muslims and other non-
Tamil Muslims and non-Muslim Tamils in Singapore. In both cases, the impact of 
ethnic difference is furthermore shaped by the peculiar historical context, producing 
different reactions to ethnic difference among Muslims in different historical contexts, 
while at the same time suggesting a tendency to similar types of discourse in various 
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION 
NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION 
 
For this thesis, sources written in a variety of languages, most notably in Tamil, were 
perused. Furthermore, it was necessary to employ Tamil, Arabic, and Malay 
terminology from time to time. All translations are my own unless noted otherwise. 
Translations are generally based on a standard dictionary for the various languages, 
viz. for Tamil, the Tamil Lexicon (TL) of the University of Madras (Vaiyapuri Pillai 
[1924-39] 1982); for Arabic, the fourth edition of Hans Wehr’s A Dictionary of 
Modern Written Arabic (Wehr 1979); and for Malay, the revised edition of Coope’s 
Malay-English English-Malay Dictionary (Coope [1991] 1993). All quotes from the 
Koran are from Abdel Haleem’s translation (Abdel Haleem 2004). 
I have decided to use full scientific transliteration for both Tamil and Arabic. 
Especially with regard to the former, all sorts of unscientific spellings abound for 
Romanizing Tamil. The argument that these popular spellings are easier to read and 
that specialists would be able to recognize the intended word anyway is simply 
mistaken. As many of these popular spellings are based on the respective author’s 
understanding of the already rather inconsistent English orthography, it is often not 
immediately apparent whether, e.g., -oo- is supposed to represent -ō- or -ū-. 
Furthermore, the inconsistencies and impreciseness of such spellings sometimes 
makes it difficult to impossible even for a specialist to identify a word.  
Similarly, I found using a reduced transliteration system, i.e. transliterating 
scientifically but omitting the diacritics, not advisable, as this would often make it 
difficult to distinguish words. Thus, for the recognition of Tamil and Arabic words, 
and especially for tracing bibliographical references, full scientific transliteration was 




NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION 
additional feature of transcribing the digraph -ḵp-in words of Arabic origin as -f-. For 
Arabic, I have employed the system used by the International Journal of Middle East 
Studies. 
Generally, transliteration has been employed in the following contexts: 
1. All direct quotes from Tamil or Arabic. 
2. Technical terms in Tamil or Arabic. When referring to Islamic religious terms 
in general, I always give the Arabic spelling of a word rather than its Tamil or 
Romanized Malay spelling. The latter are only used if the reference is to a 
specific context, thus waqf, ‘endowment’, but ‘Wakaf Board’. I do not 
normally use Arabic plurals, except where circumstances require it, and 
generally add the English plural –s to Arabic words to indicate the plurals, i.e. 
fatwās rather than fatāwin or fatāwā. 
3. Names of individuals in cases where an individual is mentioned only in Tamil 
language sources, and thus no Romanized spelling of that individual’s name is 
available. Similarly, the names of historical Muslim personalities have 
generally been transcribed from Arabic. 
4. All bibliographical references, both in the footnotes and the bibliography. 
On the other hand, I have refrained from using transliteration in the following cases: 
1. Words and names that have become standardized in modern English, e.g. 
Muhammad, Hussein, Imam, Ramadan, Shiva, etc. 
2. Personal names that have a commonly used English spelling, such as the 
names of many of my respondents. In case of a few individuals, whose names 
are commonly given in popular spelling in English language sources but 
whose Tamil language publications I quote, I use the common popular spelling 




NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION 
and use this transliteration in bibliographic references; thus ‘Maideen’ in the 
main body of the text, but ‘Meytīṉ’ in bibliographical references. 
3. For the names of towns, districts, and other geographical proper names. 
4. When English and Tamil sources written by the same author are referred to, 
the English spelling of the author’s name is used in the bibliographical 
references. As this was the case only with one author, and the Tamil source in 
that case is an unpublished typescript that does not even carry the author’s 
name (Sayed Majunoon n.d. & 1996), this was the most prudent way to handle 
the situation. 













ISLAM AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCE 
 
People, We created you all from a single man and a single woman, and 
made you into nations and tribes so that you should get to know one 
another. In God’s eyes, the most honoured of you are the ones most aware 
of Him: God is all knowing, all aware.1
 
Among [the mosques of Singapore] there is a place available for our Kling 
Muslims which is a site in the city-centre where one may come and go at 
any time of the night without any fear whatsoever.2
 
Though a minority [of Indian Muslims] has embraced the Malay culture…a 
vast majority of us are still culturally Indians – that is, we speak Tamil, we 
eat Indian food and we dress in the Indian style.3
 
                                                 
1 Koran 49.13. 
2 “Cavuttu piriṭciṟōṭ kuttupāp paḷḷivāyilaippaṟṟiya potuviṣayam”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 15 Aug 1887: 29. 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
How do differences between ethnic groups affect the practice of Islam among 
Muslims? Despite the fact that Islam is professed by people from vastly different 
geographic, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds, this question has been largely 
ignored by students of Muslim society. Though the Koran acknowledges ethnic 
diversity as an “…anthropological fact…”,4 as the first of the three quotes makes 
clear, this ‘fact’ has not been investigated as thoroughly as other aspects of Muslim 
societies. It is not that evidence for the continued importance of ethnic diversity 
among Muslims is lacking; the second and third quote, produced by Muslims in 
Singapore speaking the Tamil language of southern India and Ceylon and separated 
from each other by an interval of almost 105 years, attest to the importance that can 
be attached to ethnic identities and practices even in contexts closely connected with 
religious practice. 
Ethnic diversity among Muslims rarely features as a topic worthy of discussion 
among both Muslim intellectuals and scholars of Muslim societies. When it does, 
what is addressed is usually how Islam was made sense of in specific historical, 
regional and ethnic contexts. Ultimately, these discussions are not about ethnic 
diversity and its effects on Muslim religious life, but about the way the Muslim ideal 
of a universal Islamic tradition is realized in various ethnic contexts, and how 
ethnicity relates to an Islamic identity.5 Yet the question of what impact the encounter 
of Muslims of different ethnic or linguistic backgrounds has on the religious practice 
of these Muslims is rarely contemplated. The theoretical premise adopted by many 
scholars seems to be that ethnic or linguistic differences do not affect religious 
practices or identities, as explicitly stated by Nielsen, who contends that “...in village 
to city migration in the Arab world or Pakistan there is an element of cultural 
                                                 
4 Osman 2007 [sic]: 481. 





CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
migration as there may be of ethnic or linguistic migration. But in these 
circumstances, it is the ethnic, cultural, or linguistic identity that is challenged in the 
first instance. The environment remains Muslim in expression”.6 This premise does 
not only affect studies of Muslim society, but seems to be more common generally in 
Religious Studies. A recent Handbook of Language & Ethnic Identity has chapters 
dealing with the relation between language and ethnic identity from a variety of 
disciplinary perspectives, such as Economics, History, Political Science, Psychology, 
and Sociology, but not Religious Studies, despite the role ‘sacred languages’, ‘chosen 
people’, and other aspects of religion play with regard to both language and ethnic 
identities.7
Of course, studies considering the impact of ethnic differences among people 
professing the same religion are not completely lacking. Especially the field of 
Diaspora Studies has taken note of the phenomenon, observing processes of 
negotiating practices and identities as Muslim migrants of various ethnic backgrounds 
come to live together in diasporic settings. Vertovec has claimed that common 
transformations among diasporic Muslim communities include shifts from ‘localized’ 
to ‘universal’ practices and a greater differentiation between ‘religion’ and ‘culture’.8 
The same processes were identified by Gibb in her study of Ethiopian Hararis in 
Canada.9 Yet the diasporic Muslim societies in Europe and North America that form 
the subject of these studies are peculiar in many respects – in most cases, Muslim 
communities in these countries are relative newcomers; Muslims are both less 
established in these regions than they are in parts of Asia or Africa, and ethnic 
                                                 
6 Nielsen 2000: 121. 
7 Cf. Fishman 1999. 
8 Vertovec 2003: 316-8. 
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heterogeneity is far more pronounced, as migrants come from many different parts of 
the planet. 
Studies of the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on Muslim practice in regions where 
Muslims of different ethnic backgrounds have been interacting for centuries are much 
less common. Nagata, in her article on “Religion and Ethnicity among the Indian 
Muslims of Malaysia”, spends less than a page on the impact differences between 
Indians and Malays in Malaysia have on religious life.10 In another interesting study, 
Sakallioglu has investigated the differences of Islamist discourse among ethnic 
Turkish and Kurdish writers. He suggests  
 
…that Kurdish-Islamist writers tend to search for a ‘space’ for Kurdish 
ethnic distinctiveness within the framework of the suggested formula of 
ummah, the Islamic community of the faithful, while the position of the 
Turkish-Islamist writers leans heavily toward defending the integrity of the 
Turkish state rather than to acknowledging a Kurdish ethnic 
distinctiveness.11
 
This finding is important in so far as it questions the assumption made by many 
authors that the universal claims of Islam and ethnic particularities are necessarily 
contradictory.12 We shall return to this issue in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Singapore provides an ideal setting to investigate the impact of ethnic difference 
on Muslim religious life. Not only has Singapore’s Muslim community been multi-
ethnic from the very beginnings of the British settlement founded in 1819 and 
probably even before that, but ethnic difference, or rather what the Singaporean state 
                                                 
10 Nagata 1993: 529-30. 
11 Sakallioglu 1998: 74. 
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perceives as such, has had a strong impact on public policies and is thus highly visible 
in the public sphere.13 Given the strongly multi-ethnic character of Singaporean 
Muslim society, including Malays as well as various ethnic groups of South Asian 
backgrounds usually lumped together as ‘Indians’, Arabs, and more recent Chinese 
and Western converts, it is surprising to see that until now, the effects of this ethnic 
diversity have not been adequately addressed by scholarship on Singaporean Islam. 
While the presence of Indian and Arab Muslims is usually acknowledged in studies of 
religion in Singapore,14 its significance is either ignored or explicitly denied by the 
authors. Thus, a German publication calls Indian and other non-Malay Muslims in 
Singapore ‘negligible’.15 Similarly, though having just mentioned the existence of 
Indian Muslims in Singapore, Siddique concedes that “…the real problem with 
accommodating religion to race is the Chinese community”, suggesting that the fit of 
‘Malay’ and ‘Muslim’ is neat enough to ignore other ethnic groups among the 
Muslims.16
This latter statement exemplifies one of the greatest problems in the study of 
religion in Singapore, viz. the sometimes tacit, sometimes not so tacit identification of 
the ‘racial’ categories of Malays, Indians and Chinese with various religions,17 in our 
case the almost interchangeable use of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Malay’.18 The connection 
between categories of ‘race’ and ‘religion’ has led to some reflections on the 
relationship between ethnicity and religion. Thus, Clammer discusses the importance 
that religion assumes as an ethnic boundary marker in the Singaporean context, where 
other markers of difference are disappearing, and he even suggests the significance of 
                                                 
13 Cf. e.g. Benjamin 1976; Siddique 1989; Teo & Ooi 1996; Wu 1982. 
14 Cf. e.g. Bonneff 1985: 82; Clammer 1990: 160-3; Ling 1989: 696; Mak 2000: 13; Metzger 2003: 18, 
206-7; Siddique 1986: 316-7; Siddique 1989: 567-8; Stahr 1997: 193. 
15 Stahr 1997: 195. 
16 Siddique 1989: 567. 
17 Cf. Tong 2004: 306. 
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ethnic identification within religious communities, though he does so primarily to 
point out how religion and ethnic or linguistic identity are reinforcing each other, 
something that may be true for Malays, but is more problematic for ‘Indians’.19 More 
pertinent are Clammer’s observations on Singaporean Christianity, noting many of the 
elements that are also of interest in a Muslim context, such as the question of different 
‘styles’ of religious practice and, more importantly, the importance of language use in 
religious contexts.20 Yet for Singaporean Islam, an investigation of these issues still 
has to be accomplished. It is noteworthy that in a recent handbook on Singapore 
Sociology, the chapters on the sociology of Malays and Indians both point out that the 
relationship of ‘race’ and religion in the Singaporean context is far from facile. Thus, 
Arumugam raises the question of how non-Hindu Indians relate to the Hindu majority 
among the Indians in Singapore, and whether linguistic differences have an impact on 
the practice of Hinduism.21 Similarly, Alatas points out that “…the cultural lines 
separating Malays from Arabs, Indians and Chinese who are also Muslims are both 
subjective as well as objective”.22 Significantly, the chapter on religion of that 
Handbook has nothing to say on the issue.23 On the whole, the facile identification of 
‘race’ and ‘religion’ has retarded a scholarly assessment of the impact ethnic 
difference plays within a religious community. The most egregious example of this is 
Mak’s study on Modeling Islamization in Southeast Asia. Mak justifies his exclusion 
of Chinese and Indian ‘converts’, by which he obviously means all Chinese and 
Indian Muslims in Singapore, from his Singaporean samples, as “[e]thnicity might 
confound the effects of religion on social interaction between religious groups, hence 
                                                 
19 Cf. Clammer 1985: chapter 4; Clammer 1990: 166-7; Clammer notes some of the effects of ethnic 
differences on Muslim practice in Singapore, but on the whole does not attempt to analyze these cases. 
20 Clammer 1985: 42-4. 
21 Arumugam 2002: 332-3. 
22 Alatas 2002: 291. 
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the exclusion of Chinese and Indian Muslim [sic] makes relationship between 
Muslims and non-Muslims more manageable”.24 Ironically, Mak concedes the effects 
of ethnic difference on religiously motivated behavior – yet rather than engaging with 
these effects, he tries to avoid them by focusing on just one ethnic group, apparently 
not realizing that thereby he is obscuring the problem rather than solving it, for his 
study consequently becomes not one of Muslim, but of Malay Muslim behavior. 
This thesis attempts to address the question of the impact of ethnic difference on 
Muslim religious life by looking at one particular group of Singaporean Muslims, viz. 
the Tamil-speaking Muslims, for reasons that will be discussed in the next section. 
Despite their numbers as well as longstanding historical connections with Singapore, 
this group has received rather little attention, though some preliminary studies have 
been conducted, which will be discussed below. Yet none of these studies have been 
carried out with a background in South Asian Studies, which limits the access some of 
the authors had to sources in South Asian languages, as well as lack of knowledge of 
the similarities and differences between the situation in South Asia and Singapore. 
This study thus attempts to be of use for scholars of Muslim societies both in South as 
well as Southeast Asia. The study will be guided by three main questions: In which 
context does ethnic difference become salient in the religious domain? What practical 
impact does ethnic difference have on the organization and practice of religious life? 
And what discourses arise from the salience of ethnic difference in the religious 
domain? In addition to these questions, I also aim at advancing our knowledge of 
Tamil-speaking Muslims in Singapore and their histories, as they tend to be omitted 
form many historical accounts.25
                                                 
24 Mak 2000: 13. 
25 For example, a publication by the Singapore Indian Associations claims that Muslims and Europeans 
brought down the “…flourishing Indian commerce in the Malay Archipelago…”, a completely 
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Before I proceed to discuss the scope and methodology of the thesis, a note on my 
use of the term ‘ethnic difference’ is on order. By this I mean all differences which 
are due to the linguistic, cultural or ethnic background of an individual, regardless of 
whether these differences play a role in the formulation of ethnicity on part of an 
individual or not. I had originally planned to focus on ethnicity and identity, yet I 
realized quickly that some differences have an impact regardless of the identity 
formulated by an individual – ignorance of the Malay language, for example, excludes 
an individual from religious knowledge transmitted in that language, no matter how 
that individual perceives its ethnic or religious identity. Indeed, as I will try to show, 
many debates about identity among Tamil-speaking Muslims in Singapore have been 
precipitated by a context in which ethnic difference became salient, not the other way 
round. Identity is an important aspect of the discussion, but not the only one. 
 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
In order to be able to identify the various domains in which ethnic or ethno-linguistic 
differences become salient in the religious sphere, we need to circumscribe the society 
that forms the subject of this study more carefully. People of South Asian origins are 
generally identified as ‘Indians’ in Singapore. It has been pointed out that this tag 
obscures more than it reveals, for the putative Singaporean ‘Indian’ may actually trace 
his or her origins to several contemporary nation-states in South Asia, be it India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh. Furthermore, Singaporean Indians speak a great 
variety of languages – besides South Asian languages such as Bengali, Gujarati, 
Hindi, Punjabi, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu and others, there are also ‘Indians’ 
                                                                                                                                            
places of worship in early Singapore, it neither mentions Muslims as a group nor comments on the fact 
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having English or Malay as their main household languages.26 It is thus not surprising 
that ‘Indian’ has been called “…the most problematic” of Singapore’s official ‘race’-
categories.27 It is obvious that this diversity renders any focus on ‘Indian’ or South 
Asian Muslims in Singapore useless, as ‘Indians’ in Singapore are as much likely to 
exhibit ethno-linguistic difference among themselves as they are in relation to wider 
Muslim society. 
To avoid some of these problems, the thesis will focus on a particular section of 
South Asian Muslims in Singapore, viz. Tamil-speaking Muslims, i.e. those Muslims 
whose main household language, and usually also main language of religious 
activities, is Tamil. There are several reasons to focus on this group – Tamil-speaking 
Muslims are the largest Muslim group speaking a South Asian language in Singapore, 
have the longest history of settlement on the island coupled with an even longer 
presence in the wider region, have of all South Asian Muslim groups most actively 
participated in shaping Singapore Muslim society through the endowment of mosques 
and the establishment of religious associations, and have created the largest record of 
publications and documents relating to Islam in any South Asian language in 
Singapore. Tamil-speaking Muslims are in no way a homogeneous group. There are 
significant differences in regional background, affiliation to a sub-community or law-
school, religious practice, class, occupation, migratory history, and degree of 
‘Malayization’, many of which will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3. The 
Tamil language may be common to all these individuals, but this does not mean that 
each individual will identify as Tamil, and those who do may have very different 
perceptions of what it means to be Tamil. Thus, when I use ‘Tamil Muslim’ 
throughout the thesis instead of ‘Tamil-speaking Muslim’, it is solely for the sake of 
                                                 
26 Cf. Leow 2001b: ix; PuruShotam [1998] 2000: 83-95. 
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readability, and not for suggesting that something like a unified Tamil Muslim 
community exists, even though such a community is definitely imagined by many 
Tamil-speaking Muslims. 
Having said this, it is nevertheless necessary to take account of the fact that the 
term ‘Indian Muslim’ is widely used in public discourse in Singapore, and is certainly 
more common than ‘Tamil Muslim’ or ‘Gujarati Muslim’ or any similar combination. 
When I explained to people that I was conducting a study on Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore, I was fairly frequently confronted with the question: “Only Tamil 
Muslims?”, suggesting that Tamil Muslims were seen only as a sub-community in a 
wider ‘Indian Muslim’ community, which was in turn perceived as the ‘proper’ unit 
of inquiry. This reaction was more common among academics than among 
respondents, most of whom agreed that it was necessary to focus on one linguistic 
group.28 It needs to be kept in mind that ‘Indian Muslim’ is at least since the 1990s the 
common term in use in the Singaporean public sphere. Its prominence is hardly 
surprising, as ‘Indian’ is a recognized census-category, while ‘Tamil’ or ‘Bengali’ is 
not. Yet the use of ‘Indian Muslim’ as a catch-all category in the public sphere has a 
deeper dimension: as I shall argue in chapter 6, it lends itself to disciplining Muslims 
of a South Asian background and to obscure the problems various sections of ‘Indian 
Muslim’ society may be facing. In addition to its use as a general term for all Muslims 
in Singapore who are ‘Indians’ by race, it has to be noted that the term ‘Indian 
Muslims’ is also used in a different sense. Given the close link in Singapore of the 
category ‘Indian’ with ‘Tamil’, due to the fact that Tamil is the official ‘mother-
tongue’ associated with Indians, ‘Indian Muslim’ is not infrequently understood to 
                                                 
28 I have not encountered any objections on part of my respondents to the term ‘Tamil Muslim’, as 
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refer primarily to Tamil Muslims.29 Many of my respondents shifted between using 
‘Indian Muslim’ and ‘Tamil Muslim’, and some were obviously surprised when I 
pointed out that there were non-Tamil Indian Muslims. One respondent summarized 
the situation thus: “The Indian Muslims in Singapore, basically, when they talk about 
Indian Muslims they talk about Tamil-speaking Indian Muslims”.30 This ambiguity in 
the use of the term ‘Indian Muslim’ in Singapore sometimes causes problems, as it is 
not always clear which meaning is intended by a respondent or source. As a result, it 
was sometimes simply not possible to determine what a source meant by using the 
term; in these cases ‘Indian Muslim’ has been retained, as also in cases when a 
statement is clearly valid not only with regard to Tamil Muslims, but also with regard 
to other Muslims of South Asian background. 
Having thus delimited the section of Singaporean Muslim society that shall form 
the subject of this study, it is necessary to shortly explain the exclusive focus on 
Singapore. It was suggested to me several times to include Malaysia in my 
investigation, and it had originally been my plan to do so. Yet apart from the huge 
amount of additional field- and archival work that would have been necessary to 
accomplish this, the character of contemporary Muslim society in the two countries is 
rather different. Most important in this context is the status of the Malays as the 
majority ethnic group among Muslims in both countries. In Singapore, Malays form 
just one of the officially recognized ‘racial’ groups in the Republic, and even though 
Malays are the dominant ethnic group among Singaporean Muslims, there is little 
collective pressure on Tamil Muslims to ‘Malayize’ and to sever their links with the 
equally recognized ‘Indian’ ‘racial’-group; indeed, the negative stereotypes associated 
                                                 
29 Cf. PuruShotam 1998: 89-90; Siddique 1989: 570-1. 
30 Some North Indian respondents explicitly supported my language-based distinctions precisely 
because the term ‘Indian Muslim’ often implies Tamil Muslim, and therefore in their eyes a ‘working-
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with Malays may actually act as a deterrent against ‘Malayization’.31 In Malaysia, by 
contrast, getting recognition as Malay allows access to the special rights allocated to 
indigenous bumiputra, ‘sons of the soil’, while there is little incentive for Tamil 
Muslims to identify with the marginalized and Hindu-dominated Indian minority.32 In 
Malaysia, Indian Muslims stand less to gain from maintaining ethnic difference from 
the major ethnic group among the Muslims, while in contrast “…the advantages of 
being part of the Malay community in Singapore are substantially fewer”.33
An incident during my fieldwork may illustrate the difference between both 
countries. In December 2004, I took part in a trip organized by one of the Tamil 
Muslim associations of Singapore to the waterfalls of Kota Tinggi in southern 
Malaysia. At Johor Bahru, a Malaysian Malay tour-guide joined the group.34 After she 
had warmed up by poking fun at the supposed Singaporean gluttony, already to the 
visible annoyance of some of the Singaporean participants in the trip, the tour-guide 
began cracking rather racist jokes. “Why do Chinese have so little eyes?”, she asked. 
When nobody was able (or willing) to give the correct answer, she provided it herself: 
“Because they only look for money. And”, she added, “why do Indians have such big 
eyes? Because they always look after women”! The guide was obviously not prepared 
for the indignation she had to face on part of the group. “How do you dare say this to 
us? You know we are Indians”! Slightly startled by so much ignorance, she tried to 
explain: “No, no, Indians and Indian Muslims different lah! See, for example Indian 
women wear saris…”. “We also wear saris!”, quipped one elderly lady, effectively 
ending the exchange, and mercifully saving us from any further chauvinist jokes on 
part of the guide for the rest of the trip. While I am not sure whether the tour-guide 
                                                 
31 Cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 58. 
32 Nagata 1993: 526-9; cf. Khoo 1993: 278-81. 
33 Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 58. 
34 The guide spoke in both Malay and English. My own understanding of the incident was later 
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ever understood why these Singaporean Indian Muslims so tenaciously clung to 
identifying themselves as Indians, the incident illuminates the very different 
constraints on the maintenance of ethnic difference among Muslims in Singapore and 
Malaysia. 
 
REVIEW OF PRIOR STUDIES 
 
Several studies of both Singaporean Indian Muslims in general and Tamil Muslims in 
particular have already been conducted. The majority of them are in the form of 
unpublished academic exercises, complemented by a few articles and working papers. 
It is possible to divide these studies into three groups: those dealing with Indian/Tamil 
Muslim society in Singapore as a whole, those dealing with questions of identity, 
accommodation and difference, and those concerned with publishing and literary 
production. 
Among the studies attempting to deal with Tamil Muslim society as a whole, we 
find Syed Mohamed’s academic exercise on The Tamil Muslim Community in 
Singapore of 1973, Mani’s article on “Aspects of Identity and Change among Tamil 
Muslims in Singapore” of 1992, and the published notes of Shankar’s thesis on Tamil 
Muslims in Tamil Nadu, Malaysia and Singapore of 2001 – while the latter two 
studies ostensibly focus on identity, they are nevertheless much broader in scope, and 
it is thus justified to discuss them as studies of Singaporean Tamil Muslim society as 
a whole.35 Syed Mohamed’s study is largely an ethnographic description of Tamil 
Muslim society in Singapore in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and as such offers rich 
source material for this period, especially on the operation of Tamil Muslim 
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associations prior to the establishment of the hegemony of MUIS. The main weakness 
of the study is its exclusively descriptive nature, largely lacking analysis of the 
described phenomena. This is compounded by some statements of a highly 
ideological and idealizing nature;36 finally, it is disappointing that Syed Mohamed, 
though conversant in Tamil, made little attempts at utilizing relevant Tamil language 
sources. 
Mani’s article largely draws on Syed Mohamed’s study, but updates and 
complements the material with further sources37 as well as the incorporation of some 
studies on Tamil Muslims in India. The latter is an important point, as it distinguishes 
Mani’s study from most of the other studies of Singaporean Tamil Muslims.38 Mani 
touches upon many pertinent issues regarding Tamil Muslim society in Singapore, but 
due to the constraints of space in a journal article, is unable to develop and analyze 
them more comprehensively. The same problem, though for different reasons, 
pertains to Shankar’s published notes, which were intended as part of an ambitious 
thesis on Tamil Muslims in Malaysia and Singapore which was left unfinished due to 
the untimely death of the author. Most of Shankar’s notes deal with Malaysia and 
India, yet there is still much valuable material for our purposes in them, especially 
notes regarding the situation of Tamil Muslims in Singapore immediately after World 
War II. On the other hand, most of the information lacks references; furthermore, 
Shankar is sometimes prone to make value-judgments, i.e. such as claiming that 
certain practices are “…strictly un-Islamic…”.39
The first study that dealt exclusively with questions of identity and ethnic 
assimilation faced by Indian Muslims in Singapore is Bibijan’s article on 
                                                 
36 E.g. Syed Mohamed 1973: 27-8 (on social stratification), 83 (on idolaters). 
37 Such as Meytīṉ 1989. 
38 With the partial exception of Fakhri 2002 and Shankar 2001. 
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“Behavioural Malayisation among Some Indian Muslims in Singapore”.40 This study, 
like Syed Mohamed’s, is largely descriptive, though Bibijan attempts some analysis 
of the patterns of ‘Malayization’ in various domains of daily life. Though dealing 
largely with sections of Singaporean Indian Muslim society that have adopted Malay 
as their household language, it still offers valuable ethnographic material. Conversely, 
it suffers from the fact that no attempt is made to analyze under which conditions the 
adoption or rejection of a certain practice may constitute ‘Malayization’, thus imbuing 
many practices and customs with an essentialized ‘Indian’ or ‘Malay’ identity, 
something that will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3. In contrast to Bibijan’s 
dichotomy of ‘Indian’ and ‘Malay’, Mariam devotes part of her 1989 thesis on 
Uniformity and Diversity among Muslims in Singapore to Indian Muslims as just one 
element in the diversified Muslim society of Singapore.41 Mariam provides important 
ethnographic detail on the rituals performed at the now closed Nagore Durgah, as well 
as interesting material on Indian Muslim self-identification in Singaporean Muslim 
society. The main problems with her study is the severely limited source basis of her 
observations which derives almost exclusively from conversations with participants in 
the rituals and her own observation of the event, which are backed by only very 
limited further field-work and no secondary literature. 
The most important study dealing with Indian Muslim identity in Singapore is 
Noorul Farha’s thesis Crafting Selves of 1999/2000.42 Based on a number of in-depth 
interviews, Noorul Farha presents us with a detailed investigation of the construction 
and negotiation of Indian Muslim identity/identities in Singapore, as well as factors 
constraining identity options. On this basis, she posits a continuum of formulations of 
identity ranging from ‘Indian’ and various kin-center based identities via an 
                                                 
40 Bibijan 1976/77. 
41 Mariam 1989: 41-6, 101-21. 
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overarching ‘Indian-Muslim’ identity to a ‘pan-Islam’ identity. The statements of her 
respondents in many cases closely tally with responses of my own informants. Her 
thesis has provided a valuable basis for my own thoughts regarding the topic of 
identity, though my analysis of the issue departs in some important aspects from hers. 
As several aspects of her analysis will be treated in more detail in chapter 6, it suffices 
here to point out what appear to me to be the three main drawbacks of her thesis. 
Firstly, even though she repeatedly stresses the contextualized nature of identity,43 she 
limits herself by adopting the problematic term ‘Indian’ as the framework of her 
thesis. By adopting a term that is at least partly imposed from the outside, i.e. as 
census-category, she subordinates other aspects of identity formation such as 
language or historical imagination a priori to the ‘racial’ category of ‘Indian’. 
Secondly, as Noorul Farha was not proficient in Tamil, she was unable to utilize 
Tamil language material (which she freely admits); this, coupled with the fact that she 
did not utilize any literature pertaining to Muslims in India,44 limits her analysis and 
her ability to contextualize the identities of Muslims speaking Tamil and other South 
Asian languages in Singapore. Finally, by positing a primordial tension between being 
‘Indian’ and being ‘Muslim’, without stating why such a tension should exist, she 
inadvertently follows the common Singaporean fallacy of confusing ‘race’ and 
‘religion’. Despite these drawbacks, her thesis provides a stimulating discussion of the 
topic. 
Finally, there are a few studies dealing with publishing and literature among 
Tamil-speaking Muslims in Singapore. An important survey of Islamic Tamil 
literature is provided in Tamil by Jafar Muhyiddin (Jāpar Muhyittīṉ) in his 
                                                 
43 E.g. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 70. 
44 Such as the important studies of Fanselow and Mines regarding Tamil Nadu; c.f. Fanselow 1989, 
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“Ciṅkappūr tamiḻ muslimkaḷiṉ ilakkiyappaṇi”.45 Similarly, Fakhri’s working paper on 
Print Culture among Tamils and Tamil Muslims in Southeast Asia, c. 1860 – 1960, 
supplies some general background information, as well as more detailed discussions 
of two important individuals in the history of Tamil Muslim journalism in 
Singapore.46 His analysis is particularly pertinent as it is one of the few attempts to 
integrate developments in India and in Singapore.  
Beside the studies mentioned here, there are many monographs and articles 
dealing with other topics pertinent to our subject that provide important information. 
Among these are studies on the history and sociology of Islam and Muslim society in 
Singapore and South India; ‘racial’, religious, and linguistic policies of the 
Singaporean state; Indians in Singapore and Malaysia; and a variety of other issues. 
The information provided by these works will be evaluated in the main text of the 
thesis when and if the need arises. 
 
METHODS, SOURCES, AND STRUCTURE 
 
Several research methods were employed in order to study the salience and impact of 
ethnic difference on the religious life of Tamil Muslims in Singapore. These methods 
were chosen on the basis of three premises. Firstly, such a study has to take its basis 
in the investigation of actual practices, which can be of different kinds, such as the 
organization of religious life or the use of language in religious contexts. Secondly, in 
order to properly contextualize the impact of ethnic difference on religious life among 
Singaporean Tamil Muslims, a diachronic perspective needs to be adopted, which 
allows us to better assess under what conditions ethnic difference becomes salient. 
                                                 
45 Jāpar Muhyittīṉ 1990. 
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Thirdly, in order to avoid the risk of primordializing certain aspects of Tamil Muslim 
society in Singapore as ‘Indian’, it is important to consider the situation of Tamil 
Muslims in India and note similarities and differences between the two countries. In 
order to satisfy these premises, both ethnographical and historical research methods 
were selected. In order to be able to compare and contrast the situation in Singapore 
and India, I engaged in ethnographic and historical research in both countries, 
somewhat along the lines of the ‘multi-sited ethnography’ as suggested by Marcus.47 
As I had already conducted fieldwork among Tamil Muslims in India before, two 
spells of three-month fieldwork there in May-July 2003 and February-April 2005 
supplied me with a large amount of data. 
Among the ethnographical methods employed in both India and Singapore, the 
most important proved to be participant observation of religious functions, 
ceremonies, and rituals, activities organized by Tamil Muslim institutions, and 
religious lectures. I attempted to attend as many activities as possible; knowledge of 
these activities was provided through informants whom I had met in the course of my 
fieldwork or who were suggested to me by other respondents. In a few cases, I was 
approached directly by respondents, especially after an article mentioning my 
fieldwork had appeared in the local Tamil daily Tamiḻ Muracu in April 2003.48 In 
general, people and institutions were very helpful in allowing me to observe and 
participate in their practices. Indeed, I was often compelled to cross the line from 
being a ‘participating observer’ to that of ‘observing participant’.49 I was sometimes 
asked to deliver short speeches or give some presentation during functions organized 
by Tamil Muslim associations and mosques; when respondents learned that I was able 
to read Arabic, I was also requested several times to participate in the recitation of 
                                                 
47 Cf. Marcus 1995. 
48 “Tamiḻp paṇpāṭu eṉakku mikavum piṭikkum”, Tamiḻ Muracu, 14 Apr 2003. 
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eulogies (mawlid). In all these cases, my role as non-Muslim researcher was clear to 
both organizers and audiences. Participant observation allowed me to examine the 
salience of ethnic difference in such practices directly and to engage with other people 
attending the activity or ceremony. A difficulty in participant observation was that, as 
gender segregation is commonly practiced in public Muslim ceremonies and 
functions, with women being separated from men either by a curtain or by being 
located in a different room altogether, most of my observations pertain to male 
practices only. Furthermore, Indian Muslim associations are strongly male dominated, 
with women playing few if any roles; one respondent mentioned that membership in a 
kin-center association in mixed kin-center families was usually determined on the 
basis of the husband’s, not the wife’s kin-center. Even though women were 
interviewed by me, my data is weighted towards the male side, so that further research 
regarding women’s perspectives on the issues is desirable. 
Participant observation was supplemented by in-depth, usually unstructured 
interviews. During my research, I conducted about forty in-depth interviews in 
Singapore and India using both English and Tamil. Most of the interviews in 
Singapore were conducted in English; in India, when Tamil was used for an 
interview, I mostly worked with one or two research assistants, who would conduct 
the interview having a general list of topics that I was interested in, while I would add 
questions of my own in order to follow up on some information a respondent gave. 
Interviews were conducted for several purposes: to elucidate oral-history, to 
understand the setup of a particular institution, or to discuss about the role ethnic 
difference played in the life of these respondents. It should be noted that several of my 
Singaporean respondents preferred not to have their interviews recorded, and others 
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would then correct their opinion once the voice-recorder was switched off.50 It should 
also be noted that in general, casual conversations proved a lot more informative than 
formal interviews, as people tended to be more open and frank during such 
conversations than during interviews. Whenever I gained information by means of 
casual conversation, I recorded it on paper or voice-recorder as soon as possible. 
In addition, I perused written material, both contemporary and historical, to 
supplement my findings. Among such sources were souvenir journals published by 
Tamil Muslim associations, handbills, announcements, newspaper clippings and 
similar material in Tamil and English.51 In order to allow for diachronic comparisons, 
historical primary sources were of some importance to my thesis. While oral-history 
interviews supplied some information, these interviews were limited in their time-
frame, as most respondents had come to Singapore after World War II. Yet the prewar 
period was of particular interest for me as it provided the greatest possible difference 
in context to the contemporary situation. A cursory glance at the secondary literature 
reveals that the sections on the prewar history of Tamil Muslims in Singapore are 
usually poorly documented. This is not to say that the depiction of the prewar history 
of Tamil Muslims in these studies is incorrect; on the contrary, it seems to be largely 
correct, if superficial. Yet to be able to compare the prewar period with the 
contemporary situation, more primary sources had to be utilized. 
Information about the prewar period was drawn largely from two kinds of 
sources. Firstly, there are various English-language materials. These include 
administrative documents such as census reports as well as the relevant Indian District 
                                                 
50 Interestingly, it was those respondents which held the strongest and most controversial opinions who 
were the least concerned about me recording them; as one of them stated: “I’m [already] on record with 
this”. 
51 Noorul Farha’s thesis contains a selection of newspaper clippings largely from The Straits Times 
dating between 1982 and 1999; cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: appendix D. While I had already 
uncovered several of these items prior to my perusal of her thesis, I came to know about items 2, 4, 5, 
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Manuals and Gazetteers. Various Law Reports turned out to be a particularly rich 
source for social history; for this study, I have gone through the descriptions of 52 
cases apparently involving Tamil Muslims.52 In addition, I have occasionally drawn 
on other English-language sources, such as Buckley’s Anecdotal History,53 or The 
Singapore Free Press. Secondly, I have perused Tamil language materials, which 
form a particularly understudied source for Singaporean history. Most prominent 
among these is the newspaper Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, published by a Muslim between 1887 
and 1890, and containing much material on Muslim practice in that period. Another 
interesting source is a series of articles that appeared in the controversial journal Tārul 
Islām between February and October 1925, reporting on a journey of its editor, P. 
Daud Shah (Pā. Tāvutṣā), to Malaya from the 20th of February to the 12th of June 
1925. These consist of reports by the manager of the journal on the progress of Daud 
Shah’s journey, and occasionally articles that appeared in the Tamil press in Malaya, 
as well as a three-part travelogue by Daud Shah himself, of which however only the 
first part is pertinent to our discussion.54 Finally, I drew on the autobiography of A.N. 
Maideen (A.Nā. Meytīṉ), a former leading member of the Singapore Kadayanallur 
Muslim League (SKML), which, despite reflecting Maideen’s own biases and 
prejudices, is a valuable source for the lives of Tamil Muslim laborers and coolies in 
the 1920s and 30s that seem to be otherwise undocumented.55
The thesis is divided into five main chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 provide background 
information on Tamil Muslim society in Singapore, the former being concerned 
mainly with historical development, and the latter with contemporary social 
formations within this society, especially in comparison to India. Chapter 4 discusses 
                                                 
52 Cf. appendix 4. 
53 Buckley 1902. 
54 Tāvutṣā 1925. 
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various Tamil Muslim institutions, such as mosques and associations, which play a 
role in the religious life of Tamil Muslims in Singapore, and locates them against the 
wider background of the administration of Islam in the Republic. Chapter 5 deals with 
the most important aspect of ethnic difference for religious life, viz. language use, 
while Chapter 6 discusses the debates and discourses on ethnic difference in the 
religious domains and the contexts in which they arise. This is followed by the 












TAMIL MUSLIMS IN PRE-COLONIAL SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
Tamil-speaking Muslims had been in contact with the Malay world for several 
centuries prior to the founding of the British entrepôt on the island of Singapore in 
1819. South Indian Muslims are said to have played an important role in Malacca 
prior to the Portuguese conquest of the town in 1511.56 For the century-and-a-half 
following this event, we have little evidence for the involvement of Tamil-speaking 
Muslims in trade with Southeast Asia, but from the late 17th century onwards, there is 
copious evidence for the presence of Tamil Muslim traders from the Burmese coast in 
the north-west through the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra to Banten in West Java, and 
possibly beyond.57 During the 18th century, Kedah on the west coast of the Malay 
Peninsula and Aceh in northern Sumatra came to be important ports of call for 
Muslim merchants from the Coromandel Coast.58
                                                 
56 Fujimoto 1988: 11-8; McPherson 1990: 35-6. 
57 Arasaratnam 1987: 127-35. 
58 Arasaratnam 1987: 141-2; Bonney 1971: 10 n. 51, 41; Lee K.H. 1995: 11; all this evidence clearly 
disproves Tham’s statement that in the case of Indian Muslims, “…contact with the Malays is of a 
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It has become common in historical studies of Southeast Asia in the 18th century 
to refer to Tamil Muslims collectively as ‘Chulias’.59 Other terms in use include 
‘Kling’ and ‘Moor’, though especially the latter seems to be largely confined to 
Portuguese and Dutch sources. The use of such labels, invariably derived from 
European travelogues, letters, and other documents, is highly problematic, for several 
reasons. First, scant attention is paid to the particular background of the documents in 
which the term is used. As yet there seems to have been no study of any of these 
terms, and it is thus premature to conclude that a term used in Portuguese Malacca in 
the 16th century necessarily had the same meaning in English letters from Bencoolen 
in the 18th. Second, the use of such labels often tacitly assumes that there was a social 
reality behind the label, such as a shared identity among members of the group. 
Especially the term ‘Chulia’ has come to be identified with the Tamil term 
marakkāyar;60 yet, as we shall see in chapter 3, equating the two terms does not lead 
to more clarity, but rather to more terminological quicksand. 
There is no need to go into the details of the use of such labels here, and it will 
suffice to point to some of the inconsistencies in the use of the labels ‘Chulia’ and 
‘Kling’. It has been argued that ‘Chulia’ always refers to South Indian Muslims.61 Yet 
English sources of the early 19th century, among them documents regarding the 
founding of the English settlement in Singapore, seem to refer to both Hindus and 
Muslims when using the term ‘Chulia’.62 While other sources do equate ‘Chulia’ with 
Muslims,63 this usage of the term cannot be generalized. Similarly, some scholars 
have claimed that ‘Kling’ only referred to Hindus. This distinction has again been 
                                                 
59 Cf. Arasaratnam 1987; Bhattacharya 1999; McPherson 1990. 
60 Cf. Subrahmanyam 2001: 95. 
61 McPherson 1990: 44 n. 2. 
62 Cf. Buckley 1902 (vol. 1): 73, 83-6; Raffles [1830] 1991: 11-2; Wurtzburg 1954: 69; cf. also Lee’s 
statement that a certain ship belonged to “…some Chulia merchants from Nagore…”, while the 
owner’s name was Candapati Chitty, obviously a Hindu; Lee K.H. 1995: 160; 189 n. 39. 
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most rigorously made by McPherson, though it is difficult to see on what basis. In 
Portuguese Malacca, the term ‘Kling’ may have been used mainly for Hindus, but this 
would probably be due rather to the low numbers of Indian Muslim traders in that port 
in the 16th century rather than an a priori distinction.64 But the references to Muslim 
Klings are too numerous to assume that the term ever referred exclusively to 
Hindus.65 It is thus most probable that the terms ‘Kling’ and ‘Chulia’ were largely 
synonymous, and referred to people originating from the Coromandel Coast in 
general. 
The term ‘Kling’ actually derives from Malay, where it was used to label South 
Indians in general.66 While in many contexts the term refers to Tamils,67 it would be 
wrong to simply equate ‘Kling’ and ‘Tamil’, as is sometimes done.68 The term could 
refer as well to people from other parts of South India, especially the Telugu-speaking 
regions.69 Yet in contrast to Crawfurd’s assertion that “[b]eing the only Indian nation 
familiarly known to the nations of the Archipelago, the word [Kling] is used by them 
as a general term for all the people of Hindustan, and for the country itself”,70 Malays 
were aware of regional, ethnic and linguistic difference among Indians. The first 
Malay-English dictionary, published in 1701, lists three terms for Indians under the 
                                                 
64 McPherson 1990: 44 n. 2; cf. Bhattacharya 1999: 64 n. 7; yet according to Subrahmanyam, the 
Portuguese sources do apply both quelim, ‘Kling’, and mouro, ‘Moor’, to the same individual; 
Subrahmanyam 1999: 64.  
65 Cf. e.g. B.W. Andaya 1978: 21-3; Buckley 1902 (vol. 2): 645-6, 729; Fujimoto 1988: 30-1. Cf. also 
Yule & Burnell [1903] 1969: 487-90. 
66 In contrast, the term ‘Chulia’ does not seem to be used in Malay. That Marsden included it in his 
1812 dictionary is inconclusive, for it may have been borrowed into Malay from English by that time. 
In contrast, Bowrey’s dictionary of 1701 does not contain the term, even though Bowrey himself seems 
to have used it in his travelogue; Marsden [1812] 1984: 121, s.v. chūlīa; cf. Bowrey 1701; B.W. 
Andaya 1978: 51. 
67 E.g. when Munshi Abdullah writes that pali means ‘mosque’ in the Kling language (bahasa kĕling), 
paḷḷi being the Tamil word for mosque; Abdullah 1960: 9. In dealing with Munshi Abdullah’s text, I 
have used Hill’s translation (Abdullah 1970), but checked every passage against the Malay original, as 
Hill’s translation turns out to be highly unreliable. 
68 E.g., Hill translates kĕling in most cases as “Tamil”; cf. Abdullah 1970: 31. 
69 Marsden [1812] 1984 (vol. 1): 262, s.v. kling; cf. also Crawfurd [1856] 1971: 148-50, 198, 428, even 
though Crawfurd was rather ignorant of Indian ethnic groups. 
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heading Ōran (=orang): Ōran guzarattee, “a Surat Man”, Ōran hindoo, “an Indian”, 
and Ōran killing, “a Man of the Coast Chormandel”.71 Munshi Abdullah similarly was 
aware of Bengalis, Hindustanis, and possibly Gujaratis besides ‘Klings’.72
The main reason for the presence of South Indians in the Malay world was trade. 
According to Barbara Andaya, “…in Malay society in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
Muslim Indians…were not only the most numerous but also the most competent 
Asian traders…”.73 The main Indian product shipped to Southeast Asia was textiles, 
while among the goods procured by Indian merchants in the region, tin, elephants, and 
areca-nuts stand out.74 This trade brought them into direct conflict with European 
trading companies, but also opened up avenues of cooperation with these Western 
rivals. Europeans were ready to rent excess shipping capacity to Indian Muslim 
merchants, and also to transport the merchants themselves.75 If the Europeans 
provided Indian Muslims with shipping space and protection, Indian Muslims could 
provide Europeans with expertise of and links to Malay ports and courts. European 
traders often preferred to deal with Indian intermediaries, whose knowledge both of 
local society and languages as well as the court made them important contacts for 
foreigners,76 though this knowledge made them suspicious in the eyes of Europeans at 
the same time.77
Their economic expertise, knowledge of local conditions, and linguistic skills 
made Indian merchants not only attractive intermediaries for European traders, but 
also to the Malays themselves. This is most salient regarding the Indian dominance of 
                                                 
71 Bowrey 1701: s.v. Ōran guzarattee, Ōran hindoo, and Ōran killing. 
72 Abdullah 1960: 26-7, 31. 
73 B.W. Andaya 1978: 24. 
74 Cf. B.W. Andaya 1979: 22, 106-7, 402-3; L. Andaya 1975: 75-6; Arasaratnam 1987: 128; Lee K.H. 
1995: 203, 252.  
75 Arasaratnam 1987: 136-9; Lee K.H. 1995: 160-3. 
76 B.W. Andaya 1978: 25, 28; Lee K.H. 1995: 45-7; an example would be the Kling interpreter acting 
for the Dutch in Perak in the mid-18th century; B.W. Andaya 1979: 126-135. 
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the office of royal merchant or saudagar raja. Indian traders provided not only links 
to Europeans, but served to connect Malay rulers to India.78 Indians came to acquire 
property in Southeast Asia, and the 18th century chronicle of Perak, Misa Melayu, 
notes a Tamil Muslim who had a wife each in Perak and in the nĕgĕri Kĕling.79
While we are able to gain a differentiated picture of the economic activities of 
Indian Muslims in 18th century Southeast Asia, we know rather little of other aspects 
of their culture. Language was obviously an important component of Indian Muslim 
identity in Southeast Asia. Munshi Abdullah relates that he was sent by his father to 
study the Kling language “…because it had been the custom from the time of our 
forefathers in Malacca for all children of good and well-to-do families to learn it”.80 
Most Indian Muslims in Southeast Asia were obviously fluent in ‘Bazaar-Malay’, the 
lingua franca of the region.81 Bilingualism was certainly common among the 
descendants of Indian merchants. A late 18th century manuscript kept in the Leiden 
University Library (OR 7368), possibly from Sumatra, contains texts in both Tamil 
and Malay on Islamic creed and practices written apparently by the same person using 
the Arabic script.82 Even when they used Malay among themselves, Indian families 
continued using certain kinship terms. Munshi Abdullah’s father addressed his own 
mother as ācci, a term that can mean ‘elder sister’, but which is also used a term of 
respect for older women in general. That Abdullah was unaware of this latter 
meaning, but had to explain this term of address by relating that the age-difference 
between his father and grandmother was so small that people regarded them as 
                                                 
78 B.W. Andaya 1978: 25; Lee K.H. 1995: 31. 
79 Lee K.H. 1995: 45; Raja Chulan [1962] 1966: 78; that this ‘Kling’ was a Tamil is revealed by his 
name, Tambi Kĕchil, almost certainly a partial translation of the common Tamil Muslim ‘name’ 
Ciṉṉatampi, “Little Younger Brother”. 
80 Abdullah 1970: 45, Hill’s translation. 
81 Cf. Sneddon 2003: 84. 
82 Cf. van Ronkel 1921: 293-4 no. 754; I have to thank the staff at Leiden University Library for 
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siblings may be an indicator that Abdullah’s mother-tongue was Bazaar Malay rather 
than Tamil.83
If language may have separated Indian Muslims and Malays, their common 
religion was a uniting factor. Given the current state of research, there is little one can 
say about Islam as practiced by Tamil Muslims in Southeast Asia during the 17th-18th 
centuries, but the importance of Islam can be gauged from the fact that there were 
Tamils who converted only after their arrival in Southeast Asia.84 Nevertheless, the 
majority of Tamil Muslims in Southeast Asia during the 17th and 18th centuries will 
already have been Muslims before coming to the region. Some authors have actually 
argued that Tamils may have had a role in spreading Islam in Southeast Asia,85 but the 
evidence is inconclusive. It is more probable that similarities are due to the close 
contacts of Malay and Tamil Muslims during the 17th and 18th centuries rather than to 
a direct impetus to the Islamization of Insular Southeast Asia from South India, 
though this does not make such an impetus impossible. More research is needed 
before any conclusions can be drawn. 
Towards the end of the 18th century, the power of the native Malay states began to 
be finally eclipsed by European powers. The British takeover of Penang and 
establishment of the port of Georgetown on the island by Francis Light in 1786 
attracted a large number of ‘Chulia’ settlers and seasonal traders. In 1794, there were 
about 1000 permanently settled Chulias in Penang, and 1500-2000 seasonal traders 
and workers, most of whom were actually from Kedah.86 Tamil Muslims grew into an 
                                                 
83 Abdullah 1960: 14; it is highly improbable that Abdullah’s father called his mother ‘Achi’ as a 
shortened form of her ‘name’, Peri Achi, as suggested by Traill, as this would be considered as very 
rude among Tamils. Traill is further mistaken in claiming that ‘Achi’ means only ‘sister’ or ‘female 
relative’ in general; cf. Traill 1979: 73. The ‘question’ of Abdullah’s mother-tongue (Malay or Tamil) 
is resolved differently by different author’s; for Malay, cf. Sneddon 2003: 71; for Tamil, cf. Maier 
2004: 210; Traill 1979: 72-81; only Traill argues his case, but his argument is at best inconclusive. 
84 Cf. Abdullah 1960: 5; Abdullah 1970: 32. 
85 E.g. Drewes 1968. 
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important community in Penang, as is evident from the foundation of the Kapitan 
Kling Mosque in 1801, and the Nagore Dargah shortly afterwards.87 The settlement of 
South Indian Muslims in a port dominated by Europeans was of course not without 
precedent – many Klings had made Dutch Malacca their home. Yet with historical 
hindsight, the foundation of Penang foreshadowed the establishment of Singapore 
some 23 years later. 
 
TAMIL MUSLIMS IN SINGAPORE 1819-1942 
 
Demography and Origins 
It is not easy to give a coherent account of Tamil Muslim settlement and society in 
Singapore during the 123 years between the founding of British Singapore in 1819 
and the occupation of the island by Japanese forces in 1942. Despite the fact that 
sporadic censuses were taken right from the founding of the colony, and regularly 
every ten years from 1871 onwards, the Census Reports are of limited value for 
gaining insights on Tamil Muslim society in Singapore. The earliest censuses only 
count ‘Indians’ (or ‘Chuliahs’), without any further indication of ethnic or religious 
background.88 The census of 1871 introduced a basic distinction in South Indians 
(‘Klings’, called ‘Tamils’ from 1881 onwards) and North Indians (‘Bengalees’) that 
was kept up during the following censuses.89 In 1911, for the first and apparently only 
time, figures for individual Indian languages were provided. Despite shortcomings, 
this is perhaps the best information on the ethnic background of Indians in Singapore 
available. It amply demonstrates the dominance of Tamil-speakers among 
Singaporean Indians, with 19,378 Tamils among the 27,990 speakers of Indian (and 
                                                 
87 Fujimoto 1988: 27-39; Ghulam-Sarwar 1989: 34; cf. McPherson 1998: 203-5. 
88 Turnbull 1972: 22; Wurtzburg 1954: 589. 
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Iranian) languages in the Settlement of Singapore.90 In the censuses of 1921 and 1931, 
information on language was collected, but this information was not presented in the 
reports.91 Instead, the Census Reports favored again the inaccurate category of ‘race’, 
though at least for South Indians, ‘races’ were labeled according to language as 
Tamil, Telegu [sic], and Malayali.92
There is no need to go into the details of Indian migration and demography in the 
Straits Settlements, which have been described by Sandhu.93 The most important 
information for our purposes is that the Indian population of Singapore formed 
usually about 7.5-10% of the total population of prewar Singapore, and that Tamils 
where the dominant ethnic group among them, forming 69-79% of Singapore’s total 
Indian population between 1911 and 1931, for which years census-figures on Tamils 
are available.94
Unfortunately, the data on religion is even sketchier than the data on language and 
ethnicity. Religion was counted consistently only from 1911 onwards. Prior to this, 
information is available only from one of the sporadic earlier censuses, that of 1849. 
The data from this census is highly significant, for it shows that even thirty years after 
the foundation of Singapore, Indian Muslims clearly outnumbered their Hindu 
compatriots – of 6,261 Indians, 4,915, or 78.5%, were Muslims.95 Seventy years later, 
the situation had changed. In 1921, the 9,523 Indian Muslims formed almost 30% of 
the Indian population of Singapore, while the percentage was lower in 1931 (about 
26%), even though the absolute numbers rose to 13,330.96 There are no figures 
                                                 
90 Marriott 1911:  66-8. 
91 Cf. Nathan 1922: 383; Vlieland 1932: 27, 85. 
92 Cf. Vlieland 1932: 84. 
93 Sandhu 1969: 175-204. 
94 Cf. Innes 1901: 29; Marriott 1911: 66-8; Merewether 1892: 47; Nathan 1922: 190; Sandhu 1969: 200 
table 9; Straits Settlements 1871: 10; Straits Settlements 1881: 4; Vlieland 1932: 193. Apparently, the 
percentage of Indians in Singapore was slightly higher in the mid-19th century; cf. Turnbull 1972: 22. 
95 Jackson 1850: Table II. 
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available for the ethnic background of the Indian Muslims, but there is little doubt that 
Tamils will have been the largest community among them, given that Tamils even 
now form the largest ethnic group among Indian Muslims in Singapore. There is no 
way to determine the percentage, but it will probably have been lower than that for 
Tamils in the whole Indian community. 
Within Singapore, Tamil Muslims seem to have settled predominantly in the 
business districts, corresponding to Divisions A (the China Town-Tanjong Pagar area 
southwest of Cross Street), C (between Cross Street and the Singapore River), and G 
(between Middle Road and the Rochor Canal/River) of the 1891 census, to judge from 
the location of properties mentioned to be owned or held in interest by Tamil Muslims 
in the Law Reports (cf. appendix 1). While it is possible that this data is slightly 
distorted by the fact that most of the cases preserved in the Law Reports relate to 
merchants and are thus more likely to mention property in the business districts, it is 
confirmed by the location of endowments made by Tamil Muslims as well as the 
comments of Maideen.97 On the other hand, there is no evidence for the presence of 
Tamil Muslims in the rural divisions except for the last decades prior to the war. 
The Census Reports are of little help in elucidating the regional background of 
Tamil Muslims in Singapore, as they are limited to recording only the respective 
Presidency as place of birth, which in the case of most Indians in Singapore was 
unsurprisingly the Madras Presidency. According to Sandhu, the most important 
Districts for the recruitment of labor in Madras Presidency were North Arcot, 
Trichinopoly (Tiruchirapalli) and Tanjore (Thanjavur), and migrants from the first 
two districts also formed the largest contingent among South Indian migrants in 
                                                 
97 Cf. Ahmad 1965: 43-61; Meytīṉ 1989: 7, 13-4; cf. Merewether 1892: 52-88, see also map I & II; 
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general.98 Yet both evidence from prewar documents as well as later sources and 
currently existing kin-center associations allow us to form a clearer picture of the 
regional background of Tamil Muslims in Singapore. In principle, most hail from two 
regions – on the one hand, the coastal strip of South Arcot and Tanjore Districts from 
Kottakuppam near Pondicherry in the north to Muthupettai in the south, and on the 
other the Tenkasi Taluk of Tinnevelly (Tirunelveli) District (cf. appendix 2). 
In both cases, the reasons for the prominence of natives from these two regions 
among Tamil Muslims in prewar Singapore are fairly obvious. In the case of coastal 
Tanjore and South Arcot, seaborne trade was the central factor drawing Muslims from 
these regions to Singapore [Figure 1]. The District Gazetteer for Tanjore District of 
1906 supplies details for various goods traded between the District and the Straits 
Settlements. The most important among them were livestock, cotton and silk piece-
goods, and tobacco. The principal imports from the Straits Settlements were areca-
nuts and undyed cloth, which was then dyed and re-exported.99 Cattle were largely 
shipped through two ports, Nagapattinam and Thopputhurai.100 The Muslims of 
Nagore are depicted as an important business community, which imported pearls and 
rubies from the Gulf of Mannar and Burma, had them polished and re-exported them 
to the Straits. They also exported scents, and their women manufactured betel-boxes 
for export to the Straits. Furthermore, native firms at Nagore are said to have been in 
control of the areca-nut trade.101 Similarly, in South Arcot certain sections of the 
Muslim population were said to be “…largely big traders with other countries, such as 
                                                 
98 Sandhu 1969: 161, 164 fig. 10. Arasaratnam also mentions Madura (Madurai) District, but this is not 
borne out clearly by Sandhu’s figures; Arasaratnam 1979: 15. 
99 Cf. Hemingway [1906] 2000 (vol. 1): 130-2. 
100 Hemingway [1906] 2000 (vol. 1): 117, 130-1, 284; cf. ibid. (vol. 2): 52-4; Mani 1992: 345; there is 
apparently a mosque in Thopputhurai called Malākkā Paḷḷi (Malacca Mosque), indicating longstanding 
links with Southeast Asia; Muhammatu Meytīṉ 1989/90: 23. 
101 Hemingway [1906] 2000 (vol. 1): 126, 129-31, 243; cf. also Hemingway 1907: 167-9; Syed 
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Ceylon and the Straits Settlements…”,102 exporting tartan cloths to the Straits and 
importing areca-nuts through ports like Cuddalore and Porto Novo.103  
 
Figure 1: Colonial-period mansion of a Tamil Muslim merchant in Karaikal (Photo: Torsten 
Tschacher) 
 
Muslim traders from Tanjore and South Arcot Districts seem to have formed a rather 
unstable community in Singapore, in so far as most of these traders did not settle 
permanently in the city. Their movements were ‘circulatory’ in the way the term has 
been used recently by Markovits and others, as trade was conducted by kinship 
networks with one member of a family replacing a kinsman in Singapore when the 
latter returned to India.104 Most of these traders were single men,105 though this does 
not mean that the local Tamil Muslims were not married – on the contrary, many of 
                                                 
102 Francis 1906: 86; cf. also ibid.: 165. 
103 Francis 1906: 157, 163-4. 
104 Cf. Markovits, Pouchepadass & Subrahmanyam 2003: 2-3. The role of such kinship networks in the 
migration to and setting-up of businesses in the Straits Settlements is amply illustrated by a case 
decided in 1941; S.S.L.R. 1941-2: 281-6. 
105 In 1921, most Indian Muslims in Singapore were men, the percentage of Indian Muslim women in 
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them had wives living in India,106 or had married women from among the Malay 
population, and occasionally a wealthy individual had both Indian and local wives.107
In many regards, the Muslims from Tinnevelly District present a contrast to their 
compatriots from Tanjore and South Arcot. Their contacts with Singapore and 
Southeast Asia had been indirect at best prior to the early 20th century. Whereas the 
coastal Muslims were engaged in trade, those from the western parts of Tinnevelly 
District were largely weavers. Muslim weaving centers developed mainly in the ‘wet 
zone’ along the river Tambraparni, close to the trade route that connected the Fishery 
Coast with southern Kerala.108 Over time, a system evolved where the richer Muslim 
capitalists and merchants, based in the towns of Melappalaiyam and Pettai close to 
Tirunelveli town, advanced yarn and the warp to weavers in various towns of the 
district, and then arranged for the export of the finished piece-goods.109 Until the early 
19th century, the industry flourished, but by the early 20th century only the large 
investments of a small class of investors insured some viability and profits.110
                                                 
106 Cf. S.S.L.R. 1928: 96-7; S.S.L.R. 1940: 250; Tamil Muslims at times returned to India specifically 
to get married; S.S.L.R. 1895-6: 25. 
107 One of my respondents told that his grandfather had had two Tamil wives in Nagore and two Malay 
wives in Singapore. This is also evident in some court cases; cf. e.g. S.S.L.R. 1937: 48. Daud Shah also 
severely criticized his countrymen in Malaya for taking temporary Malay wives or even concubines for 
the time they were in Malaya while their family in India suffered; Tāvutṣā 1925: 342-3; cf. also Syed 
Mohamed 1973: 46, 96. Chan’s claim that polygamy was not widely accepted among Muslims in 
Singapore is thus difficult to maintain for Indian Muslims and their ‘transnational’ polygamy; cf. Chan 
2003: 63-4. 
108 Cf. Subrahmanyam 1990: 78-81. 
109 The Muslim shop-keepers of Melappalaiyam, said by the District Gazetteer to spend most of their 
time in cities such as Singapore, Penang or Rangoon, present a clear contrast in migration patterns to 
the poorer weavers of the District; cf. Pate 1917 (vol. 1): 485. 
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Figure 2: Street in Tenkasi (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
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Tenkasi and Kadayanallur were two of the more important Muslim weaving towns, 
both displaying the typical features of weaving settlements in the district, “[w]ide 
streets lined with double rows of trees to give shade to the workers at the long line of 
outstretched warp…” [Figures 2-4].111 In both towns, cloth was produced that was 
exported to the Straits Settlements, Ceylon, and Kerala, and a specific variety of 
checkered cloth produced by Muslim weavers was even known as ‘Singapore 
Cloth’.112 Men were engaged in weaving or in the even less profitable tasks of dying, 
bleaching and washing the cloth, while women also engaged in wage-labor in addition 
to doing household chores and collecting firewood. The staple food was millet gruel, 
with rice being eaten only twice a week. Conditions worsened after World War I, 
when famine struck the district. It was under these circumstances that many weavers 
decided to follow their products and move to the Straits Settlements.113
 
Figure 4: Old houses in Kadayanallur (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
                                                 
111 Pate 1917 (vol. 1): 215. In Kadayanallur, the trees are largely gone, but the long straight roads 
remain. 
112 Pate 1917 (vol. 1): 216-7, 458-9, 467-9. 
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While their occupational and regional background set these migrants apart from the 
Muslim traders of the coastal regions, it was the pattern of migration that marked the 
greatest difference between the two groups in Singapore. In contrast to the circulatory 
movement of Tamil Muslim traders, the weavers of Tinnevelly District usually 
migrated as families and settled down permanently in their new homes.114 This made 
their communities more stable in the long run, and incidentally may have served to 
strengthen a Tamil identity, as intermarriage with Malays would have been less 
frequent.115
 
Figure 5: View of the town of Thuckalay (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
Apart from these two larger regional groupings, Muslims from other parts of the 
Tamil-speaking regions settled in Singapore during the prewar period. Tamil Muslims 
who were already settled in Southeast Asia seem to have moved to Singapore in the 
                                                 
114 There were instances of single male migrants at least from Kadayanallur, many of whom returned to 
India after some time. Incidentally, the Singapore evidence modifies Mines’s assertion that “Tamil 
Muslim merchants migrate as family units”, and that “[m]igration of single males is associated largely 
with poverty…”; Mines 1976: 301. There were many rich single migrants, while the poorer Tinnevelly 
migrants often came with their families; cf. also Syed Mohamed 1973: 38-9; 120-1. 




CHAPTER 2: HISTORY 
early decades, yet such migrants are not prominent in the record, perhaps because 
they tended to ‘Malayize’.116 The connections of Tamil Muslims in Pulicat to the 
Straits Settlements were noted in a publication of 1923.117 In addition, Tamil Muslim 
migrants also seem to have come from the Muslim towns on the Fishery Coast. Pate 
mentions that traders from Kayalpattinam as well as the inland town of 
Melappalaiyam went to trade in the Straits Settlements, who would have been very 
similar to those from the Tanjore coastal areas in occupation and migratory 
patterns.118 Regarding the town of Kilakkarai, Thurston quotes one authority to the 
effect that “…a large proportion of the Musalmans of Kilakarai have visited Penang 
and Singapore”.119 Finally, the establishment of the Thuckalay Muslim Association in 
1939 and the Thiruvithancode Muslim Union in 1952 marks the modern-day 
Kanniyakumari District, then part of Travancore State, as another area from which 
Tamil Muslims migrated to Singapore [Figure 5].120
 
Economic Activities 
In order to make their living, Tamil Muslims in prewar Singapore engaged in a 
variety of economic activities. Most of these activities can be subsumed under the 
categories of shipping, trade, and unskilled labor.121 It is important to note that these 
categories are not clearly delineated from each other, but rather form a triangular 
                                                 
116 Abdullah 1960: 292; regarding the similar situation in Penang, cf. Fujimoto 1988: 35; Lee K.H. 
1995: 235 n. 29. 
117 Quoted in Pandian 1978: 149; cf. Mariam 1989: 103 n. 96. 
118 Pate 1917 (vol. 1): 99, 485. 
119 Quoted in Thurston 1909 (vol. 3): 201. Kin-center associations have recently been registered for 
both Kilakkarai and Kayalpattinam. 
120 Cf. Mani 1992: 345; interviews held by me in Thuckalay in March 2005 suggest that most migrants 
from this town worked in food-related businesses such as canteens, a branch of trade common among 
both Tamil as well as Malayali Muslims; the same seems to have been true for people from 
Thiruvithancode; Syed Mohamed 1973: 52. 
121 In 1890, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ distinguished trade, professional employment, and menial work as the typical 
occupations of all Tamils; cf. “Ciṅkappūril nayamuṇṭā? (Ceṉṟavārat toṭarcci.) Viyāpāramakattuvam”, 
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space that defines the range of occupations engaged in by Tamil Muslims. Shipping 
and trade often went hand in hand in this period; many of the more menial tasks 
related to shipping, such as unloading cargoes, were typical occupations of unskilled 
laborers; finally, laborers often augmented their income by petty peddling and 
hawking, thus forming a kind of ‘business proletariat’; employees in shops aspired to 
become independent shop-keepers themselves.122 Individuals could engage in various 
activities, shifting between these separate but interrelated spheres. A good impression 
of occupations among well-to-do Tamil Muslims in Singapore can be gained from 
lists of subscribers for the Tamil newspaper Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ published in 1887 (cf. 
appendix 3). The majority of the 57 Muslim subscribers from Singapore were 
engaged in trade. Especially conspicuous are cloth-traders, money-changers, cattle-
traders, as well as gem-traders and keepers of provision-stores. The remainder 
consists of clerks, agents, and peons, as well as a few skippers and pilots of light 
native vessels. 
Given what we know about Tamil Muslim interaction with Southeast Asia, their 
engagement in shipping is hardly surprising. As has been mentioned above, Indian 
Muslims had played an important role in shipping between India and Southeast Asia. 
There is enough evidence that this situation continued well into the 19th century. On 
7th of June 1823, Raffles wrote to the new Resident of Singapore, John Crawfurd, that 
piracy in the Straits of Malacca had become so frequent “…that the square-rigged 
vessels of the Chuliahs…are…precluded from coming further than Pinang or Achin, 
and thus the trade of fifty or sixty brigs and ships are [sic]…lost to Singapore…”.123 A 
number of court-cases throughout the 19th century show the involvement of Tamil 
                                                 
122 Cf. Syed Mohamed 1973: 111. 
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Muslims in shipping as owners, captains, and officers of trading vessels.124 The 
majority of these cases are from Penang, yet it is clear that ships owned and manned 
by Tamil Muslims also went to Singapore.125 It seems that the crews of ships under 
the command of such captains largely consisted of Tamil Muslims, too. Buckley 
mentions a race of Malay sampans manned by “Kling boatmen” in Singapore in 1839, 
and Muslim ‘Kling’ boatmen were commonly mentioned in The Singapore Free 
Press.126
In the late 19th century, references to Tamil Muslim overseas shipping become 
scarce.127 The opening of the Suez Canal and the increase in steam-shipping in the 
Indian Ocean may have been the single most important cause of this decline.128 Yet 
despite this decline in overseas shipping, we still see Tamil Muslims involved in 
shipping business on a more modest scale, viz. as lightermen, wharfingers, and 
owners of cargo-boats. In Singapore, there is considerable evidence for Tamil 
Muslims owning and letting out cargo-boats and tongkangs.129
The importance of mercantile activities in the economic profile of Tamil Muslims 
in Singapore is hardly surprising, too, given their historical trajectories in Southeast 
Asia in earlier centuries. We are able to get a glimpse at the range of commodities 
traded by Tamil Muslims from contemporary sources. Trade in cloth had been a 
mainstay of Tamil Muslim commercial activities since the 18th century.130 In 1855, a 
Malay resident of Singapore complained about the fraudulent practices at “…the cloth 
                                                 
124 Kyshe 1885: 64-5, 350-1, 467-8; Leicester 1877: 237-9; cf. also Fujimoto 1988: 57. 
125 Cf. Kyshe 1885: 350-2. 
126 Buckley 1902 (vol. 1): 332; “Criminal Session”, The Singapore Free Press, 3 May 1866; “Local”, 
The Singapore Free Press, 17 May 1866; “Local”, The Singapore Free Press, 7 Jun 1866. 
127 The case of a Tamil Muslim being involved in a dispute about the insurance of a ship in 1940 is 
exceptional; S.S.L.R. 1940: 173-6. 
128 Buckley 1902 (vol. 2): 723-4. In India, Tamil Muslims became involved in steam-shipping as agents 
of the British India Steam Navigation Company; cf. More 1997: 37. 
129 “Local”, The Singapore Free Press, 11 Oct 1866; S.S.L.R. 1928: 45-52; S.S.L.R. 1937: 260-3; in 
the first case, the owner may have been a Hindu; cf. Dobbs 2003: 38-43. 
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shops of the Klings…”, where simple Malays and Bugis were tricked into buying 
low-quality cloths in near darkness.131 Whereas these shops seem to have been rather 
small, the “…wholesale and retail cloth-shop business…” of Ahna Mohamed Hussain 
& Co. was a substantial enterprise.132 The firm obviously had fairly long-standing 
contacts with Bali, to judge from the fact that in 1905 a representative of the firm 
collected a debt of $3,218.80 from that island. After the shop burned down in 1905 
the assets and outstanding book debts of the business still realized $34,666.133
 
Figure 6: Part of the mansion of 'Cattle King' Kader Sultan in Still Road (Photo: Torsten 
Tschacher) 
 
Cattle-traders were similarly common among Singaporean Tamil Muslims. In the 
1920s, two cattle-traders appeared as witnesses in the trial of the Singapore Muslim 
                                                 
131 Buckley 1902 (vol. 2): 626-7. 
132 S.S.L.R. 1929: 3; cf. S.S.L.R. 1928: 83. 
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Libel Case.134 The proceedings of this case also contain a picture of what may have 
been the richest Tamil Muslim livestock-merchant in Singapore at that time – Moona 
Kader Sultan from Karaikal in French India, still known to locals as ‘Cattle King’ or 
‘Mutton King’, who imported cattle not only from India, but also from Australia. 
Kader Sultan had established the ‘Straits Cattle Trading Co.’ in 1912, and by 1921 
dominated the cattle trade in the Serangoon Road area [Figure 6]. During the 1920s, 
Tamil Muslims seem to have controlled the cattle trade to a considerable extent, 
though this dominance does not seem to have lasted into the 1930s, at least in Little 
India.135 Traders in other commodities, such as tobacco and areca-nut, are also 
mentioned in the sources, though their trade was obviously more circumscribed than 
that of the cloth- and cattle-merchants.136
Tamil Muslims not only shipped commodities between India and Singapore, they 
also had their own shops in the city.137 In 1843, complaints were voiced about Klings 
blocking the verandahs with their goods in many places. Maideen mentions a variety 
of shops owned by Tamil Muslims, such as money-changers, general merchandize 
stores, groceries, and “knife-shops” (kattikaṭai), selling everything “…from cloth to 
fragrant oils…”, but being called “knife-shops” on account of dealing in all kinds of 
penknives.138 A Tamil Muslim operated a shop selling “…piece-goods, provisions and 
general merchandize” at Woodlands Road in the late 1930s, employing a salesman 
and a cook.139 Another author mentions shops selling books, stationary items, or 
medicine.140 Tamil Muslims were also active in gastronomy, running small cafés and 
                                                 
134 Mallal 1928: 60-4, 129-30. 
135 Mallal 1928: vii; Syed Mohamed 1973: 95; Siddique & Puru Shotam 1982: 58, 77. 
136 For tobacco, see S.S.L.R. 1928: 19; for areca-nuts, see S.S.L.R. 1898-9: 54-7; cf. also Meytīṉ 1989: 
8. 
137 Tyabji lists a range of businesses run by Tamil Muslims today, which seem to be in general 
agreement with the prewar situation; Tyabji 1991b: 59-60. 
138 Meytīṉ 1989: 7. 
139 S.S.L.R. 1941-2: 282; cf. also S.S.L.R. 1940: 250. 
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food-outlets, such as the Madras Café at North Bridge Road, whose owner ran afoul 
the law for permitting prostitutes to frequent his café.141 At the lower end of the scale 
of shops were small food- and cigarette-stalls, operating on a rather modest level.142
 The business activities and financial situation of Tamil Muslim traders oblige us 
to address the question of continuities and discontinuities in the patterns of Tamil 
Muslim activity in Southeast Asia. Some scholars have argued that the 19th century 
marks the end of successful Tamil Muslim trade in Southeast Asia and the beginning 
of a period when “…Indian immigrants were almost exclusively labourers and petty 
traders…”.143 I contend that this negative assessment is highly problematic and 
methodologically unsound. Firstly, much of the argument is supported by comparing 
the Singaporean evidence exclusively with a few politically influential ‘merchants of 
standing’ of the 18th century;144 these were exceptional cases to start with, and were 
always a tiny minority among a much larger number of less affluent compatriots.145 
Secondly, the claims are not firmly based on documentary evidence. Thus the 1849 
census quoted by Turnbull mentions only 17 Indian merchants out of 4,937 Indian 
professionals in Singapore, but the percentage of merchants among the Indians was 
not much lower than among the Chinese (0.34% against 0.4%).146 Other evidence 
suggests that Indian Muslims did play an economically important role. As mentioned, 
Raffles himself noted the losses Singapore incurred because Chulia ships avoided 
Singapore for fear of piracy. In a report of 1824, Resident Crawfurd called Klings 
“…respectable as traders”, and affluent Tamil Muslims are mentioned occasionally in 
                                                 
141 S.S.L.R. 1933: 518-20. 
142 E.g. S.S.L.R. 1940: 181-3; cf. also Syed Mohamed 1973: 87-8, 95-6, 113-6. 
143 Turnbull 1972: 8; cf. B.W. Andaya 1978: 34; McPherson 1990: 44; More 1997: 37. 
144 Turnbull 1972: 8; cf. B.W. Andaya 1978. 
145 Cf. the remarks by William Petrie, Governor of Penang, that the Chulias settled in Kedah were 
“…all shopkeepers and Coolies…”; quoted in Lee K.H. 1995: 235 n. 29. 
146 The census actually lumps merchants together with clerks, which prohibits drawing general 
conclusions from the figures. It should also be noted that the majority (42.8%) of Indians appear in the 
‘miscellaneous’ section, precluding us from gaining a clear picture of economic activity at this time; 
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mid-19th century sources.147 Finally, the presence in the early 20th century of wealthy 
Tamil Muslim cloth-merchants is better interpreted as a case of continuity, rather than 
revival after an assumed rupture. An individual like Kader Sultan exhibits some 
parallels with the royal merchants of the 18th century, in that his influence did not 
only extend over a specific economic niche, but also into social and religious affairs – 
he was patron of the Anjuman-i-Islam, a religious association, and a Chevalier de la 
légion d’honneur, i.e. he held the highest civilian honor of France.148 Similarly, Kader 
Sultan’s influential position, like that of his 18th century predecessors, was not taken 
over by a family member or similar heir, suggesting a peculiar continuity in 
discontinuity.149
All in all, it thus seems to be exaggerated to claim that Tamil Muslims 
“…vanished as an economic force in the Malay peninsula”.150 What seems to have 
changed primarily was their relative standing vis-à-vis other ethnic communities, 
rather than the scope and character of their business-ventures per se. There is no doubt 
that Europeans and Chinese were able to wrest a considerable share of trade from 
Tamil Muslims. The main limitation of 19th and early 20th century Tamil Muslim 
business activity in Singapore seems to have been the failure to come to terms with 
European business practices which now dominated the mercantile sphere.151 This may 
have put Tamil Muslim traders at a disadvantage. An at least partial explanation for 
the peculiar patterns of Tamil Muslim business activity in Southeast Asia, which is 
marked by a general continuity as far as the range and kind of economic activities is 
                                                 
147 Buckley 1902 (vol. 1): 154; “Local”, The Singapore Free Press, 16 Aug 1866. 
148 Mallal 1928: vii; cf. www.legiondhonneur.fr [accessed on 16 September 2005]. 
149 Cf. B.W. Andaya 1978: 30-1; Bes 2001: 557-8; Shulman & Subrahmanyam 1993: 518-9; Siddique 
& Puru Shotam 1982: 77. 
150 McPherson 1990: 44. 
151 European judges often made dismissive comments in court on Tamil Muslim trade as well as on the 
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concerned, but which rarely shows any generational continuity, may be provided by 
patterns of inheritance. The Law Reports contain ample evidence of conflicts about 
inheritance, pitting kin versus non-kin, different branches of a family versus each 
other, and administrators versus beneficiaries.152 The constant redistribution of shares 
in firms and immovable property was certainly not conducive to allow a business 
being carried on over generations. Yet the capital was not lost, but rather applied by 
the heirs and beneficiaries for their own purposes and business ventures in Singapore 
and elsewhere. 
At the same time, it should not be forgotten that many Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore made their living not by trade, but by performing various jobs in the 
employment of others. The British town-planners seem to have foreseen a largely 
servile Indian population – the ‘Chuliah Campong’ was to be at a location “…where 
their services are most likely to be called for”,153 and a “…Chuliah and Dhoby 
encampment near the Sepoy Lines…” was removed in 1823.154 The boundary 
between boatmen and dockworkers will have been porous, and the “…noisy 
Klings…” who manned the cargo-boats would have also loaded and unloaded the 
cargo.155 In 1849, laborers made up almost 40% of all working Indians, many of 
whom must have been Muslims.156 Another apparently quite common occupation for 
Tamils, Hindus and Muslims alike, was that of syce, i.e. a groom looking after draft-
horses.157 Several Tamil Muslim syces are mentioned on the pages of the Free Press 
                                                 
152 All these tensions are aptly demonstrated in a series of litigations concerning the inheritance of 
Ahna Mohamed Hussain; S.S.L.R. 1928: 82-97; S.S.L.R. 1929: 3-22; S.S.L.R. 1931: 55-7; S.S.L.R. 
1931: 118-29. 
153 Quoted in Buckley (vol. 1): 85. 
154 Quoted in Buckley (vol. 1): 86. 
155 Buckley (vol. 1): 312. 
156 Jackson 1850: Table II. 
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in 1866 alone.158 Indeed, the owners of carriages were frequently Indians as well.159 
Indians were also employed as servants. 8.41% of all working Indians made their 
living in this way in 1849,160 and it is likely that this will have included Muslims, 
such as ‘Butler Mastan’, the butler of the governor of Singapore in the 1870s, who is 
said to have been from Mutlur.161 Already during the 19th century, Tamils worked as 
office peons. They were apparently so common that the Free Press simply spoke 
about the “office Tamby”,162 and there were peons among the police and the courts 
who may have been Tamil Muslims.163 Straddling the boundary between unskilled 
worker and trader were those Tamil Muslims who were employed as salesmen in the 
shops of others.164
The migrants that arrived from Tinnevelly District in the early 20th century took 
up many of the occupations that their compatriots had been engaged in before. Men 
found employment as laborers in the harbor, in warehouses, and at construction 
sites.165 Though Maideen does not mention it, some respondents mentioned that their 
forefathers also worked as peons in offices. Few men from the region seem to have 
engaged in any trade apart from hawking,166 yet women over thirty years of age 
ground and sold spices to shops, restaurants, and private homes. Women had 
contributed to the family income already back in India; despite the importance of their 
                                                 
158 “Local”, The Singapore Free Press, 28 Jun 1866; “Local”, The Singapore Free Press, 16 Aug 1866; 
“Criminal Session”, The Singapore Free Press, 11 Oct 1866; cf. also Kyshe 1885: 201. 
159 Cf. Buckley 1902 (vol. 1): 364. 
160 Jackson 1850: Table II; cf. “Local”, The Singapore Free Press, 16 Aug 1866; S.S.L.R. 1893: 6-7. 
161 Syed Mohamed 1973: 45-6. 
162 “The case which…”, The Singapore Free Press, 8 Feb 1866. 
163 Supplement to the Singapore Free Press, 26 Apr 1866; S.S.L.R. 1893: 7; a few Tamils seem to have 
worked as translators and clerks for the British courts and lawyers in the 19th century, as has already 
been mentioned with regard to the Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ subscribers. Most notorious among these clerks was 
the homicide Hajee Saffer Ally and his similarly delinquent son Akbar Ally; Buckley (vol. 2): 557-9; a 
certain Dubash Mohamed mentioned in 1866 may also have been a Tamil; cf. “Criminal Session”, The 
Singapore Free Press, 19 Apr 1866. 
164 E.g. a certain Mahomad Gouse in Supplement to the Singapore Free Press, 10 May 1866; cf. also 
S.S.L.R. 1941-2: 282. 
165 Meytīṉ 1989: 4-7. 
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contribution to the family income, their work was a source of embarrassment to their 
husbands.167 On the whole, the occupations engaged in by Tinnevelly Muslims were 
not uncommon among Tamil Muslims in Singapore, even though Tinnevelly Muslims 
were only marginally involved in mercantile activities. The main differences between 
them and those from the coastal areas were in the spheres of kinship and settlement 
patterns rather than occupation. 
 
Religious Life and Activities 
The sources do not only reveal something about the economic standing of Tamil 
Muslims in colonial Singapore, but also about their religious institutions and 
activities. Probably the central institution for any Muslim society is the mosque. 
While the nature of Islamic ritual prayer leaves little room for the articulation of 
ethnic or linguistic difference, other mosque-related activities, such as sermons and 
religious education, require the use of language for communication. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that many mosques in colonial Singapore had a quite clearly defined 
ethnic character. At least seven mosques were founded by Tamils in the prewar 
period: the Masjid Jamae (Chulia) (est. 1826-27), the Masjid Al-Abrar (est. 1827), the 
original mosque on the site where the Masjid Malabar is located nowadays (est. after 
1848), the Masjid Abdul Gafoor (est. 1859), the mosque of Kampong Payah Goyang 
(est. before 1899),168 the Masjid Kassim (est. before 1919), and the Masjid Khadijah 
(est. 1920).169 Other mosques at least included Tamils among their founders, such as 
                                                 
167 Meytīṉ 1989: 4, 9-10, 15-6; it is telling that Maideen does not consider the peddling of spices or 
hawking when claiming that Kadayanallurians only rarely engaged in trade; ibid.: 8. 
168 I have no information where this mosque may have been located, or whether it still exists; cf. 
Ahmad 1965: 56-7.  
169 Dates of establishment refer to the construction of a mosque at the site, not to the construction of the 
present building or the establishment of endowments supporting the mosques; cf. Ahmad 1965: 43-61; 
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the Coronation Road Mosque (est. 1905, nowadays Masjid Al-Huda) and the Masjid 
Mydin (est. 1935), or may have included Tamils among its congregation, such as the 
Masjid Bencoolen (est. 1845).170
 
Figure 7: The Masjid Jamae (Chulia) in South Bridge Road (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
That the majority of mosques founded by Tamils in the period were shāfi‘ī mosques 
suggests that adherents of this law-school were the majority among Tamil Muslims in 
colonial Singapore. The first, and apparently only, ḥanafī mosque founded by Tamil 
Muslims was the Masjid Abdul Gafoor, though ḥanafī Tamil Muslims will likely have 
frequented other non-Tamil ḥanafī mosques like the Masjid Bencoolen, and are 
sometimes mentioned in the Law Reports.171
Some of these mosques are still perceived as ‘Indian’ mosques today, as will be 
discussed in chapter 4. Particularly the Masjid Jamae (Chulia) seems to have been 
seen as a Tamil mosque [Figure 7]: when in 1887 the front part of the mosque had 
                                                 
170 Cf. Ahmad 1965: 47, 53-4, 59-60; regarding the ethnic composition of the Masjid Bencoolen’s 
congregation, see chapter 4. 
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become so decrepit that it threatened to collapse, the newspaper Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ 
published an appeal, pointing out that the mosque was a site “…for our Kling 
Muslims…” and that “…our Muslims…” frequented this mosque above all others.172 
This does not mean, of course, that only Tamils prayed in this mosque; an Arab 
staying in ‘Campong Malacca’ was noted to pray at the ‘Kling Musjid’ in 1865.173
At least the bigger mosques were also endowed with properties for their upkeep, 
and had a body of trustees attached to them that were supposed to manage the 
expenses of the mosques.174 The performance of these trustees was open to criticism, 
and disputes over the management of mosques seem to have been not uncommon. A 
reader’s letter of 1887 published in connection with the decrepit condition of the 
Masjid Jamae (Chulia) criticized the conduct of earlier managements, and seems to 
suggest that at the time of writing, there were actually two bodies of managers, the 
members of the ‘Panchayat’ (pañcāyattār) and the ‘trustee-attorneys’ (tiraṣṭi 
okkīlkārar).175 It has already been mentioned that Indian Muslim trustees and 
administrators had a low reputation in the eyes of the British, and it comes as no 
surprise that by 1965, of six endowments that had been taken over by the Mahomedan 
and Hindu Endowment Board due to ‘mismanagement’, five were endowments made 
by Tamil Muslims.176 Among these five endowments are the Jamae Mosque 
Endowment, which covers not only the Masjid Jamae (Chulia) but also the Masjid Al-
Abrar and the Nagore Durgah, and the Gafoor Endowment. Thus all important 
mosques frequented by Tamils came to be under the control of the government. 
                                                 
172 “Cavuttu piriṭciṟōṭ kuttupāp paḷḷivāyilaippaṟṟiya potuviṣayam”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 15 Aug 1887: 29; cf. 
also “Cavuttu piriṭciṟōṭ kuttupāp paḷḷivāyilaippaṟṟiya potuviṣayam”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 22 Aug 1887: 33; 
Tiṇṇappaṉ 1999: 226-7. 
173 “On the 15th instant…”, The Singapore Free Press, 21 Dec 1865. 
174 Cf. Ahmad 1965: 41-61 for details on the endowments. 
175 Cf. “Periyappaḷḷivāyil”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 29 Aug 1887: 40. 
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But the mosque and congregational prayer were not the only elements of the 
religious life of Tamil Muslims in colonial Singapore. The author of the 1887 reader’s 
letter on the Masjid Jamae (Chulia) conjured up an image of the mosque “…as an 
abode for those who worship God (praised is He and exalted), for those who make 
dhikr, for those who engage in other religious acts, for the scholars and savants,177 and 
for the ascetic178 fakirs…”.179 This may partly have been an idealized description, but 
there is no doubt that there was more to the religious life of Singapore’s Tamil 
Muslims in the late 19th century than a few mosques frequented by traders and 
shopkeepers. 
‘Popular’ religious practices are fairly well documented in the sources, which is 
slightly surprising as such practices often tend to be underrepresented in historical 
evidence. One such practice is ritual feasting, known as kantūri in Tamil and kĕnduri 
in Malay. The term derives from a Persian term for tablecloth, but has since come to 
refer to feasts given on various religiously significant occasions. In South India, it is 
mainly feasts given on the occasion of the holiday of a saint or the birthday of the 
Prophet that are called kantūri, and often the term is employed to denote the holiday 
as such, which is more generally known by the Arabic term ‘urs.180 In the Malay 
world, in contrast, also feasts given on life-cycle events like circumcision, marriage, 
death, or the commemoration of the deceased are referred to as kĕnduri.181 It was the 
more inclusive Malay definition that was apparently also adopted by many Indian 
Muslims in Singapore, as is evident both from contemporary sources as well as the 
statements of my respondents. 
                                                 
177 The letter has ālī mulamākkaḷukkum, “…for the ‘ālims and ‘ulamā’s…”, apparently being ignorant 
that ‘ulamā’ is simply the plural of ‘ālim. 
178 paratēciyākiya could also be translated as ‘foreign’, ‘traveling’, or ‘begging’. 
179 “Periyappaḷḷivāyil”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 29 Aug 1887: 40. 
180 Bayly 1989: 143-7; McGilvray 2004: 277 n. 9, 281-2; Shu‘ayb 1993: 70-3; 736-9. 
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Our main sources for the practice of feasting are remarkably the Law Reports. 
Some Muslims had included clauses in their wills that created trusts in order to pay 
for an annual feast, usually in their own honor and on the day of their death. As these 
trusts were established for perpetuity, the British judges felt compelled to decide 
whether the trusts were charitable, as only charitable trusts could be established for 
perpetuity. Following a decision taken in Penang in 1871, the courts generally came 
to regard these feasts as not charitable, and declared the establishing of trusts for them 
to be void.182 Many of these cases were decided in Penang and may have involved 
Jawi-Peranakan, i.e. Muslims of mixed Indian-Malay parentage, rather than Tamils, 
but at least two cases from Singapore suggest that feasts for commemorating the dead 
were also “…a pious custom among Mohammedans” of Indian extraction, too, even 
though the feasts are not called kantūri in these cases.183
In all likelihood, feasts in honor of important saints were also part of the religious 
practices of Tamil Muslims in Singapore. In December 1887, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ reported 
about the feast at the birthday celebrations of the Prophet and noted the upcoming 
kantūris of ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī and Shāh al-Ḥamīd of Nagore. The next two years, 
it recorded the celebration of ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī’s kantūri, and noted the 
distribution of food (aṉṉatāṉam) in the ceremonies of 1889.184 A will of a Tamil 
Muslim from Penang contained detailed instructions for the staging of three annual 
feasts in honor of the Prophet, ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, and Shāh al-Ḥamīd without 
calling them kantūris. By that time, the British had already grown accustomed to 
consider only feasts commemorating the dead to be kantūris, and the judge thus 
                                                 
182 Kyshe 1885: 269; cf. also ibid.: 580-1; Kyshe 1890: 212-3. 
183 S.S.L.R. 1911: 79-80; S.S.L.R. 1941-2: 286 [source of quote]. 
184 “Mavulitu”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 12 Dec 1887: 98; “Ciṅkappūr”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 10 Dec 1888: 90; 
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permitted the trust as a charity of the advancement of religion, explicitly denying that 
the ceremonies constituted kantūris.185
Saints and holy men were obviously an important part of the religious life of 
Singaporean Tamil Muslims all throughout the colonial period. The ‘fakirs’ of the 
1887 reader’s letter were and in some places are still a common sight in South 
India.186 It is in no way surprising that they existed among Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore as well. In August 1866, The Singapore Free Press noted the demise of 
“[a]n old Kling man, who has been reckoned as a prophet [sic] by the Mohammedans 
in this settlement for the last 50 years…”, who was buried in Tanjong Pagar.187 It was 
noted that he could take goods and even money freely from shops and money-
changers, and that carriages were free for him, due to “…the awe with which he 
inspired…” sections of the Muslim population. On the day of the burial, a syce was 
murdered, allegedly because he had asked for money to transport the corpse, though 
the charge could not be proven. The holy man’s followers seem to have been mostly 
Malays and he was noted in another article to have been “…a great man amongst the 
Malays…”.188 What makes this case particularly interesting is the possibility that this 
holy man, called Nabi (i.e. prophet) Noah, was none else but Habib Nuh (Nuh = 
Noah), Singapore’s most celebrated saint, generally believed to have been an Arab 
nowadays.189
About sixty years later, holy men called taṅkaḷ, cāyapu or mastāṉ, played an 
important role in the society of Muslim migrants from Kadayanallur. As will be 
discussed in chapter 3, Kadayanallur Muslims were then segregated into various 
factions each of which claimed allegiance to a different spiritual preceptor in Kerala. 
                                                 
185 S.S.L.R. 1936: 107-13. 
186 Cf. Jaffur Shurreef [1863] 1991: 160-1; Saheb 1998: 61-72.  
187 “An old Kling man,…”, The Singapore Free Press, 2 Aug 1866. 
188 “Criminal Session”, The Singapore Free Press, 11 Oct 1866. 
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Not only were these factions taken over to Singapore, but migrants continued to take 
discipleship with holy men here. According to Maideen, it was believed that one 
could attain heaven just by following the preceptor’s injunctions and reciting an 
Arabic formula called a ṣēk mantiram.190 Similar traditions seem to have been en 
vogue among migrants from nearby Tenkasi, according to my respondents. 
The respect for holy men easily translated into veneration for their tombs on their 
death. Saint-veneration was and to a certain degree still is a common practice among 
Singapore’s Tamil Muslims. One of the oldest Muslim buildings in town is a replica 
of Tamil Nadu’s most famous shrine, the Nagore Dargah. Singapore’s ‘Nagore 
Durgah’ was constructed between 1828 and 1830 in Telok Ayer Street, then almost 
directly on the beach. Similar replicas were constructed in other parts of Southeast 
Asia, such as Penang.191 According to Jaffur Shurreef, Muslim sailors and captains 
made vows to donate a certain amount of money to the saint of Nagore when in 
distress at sea, and the Southeast Asian replicas may have been set up at first to allow 
these seamen to fulfill their vows on safe arrival in the port.192
Together with the Prophet and ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī,193 Shāh al-Ḥamīd of 
Nagore was certainly the most venerated individual among Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore, as the references to his kantūri mentioned above attest. Yet he was 
certainly not the only saint venerated. According to my respondents, the custom of an 
influential Tamil Muslim family to celebrate the holiday of Mu‘īn al-Dīn Chishtī 
annually was instituted before World War II, and an association floated by one of the 
Kadayanallur factions in 1940 was named after the 14th century saint Gīsū Darāz 
                                                 
190 Meytīṉ 1989: 21. 
191 Lee G.B. 2002: 80-1; Ghulam-Sarwar 1989. 
192 Cf. Jaffur Shurreef [1863] 1991: 161-2. 
193 The Masjid Jamae (Chulia) was apparently also called the ‘Mosque of Kuttūpmīṟāṉ Mukiyittīṉ 
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‘Khwāja Banda Nawāz’ who lies buried in Gulbarga, Karnataka.194 Tamil Muslims 
also expressed their veneration for local and Southeast Asian saints. In 1886, a poem 
written in Singapore called Malākkāp piravēcat tiraṭṭu (“Compilation on the Gateway 
to Malacca”) eulogized Shaykh Ismā‘īl, who is buried on the island of Pulau Besar 
near Malacca.195 Another collection of religious poems published in 1896 contains, 
among others, poems on the Singaporean saints Habib Nuh and Sikandar Shah as well 
as on a saint called Cālimcāyapu who was buried in the compound of the Masjid 
Jamae (Chulia).196
As becomes clear from what has been said above about kantūris, people not only 
venerated but celebrated important religious personalities. This would include among 
other things the recitation of panegyrical poetry (mawlid), feasting, and, in case of 
saints, flag-raising ceremonies.197 On 5th of February 1857, a small riot in Telok Ayer 
Street left two people dead when an overzealous police inspector tried to remove 
“…obstructions in the shape of stakes and plantain trees stuck in the ground”,198 to the 
chagrin of the Kling Muslims who had assembled there to celebrate a festival. The 
location at the intersections of Telok Ayer and Boon Tat Street (then Japan Street), 
and the date make it clear that the people were celebrating the holiday of Shāh al-
Ḥamīd of Nagore at the Nagore Durgah: the evening of 5th of February 1857 
corresponded to the early hours of the 11th of Jumādā al-Ākhira in the Muslim 
calendar, marking the climax of Shāh al-Ḥamīd’s annual festival. 
                                                 
194 Meytīṉ 1989: 24, 27. 
195 Jāpar Muhyittīṉ 1990:118. 
196 Mukammatu 1896: 45-6; there is still a shrine for a saint with a different name on the compound of 
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197 Cf. “Mavulitu”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 12 Dec 1887: 98-9; Meytīṉ 1989: 18, 26. 
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It is not clear whether processions were held on the holidays of certain saints, as 
they were in Penang and still are in Nagore.199 But processions in commemoration of 
the martyrdom of Hussein, the Prophet’s grandson, in the month of Muharram were 
common in 19th century Singapore, in which miniature representations of Hussein’s 
tomb, called tābūt or ta‘ziya, were paraded around the town. Despite the fact that 
Tamil Muslims are usually Sunnite rather than Shiite, they apparently participated 
avidly in the processions, both in Singapore as well as in India, where in the late 19th 
century an important Tamil religious scholar warned his coreligionists of participating 
in tābūt processions in honor of Hussein or saints.200
In Singapore, the colonial government was apparently always wary of processions 
and their potentially disturbing character. In 1842, it refused to allow tābūt 
processions to the Klings, who went into a short strike on that account. Yet the 
processions were apparently resumed shortly thereafter, for in 1849 the Grand Jury 
claimed that processions were allowed to the Klings and (Indian) convicts, but not to 
the Chinese, and should be banned completely in public streets. The conflict about 
Muharram processions went on, with processions being banned and allowed again 
intermittently at least until 1864.201 In 1864, a serious incident happened during the 
procession. By that time, the Muharram processions had apparently become the 
preserve of two Indian secret societies, the ‘White Flags’ and the ‘Red Flags’, whose 
processions were kept strictly apart, though the ‘White Flags’ usually went first on 
their circuit through the business district and Chinatown. During the 1864 
processions, members of the ‘Red Flags’ society entered the building where the tābūt 
of their rivals was kept and destroyed it, setting in motion disturbances and court trials 
                                                 
199 Cf. Ghulam-Sarwar 1989: 33; Saheb 1998: 65-8. 
200 Sayyid Muḥammad 1963: 505-6; cf. also Bjerrum 1920: 174; cf. Jaffur Shurreef [1863] 1991: 112-
23 and Nambiar & Narayana Kurup 1968: 56-8 for descriptions of Muharram as celebrated in Madras. 
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which document the practice of Muharram processions in the mid-1860s. After that, 
the processions seem to have been discontinued.202
In contrast to such popular customs, the presence of Islamic scholarship and 
learning among Tamil Muslims in Singapore is much less documented for the prewar 
period. Nevertheless, there is evidence that people with at least basic religious 
education lived in Singapore. Some Tamil religious scholars in India supported 
themselves by engaging in trade with Ceylon or Burma, and there is no reason to 
assume that this could not also have been the case with Singapore.203 The Imams 
working at the various Tamil mosques would in all likelihood have had a religious 
education of some sorts. 
Literacy was fairly high among the Muslim trading communities of the 
Coromandel Coast, and Tamil was used by those Tamil Muslims living in Singapore 
from at least the late 19th century onwards for newspapers, panegyric literature, wills 
and handbills.204 It thus comes as no surprise that the written word was used to 
transmit religious information: Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ for example regularly published articles 
and reader’s letters containing religious information, such as a letter containing advice 
on the proper performance of prayers, or an article on the reformer Jamāl al-Dīn al-
Afghānī (1838/9-1897).205 The newspaper also reported copiously about Muslim 
states like Afghanistan or the Ottoman Empire, and once included a lengthy article on 
Cairo.206
                                                 
202 Cf. “The following is…”, The Singapore Free Press, 23 Nov 1865; “Criminal Session”, The 
Singapore Free Press, 19 Apr 1866, 26 Apr 1866, 3 May 1866 & 10 May 1866, as well as Supplement 
to the Singapore Free Press, 26 Apr 1866 & 10 May 1866.  
203 Cf. Shu‘ayb 1993: 587-8. 
204 Cf. Birch 1879: 51; Hemingway [1906] 2000 (vol. 1): 160; Jāpar Muhyittīṉ 1990; Mallal 1928: 1; 
S.S.L.R. 1931: 4. 
205 “Kaṭitam”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 25 Jul 1887: 20; “Ceyku Jamāluttīṉ”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 17 Oct 1887: 68. 
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Our knowledge about the transmission of religious knowledge becomes more 
secure in the first decades of the 20th century. The Arab Street Educational Trust was 
created in 1919 by the Indian Muslim Society of Singapore with the object “…to 
impart religious education to Indian Muslim children”.207 In the 1920s, the Society 
employed at least one teacher who had studied at Vellore in India, most probably at 
the Madrasat Bāqiyyāt al-Ṣāliḥāt.208 With more Tamil Muslims bringing their families 
along to Singapore, the need for religious education in Tamil would have increased.209 
Many of my older respondents mentioned religious schools run by Tamil Muslims, 
though few could remember any details. Even among the poor migrants from 
Tinnevelly District, religious schools sprang up. Maideen reports a dispute among 
some Kadayanallurians about whether to use a common fund to register an association 
or to start a madrasa. He also mentions that tensions arose between members of the 
registered Muslim Apiviruttic Caṅkam (‘Muslim Improvement Association’) and the 
supporters of a religious school called Matracattul Muhammatiyā in Tanjong Pagar. 
Maideen himself had received basic religious education, as well as elementary 
knowledge of English, at a simple ‘school’ operating on a verandah (tiṇṇaip paḷḷi), 
where both boys and girls were taught.210
This upsurge in religious education, combined with improving communication 
with India, had some important consequences for the religious life of Tamil Muslims 
in Singapore. On the one hand, associations proliferated among Tamil Muslims in this 
period, a process that will be discussed further in chapter 4. Tamils also participated 
in pan-Muslim committees and associations. When new trustees were appointed at the 
                                                 
207 Ahmad 1965: 44. 
208 Mallal 1928: 37; cf. Tschacher 2006a: 204-7. 
209 In Penang, a school “…for the learning in English, Hindoostanee, Malay, Tamil, Malabar, and the 
Alkoran…” was apparently in existence by 1870; Kyshe 1885: 268. On Islamic education in colonial 
Singapore in general, cf. Chee 2006: 7-13; Hussin Mutalib 1996: 233-5; Zahoor Ahmad 1967: 37-41. 
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Masjid Sultan in 1915, Tamils were one of the communities represented among the 
trustees, together with Arabs, Malays, Bugis, Javanese, and other Indians.211 An 
important association, the Anjuman-i-Islam, which had links with the controversial 
Aḥmadiyya movement,212 also had many Tamil members. Indeed, Tamils seem to 
have been among the most influential individuals in this association. In 1926, the 
Vice-President of the Anjuman was a Tamil cattle trader from Porto Novo, and among 
its patrons was none less than ‘Cattle King’ Kader Sultan.213
Another effect of the greater dissemination of religious knowledge was an 
increase in religious disputes. This is best illustrated by the controversy generated by 
the visit of Daud Shah to Singapore. Not only was this visit widely reported in India, 
both in Daud Shah’s own journal as also in a rival one,214 it also led to considerable 
tensions among the Tamil Muslims of Singapore. Daud Shah, like the Anjuman-i-
Islam, which hosted him in Singapore, had links to the Aḥmadiyya movement. Some 
of Daud Shah’s supporters among the Anjuman wrote articles and handbills in his 
support. This provoked three religious scholars, who had come to Singapore just to 
raise opposition against Daud Shah, to pen a handbill attacking Daud Shah and his 
supporters as ‘infidels’ for associating with ‘Qādiyānīs’.215 The handbill was 
published under the name of a local merchant, while the scholars who penned it 
retreated to India. Two of those attacked by the pamphlet went to court, suing the 
merchant who published it for libel. The case, which ended in the victory of the 
plaintiffs, came to involve not only many influential Tamil Muslims, but also North 
                                                 
211 Ahmad 1965: 51. 
212 The Aḥmadiyya is a movement going back to the Punjabi Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad Qādiyānī (1839-
1908). Part of the supporters of the Aḥmadiyya maintain that Ghulām Aḥmad was a prophet, making 
them heretics in the eyes of most Muslims, while another faction, to which the Anjuman was linked, 
came to reject this claim; cf. Friedmann [1989] 2003: 147-162. 
213 Mallal 1928: plate facing p. vi, 61; most accounts seem to put more stress on the North Indian 
members; cf. Khoo 1993: 269. 
214 Cf. “Malāy nāṭṭil namatu āciriyar”, Tārul Islām 7-6, Jun 1925: 277-8. 
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Indians, Arabs and Malays, showing the disruptive potential of religious disputes in 
the community.216
The case shows how much Tamil Muslims in Singapore had come to be integrated 
into discourses linking them with the wider Muslim society on the island and even 
beyond. At the same time, they maintained peculiarly Tamil networks and institutions 
that linked up with Tamil Muslim society and debates in India. When the British army 
surrendered Singapore to the Japanese on the 15th of February 1942, Tamil Muslims 
were an established and important part of Muslim society in the city. 
 
TAMI MUSLIM SOCIETY AFTER WORLD WAR II 
 
As there is considerable continuity between many aspects of pre- and postwar Tamil 
Muslim society, and detailed discussions of some contemporary issues will be taken 
up in later chapters, there is neither need nor space to present postwar Tamil Muslim 
society in the same detail as was done with prewar society. It will suffice here to 
discuss some broad trends in the way Tamil Muslims were affected by postwar 
developments. When I draw on oral history for information in this section, I tend to 
use information supplied by my own respondents rather than the interviews conducted 
by the National Archives of Singapore.217  
The Japanese occupation of 1942-5 had a strong impact on Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore, as it had on other communities. Some were able to escape from the city to 
the relative safety of India. Those who remained had to bear the indignities of 
                                                 
216 The proceedings of the trial were published by Bashir A. Mallal, himself one of those attacked in the 
handbill, in 1928; cf. Mallal 1928; the case is discussed in greater detail in chapter 5. 
217 As the summaries of the six interviews with Tamil Muslims by the Archives make clear, there is 
very little in these interviews that has a direct bearing on the topic of the thesis. Furthermore, the 
longest interview is with Maideen, and the information supplied seems to be largely the same as that 
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Japanese rule, such as disease, starvation, abuse by Japanese soldiers, arbitrary 
executions, and being ‘conscripted’ into the labor force building the Siam Railway.218 
The lower classes among Tamil Muslims tried to make their living by hawking or by 
joining a labor unit working for the Japanese known by the Japanese term kutai.219 
According to Shankar, the merchants were first able to make a living of their savings, 
but due to inflation and the lack of merchandize, these were soon used up.220 
Maideen’s judgment of the merchants was much more critical: according to him, the 
merchants exploited the lower classes by cheating and inflated prices, claiming that 
their greed was stronger than their fear of the Japanese, while the lower classes did 
not betray their fraudulent practices to the Japanese because of pity and a sense of 
common identity with the merchants.221
One important element of the Japanese occupation was the Indian National Army 
(INA) under the leadership of S.C. Bose. Relationships between the INA and Indian 
Muslims were tense. The Muslim League and other Muslim associations were under 
the suspicion of supporting the British, and the Japanese and their INA allies closed 
down or suppressed Indian Muslim associations.222 In how far other Tamil Muslim 
institutions, like mosques, continued to operate does not become clear from the 
available sources. Muslim and other Indian merchants also came into contact with the 
INA by being ‘asked’ to contribute funds to the outfit.223 But there were also Muslims 
who supported the INA, most notably M. Karim Ghani (Karīm Kaṉi), who came to 
Singapore in 1943 as Propaganda Minister of the Provisional Government of Free 
India proclaimed by Bose. Ghani would come to play an important if notorious role in 
                                                 
218 Cf. Meytīṉ 1989: 34-44; Arasaratnam 1979: 102-11. 
219 Meytīṉ 1989: 37. 
220 Shankar 2001: 31. 
221 Meytīṉ 1989: 35. 
222 Shankar notes that the All India Muslim Club of Singapore was closed down by the Japanese during 
the war, but unfortunately he does not state his sources; Shankar 2001: 34. 
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Singapore a few years later, after British control over the island had been 
reestablished in 1945.224
The primary development that impacted on Tamil Muslims in postwar Singapore 
was the process of decolonization, rapid in the case of India and Pakistan, which 
attained independence in 1947, more gradual in the case of Singapore, which 
developed from crown colony to part of Malaysia in 1963 to independent country in 
1965. Decolonization affected Tamil Muslim society in Singapore in various ways. 
The two most discernible effects are the decline in importance of the role played by 
the merchant and trading elite and a simultaneous rise in influence of the poorer 
sections of that society. While the rise of independent states formed obstacles for the 
circulatory regimes of merchants by forming borders where none had been before, the 
more settled communities of labor migrants and petty shopkeepers could easily 
transfer their loyalties to an increasingly independent Singapore.225 Their greater 
numbers and the presence, in many cases, of their wives and children, gave these 
communities greater stability and greater leverage to participate in the public sphere 
through the founding and maintenance of associations.  
As has been mentioned before, the founding of associations by Tamil Muslims 
had begun in the early 20th century. In the late 1930s, several migrant groups began to 
form associations on the basis of their hometown or kin-center. These associations 
seem to have been mainly formed by lower class Tamil Muslims, like labor migrants 
and small shopkeepers. The six kin-center associations founded until 1952 all 
represented towns whose inhabitants were employed largely either in menial jobs or 
                                                 
224 Pātucā 1996; Singapore Riots Inquiry Commission 1951: 10-1; Fakhri 2002: 14. 
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non-laboring Indians who seem “…to have first sunk its roots in Malaya…”; Sandhu 1969: 298. But 
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in low-level trade, whereas the affluent merchants of towns like Porto Novo or 
Karaikal did not found such associations. Furthermore, at least four such kin-center 
associations survived the war, while none of the kind of association represented by the 
Indian Muslim Society, the Anjuman-i-Islam or the All India Muslim Club seems to 
have done so.226 Through these associations, the kin-center communities could engage 
in activities that their members would not have been able to organize individually, 
such as the funding of schools. The Umar Pulavar Tamil School, which was founded 
in 1946 by the Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim League, and operated between 1960 
and 1982 as the only Tamil-medium high school in Singapore, is a good example of 
the rising impact these kin-center associations had on Tamil Muslim society in 
Singapore.227
Debates on religious and quasi religious issues occurred frequently in the two 
decades following the war, sometimes with violent consequences. The most burning 
issue in the immediate postwar period was the demand for Pakistan and the partition 
of India in 1947. Support for Jinnah and the Muslim League had already existed in the 
immediate prewar period.228 No detailed study of the issue has been undertaken until 
now, but material collected by Shankar shows that there was considerable debate 
among Tamils in Singapore and the rest of Malaya regarding partition after the war. 
In Singapore, there were even cases of arson and rioting among Hindus and Muslims, 
though these were claimed by some to be unrelated to communal issues.229 But it 
would be wrong to reduce the issue simply to a religious conflict. On the one hand, 
not every Muslim supported partition, while on the other hand some prominent non-
                                                 
226 Some of these had apparently become defunct already before the Japanese occupation. 
227 For a history of the Umar Pulavar Tamil School see Palanisamy 1987, as well as Maideen’s 
reminiscences throughout the second half of his biography. 
228 Cf. Meytīṉ 1989: 25-7. 
229 “S’pore Disturbances”, Indian Daily Mail, 26 Jun 1946; “Incidents Not Connected with India 




CHAPTER 2: HISTORY 
Muslim South Indian politicians did support the creation of Pakistan.230 Shankar is 
probably right when he asserts that most Indian Muslims in Malaya had supported the 
Pakistan movement without intending to shift their allegiance to the new state, 
especially as many may have envisioned Pakistan as well as Hindu India as part of a 
larger Indian federation.231 Yet for Singapore, the debate was the first real 
confrontation between Tamil Hindus and Muslims. 
The immediate postwar period was a time of intense debate with various strands 
of both pan-Islamic and nationalist ideologies intersecting with and contesting each 
other. One of the best examples of this intellectual milieu was Karim Ghani, who had 
been shortly imprisoned, but released in 1946. Karim Ghani took over as the editor of 
the Tamil newspaper Malāyā Naṇpaṉ, and later also edited an English newspaper, 
Dawn, as well as its Malay version, Sinaran.232 He was elected President of the 
Singapore Muslim League in 1949 and is also claimed to have been president of the 
All-Malaya Muslim Missionary Society, better known as Jamiyah nowadays.233 
Ghani’s career presents an almost paradoxical engagement with various political 
forces. Despite his engagement in the INA, Ghani also supported the Dravidian 
movement as well as the demand for Pakistan and the Palestinian cause.234
Ghani’s career in Singapore ended with the Nadra/Maria Hertogh controversy and 
the ensuing riots, which ensued from the conflict over the guardianship of a Dutch-
Eurasian Christian girl, Maria Hertogh, who had been separated from her parents in 
                                                 
230 Cf. “Local Muslims Protest against Pakistan”, Indian Daily Mail, 12 Apr 1946: 4; More 1997: 216. 
231 The idea of ‘Pakistan in India’, which was espoused by Karim Ghani, was neither new nor original, 
as Shankar claims; cf. Cohen 2004: 29; “Jinnah Prepared for a Compromise?”, Indian Daily Mail, 13 
Apr 1946: 2; Shankar 2001: 35. 
232 Cāmi 1994: 314; Fakhri 2002: 14; Singapore Riots Inquiry Commission 1951: 10; Shankar also 
mentions that he edited an English weekly, The Comrade; Shankar 2001: 35. 
233 Singapore Riots Inquiry Commission 1951: 10; Hughes, who was later involved in the Nadra/Maria 
Hertogh controversy, denies that Ghani held any of these posts, but his election as President of the 
Muslim League is confirmed by a newspaper article; “Muslims Elect Leader”, The Malaya Tribune, 25 
Apr 1949: 3; cf. Shankar 2001: 67; Hughes 1980: 50. 
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World War II and raised by Muslims in Singapore, who called her Nadra. Karim 
Ghani, as well as a number of Malay and Arab leaders, formed the ‘Nadra Action 
Committee’ on 9th of December 1950 to fight for the return of Maria/Nadra to her 
Muslim foster-family. Ghani had used his newspapers as well as his apparently 
considerable rhetorical abilities to whip up Muslim sentiment. On the 11th of 
Decembers, riots erupted, in which Muslim rioters killed nine Europeans and 
Eurasians, while the police itself shot nine rioters. Ghani and the ‘Nadra Action 
Committee’ were detained, and on his release Ghani was ordered to leave the colony 
and finally ended up in Pakistan, where he died in 1978, as the British saw in him the 
‘moving spirit’ in the agitation that led up to the riots.235 In any case, the ‘Nadra 
Action Committee’ was probably the last instance of a Tamil Muslim taking a leading 
role in a public debate involving Islam in Singapore for a long time. 
The decline in importance of Tamil Muslims can also be seen in their loss of 
control over the mosques they had founded in the last 120 years. As mentioned, 
already before the war the major Tamil mosques had come under the control of the 
Mahomedan and Hindu Endowment Board. The Coronation Road Mosque and the 
Masjid Kassim followed in 1961 and 1962, respectively, and both have by now lost 
any Tamil character they may have had in the past.236 Other mosques founded by 
Tamils gradually received Malay or Arab trustees, while one Tamil mosque fell into 
disrepair and was taken over by Malayali Muslims in the 1950s.237 Conversely, the 
congregation of the Masjid Bencoolen seems to have been transformed from a 
predominantly Urdu-speaking one to a Tamil one after the 1950s. 
The merger of Singapore and Malaysia in September 1963 and independence 
from Malaysia in August 1965 finally forced Tamil Muslims in the city to decide 
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORY 
between transferring their loyalties to the new state or to keep on to consider 
Singapore mainly as a place where to work and make money, and to return to India in 
due time. Debates about the issue of loyalty to this or that state had ensued ever since 
the end of the war, though more heatedly in those areas that were to become 
Malaysia, as the transition to independence happened earlier there than in 
Singapore.238 As I have already mentioned, the decision for India or Singapore was 
easier to make for the laborers and petty shopkeepers who had settled down in 
Singapore with their families than for the traders and laborers who were on their own 
or had their family in India. One of my respondents admitted that in the first place he 
had taken Singaporean nationality because it made traveling and thus also trading 
easier for him, as Indians needed visas for many countries.239 Many respondents in 
Singapore and India confirmed that shāfi‘ī migrants from Kadayanallur, who had 
usually arrived in Singapore with their families, were more ready to settle down in 
Singapore than ḥanafī migrants from the same town, who more commonly arrived as 
lone male laborers; even among ḥanafī families, the participation in the Singapore 
Kadayanallur Muslim League remained lower than among shāfi‘ī Kadayanallurians. 
Tamil Muslims and their institutions and associations do not figure prominently 
during the first twenty years of Singaporean independence. The last major Tamil 
Muslim association was founded in 1964, and it was not until the 1990s that new 
associations came to be formed. A number of important developments took place 
during this period which helped to obscure the presence of Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore. These are the growing importance of the so-called CMIO-paradigm (see 
next paragraph) in counting, policing and representing Singaporeans, the resettlement 
of a large part of Singapore’s population in housing estates, and the establishment of 
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the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) as the statutory board on religious 
matters for Muslims in Singapore. As the latter point will be discussed in chapter 4, it 
may suffice here to point out briefly the impact of the first two developments. 
The term CMIO-paradigm refers to the initials of the four official ‘races’ that 
came to be recognized in independent Singapore for census purposes, viz. Chinese, 
Malay, Indian, and ‘Others’. This paradigm has a great impact on the way 
Singaporean identity is perceived, so much so that Siddique has claimed that 
“…belonging to and conformity with the norms of one of the CMIO categories, 
cannot be considered as conceptually separate from Singaporean identity”.240 These 
categories grew out of the census categories employed by the British,241 yet their 
strongest impact on Tamil Muslims was to develop from features peculiar to the post-
independence period, viz. the method of determining an individual’s ‘race’, and the 
importance of the CMIO-paradigm in representing and policing Singaporean society. 
Contemporary Singaporeans are not free to choose the racial category they belong 
to, as they were in the prewar period,242 but are generally supposed to follow the 
‘race’ of their father.243 The results of this simple principle for Indian Muslims in 
Singapore were far reaching. As mentioned, marriages between Indian Muslim men 
and Malay women were and still are a common occurrence.244 In the prewar period, 
the offspring of such marriages, who mostly would have spoken Malay at home, 
would have come to be counted as Malays and Jawi-Peranakan.245 But the post-
independence practice to trace a person’s ‘race’ through his or her father has given 
                                                 
240 Siddique 1990: 37. 
241 For a discussion of the development of the census categories, cf. PuruShotam 1998. 
242 Much to the frustration of the Superintendent of the 1931 census! Vlieland 1932: 73-4. 
243 Siddique 1989: 574; Wu 1982: 32; cf. Siddique 1990 for a case-study of the way these categories 
are manipulated in practice. 
244 In the late 1960s they formed the largest section (12.8%) of all interracial marriages; Hassan 1974: 
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rise to a large section of Muslims speaking Malay, but being considered ‘Indians’. In 
2000, 11.6% of all Indians used Malay as primary household language, and indeed 
Malay seems actually to be spoken by more Indian Muslims than any South Asian 
language.246 The presence of a ‘Malay’ Indian Muslim community has influenced the 
organization of and debates on religion among Indian Muslims in Singapore, as will 
be considered in chapters 5 and 6. 
Another aspect of the CMIO-paradigm that has generated a lot of debate, and 
indeed problems, among Indian Muslims is the stereotyping it engendered. As 
Benjamin has pointed out, it is to be expected that in a society following the ideology 
of ‘Multiracialism’ there would be “…a tendency to make social reality fit an ethnic, 
or even racial, theory of causation”, by “…replacing reality with stereotype…”, by 
“…reaffirming…the notion of ‘traditional’ unchanging cultures…” and by having 
“…great concern for boundary definition…”.247 Religion did not escape this process 
of racial stereotyping. Islam and Hinduism came to be intrinsically associated with 
Malays and Indians,248 respectively, even though the situation is quite different in the 
two cases. While almost all Malays are Muslims, not every Muslim is a Malay (about 
15.5% are not). Conversely, while almost every Hindu is an Indian, not every Indian 
is a Hindu (44.6% are not).249 Nevertheless, in Singapore Muslims are usually 
expected to be Malays and Indians to be Hindus. This is particularly obvious in the 
representation of the three main ‘races’ in publications and cultural displays.250 Even 
scholarly projects rarely escape racial and religious stereotyping. Thus, the project 
paper for the oral history interviews with Indians conducted by the Oral History 
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Centre only lists questions aimed at Hindu religious practice, such as which temples 
an individual visits or which deities he or she worships.251
It is hardly surprising that under these circumstances, Tamil Muslims have tended 
to vanish in the interstices of the CMIO-paradigm after independence. Similarly, 
some policies aimed at maintaining racial harmony have contributed to obscuring the 
presence of Tamil Muslims in Singapore. This is especially true with regard to the 
resettlement of large parts of Singapore’s population to suburban housing estates after 
independence. The resettlement broke up the small enclaves of Tamil Muslim 
communities in areas like Tanjong Pagar, and dispersed them over the island. As the 
government was keen to prevent the formation of ghettos dominated by one ethnic 
group, care was taken to prevent concentration of one ethnic group in specific housing 
estates.252 This means that Tamil Muslims always form a minority in specific housing 
estates, and especially in the congregations of local mosques. 
Yet it may have been the same tendency to formulate policies in accordance with 
the CMIO-paradigm that may have contributed to a new assertiveness of Tamil 
Muslims in the 1980s and 90s, as they increasingly began to feel marginalized by 
such policies. In recent years, Tamil Muslims have increasingly pressed claims 
especially in the religious and social fields, and a new phase of forming associations 
has set in during the 1990s. These developments and the ensuing debates have 
interesting repercussions for the religious life of Tamil Muslims in Singapore, and it is 
these developments that form the basis of most of the discussion in the following 
chapters. 
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At the surface level, the term ‘Tamil Muslims’ seems to suggest a quite clearly 
demarcated community unified by language and religion. Yet as the foregoing 
discussion about the history of Tamil Muslim society in Singapore has already 
suggested, the term ‘community’ should be used with caution. Apart from the already 
mentioned fact that most Tamil Muslims in Singapore seem to prefer imagining an 
‘Indian Muslim’ rather than a ‘Tamil Muslim’ community, there exists a great deal of 
heterogeneity and difference among Tamil-speaking Muslims in Singapore.253 This 
has had a visible impact on the organization of religious life among Singaporean 
Tamil Muslims, and thus needs to be addressed in order to comprehend debates and 
discourses current among Tamil Muslims. 
To understand how various segments of Singaporean Tamil Muslims are 
differentiated from each other, it is first necessary to briefly discuss what can be said 
on the basis of our sketchy data about Tamil Muslim society in Singapore in general. 
In particular, what is of interest here is which of these social characteristics have been 
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employed in the construction of a homogenous ‘Tamil Muslim’ community by 
individual Tamil Muslims and scholars alike. 
The main part of the chapter will then deal with delineating the actual fault lines 
that differentiate various segments of Tamil Muslim society from each other. For the 
most part, these fault lines reproduce distinctions characteristic of Tamil Muslim 
society in India, viz. sub-groups, kin-centers, and various religious groupings. It is 
thus necessary to compare the situation in Singapore with that in India to gain an 
understanding of the operation of these differences and the way they are employed in 
the social imagery of Singaporean Tamil Muslims. Another aspect that has to be 
considered in this context is the question of ‘Malayization’. 
Different segments of Tamil and indeed Indian Muslim society in Singapore do 
not simply exist side by side, but actually inform constructions of status within this 
society. As the claim that a kind of caste-system is operative amongst Indian Muslims 
in Singapore is an important part of the (negative) stereotyping of Indian Muslims, it 
is necessary to evaluate this claim and to assess on what basis it has been made. These 
questions of hierarchies and the way they are interpreted shall be discussed in the final 
section of the chapter.  
 
TAMIL MUSLIMS AND SOCIETY IN SINGAPORE 
 
In 1997, the then President of the Federation of Indian Muslims, E.S. Ebrahim 
Marican, lamented that it was “…difficult for us to determine, statistically, how our 
community is faring in terms of educational performance and in other areas”.254 This 
situation has not changed since then. Practically the only indisputable figure available 
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is that in 2000, 45,927 or 25.6% of all Singaporean Indians over the age of 14 were 
Muslims. Even more problematic for our purposes, the census makes only very 
general statements about languages spoken by various groups of Indians. Data on 
religion has only been collected since 1980, and it is usually only cross-listed with the 
general category of ‘race’, but not with language. Estimates of the number of Tamil 
Muslims in Singapore have ranged from 30,000 to 45,000.255 In reality, the figure 
seems to be much lower. According to the 2000 census, which seems to be the only 
one to provide comparable data, 17.9% of all Tamil-speakers aged fifteen and over 
professed Islam. This figure cannot be put into absolute figures exactly, as the 
absolute figures for Tamil-speakers include everyone aged five and over, yet the total 
of Tamil-speaking Muslims would probably be below 20,000. While Tamil is 
probably the most commonly spoken South Asian language among Indian Muslims, 
24,434 Indians returned Malay as their primary household language, and assumedly 
most of these would be Muslim. This means that the majority of ‘Indian Muslims’ 
enumerated in the census may be speakers of Malay.256
That Malay-speakers may form the majority of Singaporean ‘Indian Muslims’ has 
an important impact on the way figures relating to Indian Muslims have to be read. 
For instance, it may explain why a higher percentage of all registered Muslim 
marriages in 1998 were marriages of Indians with Malays than of Indians with other 
Indians: presumably, the majority of the ‘Indians’ marrying Malays were Malay-
speaking Indians.257 As a result, even the few figures that are available have to be 
treated with utmost care when one is interested in the social conditions of Muslims 
speaking Tamil or another South Asian language in Singapore. 
                                                 
255 Syed Mohamed 1973: 25 (41,000); Mani 1992: 342 (30,000); “Tamil Muslim chief defends right to 
participate in subsidy debate”, The Straits Times, 5 Sep 1989 (45,000). 
256 Cf. Leow 2001a: 39; Leow 2001b: 98. 
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Figure 8: A garment store in Kadayanallur named 'Singapore Readymade', reminder of 
continued links between Singapore and South India (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
Statements about the social life of Tamil Muslims in existing studies are thus 
indicative of the way a Singaporean Tamil Muslim community is perceived and 
constructed rather than depictions of reality. In the economic domain, the image of 
Tamil Muslims as traders and shopkeepers is pervasive. Mani, in his section on 
economic participation, exclusively discusses Tamil Muslim businesses, such as 
jewelers, general stores, and hawkers, but fails to mention the economic activities of 
those Tamil Muslims who lack mercantile backgrounds, even though he does mention 
the low involvement of some migrants in commercial activities.258 Similarly, Tyabji 
points out that Tamil Muslims were recognized as “…skilled and shrewd shopkeepers 
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and traders…”, and notes their “…prominence in trade…”.259 There is of course no 
doubt that trading is an important economic activity engaged in by Tamil Muslims 
[Figure 8].260 But it is hardly justified to focus solely on mercantile activities at the 
expense of all other forms of economic engagement. There are still many Tamil 
Muslims who earn their money as employees. 
Nevertheless, it is understandable that the image of a community of traders is 
rarely contested; in the Singaporean context, mercantile activity is seen as a positive 
trait. Furthermore, it helps to differentiate Tamil Muslims from the image of the 
unskilled laborer that often still attaches to the Tamil community at large. As one 
respondent said about the migration of Tamils to Singapore in the colonial period: 
“Whenever the Muslim comes from there [India; T.T.], they [sic] will say: ‘I want to 
be rich’. The Hindu will say: ‘I want to earn a living’…So all the Indian Muslims are 
rich people”.261 One of my respondents even went so far as to deny that in the past, 
Tamil Muslims had engaged in anything but commercial activities, and he was furious 
about a statement by Yaacob Ibrahim, then Acting Minister of Community 
Development and Sports, which in his opinion depicted Tamil Muslims as 
‘coolies’.262
Education is another domain that is often commented on even though there are 
practically no detailed figures regarding it. Discussions of Tamil Muslim education 
usually focus on one of two things, viz. the attitude towards education by traders and 
shopkeepers, or the efforts of some non-mercantile groups at establishing schools. It is 
often noted that Tamil Muslims exhibit a high literacy rate, but lack higher education. 
                                                 
259 Tyabji 1991b: 59; cf. Mines 1972a: 7-8. 
260 An overview of Tamil Muslim business practices can be found in Syed Mohamed 1973: chapter vii; 
cf. also the advertisements in e.g. Mashuthoo 2000; Shaik Alaudeen & Kamal 1996. 
261 Cf. also Mines 1972b: 343 for differing attitudes towards work among Tamil Hindus and Muslims. 
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The common explanation for this situation is that traders require basic literacy for 
bookkeeping, but have little use for further education.263 Similar statements were 
made by some of my respondents, and the need for education is a common topic in 
the Tamil Muslim associations’ souvenir magazines and in speeches.264 A problem 
with this discussion of attitudes towards education is that it focuses again primarily on 
the mercantile communities, and that it is completely unclear in how far these 
attitudes still have an impact today. Similarly, accounts of the founding of Tamil 
schools by Muslims is largely a historical issue that does not tell us anything about the 
current situation, as the last of these schools was closed down in 1982.265
Indeed, the discourse on education again tells us more about the way a Tamil 
Muslim community is perceived and constructed than about the de facto educational 
attainments of Tamil Muslim students in Singapore. Debates about education are 
nothing new among Tamil Muslims in Singapore. Already in 1887, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ 
praised the government for its attempts at instituting schools in the colonies, and 
chided Singaporean Tamils for their attitudes towards education.266 Almost forty 
years later, Daud Shah severely criticized both the government as well as the Indian 
community at large for the ‘educational deficiency’ (kalvikkuṟai) of the Indians. The 
government, Daud Shah alleged, did nothing to further Tamil-medium education in 
Malaya, while Indians in Malaya “…consider higher education unnecessary for trade. 
They consider it to be enough to earn money even if they cook or do menial work 
[‘tampi’ vēlai, lit. ‘younger brother work’; T.T.]”.267 These examples show how much 
the educational discourse is embedded in wider discourses about the Tamil Muslim 
                                                 
263 Cf. Mani 1992: 349; Mines 1972a: 106-7; More 1997: 50-2, 82-3; yet cf. Syed Mohamed 1973: 110. 
264 Cf. e.g. Mashuthoo 2003: 41; Sayed Majunoon 1996. 
265 Palanisamy 1987: 16-26. 
266 “Government Schools. Kavarṉameṇṭu pāṭacālaikaḷ”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 21 Nov 1887: 85-6. 
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community and is employed strategically by various sides to bolster their respective 
visions of community. 
Another social domain occasionally discussed with regard to Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore is that of marriage, family, and gender relations. Few studies fail to 
mention marriage patterns, and almost inevitably comment on the intermarriage of 
Tamil and other Indian Muslims with Malays.268 Again, the matter is largely treated 
as a historical issue, as authors discuss it mainly in the context of early Tamil Muslim 
migration to Singapore, but largely fail to discuss current marriage patterns apart from 
some very vague and generalized statements.269 Another topic that is sometimes 
mentioned in the context of marriage and gender relations is the negative image of 
Indian Muslims “…as abusive and domineering husbands”.270 Even though rarely 
discussed in the scholarly literature, the sensitivity of the issue became glaringly 
apparent in the controversy around the drama Taláq, which shall be treated in greater 
detail in chapter 5. It should be noticed that conversely, some of my Hindu Tamil 
respondents thought of Tamil Muslims as caring and loving husbands. Again, there is 
little data available to investigate how common this phenomenon is among Tamil 
Muslims. 
 
THE BASIS OF DIFFERENCE 
 
Subgroups 
It has become common in studies of Tamil Muslims to claim that Tamil Muslim 
society is divided into various subgroups or –divisions. The most influential 
                                                 
268 E.g. Bibijan 1976/77: 120-3; Mani 1992: 347-9; Mariam 1989: 102; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 25-6, 
65-6. 
269 Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 65-6 is the main exception. 
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classification has been that of Mines, who distinguished four such divisions, namely 
Labbai (ileppai, also Lebbai etc.), Marakkayar (marakkāyar, also Maraikkayar, 
Marakkar, Merican, etc.), Ravuttar (irāvuttar, also Rowther, Rauther, etc.), and 
Kayalar (kāyalar).271 While authors vary in the number of subgroups they distinguish, 
practically all scholars include Labbai, Marakkayar, and Ravuttar.272 Such subgroups 
are said to be defined by a set of shared characteristics, including adherence to a 
specific law-school, regional background, common economic activities, and most 
importantly a common origin. Thus, Marakkayar are said to belong to the shāfi‘ī law-
school, settle in the coastal areas of Tamil Nadu, are successful traders, and descent 
from Arabs who married Tamil women.273 Surprisingly, even though in descriptive 
terms, these Muslim subgroups sound deceptively like castes, most authors deny that 
they constitute caste-groups, even though some admit that there is a hierarchy of 
subgroups, a topic to which we shall return below.  
The similarity in descriptive terms of these subgroups to castes becomes 
understandable when we consider the origin of this taxonomy, viz. the influential 
seven volume work Castes and Tribes of Southern India published by Edgar Thurston 
in 1909. As Thurston himself acknowledges, he relied heavily on District Manuals 
and other secondary sources in compiling this work.274 Though Mines does not quote 
Thurston in his bibliography of his original study, he mentions exactly the same four 
Tamil Muslim groups as Thurston does, for the information contained in Thurston and 
                                                 
271 Cf. Mines 1972a: 23-8; this taxonomy was subsequently popularized through articles like Mines 
1984 & 1986. 
272 Cf. Bayly 1989: 73-103; Bjerrum 1920: 172-3; Fanselow 1989: 274-81; Kamāl 1990: 37-55; More 
2004: 3-27. 
273 Cf. Bayly 1989: 79-81; Bjerrum 1920: 173; Fanselow 1989: 275-6; Kamāl 1990: 47-9; Mines 1984: 
431-2; only More assumes that the Marakkayar migrated from Kerala, but else agrees with the other 
authors; More 2004: 14-8. 
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the District Manuals is widely known in India – these works are commonly reprinted, 
and often reproduced in Census Reports or Tamil publications.275
Given its origin in colonial census ethnography, it is surprising that the general 
applicability of this taxonomy is practically never questioned. Yet there are serious 
problems with the applicability of this model for all of Tamil Nadu. For example, it 
has been mentioned that adherence to the shāfi‘ī law-school is a characteristic of 
Marakkayars, but when I related this information to an Indian-born Marakkayar 
respondent in Singapore, he denied it, pointing out that both his mother and his 
daughter-in-law belonged to the ḥanafī law-school even though they were also 
Marakkayar. Geographical differences emerge most clearly when we compare 
Mines’s study conducted in the utmost north of Tamil Nadu with Fanselow’s research 
on the far south. For example, the Kayalar subgroup mentioned by Mines seems in 
fact to be a kin-center community276 which came to be identified with certain low-
class occupations in Madras and surroundings, and which is absent from practically 
any other account except Thurston’s.277 On the other hand, the Tirunelveli subgroup 
of the Tarakanar (tarakaṉār) mentioned by Fanselow is absent from Mines’s 
accounts.278
The appearance of terms like ‘Marakkayar’ or ‘Labbai’ in the names of 
individuals in the pre-colonial period has prompted many scholars to assume that the 
subgroups were already a feature of Tamil Muslim society in the past, yet the 
argument is inconclusive. The terms are simply assumed to mean the same that they 
are supposed to mean nowadays, and contradictory evidence is either ignored or 
                                                 
275 Cf. e.g. Kamāl 1990: 210-2. 
276 The term kāyalar simply means ‘people from Kayalpattinam’. 
277 Mines 1972a: 26; cf. Thurston (vol. 3): 267; in fact, in Tirunelveli District, people from 
Kayalpattinam are regarded as Marakkayar with a reputation for business and Islamic ‘orthodoxy’; cf. 
Fanselow 1996: 204-7; Pate 1917 (vol. 1): 499-501. 
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discussed away by ad hoc explanations lacking evidence. Thus, Subrahmanyam 
uncritically identifies the term ‘Chulia’, which as discussed appears in records from 
Southeast Asia, as another term for ‘Marakkayar’, despite the fact that Arasaratnam 
refers to individual ‘Chulias’ who carry ‘Labbai’ as part of their names, and that a 
certain Shakkarai Rowter is referred to as a ‘Chulia’ as late as in a 1927 court case 
from Penang.279 Similarly, Bhattacharya attempts to explain the common occurrence 
of both ‘Labbai’ and ‘Marakkayar’ in the same individual’s name in 18th century 
Dutch records by suggesting that ‘Labbai’ was a more inclusive term of which 
‘Marakkayar’ was a subgroup.280 Yet there is strong evidence that Tamil ileppai, like 
its Malay cognate lebai, originally referred to nothing else but a type of religious 
official or a pious person. This is not only evidenced by the continued use of the term 
in this meaning in many parts of Tamil Nadu nowadays,281 but also by historical 
records.282
The evidence from Singapore, both past and present, indeed provides valuable 
insights for a critique of the subgroup taxonomy and its importance for Tamil Muslim 
society. The terms associated with particular subgroups appear already during the 
colonial period, and forms of ‘Marakkayar’ or ‘Ravuttar’ are still part of names of 
Tamil Muslims and their descendants. The subscription-lists of Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ often 
mention individuals whose names contain one of the subgroup titles, as do the Law 
Reports, with versions of Marakkayar being the most common (cf. appendices 3 & 4). 
Yet as has been mentioned, evidence from names is inconclusive, as it does not tell us 
anything about the understanding of the terms involved. Indeed, one encounters many 
                                                 
279 Subrahmanyam 2001: 95; cf. Arasaratnam 1987: 135; S.S.L.R. 1928: 25. 
280 Bhattacharya 1999: 288. 
281 Cf. Fanselow 1989: 274-5; Shu‘ayb 1993: 76-7; my respondents both in India and in Singapore 
similarly used the term in this meaning. 
282 Cf. Kamāl 1990: 52-3; Pate 1917 (vol. 1): 97; S.S.L.R. 1936: 108-10; More 2004: 123; More 
contradicts himself by insisting in another passage that the term was used “…on the whole…to identify 
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of the same problems that have been mentioned above with regard to Tamil Nadu.283 
One court case even suggests intermarriage between ‘Ravuttar’ and ‘Marakkayar’. 
The cloth-merchant Ahna Mohamed Hussain had a brother by the name of 
Sinnatamby Rowther, as well as a cross-cousin or brother-in-law284 called Moona 
Mohamed Eusope Marican.285 On the whole, one gets the impression that the 
subgroups did not play a significant role in Singaporean Tamil Muslim society in the 
colonial period. Apart from the absence, as far as I can see, of any reflections by the 
British or Indians on the issue, this is most strongly suggested by the interesting fact 
that no Tamil Muslim association in Singapore ever seems to have been formed on the 
basis of one of the postulated subgroups.286
Mani, the only contemporary scholar on Tamil Muslims in Singapore who seems 
to be aware of the subgroups and Mines’s work, thus may be correct when noting that 
“…these divisions are not significant in the context of Singapore for family 
formations, marriage and kinship”.287 Other authors do at times mention one or the 
other subgroup name, but their remarks, echoing the opinions of their respondents, 
show how ill-defined the concept of subgroup appears to be in Singapore. Bibijan 
claims that ‘Maricar’, ‘Rowther’, and ‘Mani’ are “family names”.288 Mariam’s 
respondents named ‘Rowthers’ and ‘Mutlers’ as the two most important castes among 
Indian (read: Tamil) Muslims.289 Similarly, Noorul Farha discusses the “family 
names” ‘Marican’, ‘Rauther’ and ‘Sahib’ as caste-like categories.290
                                                 
283 E.g. names combining two ‘subgroups’, like Shaik Lebbai Maricar; S.S.L.R. 1929: 141-6. 
284 The Tamil term maccāṉ can mean both. 
285 S.S.L.R. 1928: 83, 89. 
286 This seems similarly to be the case in India; cf. Mines 1983: 113. 
287 Mani 1992: 347; but cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 45. 
288 Bibijan 1976/77: 100. 
289 Mariam 1989: 109. 
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If there is one domain where the subgroups do seem to play a certain role in 
Singapore, it is for the formulation of origin myths. One author for example tried to 
construct an Arabic ancestry for both Marakkayar and Ravuttar by deriving the former 
term from the town Marrakech in Morocco and claimed that the latter were the 
descendants of Arabic horse-traders.291 One of my respondents recounted that his 
father claimed that the Ravuttar were descended from Turkish cavaliers.292 On the 
other hand, a publication by the Thopputhurai Muslim Association derived the term 
irāvuttar from iravu tattarkaḷ, ‘those who hop through the night’, explaining that the 
Ravuttar were merchants trading goods from the coast to the hinterland who preferred 
to travel by night to avoid the heat of the day – an ingenious, but unfortunately 
linguistically impossible etymology!293
The foregoing discussion may lead to the question of why the subgroups have 
been so relatively insignificant in the Singaporean context. Yet perhaps it is more 
prudent to ask whether the Singaporean case actually presents a contrast to India, or 
whether scholars of Tamil Muslim society in India have not put undue stress on the 
concept of subgroup. After all, though subgroups are claimed to be endogamous units, 
they are not particularly evident in the ‘Matrimonial’ sections of South Indian 
newspapers, usually the best source of information on which groups are considered 
endogamous in India. Tamil Muslim marriage ads generally only know two divisions, 
‘Tamil Muslim’ and ‘Tamil Muslim Ravuttar’, which do not distinguish subgroups, 
but the shāfi‘ī and ḥanafī law-schools, respectively.294 Even Mines admitted that 
subgroup-endogamy may be quite accidental and result from the tendency to marry 
                                                 
291 Mohamed Mustapha 2003: 75; cf. Kamāl 1990: 37-9; actually, marakkāyar is generally assumed to 
derive from marakkalam, ‘ship’, while irāvuttar comes from a word denoting a mounted trooper rather 
than a horse-trader; cf. Fanselow 1989: 275-7. 
292 The Ravuttars are often linked to Turks because of the use of the probably Turkish-derived kinship-
term attā, ‘father’; cf. Mines 1972a: 27; Shu‘ayb 1993: 59. 
293 Cf. Muhammatu Meytīṉ 1989/90: 23. 
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among relatives or people from the same village, who often would be homogeneous 
with regard to subgroup.295 Indeed, what emerges from Mines’s own writings is the 
importance of a concept which definitely is salient in the Singapore context, viz. that 
of the kin-center. 
 
Kin-centers 
The kin-center is among the most important concepts for understanding the 
imagination of difference among Tamil Muslims in Singapore. At the most basic 
level, kin-centers simply are “…the towns or villages which the [Tamil; T.T.] 
Muslims commonly name as their native places. For some it is where they were born. 
For others it is from where their people, their kinsmen, come”.296 Yet for Tamil 
Muslims, the importance of the kin-center goes far beyond the simple notion of 
hometown. Mines observed that most marriages occurred within the kin-center 
community, even though there is no bar on marrying outside the kin-group. The kin-
center also supplied merchants with a reliable source of employees, and with a far-
flung net of business contacts.297 The importance of the kin-center is thus not as a 
physical location, but as the focus for the maintenance and recreation of a 
geographically dispersed social and economic network. Yet for Mines, the most 
important aspect of the kin-center is that it endows Tamil Muslims with an identity. 
“In urban society organized around corporate caste the Tamil Muslims have retained 
the only corporate identity they ever have had, their village identity”.298
The presence of kin-center identities and their perpetuation through various 
institutions are highly visible in the Singaporean context, and it is no surprise that this 
                                                 
295 Mines 1978: 164. 
296 Mines 1983: 99-100. 
297 Mines 1983: 104-11. 
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element of Tamil Muslim society has received a fair amount of attention.299 Most of 
the authors seem to be unaware of Mines’s and similar studies on Tamil Muslim 
society in India. This has the advantage that these studies allow a glimpse of the way 
divisions within Tamil Muslim societies are perceived in Singapore, yet it has the 
disadvantage that no analysis of the data is undertaken except vague assumptions 
about the operation of a caste system among Singaporean Tamil Muslims, a notion 
which we shall have the opportunity to critique. 
As mentioned, kin-center affiliation is visible in at least four domains. One is the 
domain of marriage. Marrying within the kin-center community still seems to be the 
preferred practice in many cases, at least in the eyes of the elders. One respondent told 
me how her father had tried to keep her brother away from his Malay girl-friend as 
well as the company of members of another kin-center, and how he had encouraged 
his children to get married in India to someone from the kin-center. Especially for 
those kin-center communities whose numbers in Singapore are low, marrying 
someone from the kin-center community often means marrying to India. I have 
attended several marriages in the town of Porto Novo in India where either bride or 
groom came from Singapore. For larger kin-center communities, spouses are more 
readily available within Singapore itself, and some associations actually engage in 
‘match-making’. Of course, suitable spouses are not always found in the kin-center 
community, and so ‘mixed’ marriages do occur. In these cases, marriages with 
individuals from a comparable background in terms of region, religious affiliation and 
occupation are preferred. Thus, it is not uncommon for people from the Kadayanallur 
and Tenkasi communities to intermarry. It is also in the context of intermarriage that 
hierarchical stratification and rank become most visible. The most salient barrier 
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seems to be between Tamil Muslims from business communities, especially the 
ḥanafī business communities, on the one hand, and the mainly shāfi‘ī descendants of 
the Tinnevelly migrants (lumped together as teṉkāciyar, ‘Tenkasis’) on the other.300
There is also a certain amount of stereotyping current among different kin-center 
communities, for example with regard to the ‘traditional’ occupations of the various 
communities. One person from Tenkasi told me that Muslims from the trading towns 
were more willing to take risks and to be active in business in contrast to the risk-
averse people from Kadayanallur and Tenkasi.301 Other elements of stereotyping 
concern food, Tamil dialects, ‘Malayization’, or dress.302 Like marriage, stereotyping 
is closely connected to notions of status, and shall be considered again in that 
connection. 
A third, though much less salient way of recreating the kin-center community is 
through rituals. Mines relates that his respondents used to go back annually to attend 
festivals at their kin-centers, especially for the ‘urs, i.e. the festival at the shrine of the 
kin-center’s patron or some other saint.303 This practice does exist in Singapore, 
though people may not return to the festivals as regularly as in the case of Mines’s 
Indian respondents due to constraints on money and time. These visits to shrines will 
usually also be used to spend time with the family, to arrange marriages, or similar 
forms of social networking. The attendance of an ‘urs in the kin-center is largely an 
individual affair, i.e. not everyone will return for the occasion, and often it is indeed 
just an individual member of a household, not the whole household, who returns for 
the ‘urs. Within Singapore, the kin-center’s ‘urs is not usually publicly observed, the 
main exception being the annual commemoration of Pīr Muḥammad (Pīr 
                                                 
300 Cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 43-5. 
301 Cf. also Sayed Majunoon n.d.: [3]. 
302 Cf. Mariam 1989: 102; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 43-5. 
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Muhammatu), the patron-saint of the town of Thuckalay, by the Thuckalay Muslim 
Association. 
Indeed, the most visible institutions of kin-center identity in contemporary 
Singapore are the kin-center associations. More than half of the associations in the 
Federation of Indian Muslims are based on kin-center communities. Currently, there 
are ten kin-center associations in Singapore, some of which go back to prewar days, 
while others were founded only a few years ago. These associations and the role they 
play in the organization and contestation of religious life among Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore will be discussed in subsequent chapters. It suffices here to point out that in 
contrast to marriage and the attendance of kin-center festivals and rituals, which 
require travel to and presence in the physical kin-center, the associations are a 
thoroughly Singaporean phenomenon. Practically all of their activities relate to the 
kin-center community here, whereas the maintenance of direct linkages is left to 
individual members of the kin-center community. The kin-center is transformed in 
these associations into an idea that helps to create and maintain community among the 
members of the kin-center community in Singapore quite apart from its physical 
manifestation in India. 
In a way, the kin-center association is thus a peculiarly Singaporean (and 
Malaysian) phenomenon. Mines claims that “[s]ince [Tamil Muslims] never faced 
strong opposition to the pursuits of their interests, they have never formed 
associations”.304 The associations in which Tamil Muslims in Mines’s study area 
participated were based on economic interests or religion, not on kin-centers,305 
though I am aware of something like a kin-center association in Chennai, so that 
Mines’s case may not be extendable to Tamil Nadu as a whole. Yet the difference 
                                                 
304 Mines 1983: 116. 
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between Singapore and India seems to be that at some point in history, kin-center 
associations in Singapore started getting registered, providing a blueprint for a type of 
association that was successful in public activities precisely because it could build on 
established social networks. Recent events, such as the recognition of such 
associations implicit in the cooperation of MUIS with various kin-center associations, 
have helped to stabilize this peculiar Singaporean model even further. 
 
Figure 9: Two examples from Koothanallur of mansions built partly with money remitted from 
places like Singapore and the Gulf States (Photos: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
Yet while the kin-center concept is very much alive in Singapore, at the same time it 
is being claimed that the parochialism represented by the concept and the kin-center 
associations is outdated and undermining the unity of the larger imagined community 
of Indian Muslims.306 How this discourse is played out in the institutional context will 
be discussed in chapter 6. Several of my respondents claimed that it was difficult to 
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get young people interested in participating in kin-center activities and associations. 
Some, but certainly not all, younger Tamil Muslims themselves declared that they 
were not able to identify with the concept and preferred to cut any ties with India 
whatsoever. Few of the younger people have actually been to the kin-center, and have 
only hazy, largely negative, notions and prejudices what the ‘ancestral village’ was 
like.307 Those younger people who actually visit their kin-center are often surprised by 
its appearance, such as in the case of one respondent who was struck by the large 
mansions in his kin-center, built by successive generations of successful migrant 
merchants [Figure 9]. Yet even if the physical kin-center has very little meaning for 
today’s Singaporean youth, the associations see participation of teenagers in activities, 
and the Tenkasi association even has a football team organized by the youth 
subcommittee of that association. Thus, a reduction of identification with the Indian 
kin-center does not necessarily have to result in a reduction of the importance of kin-
center associations, a further indicator of how far the idea of the kin-center has 
become divorced from its physical location in the Singaporean context. 
 
Religious Differences 
Beside the distinctions of subgroup and kin-center, there are a few religious 
distinctions that also bear on the construction of community and difference among 
Singaporean Tamil Muslims. The most basic is the distinction of the two law-schools 
of Sunnite Islam that Tamil Muslims belong to, the ḥanafī and shāfi‘ī schools. The 
                                                 
307 The term ‘village’, often used with regard to kin-centers, is misleading. It is obviously used to 
render the Tamil term ūr, which, depending on the context, can mean anything from a hamlet to a 
nation-state. Yet it is clear that the associations of the English term ‘village’ with a small, rural and 
somewhat backward settlement often inform the images kept by Singaporeans about their ancestor’s 
home; but ‘village’ is hardly a proper description for a municipality like Kadayanallur, which in 2001 
had 75,604 inhabitants; cf. 
http://www.censusindia.net/results/town.php?pl=20688&submit=Next&stad=A&state5=98765 
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presence of these two law-schools among Tamil Muslims has often been seen as the 
product of two different processes of Islamization in South India, viz. through the 
conquests of North Indian Muslim states in the case of ḥanafīs, and through Indian 
Ocean trading networks in the case of shāfi‘īs.308 There is on the whole not much 
discussion on the impact of this difference on Tamil Muslim society. Bibijan claims 
that adherents of the two law-schools freely intermarry in Singapore, with either both 
spouses remaining with their respective law-schools, or the ḥanafī partner turning 
shāfi‘ī.309
Discussions of the difference between the two law-schools in the Singaporean 
context usually do not touch upon the manifestations of that difference among Tamil 
Muslims themselves, but rather ‘ethnicize’ the difference in law-school as a difference 
between ḥanafī Indians and shāfi‘ī Malays.310 The fact that there are practically no 
Malay or Arab ḥanafīs in Singapore makes adherence to that law-school a peculiarly 
‘Indian’ feature. Being ḥanafī plays a role in the construction of an ‘Indian’ Islam in 
Singapore. In contrast, Tamil shāfi‘īs often are assumed to be highly ‘Malayized’.311 
My respondents seemed to assume that the majority of Tamil-speaking Muslims in 
Singapore are ḥanafī, though there is practically no data to prove this. Indeed, many 
of the more prominent kin-center communities in Singapore are actually dominated 
by shāfi‘īs, such as Kadayanallur, Tenkasi, Thuckalay, Kilakkarai, Kayalpattinam, 
Thopputhurai, Karaikal, etc. 
One argument which was sometimes given to prove the higher number of ḥanafī 
Tamil Muslims in Singapore was that of six mosques employing Tamil in 
contemporary Singapore, five are ḥanafī mosques. Yet indeed, the case of the 
                                                 
308 Fanselow 1989: 265-73. 
309 Bibijan 1976/77: 113-4. 
310 Cf. Mariam 1989: 103-4; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 61-2. 
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mosques is a showcase of how structural constraints impact identity discourse 
regarding Tamil Muslims in Singapore. First, as has been mentioned in chapter 2, 
seven mosques were founded by Tamil Muslims in the prewar period, of which only 
one was a ḥanafī mosque, viz. the Masjid Abdul Gafoor. Of the six shāfi‘ī mosques of 
that period, only two are nowadays still associated with Tamil,312 showing that Tamil 
shāfi‘ī mosques in Singapore were always in the danger of getting Malayized, while 
ḥanafī mosques were not. Second, of the five ḥanafī mosques in contemporary 
Singapore, only the Masjid Abdul Gafoor was founded as a mosque for Tamil 
ḥanafīs. Three of the other ḥanafī mosques were founded by or for the benefit of 
North Indians and Iranians, yet they have become Tamilized over the years. Finally, 
the Masjid Al-Abrar, though originally shāfi‘ī, received a ḥanafī Imam in the 
1980s.313 The larger number of ḥanafī mosques among the Tamil mosques of 
Singapore is thus not because of a majority of ḥanafīs among Tamil Muslims, but 
because of factors limiting the role of Tamil in the Malay-dominated shāfi‘ī domain, 
but strengthening it in the Indian-dominated ḥanafī domain. This in turn has 
intensified the identification of Tamil Muslims with the ḥanafī law-school in public 
discourse.  
The shāfi‘ī – ḥanafī distinction also plays a role in stereotyping.314 One of the 
most important aspects of this is food; my respondents told me that seafood like crabs, 
squid, and mussels were prohibited according to ḥanafī law,315 but permitted to 
shāfi‘īs. In the words of one Indian-born ḥanafī respondent: “They [the shāfi‘īs; T.T.] 
                                                 
312 These are the Masjid Jamae Chulia and the Masjid Al-Abrar; regarding the subsequent fate of the 
latter, see below. 
313 This was done to protect the Indian character of the mosque – it would have been difficult to justify 
bringing a shāfi‘ī Imam from India, because there are many shāfi‘ī Imams available in Singapore. Yet 
these Imams are all Malay, and so it was seen as more prudent to get an Indian ḥanafī Imam instead; cf. 
Mariam 1989: 103-4. 
314 Cf. also Mines 1978: 161. 
315 According to one respondent who is a religious scholar, they are makrūh taḥrīm, ‘highly 
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eat that fish. Fish, especially the prawns. We are not like much [sic]. The coastal 
people eat some fish. But generally they [the fish; T.T.] are not good for health. The 
Marakkayars, they eat; the seashore people, they eat some fish. We avoid”. At least 
some ḥanafīs see this consumption of seafood by shāfi‘īs as a sign of low status 
(kēvalam), as one respondent put it. Yet such stereotyping extends to spheres other 
than food as well. One ḥanafī respondent claimed that the ḥanafī law-school was 
more tolerant. Conversely, a shāfi‘ī respondent said that he considered the shāfi‘ī law-
school was easier to follow, putting less restraints on acts like ritual prayer in his 
opinion. Interestingly, awareness of the differences between law-schools seems to be 
higher among ḥanafīs, perhaps reflecting the minority status of ḥanafīs in Singapore. 
There are a few further religious divisions that have or have had an impact on 
Tamil Muslim society in Singapore. A highly pervasive division, which we shall 
return to in chapter 6, is that between the supporters of Sufi practices and anti-Sufi 
groups. This conflict has been dividing Tamil Muslims since at least the mid-19th 
century, and it has never been resolved in any way.316 Given the highly volatile nature 
of these tensions, they nevertheless seem to have had fairly little impact on 
community formation within Tamil Muslim society; rather, the fault-line between 
these theological positions runs right through families and kin-groups. 
On the other hand, affiliation to a particular holy man did result in social divisions 
at least among Kadayanallur and Tenkasi migrants in the early 20th century, as has 
been mentioned in chapter 2. According to my respondents, shāfi‘īs in Kadayanallur 
were at that time divided into four ‘factions’ or ‘parties’ (kaṭci), viz. the ‘West Party’ 
(mēlakkaṭci), the ‘East Party’ (kīḻakkaṭci), the ‘Taṅkaḷ Party’317 (taṅkaḷkaṭci), and the 
                                                 
316 Cf. More 2004: 119-31. 
317 In Kerala, the term taṅkaḷ is used as the equivalent of the Arabic sayyid, denoting a descendant of 
the Prophet. Yet according to my respondents, the term had no such connotations in Kadayanallur. The 
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‘Kuṇṭūṭi Party’318 (kuṇṭūṭikaṭci).319 Each of these parties owed allegiance to a holy 
man (called taṅkaḷ by all the four parties), who resided in Kerala. The four parties 
were endogamous, and tried to outdo each other whenever possible, yet they do not 
seem to have been hierarchically ranked. In contrast, each included people from 
various subgroups, occupations, and classes, who did intermarry with each other 
within one party. In Singapore, these divisions were finally overcome with the 
registration of the unified Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim League (SKML) in 1941, 
but in Penang, they apparently persist to this day.320
Finally, a remark has to be made about the role played by claiming foreign 
descent in the structuring of Tamil Muslim society. Claims to connections or even 
descent from Middle Eastern Muslims are common elements in subgroup 
stereotyping. Some authors have suggested that such claims to Middle Eastern descent 
were linked to maintaining status boundaries, yet More has claimed that such notions 
were absent from Tamil Muslim society.321 Nevertheless, the evidence collected by 
anthropologists and British administrators suggests that foreign descent was advanced 
as status claim at least since the colonial period, when the settlement of Tamil 
Muslims in Singapore began.322 It is important not to make the mistake and 
homogenize Tamil Muslim society to an unacceptable degree. J.B.P. More is correct 
in asserting that such claims have had only a very limited impact on the creation of 
status hierarchies or larger communities in the region; it seems that they are mainly 
used to bolster already existing status, rather than to claim high status from the outset. 
                                                 
318 Perhaps derived from the town Kondotti, a Muslim-dominated town in Malappuram District, 
Kerala; cf. Miller 1992: 258. 
319 In addition to the ‘West’, ‘East’ and ‘Taṅkaḷ’ parties, Maideen also once mentions a ‘Big Party’ 
(periyakaṭci [sic]) and a ‘Small Party’ (ciṉṉakkaṭci). The ‘Kuṇṭūṭi Party’ is absent from his account; 
Meytīṉ 1989: 17, 20, 24. 
320 Personal communication from Mr. Syed Sultan, president, Persatuan Nurul Islam, on 8th of April 
2003. 
321 Bayly 1989: 80-2; Fanselow 1996: 205-10; cf. More 2004: 22-3. 
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In Singapore, one usually encounters such claims in origin myths, whereas claims to 
superior status are usually based, as will be discussed below, on distinctions in 
occupation, gender relations, language, or food. Indeed, in many cases claims to Arab 
or Turkish descent may be aimed at non-Tamil Muslims who project images of Tamil 
Muslims as low-status half-Muslims rather than at fellow Tamils.323
Linked to these claims of Middle Eastern descent is the position of descendants of 
the Prophet, known as sayyids. Indeed, there are sayyids among Tamil Muslims, yet 
there is little to suggest that sayyids in Tamil Nadu have formed separate sections of 
society.324 The important 19th century Tamil scholar Sayyid Muḥammad stated 
unequivocally that, even though the concept of ‘equality’ (kafā’a) in status between 
the husband and wife should be maintained when possible, a woman from the tribe of 
the Prophet, i.e. of high status, could nevertheless marry an Abyssinian, i.e. someone 
of low status, if both she and her guardian agreed to it.325 As a result, it is often not 
possible to tell whether a person is a sayyid or not. This process has been amplified in 
Singapore and Malaysia by what seems to be a virtual monopolization of the sayyid-
title by Arabs. As Nagata notes, Malays and Arabs mocked Indian Muslims claiming 
Arab descent as “…Indian Muslims ‘born on Friday’”.326 Most of my respondents 
who claimed descent from the Prophet revealed this fact only when the conversation 
somehow turned to the topic, and seemed not to be overly interested in projecting this 
status. Being sayyid is thus of no consequence for community-formation within Tamil 
Muslim society in Singapore. 
 
                                                 
323 Such as Urdu-speakers in 19th century North Arcot District, who claimed that the Labbai were 
descendants of their African slaves; cf. Cox 1895 (vol. 1): 206-7. 
324 Such as e.g. among Ḥaḍramī Arabs; Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 24-8. 
325 Sayyid Muḥammad 1963: 432-3; usually, marriages between sayyid women and non-sayyid men 
were rejected on the basis of the kafā’a-concept; cf. Mobini-Kesheh 1999: 25, 94. 
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Malayization 
The process of ‘Malayization’ is probably the most discussed aspect of Tamil Muslim 
social life in Singapore. Besides a full length article by Bibijan, Noorul Farha devotes 
a whole chapter to the issue, and most other authors discuss the topic in their 
treatments of Tamil Muslim society.327 Bibijan distinguishes between ‘structural’ and 
‘behavioral’ Malayization; while the former implies the complete takeover of a 
‘Malay’ identity in ideal and practice by an individual, the latter signifies the selective 
adoption of ‘Malay’ traits such as language or dress.328 Both Bibijan and Noorul 
Farha propose that Malayization forms a continuum, and that individuals are able to 
actively manipulate the degree to which they emphasize or deemphasize ‘Malayness’ 
according to the situation.329 Yet there are several problems in adopting this model of 
Malayization-by-degree which have to be addressed in order to avoid a 
misrepresentation of Tamil Muslim social and religious life in Singapore. 
The first problem is that to talk about ‘Malayization’, one first has to identify 
notions and practices as either ‘Malay’ or ‘Indian’, a process which is difficult to 
accomplish without a certain amount of essentializing. While it seems common sense 
to call the adoption of the Malay language by someone formerly speaking Tamil 
‘Malayization’, to identify a dress or a religious practice as ‘Indian’ or ‘Malay’ is a far 
more problematic issue, and reveals a lot about the assumptions the commentator 
brings to bear on the issue.330
If no ‘essential’ ethnicity is inherent in a practice, it follows that practices are 
imbued with such identities in specific contexts and by specific actors. Whereas the 
                                                 
327 Cf. Bibijan 1976/77; Mani 1992: 352-3; Mariam 1989: 109-12; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: chapter 5; 
the only author who gives the topic a very short shrift is Syed Mohamed 1973: 121. 
328 Bibijan 1976/77: 99. 
329 Bibijan 1976/77: 99; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 69-71. 
330 E.g., garlanding a couple at the wedding, which Bibijan seems to associate with ‘Malayization’, is 
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integration of certain marriage customs by Tamil Muslims is widely interpreted as a 
sign of ‘Malayization’, few would argue that the widespread adoption of Indian dishes 
such as Roti Prata by Malays has led to an ‘Indianization’ of Malay cuisine or culture. 
That the former instance is seen as transforming the actors’ culture, while the latter is 
not perceived to have that effect, has nothing to do with any inherent difference 
between the two, but rather with the meaning observers invest in these practices. In 
other words, ‘Malayization’ is more a discourse rather than a social process. 
As a result of its discursive nature, ‘Malayization’ can be a deeply contradictory 
phenomenon at a closer look. For instance, some sections of Tamil Muslim society 
perceive the ‘Tenkasis’, i.e. those Tamil Muslims coming from Tenkasi and 
Kadayanallur in former Tinnevelly District, to be more Malayized than other Tamil 
Muslims in terms of dress or even sometimes language.331 Yet in contrast, it appears 
that intermarriage with Malays is much rarer among these Tinnevelly migrants, 
mainly on account of the fact that they usually migrated with their families. Indeed, 
their engagement in supporting Tamil in the public sphere through schools or literary 
activities is much more salient than that of any other group among Singaporean Tamil 
Muslims. The claim that ‘Tenkasis’ are more Malayized than other Tamil Muslims 
seems to be made primarily by certain sections among the ḥanafī businessmen, who 
seem to intermarry less commonly with Malays than their shāfi‘ī counterparts. 
Statements about Malayization should thus not be seen as reflecting social processes 
on the ground, but rather as a means to express difference and imbue it with meaning. 
Closely connected to these expressions of difference is the fact that statements 
about the relative ‘Malayization’ of a person are usually value judgments. For 
example, the wearing of a sari is generally interpreted as a sign of a very low degree 
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of Malayization. Those who value their Indian heritage often claim that the sari is 
“…the proper attire for women”, as one respondent put it. On the other hand, Malays 
and people who are supposedly strongly Malayized often consider the wearing of the 
sari to be improper.332
Despite the attention that the topic has received, one should be cautious about its 
importance for our purposes. One interesting aspect is the fact that ‘Malayization’ 
does not seem to have been an important issue for Tamil Muslims in the colonial 
period. I have not come across any indication of the matter in the admittedly sketchy 
records of the period. Even Daud Shah, as an ‘Indian’ observer of ‘Malayan’ Tamil 
Muslims, does not make any comments on ‘Malayization’. Daud Shah’s report 
includes harsh criticisms both of Tamil Muslim traders in Malaya as well as the 
‘unrefined’ and ‘shameful’ customs (anākarikam, avamāṉam) of the Malays,333 yet he 
only mentions in passing Indians who have adopted the Malay language because they 
have been living in Malaya for ages.334 His concern is not ‘Malayization’, but the 
imitation of European culture by the majority of Indians in Malaya.335 This does of 
course not mean that in this period, there were no Indian Muslims adopting the Malay 
language or other practices now identified as ‘Malay’, but rather that there was as yet 
very little of the ‘Malayization’ discourse. Ethnic boundaries seem to have been more 
permeable in those days. An Indian Muslim could live with his Malay wife and her 
relatives in a completely Malay setting, and have his children raised as Malays, 
whereas back in India, he would reintegrate into a Tamil environment.336
                                                 
332 Cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 63-4. 
333 Tāvutṣā 1925: 341-6. 
334 Tāvutṣā 1925: 346. 
335 Tāvutṣā 1925: 344-5. 
336 That ethnic boundaries were less fixed and people may have been more free to identify as either 
Indian or Malay may be borne out by the fact that generally very few ‘Jawi Pekans’ (i.e. people of 
mixed Indian/Malay parentage) turn up in the census reports for Singapore (never more than 700), 
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Yet there is also evidence that the issue of ‘Malayization’ may be less central in 
contemporary terms as well. Many of Noorul Farha’s respondents, for instance, seem 
to have been speakers of Malay themselves.337 On the contrary, my respondents did 
rarely touch on the issue of Malayization, and then it was commonly those who spoke 
Malay rather than Tamil as their household language. The possibility that the research 
topic accounts for these differences should not be neglected – after all, Noorul Farha 
dealt with identity, whereas I was more interested in religious practice. As a 
phenomenon creating difference in Singaporean Tamil Muslim Society, Malayization 
can be neglected. Malayization does not lead to the formation of distinct 
‘communities’ within Tamil Muslim society, but only outside it – to identify as a 
distinct ‘Malayized’ group of Indian Muslims usually means to break with any 
identification as Tamil Muslims. Individuals considered to be highly ‘Malayized’ can 
of course opt to remain part of, e.g., a kin-center community, and claims to greater or 
lesser ‘Malayization’ may be employed in the stereotyping of communities. But in 
these cases, the ‘Malayization’ discourse serves to bolster claims to difference rather 
than cause that difference in the first place. 
 
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND THE QUESTION OF CASTE 
 
The foregoing discussion should have made it clear that despite the existence of 
unifying elements and a common discourse on ‘Indian Muslim’ identity, differences 
between various groups of Tamil-speaking and indeed other Indian Muslims are not 
only recognized, but indeed have an impact on the organization of social and religious 
life and on the imagination of community. Furthermore, such differences often reify 
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and are reified by notions of hierarchy and social stratification. To put it differently, 
differences in occupation or domestic behavior are employed to argue the supposed 
superiority or inferiority of a group, and the resulting ranking serves to underscore the 
differences existing between groups. 
Despite attempts to do so by some authors and their respondents,338 it is 
practically impossible to draw up a representative list of ranked groups. The reasons 
for this are manifold. First of all, different respondents name different groups. For 
example, one of Noorul Farha’s respondents mentioned ‘Marican’ and ‘Sahib’ as 
status-groups, while both these groups were missing in the response of Mariam’s 
informants.339 Secondly, even if there is agreement on the inclusion of a group, the 
status ascribed to that group can vary tremendously. Thus, Mariam’s respondents 
named the ‘Rowther’ as one of the two top ‘Indian Muslim’ ‘castes’, while Noorul 
Farha’s respondents claimed that this group were laborers of lower descent.340 
Practically the only thing that respondents seem to agree upon is to assign a low status 
to ‘Tenkasis’. Indeed, the very characteristics that are seen as evidence of low status 
by one person may indicate high status for another. For one of Mariam’s respondents, 
a ḥanafī ‘Pathan’,341 speaking or at least knowing Urdu was a sign of high status,342 
whereas one of my respondents from coastal Tamil Nadu actually sneered at Urdu-
speaking South Indians.  
As will be obvious from the foregoing, there is also great variation in the way 
hierarchy is being argued, yet a few important constants emerge. One prominent basis 
for claiming superior status is confirming to religious standards. Thus, one respondent 
                                                 
338 E.g. Mariam 1989: 105-9; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 43-6. 
339 Cf. Mariam 1989: 109; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 45. 
340 Mariam 1989: 109; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 45. 
341 A term used in parts of Tamil Nadu to denote Urdu-speakers of supposedly Afghan descent; cf. 
Fanselow 1989: 281-3. 
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told me that among the reasons why ‘Tenkasis’ were considered to be of lower status 
was that their women worked in public as spice-sellers and that they ate ‘prohibited’ 
seafood. Interestingly, as we have seen, the consumption of certain seafood is seen as 
absolutely proper by members of the shāfi‘ī law-school, to which most Muslims from 
Tenkasi and Kadayanallur belong. Implicit in marking this feature as low status is a 
claim to the superiority of the ḥanafī law-school. The question of women’s ‘modesty’ 
also underlies many constructions of hierarchy. Women’s dress and their visibility in 
public were mentioned fairly frequently by my respondents as factors influencing the 
ascription of high or low status.343 This factor may also partly explain why Malays 
and ‘Malayized’ Indians are ascribed a low status by some Tamil Muslims. Already 
Daud Shah harshly criticized the ‘loose’ behavior of Malay women.344 One 
respondent told that Tamil Muslim women used to walk about fully veiled when he 
was younger, while Malay women did not even cover their hair. “Now both wear a 
headscarf, but no veil – we have met in the middle”. At least some sections among the 
Tamil Muslims seem to have the opinion that Malay and ‘Malayized’ Indian women 
are too visible in public. These concerns about religious propriety as a marker of 
status reminds one of what Fanselow has termed ‘competitive Islamization’ with 
reference to an article by Mines.345 Both authors see ‘Islamization’ among Tamil 
Muslims as a result of status competition, with more highly ‘Islamized’ individuals 
occupying higher ranks. Yet they fail to take into account that the standards of what is 
considered ‘proper’ Islamic behavior may vary amongst groups, e.g. perceiving 
seafood as either proper or improper. Status gained through ‘Islamizing’ is thus 
always in danger of being destabilized by varying interpretations of Islam. 
                                                 
343 Cf. Mariam 1989: 106-8. 
344 Tāvutṣā 1925: 343. 
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Besides religious propriety, various other factors play a role in determining status. 
Occupation plays an important role. It is this notion that obviously underlies the 
attempts to portray Tamil Muslims as a mercantile community as a whole, and which 
at times engenders emphatic denials of the presence of menial laborers among the 
earliest migrants.346 Yet another, more diffuse category is ‘cultural refinement’.347 
This category partly informs notions about the propriety of certain dress-habits and 
foods, as well as ideas about language. As mentioned, some Tamil Muslims 
(predominantly ḥanafīs) consider Urdu a more refined (and more ‘Islamic’) language 
than Tamil. Among Tamil-speakers, dialectal variation and the influence of the 
‘Singapore linguistic area’ (i.e., the presence of particles like lah in an individual’s 
spoken Tamil) similarly serve as indicators of refinement and status. One respondent 
noted that people from her kin-center considered the spoken Tamil of ‘Tenkasis’ to be 
deviating from their own, ‘pure’ Tamil.348
In what way do these status hierarchies impact social life among Tamil Muslims 
in Singapore? Their influence is most visible in the sphere of marriage. This emerged 
clearly both from the statements of my own respondents as well as the information 
presented in the works of other authors.349 Status-groups are often claimed to be 
endogamous, yet marriages between members of different groups of roughly the same 
status occur.350 More importantly, the statements of various respondents indicate that 
it is not so much endogamy, but hypergamy351 that characterizes marriage 
arrangements among Tamil Muslims.352 This is not unimportant in the discussion 
                                                 
346 Cf. also Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 45. 
347 Cf. Mariam 1989: 108; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 44. 
348 Cf. also Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 44. 
349 Cf. Mariam 1989: 106-7; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 43-5. 
350 Cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 45. 
351 I.e. the prohibition for a woman to marry below her status, whereas men may opt for a wife of lower 
status. 
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about the existence of caste among Singaporean Tamil Muslims that we will consider 
shortly. Status considerations also impact the social networks of individuals. Most 
importantly for our purposes, it may restrain a person’s choice of participating in 
certain religious activities, if these happen to be organized by a lower status-group. 
Thus, one respondent told me how her father had tried to stop her brother from 
participating in an important Singaporean Muslim organization because most of its 
members were Malays and low status Indians. 
This brings us to the one question that has vexed discussions of Tamil Muslims in 
India and Singapore, viz. whether social stratification among Tamil Muslims can be 
said to constitute caste. Regarding India, I am not aware of any scholar explicitly 
arguing for the existence of caste among Tamil Muslims. At the same time, only 
Mines and Fanselow actually employed methodologies to test their assumptions 
regarding this issue.353 Indeed, Fanselow’s argument is highly important for our 
purposes, because it has a direct bearing on the Singaporean case. He argues that to 
ask whether Muslims have caste simply means to ask the wrong question. From the 
anthropologist’s point of view, the outcome of the answer is determined by the 
definition of caste employed. Yet because the concept of caste “…was developed into 
a ‘gate-keeping’ concept of Hindu civilisation…”,354 to state that Muslims have caste 
is often perceived by Muslims themselves as a claim that ‘Muslims are Hindus’, 
which is either seen as paradoxical or as offensive.355 Indeed, the accusation of trying 
to maintain caste in an Islamic society was leveled by low status communities against 
those Tamil Muslims who claimed higher status.356
                                                 
353 Fanselow 1996; Mines 1972a: 27-8. 
354 Fanselow 1996: 224. 
355 This explains the harsh reactions of scholars like More and Syed Mohamed against suggestions of 
Tamil Muslim castes or even stratification; cf. More 2004: 22-3; Syed Mohamed 1973: 27-8. 
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What does that mean in the Singapore context? The notion that there are castes 
among Indian Muslims is in fact not only asserted by some studies, but actually 
enjoys a certain circulation in the general population. A Malay taxi-driver once told 
me that about all he knew about the Indian Muslims was that they have castes. It is 
interesting to note that among the scholars mentioning the issue, the Indian authors 
seem to deny the existence of Indian Muslim castes at least for the contemporary 
period,357 while the Malay authors seem to affirm the relevance of at least caste-like 
stratification, though noting its decline among youngsters.358
This raises questions about how the term caste is defined by both scholars and 
respondents. Though this is an important question, for as we have seen the evaluation 
of the existence of caste changes with the definition employed, it is nowhere 
addressed in the literature. Yet it becomes immediately clear that both respondents as 
well as scholars see caste as a fundamentally ‘Indian’ or ‘Hindu’ phenomenon. Social 
stratification among Tamil Muslims is generally seen as the ‘vestiges’ or ‘residue’ of 
a social system brought over into Islam on conversion from Hinduism.359 The basis of 
this argument seems to be the oft repeated claim that Islam is an egalitarian religion 
and thus knows no caste.360 Consequently, the origins of Indian Muslim social 
stratification are located by respondents and scholars alike in the ‘Indian’ part of their 
heritage, and are thus identified with the caste system. This in turn leads to a 
reaffirmation of the difference of Indian Muslims from their non-Indian coreligionists 
in Singapore. 
                                                 
357 Cf. Bibijan 1976/77: 122; Syed Mohamed 1973: 27-8; Mani does not even seem to mention castes. 
358 E.g. Mariam 1989: 106-9; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 43-6. 
359 Cf. Bibijan 1976/77: 122; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 43-6. 
360 Cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 46; Syed Mohamed 1973:27-8; Fanselow has rightly criticized this 
image (present also e.g. in More 2004: 4) as “…not only a simplistic view of Muslim societies and 





CHAPTER 3: IMAGES OF COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 
Consequently, social stratification among Indian Muslims is never compared to 
that of Arabs or Malays. Yet many of the features of that stratification, especially the 
tendency towards hypergamy rather than endogamy, actually seem to indicate an 
impact of the Muslim legal concept of kafā’a on ranking among Indian Muslims.361 It 
is noteworthy that one of just two references to caste in connection with Indian 
Muslims in the colonial Law Reports relates to kafā’a: An Arab girl intended to marry 
an Indian Muslim against the wishes of her uncle and guardian. The judge noted that 
the Indian husband would be inferior to the Arab wife “…in point of caste, she being 
the daughter of an Arab father,…”.362 What is surprising is that the term caste here 
applies to both Arabs and Indians, a usage that is difficult to imagine in contemporary 
Singapore. The answer to the question about the presence of caste among Tamil and 
other Indian Muslims in Singapore thus has to be rephrased. What is important is not 
to ask whether there is caste or not, but to notice the impact that racial and religious 
stereotyping has on the discourse concerning Tamil Muslim society in Singapore, a 
feature that we will encounter again in chapter 6. 
                                                 
361 It is striking that any discussion of kafā’a seems to be absent in the historical and anthropological 
literature on Tamil Muslims. J.B.P. More appears to be vaguely aware of it, but denies that it existed 
among Tamil Muslims, thereby completely ignoring the evidence from Tamil Muslim religious 
literature such as Sayyid Muḥammad’s statement mentioned above; cf. More 2004: 22. 
362 Kyshe 1885: 422; the other mention of caste in the Law Reports is from the English translation of a 
French translation (!) of a Tamil will executed in Karaikal, in which the testator calls himself 
“…Chulia by caste…”; S.S.L.R. 1940: 75. ‘Choulia’ was the census category for Tamil-speaking 
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Chapter 4 








The religious life of Tamil Muslims in Singapore does not exist in an institutional 
vacuum. Rather, there is a plethora of institutions, associations and fraternities which 
structure, organize, perform, and contest religious activities. To understand the 
debates and tensions about religion and religious activities among Tamil Muslims in 
the republic, the institutional framework has to be delineated and the key players in it 
have to be identified. The various agencies and associations in this framework are 
interlinked by a complex network of formal and informal connections between their 
members, and have to interact and cooperate with or contest each other at various 
levels. It is at the interstices between the various groups that the outlines of a 
distinctive religious life of Singapore Tamil Muslims are formulated and debated. 
One of the central actors in this organizing framework is the Singaporean state. 
The state actually defines the rules and boundaries of ‘proper’ interaction between 
different religious groups by framing public policies with regard to religion. But the 
state does not only provide the legal framework for organizing religious activities, it is 
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Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS), or Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. 
As the single most important institution with regard to Muslim public life in the 
republic, practically all associations and fraternities organizing religious activities 
have to engage and interact with MUIS. 
Besides MUIS, there are a number of institutions closely linked to MUIS and 
other state agencies. Mosques play a central role in providing services and activities to 
Tamil Muslims, especially a number of so-called ‘Indian’ mosques, where activities 
are usually conducted in South Asian languages. Another important body in the 
administration of Muslims and Islam in Singapore is the self-help organization 
MENDAKI (Majlis Pendidikan Anak-Anak Islam, or Council on Education for 
Muslim Children). Though primarily concerned with secular education, MENDAKI 
has had an important, though largely negative, impact on the formation of the 
Federation of Indian Muslims (FIM) in 1992. 
Yet existing beside these state- and state-sponsored bodies and organizations is a 
large number of more independent associations which have an impact on Islamic 
religious life and activities in Singapore. Most of these organizations, with a few 
exceptions, are dominated by Muslims of Malay and Arab descent. In contrast to 
these, and of prime importance for Tamil Muslim religious life in Singapore, are 
various Indian Muslim associations, reflecting different ethnic, social and religious 
backgrounds. Of particular importance among these are several associations based in 
and catering to different kin-center communities. Finally, there exist more informal 
fraternities and religious groups which organize religious activities for their members 
and adherents. Most prominent among these are Sufi brotherhoods, which form an 
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These different groups and institutions interact with each other in various ways. 
MUIS is in close contact with the FIM, and both the Indian mosques as well as the 
larger associations receive funding from this source. Members of the different 
associations visit each other’s functions, and mosques often serve as venues for 
activities organized by Indian Muslim associations. Individual members may actually 
be active in different organizations, and complicated networks of friendship and 
kinship interlink institutions, associations and informal brotherhoods. 
 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF ISLAM IN SINGAPORE – HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
The Administration of Islam in Singapore before World War II 
The system of administrating Islam and Muslim practice current in Singapore has not 
come into being overnight. Rather, it grew out of practices and policies of the British 
colonial period, and to a much lesser degree of the short period between 1963 and 
1965 when Singapore was part of Malaysia. Several issues of contention between the 
Tamil Muslims and the Singaporean administration actually result from decisions 
taken during the colonial period. A survey of British administrative policies with 
regard to Islam in Singapore is therefore necessary to understand some of the 
contemporary disputes.363
Muslims were a minority in most of the Straits Settlements with the exception of 
Province Wellesley during most of the colonial period, and in contrast to the Malay 
states, there was no established system of administration and legislation relating to 
Muslims in either Penang, Malacca or Singapore. This situation exercised an 
important influence on the way the development of British policy towards Muslims 
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and Islamic institutions did develop. Firstly, due to the large number of Chinese in the 
Straits Settlements, there was greater urgency to adjust policies towards Chinese 
social practice than to create a coherent administrative and legal policy towards 
Muslim practice.364
Secondly, the British policy tended to be aimed at ‘races’ or ‘nations’ rather than 
religions almost from the founding of the Straits Settlements. Muslims were thus 
separated into Malays, ‘Klings’, and other ethnic groups.365 Administrative measures 
tended to be taken with regard to race rather than religion, even though, as the director 
of the 1931 census noted, most of the Asian population of Singapore had “…no clear 
conception of race, and commonly regard[s] religion as the most important, if not the 
determinant, element”.366  
Finally, due to the absence of a local Muslim political order in the Straits 
Settlements, the British felt no compulsion to institute a separate law for Muslims as 
they did in India. Even though the Straits Settlements had been subject to the 
Governor-General of India until 1867, the Anglo-Muhammadan law as practiced in 
India was not considered to be generally applicable there. Though judges were 
prepared to make exceptions in cases where English law clashed with local realities 
and would cause undue hardship, “…the propriety of general application [of English 
law; T.T.] was never in question”.367 This led to a rather confusing situation in which 
matters relating to marriage, divorce and intestacy were often settled according to 
Muslim practice, but all other cases according to English law, a practice that came to 
be criticized harshly in the later 19th century.368 The legislature did subsequently pass 
                                                 
364 Cf. Yegar 1979: 95. 
365 Cf. Nagata 1993:518-22; Yegar 1979: 146; for the construction of Malays as a ‘race’ see Reid 2004: 
10-8.  
366 Vlieland 1932: 73. 
367 Hooker 1984: 87; cf. Yegar 1979: 128-30. 
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bills and ordinances that regulated the application of Muslim law in an English 
framework, but the application of Muslim law in the Straits Settlements extended to 
less spheres than in India or the Malay states. 
It is not necessary to go into the details of British administration and legislation 
with regard to Islam and Muslims in the Straits Settlements here. It will suffice to 
outline the most important developments in the administrative sphere. The first major 
legislation with regard to the administration of Islamic practices in the Colony was the 
Mahomedan Marriage Ordinance of 1880, which regulated the registration of 
marriages and divorces and the effect of marriage on women’s property.369 In 1908, 
this ordinance was replaced by the Muhammadan Marriage Ordinance, which made 
the registration of marriage and divorce compulsory, and extended the authority of 
Muslim judges. It furthermore provided for the appointment of a ‘Registrar of 
Muhammadan Marriages’ in each of the three major towns of the Straits 
Settlements.370 In 1936 a chief judge was appointed, but Muslim requests for the 
appointment of a muftī, i.e. an official charged with giving fatwās, ‘legal opinions’, 
were not conceded until the independence of Singapore. 
But legislation did not remain limited to matrimonial matters. The Mahomedan 
and Hindu Endowment Ordinance of 1905 made possible the setup of the 
Mahomedan and Hindu Endowment Board a year later. The Board’s main powers 
consisted in taking over the administration of an endowment when it either seemed to 
be mismanaged, there were no trustees appointed for the endowment, or the Board felt 
that the endowment would benefit from being administered by the Board. 
Furthermore, it could enquire into the management of any endowment, and request 
written accounts. Though the Board was concerned with Muslim and Hindu religious 
                                                 
369 Ahmad 1965: 17-8; Hooker 1984: 95-6; Yegar 1979: 149-50. 
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endowments, no Muslims or Hindus were appointed to it until 1948. The Mahomedan 
and Hindu Endowment Ordinance survived virtually unchanged371 until the 
independence of Singapore and the passing of the AMLA in 1966.372
It has already been mentioned in chapter 2 that Tamil Muslim notions often 
collided with British understandings of endowments. Even before the establishment of 
the Mahomedan and Hindu Endowment Board, this became apparent with regard to 
the practice of creating trusts for kantūris, and it is even more obvious when we 
consider the endowments that were taken over by the Mahomedan and Hindu 
Endowment Board in the course of time. The Jamae Mosque Endowment, for 
instance, was lost to the Board due to the circulatory regime of its trustees – trustees 
left to India without informing the administration, which led to the discontinuing of 
accounts and general mismanagement. The endowments and the proper use of the 
funds generated by them are still points of contention between Tamil Muslims and 
MUIS, as will be discussed in chapter 6.373
A further important development was the establishment of the Muhammadan 
Advisory Board in Singapore on 10th of June 1915. The immediate reason for this 
move was the so-called ‘Singapore Mutiny’ of the 5th Indian Light Infantry regiment 
in February 1915, which consisted exclusively of North Indian Muslims.374 The main 
purpose of the board was to advise the government on matters pertaining to Muslims, 
but it had no power beyond the issuing of recommendations. Furthermore, it met with 
opposition from some quarters of the Muslim community. The advisory function of 
                                                 
371 Except for the replacement of ‘Mahomedan’ with ‘Muslim’ and the extension of the Board’s 
responsibilities to the Parsi religion; cf. Ahmad 1965: 41-2. 
372 Ahmad 1965: 41-2; Hooker 1984: 101; Siddique 1986: 323; Yegar 1979: 205-7. 
373 Ahmad 1965: 44. 
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the board makes it to some degree the forerunner of MUIS, though it was never to 
achieve the dominance in Muslim affairs that MUIS yields nowadays.375
This survey of British policies with regard to Islam and Muslims in the Straits 
Settlements reveals that there was no coherent policy taken towards Islam and 
Muslims in the prewar period. While marriage and endowments were regulated, other 
aspects, such as the alms tax (zakāt) or religious education, were not. Yet even though 
many of the administrative measures taken during the British period were piecemeal, 
they have had a significant impact on further policies regarding Muslim affairs in 
Singapore. 
 
The Administration of Islam in Postwar Singapore 
Despite the far-reaching changes in the administrative setup of Singapore after 
Japanese occupation, developing from crown colony to part of Malaysia to 
independent nation, “Singapore’s constitutional history has had no effect on the 
Muslim law administered in the State”.376 When the British regained possession of 
Singapore, they reinstated those bodies which had already administered Muslim 
affairs in pre-war Singapore. The Muhammadan Advisory Board, then renamed 
Muslim Advisory Board, and the Mahomedan and Hindu Endowment Board, 
similarly renamed Muslim and Hindu Endowments Board in 1952, were reconstituted. 
In 1948, two members of the Muslim and Hindu communities, respectively, were 
finally admitted to the Board. By 1965, the Board consisted of three Muslims, three 
Hindus, a Parsi, and the Public Trustee, who acted as secretary.377 The only major 
piece of legislation in this period was the Muslims Ordinance of 1957. This 
Ordinance regulated the setting up of a Shariah Court, centralized the appointment of 
                                                 
375 Siddique 1986: 323; Yegar 1979: 99-100, 104-5. 
376 Hooker 1984: 102. 
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Muslim Registrars and Judges, and regulated the registration of marriages and 
divorces. The Court’s languages were to be English or Malay, thus excluding Arabic 
and South Asian languages from its dealings.378
As M.B. Hooker has stated, “[t]he main achievement of the Ordinance was to 
transfer Muslim family law matters from a secular European judiciary to a Muslim 
Court staffed by persons whose qualifications were religious rather than purely legal 
in the technical sense”.379 With the setting up of the Shariah Court, most of the 
different ingredients that would be combined in the Administration of Muslim Law Act 
(AMLA) in 1966 were in place, even though few could have foreseen in the 1960s 
what impact this Act would have on Muslim practice in Singapore. Indeed, the 
passing of the AMLA in 1966 was in many ways the logical outcome of an 
administrative system long in the making. The AMLA combined the Muslim 
Advisory Board, the Muslim section of the Muslim and Hindu Endowments Board, 
and the provisions of the Muslims Ordinance, and added several new elements like 
the office of the Mufti to create a comprehensive body for the administration of Islam 
and Muslims in independent Singapore. 
Though the AMLA was the result of a provision which Singapore agreed to on 
joining Malaysia, the Singaporean government nevertheless thought it wise to 
implement the Act after the immediate cause for its implementation disappeared with 
Singapore’s secession from Malaysia in 1965.380 The fact that Singapore’s neighbors 
Malaysia and Indonesia are both predominantly Muslim countries, whose national 
languages are variants of the Malay language, certainly influenced the government’s 
                                                 
378 For details of the Muslims Ordinance, see Hooker 1984: 102-9. 
379 Hooker 1984: 109. 




CHAPTER 4: THE ORGANIZATION OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 
decision to clearly define the domain of Muslim law and to establish a single body for 
the administration of Singapore’s largely Malay-speaking Muslim community.381
The main provision of the AMLA was the constitution of the Majlis Ugama Islam 
Singapura (MUIS), or Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, to advise the President 
of Singapore on matters pertaining to Islam as well as to fulfill the administrative 
functions described in the act. The Council consists of a President,382 the Mufti of 
Singapore, up to five members who are appointed on the recommendation of the 
Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, and at least seven members who are appointed 
from a list of nominees nominated by Muslim societies in Singapore. Members must 
be Muslims above the age of 25 who are Singaporean citizens. 
A large part of the AMLA is dedicated to provisions regarding Muslim marriage, 
divorce and property, detailing the powers of the Shariah Court and providing for the 
appointment of a Registrar of Muslim Marriages,383 and detailing the responsibilities 
of Muslim judges. New is the introduction of the office of Mufti, who is appointed by 
the President of Singapore after consultation with the Council, and the setup of a 
Legal Committee which is charged with the task of issuing fatwās. Another new 
aspect is the compulsory registration of conversions to Islam. 
The AMLA also makes MUIS heir to the Muslim and Hindu Endowments Board 
by vesting in it all property held under Muslim charitable trusts and by appointing 
MUIS to administer such trusts under much the same provisions as those enacted by 
the Mahomedan and Hindu Endowment Ordinance. Much the same rules apply for 
mosques, which are all to be administered by MUIS. No new mosque may be erected 
in Singapore without written permission by MUIS. Control of religious schools and 
their curricula by MUIS is another important activity provided for in the AMLA, and 
                                                 
381 Cf. Metzger 2003: 34. 
382 The current MUIS President is Mohammad Alami Musa, who took over the office in 2003. 
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the Council has the right to close down any schools that do not operate in a 
satisfactory manner. Furthermore, the AMLA provides for the establishment of a 
General Endowments Fund administered by MUIS. In contrast to the situation in the 
colonial period, it also makes MUIS the sole collector of zakāt in Singapore, and 
charges it to dispose of this capital in accordance with Muslim law.384 MUIS has since 
developed into the main administrative body dealing with Islam in Singapore. 
 
NON-ETHNIC MUSLIM INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) 
When MUIS was set up in 1968 “…few foresaw the hegemonic role which MUIS 
would play in the development of the Muslim community in Singapore…”.385 Since 
its inception, MUIS has steadily established control over most aspects of Muslim 
public life in Singapore, including domains that had not been part of the original 
AMLA. The transformation of MUIS from an understaffed statutory board to the 
dominant Islamic institution in Singapore is best exemplified by the development of 
the Mosque Building Fund (MBF) and the administration of mosques.386 Until the 
early 1970s, most mosques were small structures that were managed by the local 
Muslim communities they served.387 Yet the development of new housing estates by 
the Housing and Development Board (HDB) since the early 1960s dispersed 
traditional communities and created the need for new mosques.388 After some 
unsuccessful attempts to raise money from the local communities, the AMLA was 
                                                 
384 Detailed descriptions of the AMLA and its provisions can be found in Hooker 1984: 110-8 and Siraj 
1967. 
385 Siddique 1986: 326. 
386 General overviews of this topic are Che Man 1991: 12-4; Metzger 2003: 40-3; Siddique 1986: 327-
8; Tyabji 1991a: 207-17; Zuraidah 1994: 59-64. 
387 Cf. Siddique 1986: 327. 
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amended in 1975 to establish the MBF. Under this scheme, Muslim employees could 
pay 50 cents per month of their contributions to the Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
into the MBF, which was later raised to S$1, even though many Muslims voluntarily 
contribute more to the fund.389
The first ‘new-generation’ mosque was inaugurated in April 1977. By the end of 
2004, 21 mosques have been constructed with money from the MBF. A MUIS 
publication proudly proclaimed the MBF to be the “jewel in MUIS’ crown”.390 While 
many Singaporean publications stress the success of the ‘self-help’ policy represented 
by the MBF, it should not be overlooked that this success has been predicated on the 
strong support of the government for the scheme, for example by supplying land for 
the mosques at nominal prices.391
MUIS furthermore was able to establish control over the remaining ‘old-
generation’ mosques. MUIS has continuously assisted in renovating, upgrading, or in 
some cases even reconstructing existing mosques. Several funds are maintained by 
MUIS to assist in the maintenance of both ‘old-’ and ‘new-generation’ mosques, 
though donations play an important role in the renovation and maintenance of 
mosques in Singapore, especially in the case of ‘new-generation’ mosques which have 
no waqf properties set aside for their maintenance.392 Yet nevertheless, MUIS’s 
funding and control over the endowments attached to some of the older mosques 
serve to reinforce the control MUIS exerts over the mosques. 
Each mosque is managed by a Board of Management. The members of these 
boards, as well as the Imam, are appointed by MUIS and can be removed from their 
office if MUIS perceives their performance as unsatisfactory. This allows MUIS to 
                                                 
389 Zuraidah 1994: 62; the CPF is a compulsory retirement scheme formed by monthly deductions from 
an individual’s income. 
390 Zuraidah 1994: 59. 
391 Tyabji 1991a: 207; Zuraidah 1994: 62. 
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remove anybody from his or her post who does not comply with official policies. 
Given its potential for shaping public opinion, MUIS also exerts strong control over 
the Friday sermon (khuṭba). MUIS determines the topic for each week’s sermon and 
provides a basic text, and while the preachers may write their own sermons in 
accordance with MUIS’s guidelines and add to and embellish the MUIS text, in many 
mosques this text is simply read out.393
Despite the strong amount of control exercised over the mosques by MUIS, the 
mosques are given greater freedom in organizing a host of activities and events. 
Individual mosques may furthermore establish links with one or the other independent 
association. In this regard, mosques are independent actors in the organization and 
administration of Islam in Singapore, as we shall discuss below. Nevertheless, MUIS 
maintains the sovereignty over mosques and their activities, and is able to interfere 
with their affairs at any time. 
The management of endowments presents a slightly different picture. In 2001, 
MUIS managed just 53 of 90 Muslim endowments registered.394 Yet until the early 
1990s, not much development had taken place. In 1985, MUIS managed just eight 
endowments under the ‘Wakaf Fund’.395 It was not until the late 1980s that plans to 
improve the existing waqf properties became more tangible, and the first endowment 
was redeveloped in 1991. Redevelopment had actually been hindered by existing 
legislation, especially the Control of Rent Act which tied down the rental rates of 
waqf properties. The repealing of this act in 2001 and the amendment of the AMLA in 
1999 have allowed MUIS to extensively develop its properties and to raise their value 
                                                 
393 Che Man 1991: 13-4; Metzger 2003: 43-4. 
394 “Did You Know… What Is a Wakaf?”, Warita Kita 132, Mar-Apr 2001: 2. The most important 
organization managing Islamic endowments in Singapore besides MUIS is the Muslimin Trust Fund 
Association (MTFA), cf. Ahmad 1965: 47-9; Tyabji 1991a: 224-5. 
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significantly.396 The Kassim Fund, for example, was developed at an expenditure of 
S$25 million.397 Whereas this fund generated a surplus of just S$106,804 in 1996, 





















Total value of Wakaf and Trust Funds
Figure 10: Total value of MUIS Wakaf and Trust Funds 1988-2003 (Source: MUIS Annual 
Reports 1988-2003) 
 
MUIS’s success in managing charitable endowments can be glimpsed from the 
development of the total value of the Wakaf and Trust Funds. From 1988, when 
several funds which were then kept separate as Miscellaneous Funds were added to 
the Wakaf Funds, until 1998, the value of the funds kept on rising. From 1999, it fell 
again due to the redevelopment of several endowments, for which money from the 
funds was spent [Figure 10]. The value can be expected to rise again with the 
completion of the redevelopment projects. Yet it should also not be forgotten that this 
                                                 
396 Metzger 2003: 60-1; Tyabji 1991a: 206; “Wakaf Awakening”, Warita Kita 132, Mar-Apr 2001:  3. 
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success was only possible after legal reforms. That even MUIS with its governmental 
backing was not able to develop properties before these legal reforms were effected 
should make us more cautious when assessing reports of the earlier ‘mismanagement’ 
of endowments. 
As has already been pointed out, there was no centralized effort on part of the 
state to collect zakāt in the pre-independence period, and MUIS thus had to develop 
mechanisms for its collection from scratch. These mechanisms were established 
during the late 1960s-early 1970s, by drawing upon the expertise of similar 
institutions in Malaysia and other parts of the world.399 While payment of the zakāt 
al-fiṭra400 has been made statutory, payment of the ordinary zakāt is not, and MUIS is 
apparently not satisfied with the numbers of Muslims paying zakāt to it. It should be 
pointed out that failing to pay zakāt to MUIS does not mean that a person does not 
pay zakāt at all. Individual Muslims, including Indians, still seem to prefer paying the 
tax to a recipient of their choice.401
The control over full- or part-time religious schools and madrasas was already 
part of the original AMLA in 1966, but amendments made in 1990 apparently gave 
MUIS more powers over the structure and organization of these institutions which are 
officially regulated by the Ministry of Education.402 Efforts have been made to 
regulate the management of the madrasas, to standardize curricula, and to raise the 
quality of teachers. Most of this effort is directed towards the six full-time madrasas 
which exist in Singapore.403 Much attention has been paid to ensure that madrasa 
                                                 
399 Cf. Zuraidah 1994: 57. 
400 An obligatory gift made annually on the occasion of the ‘Īd al-Fiṭr at the end of the fasting-month of 
Ramadan, usually called simply fitrah in Malay. 
401 Metzger 2003: 61-2; Tyabji 1991a: 200-3; cf. also Mak 2000: 37-8. 
402 Zuraidah 1994: 72. 
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education remains compatible with non-religious education, and that students can 
switch to state-based schools if they wish so.404  
MUIS is furthermore active in several other spheres, such as missionary activities, 
coordination of the pilgrimage, and ḥalāl certification.405 In addition to its domestic 
activities, MUIS has also linked up with various international bodies, especially the 
Meeting of Ministers of Religious Affairs of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore (MABIMS). MABIMS is a forum which allows these four Southeast Asian 
states to coordinate their religious policies with regard to Islam, such as determining 
the date for Islamic festivals or finding common lines in the administration of Muslim 
law.406 Yet it is precisely MUIS’s involvement with MABIMS that should alert us 
again to a fundamental aspect of MUIS’s existence, viz. that it is a state agency, 
administering Islam and Muslims on behalf of a non-Muslim state. It is important to 
keep this aspect in mind when analyzing the activities of MUIS. To say that Islam is 
the most heavily and most directly administered religion in Singapore is no 
exaggeration. Recently, Singapore’s Mufti has pointed out that no religion in 
Singapore has such a supreme official body except for Islam.407 MUIS’s policies have 
certainly done a lot to improve the standards of Muslim institutions in Singapore, but 
it has also allowed the state to keep a close check on all kinds of activities of which it 
disapproves. 
One important element in this control over the Muslim public sphere has 
interestingly received much less attention in standard accounts of the administration 
of Islam in Singapore than mosque building or the development of endowments, viz. 
MUIS’s power to take measures against ‘false doctrines’ and ‘deviant teachings’. 
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MUIS has acted in concert with MABIMS against groups and teachings which seem 
to threaten the state and religious harmony as propounded by the state, and has 
organized a forum in 1994 on the issue.408 In recent years, tensions between MUIS 
and other sections of the Muslim community have become more pronounced, as the 
recent debates over the status of religious schools, the use of the headscarf in public 
schools or certain web-pages attest.409 As the measures taken against ‘deviating’ 
groups have until now been directed largely against groups perceived to be radical or 
terrorist, they have had relatively little impact on the Tamil Muslim community as 
Tamils, and thus are of relatively little concern for us here. Yet it should be noted that 
MUIS’s responsibilities in this regard are not limited to questions of dogma, but also 
to questions of practice. The AMLA provides for MUIS to take measures against 
persons who “…teach or publicly expound any doctrine or perform any ceremony or 
act relating to the Muslim religion in any manner contrary to the Muslim law…”.410 It 
is thus theoretically possible for MUIS to penalize Muslims for participating in 
popular religious practices which are perceived by some to violate Muslim law, or to 
take measures against groups defending such practices. This has to be kept in mind 
when we shall discuss the issue of custom and popular religious practice amongst 
Tamil Muslims in Singapore. 
 
Mosque Administration and Indian Muslims in Singapore 
As has already been mentioned, the AMLA conferred to MUIS the control over 
mosques and their managements. MUIS appoints a Board of Management in each 
mosque which manages its day-to-day activities. The Board is supposed, among other 
things, to manage the mosque and organize its activities, and to promote inter-
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religious harmony. The Board consists of nine to fifteen members. Only citizens or 
permanent residents of Singapore who are at least 21 years old and of “sound moral 
and religious character” may be appointed as members of the board. Members are 
appointed for a two years term. More important for our purposes is that the Board is 
empowered to allow “registered non-political Muslim organizations or businesses” to 
use its facilities.411
Besides their normal tasks of providing space for praying and organizing Friday 
sermons, mosques in Singapore organize a number of activities. Especially the ‘new-
generation’ mosques offer ample facilities for a wide range of activities. Conference- 
and classrooms, halls, and auditoria are part of most ‘new-generation’ mosques, and 
are increasingly added to ‘old-generation’ mosques in the context of redevelopment 
and renovation. In MUIS publications, the activities of mosques are usually grouped 
under three headings, namely ‘Educational’, ‘Religious’, and ‘Family and Welfare’. 
Educational activities include kindergartens and religious classes for both children 
and adults. Religious activities comprise of prayer and the Friday services, but also 
include special prayers during Islamic holidays, sacrifices during the month of 
Ramadan, religious lectures, and the like. Finally, Family and Welfare activities 
include the solemnization of marriages, marriage counseling, or ‘exhibitions’ on drug-
abuse.412 These activities are coordinated by MUIS, and have helped to transform 
mosques into the Islamic equivalent of the secular ‘community centers’ of Singapore. 
Indeed, one author has pointed out the danger that this development may adversely 
affect the integration of Muslims into the wider society of Singapore, as many 
                                                 
411 http://cmsweb.mosque.org.sg/English/Manual/Manual_Regulatn/Manual_Regulatn.aspx?pMenu=5 
[accessed on the 10 November 2004]. 
412 Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 1991: 9; see Mansor 1982: table 2 for the extent of participation in 
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Muslims might prefer to attend activities of their mosques rather than the non-Muslim 
community centers.413
While the role of mosques as centers of the Muslim community is a point 
reiterated again and again by MUIS, another aspect of mosques and the communities 
attached to them is conspicuously absent from most official publications, viz. the 
ethnic background of a mosque’s congregation. As has been mentioned in chapter 2, 
ethnicity did play a not unimportant role in the establishment and management of 
mosques in the prewar period, and consequently ethnic identifications are more 
common in the case of the ‘old-generation’ mosques. One case in point is the Masjid 
Ba’alwie, which is generally identified with Singapore’s Arab community.414 Another 
example would be the by now demolished Masjid Bawean, which catered to that part 
of the Malay community which hailed from the Indonesian island of Bawean.415 But 
most important for our purposes are a number of mosques often collectively glossed 
as ‘Indian’ mosques, which still cater to a largely Indian congregation. 
Usually, the number of ‘Indian’ mosques in Singapore is given as seven: these are 
the Masjid Abdul Gafoor, the Masjid Al-Abrar, the Masjid Angullia, the Masjid 
Bencoolen, the Masjid Jamae (Chulia), the Masjid Malabar, and the Masjid Moulana 
Mohammad Ali.416 All of these mosques are located in Central Singapore, and are 
thus fairly remote from the housing estates where most of the Indian Muslims live. 
What makes these mosques ‘Indian’ is the fact that in all of them religious activities 
are conducted in a South Asian language, usually in Tamil. Furthermore, most of 
them are ḥanafī mosques.417 The ethnic identification of the mosques is thus neither 
                                                 
413 Cf. Mansor 1982: 32; Tyabji 1991a: 217. 
414 Cf. Abaza 1997. 
415 Cf. Abdullah Baginda 1967: 52; Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 1991: 5, 19. 
416 Cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: appendix B; Sankaran 2003: 128 [section not paginated]. 
417 Only two of them, the Masjid Jamae (Chulia) and Masjid Malabar, are shāfi‘ī; the Masjid al-Abrar 
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predicated on the composition of the congregation nor on the ethnic background of 
the mosque’s founder, but on language. In other words, that these mosques are 
considered to be ‘Indian’ and have a congregation consisting largely of South Asians 
is a result, not the cause, of conducting activities in South Asian languages. 
The ‘ethnic’ history of these mosques is also noteworthy. Though most of the 
‘Indian’ mosques have indeed been founded by Indians, not all mosques established 
and endowed by Indians are still perceived as ‘Indian’, as is the case for example with 
the Masjid Kassim.418 It is furthermore significant that in almost all cases the 
language used is Tamil. The only exceptions are the Masjid Malabar, where 
Malayalam is used, and the Masjid Angullia, where both Tamil and Urdu are in 
use.419 It is noteworthy that Urdu is used besides Tamil in only one mosque, and other 
North Indian languages, such as Bengali, do not seem to be used at all. Of course, 
Tamil is an official language in Singapore, and it is not surprising that it dominates in 
most of the Indian mosques. But other languages are not barred from use, as the case 
of the Masjid Malabar shows, and it is significant that North Indian languages seem to 
be so little represented in Singapore’s mosques, especially as some of the mosques 
were founded by North Indians.420 A case in point would be the Masjid Bencoolen, 
which according to my respondents was built at the initiative of the British 
Government for its North Indian soldiers, while its construction in 1852 was financed 
by an Arab merchant.421 The names of later trustees seem to point to a largely Indian 
congregation, and the fact that the mosque was officially recognized as ḥanafī from at 
least 1906 onwards substantiates this. There were South Indians as well as Gujaratis 
                                                 
418 Cf. Ahmad 1965: 46. 
419 Furthermore, the Masjid Moulana Mohammad Ali is one of the mosques where English sermons are 
sometimes delivered. 
420 Cf. Ahmad 1965: 6, 54-5; Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 2000: 35. 
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among the trustees at that time.422 Today, activities of the mosque, which has recently 
been redeveloped and completely reconstructed, are conducted in Tamil. 
If it is interesting to see how some of the mosques came to be perceived as 
‘Indian’, it is also telling that some mosques are not generally included in that 
category though they share some features with the ‘Indian’ mosques. The most 
obvious case is the Masjid Dawoodi Bohra. Even though all the members of the 
Bohra community are of South Asian background, the mosque is not usually named as 
‘Indian’. This is probably due to the doctrinal differences between the Shiite Bohras 
and their Sunnite counterparts, and perhaps also to the non-Tamil character of the 
Bohra community, given that ‘Indian’ is often conflated with ‘Tamil’ in Singaporean 
discourse.423 Another mosque, the Masjid Naval Base in Sembawang, was originally 
built in 1968 for Muslim personnel of the British Navy, which included, according to 
my respondents, many Indians.424 Religious classes for Indian Muslim children were 
held at the mosque on Sundays until recently, when the Masjid Naval Base was 
replaced by the ‘new-generation’ Masjid Assyafaah.425 This mosque was likewise not 
considered as ‘Indian’, apparently as many activities were delivered in Malay rather 
than an Indian language. 
The ‘Indian’ mosques are significant for the South Asian Muslim communities in 
Singapore for various reasons. First of all, they are symbolic reminders of the 
existence of South Asian Muslims in the city, and of their contributions to its religious 
landscape, especially as three of these mosques are also national monuments. But they 
are also important because they offer services to South Asian Muslims that would not 
                                                 
422 The language of the congregation seems to have been Urdu; cf. Ahmad 1965: 53-4. 
423 Cf. Ahmad 1965: 60; Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 2000: 48; the languages used in the Masjid 
Dawoodi Bohra are Gujarati and Arabic; information supplied by Mr. Ameer Ali, 19th of November 
2004. 
424 According to PuruShotam, the congregation consisted mainly of Malayalis; PuruShotam [1998] 
2000: 93. 
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be available otherwise. This is especially the case with regard to sermons, but some of 
the ‘Indian’ mosques also offer religious classes for children and adults, services that 
are otherwise only offered by some Indian Muslim associations. The relationship 
between some of these mosques and Indian Muslim associations will be discussed 
below, while their role for preaching and teaching in Tamil will be taken up in chapter 
5. Here it may suffice to stress their agency in the organization and administration of 
services for Tamil Muslims in Singapore. 
 
MENDAKI and the Ethnic Self-Help Paradigm 
When talking about the different government bodies and associations which define 
and contest the administration of Islam in Singapore, mention has to be made of 
MENDAKI.426 Even though its main aim is the improvement of the educational 
standards of Malays/Muslims in Singapore, MENDAKI has engaged in a number of 
activities which relate much more closely to Islam and Islamic practice. Yet even 
more importantly, its activities have led to a certain polarization of ethnic identity 
among Indian Muslims, especially after MENDAKI’s Indian counterpart SINDA was 
set up in 1991. 
MENDAKI was registered in October 1982, after the census reports of 1980 had 
indicated the stark underperformance of Malays in the educational system.427 Yet 
despite being founded in reaction to Malay educational underperformance, the main 
object of MENDAKI, according to its constitution, surprisingly was stated to be “to 
promote the education of Muslims in all fields…”.428 Already in newspaper articles 
published during the formation of MENDAKI, the term Muslim was actually replaced 
                                                 
426 The acronym MENDAKI means ‘to ascend’ in Malay. 
427 Rahim 1998: 211-3; Saat 2002: 131; Yayasan Mendaki 1986: 2-4; “Accelerating the Climb to 
Success”, The Straits Times, 28 May 1982. 
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by the juxtaposition ‘Malay/Muslim’, which soon started to appear in official 
MENDAKI publications, too.429 This juxtaposition is interesting insofar as it is not 
really clear what is meant by it. It might be taken to mean “all Malays, no matter of 
what religion, and all Muslims, no matter of what ethnic background”. Yet all of 
MENDAKI’s activities relate to Muslims and it clearly sees itself as an organization 
for Muslims alone.430 The composite ‘Malay/Muslim’ is thus rather a concession to 
Malay sentiment and the common Singaporean equation of ‘Malay’ and ‘Muslim’, 
without running danger to compromise MENDAKI’s Muslim identity. 
During the 1980s, MENDAKI drew most of its funds from a scheme similar to 
MUIS’s MBF. This was augmented by donations and an annual grant by the 
government.431 A restructuring of the organization in 1989 allowed it to start its own 
business activities, though most of MENDAKI’s ventures into business have been 
rather unsuccessful, and have consequently drawn considerable criticism.432 Yet 
despite these efforts in setting up various enterprises, MENDAKI’s main focus of 
activity remains education. This is done through a variety of means, like tuition 
classes, bursaries, awards and scholarships.433 Awards are given to those students who 
excel in their exams from the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) 
onwards.434 Other programs were initiated to assist students in the normal education 
stream and ‘underachievers’.435
The model of an ethnic self-help organization which draws on CPF contributions 
to further the educational and economic standing of a specific community has actually 
                                                 
429 Cf. e.g. “Accelerating the Climb to Success”, The Straits Times, 28 May 1982; Yayasan Mendaki 
1986: 15. 
430 One of my informants claimed that MENDAKI was indeed wary that non-Muslim Malays could 
actually apply for help from the association, as there would be no way to turn them away, and 
MENDAKI would have to compromise its Muslim identity. 
431 Metzger 2003: 71-2; Rahim 1998: 228 n. 7; Saat 2002: 132-3; Tyabji 1991a: 223. 
432 Metzger 2003: 79-83; Rahim 1998: 214-5; cf. Yayasan Mendaki 1992: 181-2. 
433 Metzger 2003: 74-8; Yayasan Mendaki 1986: 12-3. 
434 Rahim 1998: 217; Yayasan Mendaki 1986: 14. 
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led to the proliferation of several such organizations in the early 1990s. In 1991, the 
Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA) was set up, and was followed 
soon after in 1992 by the Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) and the 
Eurasian Association (EA).436 The creation of SINDA has made a further self-help 
association available to Indian Muslims, if they are willing to contribute to both 
MENDAKI and SINDA. 
The ethnic self-help paradigm in general and MENDAKI in particular have been 
subject to much criticism. There is no need to enter into this discussion here.437 What 
is noteworthy for our purposes is that supporters and critics alike treat MENDAKI 
primarily as an organization supporting Malays and dealing with Malay educational 
deprivation. This tendency was of course already perceivable when MENDAKI was 
established, but it has been reinforced by the establishment of other self-help 
organizations on the basis of race. Given that there are organizations for Chinese, 
Indians and Eurasians, it is only natural to perceive MENDAKI as a Malay 
organization. The fact that MENDAKI officially claims to represent all Muslims 
seems to be generally ignored or not deemed important. This attitude, as we shall see 
in chapter 6, has had an important impact on the way Tamil Muslims relate to 
MENDAKI, and has served as a catalyst for recent changes in the way Tamil Muslims 
have reacted towards it.  
 
Non-ethnic Muslim Associations  
Beside MUIS as the statutory board charged with administering Islam and 
MENDAKI as the major government-supported organization, there exist a plethora of 
Islamic associations in Singapore which are officially registered, yet independent 
                                                 
436 Metzger 2003: 71; Rahim 1998: 233. 
437 The most verbal academic critique is Rahim 1998: chapters 10 & 11; but cf. also Li 1989: chapter 
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from direct state control. Among these, of prime interest for us are a number of 
associations catering specifically to Singapore’s Indian Muslim communities. Yet 
before we turn to these ethnic associations, it is necessary to briefly discuss the 
general state of affairs regarding Muslim associations in Singapore. 
The number of Muslim associations in Singapore is considerable, though only a 
handful is of greater significance for Muslim society at large. Among the more 
important ones are the AMP (Association of Muslim Professionals), Darul Arqam 
(The Muslim Converts’ Association of Singapore), Jamiyah (Muslim Missionary 
Society of Singapore), PERDAUS (Association of Adult Religious Class Students of 
Singapore) and PERGAS (Singapore Islamic Scholars & Religious Teachers 
Association). As Laurent Metzger has pointed out, the spheres of activities of many of 
these associations actually overlap with each other and with MUIS and MENDAKI.438 
Education, social services, and missionary work are among the most common 
activities. 
There is no need to discuss the activities of these associations in any detail here.439 
The different associations seem to be rather uncontroversial among Tamil Muslims. In 
contrast to MUIS and the semi-government MENDAKI, individual associations were 
almost never criticized by my respondents for neglecting Tamil Muslims. While state-
institutions are expected to cater to all Muslims equally, independent associations are 
not, especially given that there are a number of associations specifically for Indian 
Muslims. Thus, even though some associations are almost exclusively Malay, this 
does hardly affect Indian Muslims. Many of the associations indeed see little 
participation by Indian Muslims, and some are acutely aware of this fact. On its 
internet website, PERDAUS freely admits to “…have been unable to tap and utilize 
                                                 
438 Metzger 2003: 93. 
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the expertise of the Muslims within the Chinese, Indians [sic], Caucasian and others 
groups within Singapore…”.440 It will thus be sufficient to limit the discussion to 
some groups which play a role for the organization of religious life among Tamil 
Muslims in Singapore, viz. the Muslim League of Singapore, Jamiyah and PERGAS. 
The Muslim League is discussed as an Indian Muslim association by many 
authors, though it actually aims to represent all Muslims in Singapore, which is one 
reason why the group did not join the FIM in 1992. It was a very active organization 
in the 1950s, but afterwards declined, and now has only 30-40 members.441 For most 
of its history, it seems to have had close connections with the Tamil Muslim Jama‘at 
(both organizations being headed by Karim Ghani in the early 1950s) and later the 
South Indian Jamiathul Ulama, and its current president is a high-ranking member of 
both these associations. Despite its considerable historical importance, the Muslim 
League thus plays practically no role in Tamil Muslim religious life nowadays. 
Jamiyah, on the other hand, is easily one of the most multi-ethnic Islamic 
associations in Singapore, and the strong involvement of Indians in it is no surprise, 
given that the association’s founder, Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddique (1892-1954), 
hailed from Meerut in North India.442 Jamiyah was formed in 1932 as the All-Malaya 
Muslim Missionary Society. The founding committee reflected the multi-ethnic 
composition of the association. Among the seventeen founding committee members 
were at least six Indians.443 It is noticeable that two of the Tamil Committee members, 
and a further Tamil in the Management Committee, were trustees of the Masjid Jamae 
(Chulia).444
                                                 
440 Cf. http://www.perdaus.org.sg/about/index.html [accessed on  9 December 2004]. 
441 Cf. Syed Mohamed 1973: 53-7. 
442 Cf. Muslim Missionary Society of Singapore 1985a: 31; Weyland 1990: 247. 
443 Four of whom were Tamils; cf. Muslim Missionary Society Singapore 1985a: 21. 
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Especially since a change in leadership took place in 1970, Jamiyah is a highly 
active society. It runs a clinic, a home for the aged, an orphanage, two kindergartens, 
and the center for the rehabilitation of drug addicts, and offers a wide range of social 
and religious services.445 Even though the Malaysian and Singaporean branches of 
Jamiyah have been separated since 1965, the association maintains strong connections 
with Muslim groups outside Singapore, and has at times incurred the government’s 
suspicion therefore.446 At the same time, Jamiyah is actively engaged in inter-
religious dialogue, and most of its services and institutions are open to everybody 
regardless of creed.447
Conversely, the relationship of the Singapore Islamic Scholars & Religious 
Teachers Association PERGAS with the Tamil Muslim community are more recent 
and of a very different nature. Founded in 1957, PERGAS primarily caters to 
religious education, offering part-time madrasa classes and courses in Arabic.448 
PERGAS is largely Malay in nature,449 yet in 1999, it has opened an English unit, 
which offers religious and Arabic education to those Muslims who do not speak 
Malay. Most important among these courses are the teacher training classes, which 
are designed to train adults in imparting religious knowledge in English.450 Many of 
the assistant teachers in Tamil religious schools have received training from 
PERGAS, so that only the main teacher has to be recruited from India.451 Thus, in 
contrast to Jamiyah, PERGAS links to the Tamil Muslim community are not based on 
participation by Tamil Muslims in the association itself, but by providing skills that 
                                                 
445 Further information on Jamiyah’s activities can be found in Metzger 2003: 94-100; Muslim 
Missionary Society Singapore 1997; Weyland 1990: 233-45. 
446 Cf. Bedlington 1974: 496, esp. note 85. 
447 Cf. Metzger 2003: 98-9. 
448 For PERGAS’s activities, see Metzger 2003: 110-2; Yayasan Mendaki 1992: 203-4. 
449 Cf. www.pergas.org.sg [accessed on 9 December 2004]. 
450 Cf. www.pergas.org.sg/dept.html#english [accessed on 9 December 2004]. 
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can be utilized by those associations which specifically address themselves to Tamil 
Muslims. 
 
INDIAN MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Overview 
As mentioned, most of the larger Muslim associations in Singapore are not rooted in 
specific ethnic communities and cater, at least in theory, to the needs and demands of 
the Muslim population at large. Nevertheless, there are also a sizeable number of 
organizations and associations whose ethnic background is more circumscribed. 
Among these, Indian Muslim associations clearly dominate the scene. When talking 
about Indian Muslim associations in Singapore, one has to admit that the term is not 
as facilely defined as it may seem. The most straightforward cases are those where the 
association in question clearly identifies itself both as South Asian and as Muslim, as 
in the case of the Malabar Muslim Juma-ath, the South Indian Jamiathul Ulama or the 
Thuckalay Muslim Association. Yet in other cases, the identification is more 
problematic. The Rifayee Thareeq Association of Singapore, for example, lacks any 
explicit ethnic identification, and the basis for considering it to be an Indian Muslim 
association is the fact that its members are mostly South Asians, and that it is a 
member of the FIM. On the other hand, there are a number of associations whose 
membership consists primarily of South Asian Muslims, and which may address 
themselves explicitly to South Asian communities, but which nevertheless make no 
explicit reference to Islam or Muslims in their names. Such is the case, for example, 
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In the following discussion, I will restrict myself largely to those associations 
which a) are explicit about both their South Asian and their Muslim background, or 
which b) are members of the FIM. On the other hand, I have excluded groups which 
may have clear South Asian Muslim backgrounds, but are not or only peripherally 
connected to religious affairs, such as the trade associations mentioned by Mani.452
Given the total number of Indian Muslims in Singapore, the number of Indian 
Muslim associations is surprisingly high. What is even more surprising is that the 
ethnic background of most of these associations is clearly Tamil, and that those which 
are not are still South Indian. It is striking that there are no associations representing 
North Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi Muslim interests interacting with these South 
Indian organizations, especially as language and culture associations catering to these 
Muslims exist, such as the Singapore Bangladesh Society, the Bangladesh Language 
and Cultural Foundation, or the Singapore Pakistan Association.453 That these groups 
are not participating in a forum like the FIM may be due to Tamil linguistic 
dominance, which severely limits North Indian participation (cf. chapter 5 & 6). 
 
Typology of Indian Muslim Associations 
The various Indian Muslim associations differ substantially from each other in regard 
to the date of their foundation, the size and character of the communities that they 
claim to be representing, and also, to a lesser extent, in the aims and activities 
pursued. Some of the contemporary associations were founded before World War II, 
but most were registered in two distinct periods in the postwar era, viz. the two 
decades immediately after the war from 1945 to 1965, and then since about the mid-
1990s. Mani has claimed that the spur of registrations of Indian Muslim associations 
                                                 
452 Cf. Mani 1992: 344-7. 
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in the decades just before and after World War II was linked to British efforts in 
countering communist activities through the registration of all voluntary societies.454 
Yet if British fear of Communism contributed to the registering of associations, fear 
of Indian Nationalism had the opposite effect. Maideen relates that the efforts at 
registering an association called Aikkiya Muslim Caṅkam (‘United Muslim 
Association’) were frustrated because rivals had denounced the founders as supporters 
of the Indian National Congress, who were therefore denied registration by the 
British. Only by changing the association’s name to Muslim Apiviruttic Caṅkam 
(‘Muslim Improvement Association’) and by hiding their Indian identities were the 
founders finally able to register the association in 1926.455
Associations also vary in size. Some consist effectively only of a handful of 
members, while membership among the largest goes into the hundreds. Yet the most 
important distinctions relate to the character of the communities to which the various 
associations cater. For convenience, it is possible to distinguish different types of 
Indian Muslim associations in Singapore on this basis as either pan-Indian, ethnic, 
religious, or kin-center associations (cf. appendix 5).456
Despite frequent exhortations from various sides for Indian Muslims to unite, 
there are and have been surprisingly few associations that claim to represent all Indian 
Muslims in Singapore. In the prewar period, the Indian Muslim Association would be 
the prime example, even though it seems to have concentrated mainly on Tamils. 
Nowadays, there are only two such associations. The United Indian Muslim 
Association (UIMA) was originally known as Pasir Panjang Indian Muslim 
Association, a group representing, according to Mani, primarily Tamil Muslims who 
                                                 
454 Mani 1992: 344. 
455 Meytīṉ 1989: 11-2; Daud Shah similarly deplored the harassment of Indian Nationalists by the 
Secret Police in Malaya; Tāvutṣā 1925: 345. 
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lived in the Pasir Panjang area of Singapore. This association had become defunct, 
and was taken over by M.K.A. Jabbar, a former Member of Parliament, in 1991, who 
had the name changed to UIMA and widened the activities of the association.457 The 
Indian Muslim Social Service Association, on the other hand, was registered only in 
2004. It was actually formed as a result of differences between the Singapore Tenkasi 
Muslim Welfare Society and its religious teacher hired from India, who formed this 
new group with the help of some Muslim businessmen. 
The ‘ethnic’ associations might perhaps better be called ‘ethno-linguistic’ 
associations, as they address themselves to various Indian Muslim communities on the 
basis of a shared language. Currently there are four such associations in Singapore, 
with two associations catering to Tamil-speakers, and one each to speakers of 
Malayalam and Dakhni-Urdu. The Malabar Muslim Juma-ath was the first ethnic 
association in Singapore, dating back to the prewar period.458 Another ethnic 
association, the Tamil Muslim Jama‘at (TMJ), is claimed to have been established by 
none other than Karim Ghani in 1950.459 In contrast, the other two associations are of 
more recent origins. The Dakhni Urdu Association has been formed only a few years 
back with the aim to represent those South Indian Muslims who claim Urdu as their 
mother-tongue.460 An intriguing case finally is provided by the Thiruvithancode 
Muslim Union (TMU). This association was originally a kin-center association, 
representing Muslims from the small town of Thiruvithancode in Kanniyakumari 
District, which grew out of an informal society of young men for the recitation of 
mawlid in 1939.461  The association was in the process of deregistration as all its 
members were returning to India in the 1990s when it was taken over by a group of 
                                                 
457 Mani 1992: 346. 
458 Cf. http://www.mosque.org.sg/malabar/default.asp?ID=aboutus [accessed on 22 January 2006]. 
459 Syed Mohamed 1973: 29, 32-7; cf. Mani 1992: 345, though, who has 1958 as date of registration. 
460 Cf. Schmidt 2003: 302. 
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Tamil Muslims who wanted to start an educational association for Tamil Muslims. 
The organization retained its name even though there is nothing anymore linking it to 
Thiruvithancode. 
Calling an Indian Muslim association ‘religious’ may seem to constitute a 
tautology, yet it serves a purpose in the case of the two associations under 
consideration here. While most of the other associations address themselves to groups 
of people that happen to be Muslims, without necessarily limiting themselves to 
religious activities and services alone, the Rifayee Thareeq Association (RTA) of 
Singapore and South Indian Jamiathul Ulama (SIJU) are defined by representing two 
more narrowly religious groups. The RTA is, as far as I know, the only branch of a 
Sufi brotherhood (ṭarīqa) that has been officially registered as an association in 
Singapore. Even though membership in the brotherhood is not limited to a particular 
ethnic group, the Rifā‘iyya brotherhood seems to be more popular among South 
Indians than among Malays or North Indians. It is thus not surprising that the RTA of 
Singapore thus identifies itself as an Indian Muslim association, expressed for 
example by its participation in the FIM. On the other hand, the SIJU, an association 
representing religious scholars (‘ulamā’),462 is explicit about its regional background. 
Originally founded as an association mainly for religious scholars,463 it has later had 
some problems because it came to consist largely of ‘lay-men’ rather than fully 
accredited ‘ulamā’, as one high-ranking member told me. This problem was solved by 
inserting a clause in the association’s regulations that ‘ulamā’ refers to any pious 
Muslim that the association’s committee decides to accept as such.464
As already mentioned, kin-center associations account for more than half of the 
voluntary associations maintained by Indian Muslims in Singapore. Though several 
                                                 
462 Syed Mohamed 1973: 30 calls it an “…alumni [association; T.T.] of religious scholars”. 
463 Syed Mohamed 1973: 60. 




CHAPTER 4: THE ORGANIZATION OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 
kin-center associations became deregistered over time,465 they still form the single 
most important element among Indian Muslim associations in Singapore as a whole. 
All kin-center associations were formed by Tamil Muslims. That no similar 
organizations were founded by Muslims of other ethnic groups may be a result of the 
relatively smaller size of these groups rather than the absence of the kin-center 
concept among these groups. There are currently ten kin-center associations in 
Singapore, excluding the TMU. 
We are fortunate to have an account of the founding of what is probably the 
largest Indian Muslim association in Singapore today, the Singapore Kadayanallur 
Muslim League (SKML), in the memoirs of Maideen. SKML got registered in 1941. 
As has been mentioned in chapter 3, Kadayanallur society was at that time fractured 
into various ‘parties’. When the ‘East Party’ had an association registered in 1940, 
sections of the ‘West Party’ and the ‘Taṅkaḷ Party’ united and attempted to establish 
their own association. Fearing a further fragmentation of their community, concerned 
community leaders in all the different ‘parties’ decided to unite and found a single 
association for the whole Kadayanallur community. On 8th of August 1941 the SKML 
was formed, with two widely respected religious personalities as president and vice-
president. Yet moves to found further associations on the basis of ‘party’-membership 
continued, and where only brought to an end by the Japanese Invasion.466  
The emergence of the SKML from the efforts to unite a fragmented community 
seems to mirror events that led to the establishment of other Indian Muslim 
associations in Singapore. Respondents told me that the Singapore Tenkasi Muslim 
Welfare Society (STMWS), which was registered one year before the SKML, was 
also founded to overcome faction fighting in the Tenkasi Community. It is indeed 
                                                 
465 Syed Mohamed mentions four kin-center associations which are not in existence anymore, cf. Syed 
Mohamed 1973: 28-9. 
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probable that the foundation of the STMWS had an impact of the formation of the 
SKML, given the geographic, economic, and socio-cultural proximity of the two 
communities, and the fact that Maideen does not mention the STMWS at all should 
alert us to possible gaps in his account. 
An interesting development is the founding of new kin-center associations since 
the mid-1990s. Whereas those associations that were registered during the 1930s-50s 
were predominantly founded by labor migrants rather than merchants, most of the 
associations founded during the last ten years are linked to wealthier merchant towns 
like Kilakkarai or Muthupettai. This suggests two things: Firstly, we may take it as an 
indicator that more Tamil Muslim merchants come to settle permanently with their 
families in Singapore,467 and secondly that the kin-center association continues to 
provide a model for the foundation of voluntary associations among Singapore’s 
Tamil Muslims. 
 
Activities and Programs 
Indian Muslim associations offer a wide range of services in the field of religious 
education as well as religious and social counseling.468 In addition, they organize 
special functions on Muslim holidays, annual family days to maintain ties among the 
geographically dispersed members of the kin-center community, and receptions for 
members returning from the Hajj. The activities of the larger associations like SKML 
and STMWS practically cover this whole spectrum, while many of the smaller 
associations may confine themselves to a few annual functions. The following 
                                                 
467 This was also suggested to me by some members of merchant families from Porto Novo who are 
settled in Singapore, though Porto Novo (as yet) lacks a kin-center association. 
468 Information about the activities of the associations is derived from interviews with members of the 
associations, activity reports, and web pages; useful information on the activities of some associations 
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overview will be confined to the activities of associations with predominantly Tamil 
membership, as these are of greatest relevance for our purposes. 
Probably the single most important field of activity is education, an early example 
of which is the operation of the Umar Pulavar Tamil School by the SKML from 1946-
1982. With the schooling system taken care of by the state, the Tamil Muslim 
associations concentrate on supplying religious education, even though some 
organizations offer computer courses or give out bursaries to needy students.469 Both 
STMWS and UIMA also run child- and student-care centers.470 The religious classes 
conducted by the associations will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5, so that it 
is sufficient here to remark on the central importance Tamil Muslim associations play 
in offering religious education in Tamil. 
Associations also arrange religious speeches and preaching, and ‘Koran-
conferences’ are regularly organized by several of them [Figure 11]. Islamic 
materials, publications and books are borrowed, distributed and/or sold at reduced 
prices by some associations. TMU runs a postal library, lending tracts about Islam to 
Muslims as well as non-Muslims. The scheme was inspired by a similar scheme of the 
Islamic Foundation Trust in Madras, whose publications are among those distributed 
by the TMU. 
                                                 
469 Cf. United Indian Muslim Association 2006a: 3. 
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Figure 11: Imam Rafiq Ahmad Baqawi, Imam of the Masjid Abdul Gafoor, speaking at a 
function organized by the United Indian Muslim Association on the occasion of Prophet 
Muhammad's birthday on 30th of April 2006 (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
Closely connected with the programs for religious education are preparatory classes 
for persons embarking on the Hajj. The purpose of these courses, which are conducted 
under the general supervision of MUIS as the central authority in matters relating to 
the pilgrimage, do not only aim at imparting the necessary religious knowledge for 
performing the Hajj, but also convey advice on all kinds of problems that may arise in 
conjunction with it. 
A second important branch in which Indian Muslim associations are active is 
counseling. For example, SKML conducts marriage guidance courses sanctioned by 
the Registry of Muslim Marriages, which are designed to impart information on 
marital duties and possible conflicts to the would-be couple. One of the aims of such 
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reduce the high rate of divorce among Muslim couples.471 Some associations also 
offer medical or legal counseling to their members, or organize Health Fairs. 
Many of the associations organize tours, excursions and other events like book 
releases or competitions, and SKML even conducted an Islamic song festival.472 
Other functions are held on Islamic holidays, for example during Ramadan or on the 
occasion of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. Another type of function, though 
of a very different kind, that is taken care of by some of the associations are funerals, 
with SKML even having bought a vehicle for this purpose in 1997. 
 
Figure 12: Members of the Thuckalay Muslim Association reciting poetry by Pīr Muḥammad at 
the Masjid Bencoolen on 30th of August 2004 (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
In at least one case, a kin-center association continues to celebrate the holiday (‘urs) 
of its kin-center’s patron saint. The Thuckalay Muslim Association (ThuMA) 
observes the ‘urs of the 17th century Tamil poet and Sufi Pīr Muḥammad, who is 
                                                 
471 Cf.  Mashuthoo 2003: 12. 
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buried in Thuckalay. On the ‘urs, which is conducted on the 14th of Rajab,473 
members of the association meet to recite poems by Pīr Muḥammad, usually in one of 
the Indian mosques [Figure 12].474 Similarly, the RTA observes the annual 
anniversary of Aḥmad al-Rifā‘ī, the founder of the brotherhood, by reciting poems in 
his honor.475
Most of the kin-center associations also conduct some activities that are aimed 
especially at perpetuating a sense of identity among people hailing from the same kin-
center. The most common activity of this kind is an annual family day.476 These 
family days are often held in a park or some similar venue. The association provides 
buses from different pick-up points to the venue, as well as food, games for the 
children and several other activities. Everybody can participate, but the family days 
are specifically meant to provide a possibility for families from the same kin-center to 
meet and to renew friendships. The family day thus serves to perpetuate a common 
identity, which has increasingly become difficult after the kin-center communities 
became geographically dispersed through resettlement. Yet it is interesting to note 
that few of the activities relate to the kin-center directly. Specifically, there seems to 
be no effort on part of the organizations (as opposed to individual efforts) to fund 
mosques, schools or other institutions located at the Indian kin-center, or to maintain 
any official contact with organizations there.477
 
                                                 
473 The 7th month of the Islamic calendar. 
474 Cf. “Ñāṉamētai Pīrmuhammatu Appā peruviḻā”, Ceyticcuṭar 30, Aug-Nov 2003: 10, and “Takkalai 
tavañāṉi Pīr Muhammatu Appā niṉaivu viḻā”, Ceyticcuṭar 32, Oct 2004: 3; I was able to participate in 
one of these functions on 30th of August 2004. 
475 Cf. “Rifāyi tarīkkā caṅka mavlūtu”, Ceyticcuṭar 32, Oct 2004: 11; I have participated in this 
function on 22nd of August 2004, which had actually been postponed for more than a month that year as 
some of the members of the association had been too busy to participate in it on the proper day! 
476 Information on the family days is based on my participation in SKML’s Annual Family Day on 7th 
of September 2003. Family days are often featured in the FIM newsletter Ceyticcuṭar; cf. e.g. 
“Takkalai Muslim Caṅkattiṉ kutūkalamāṉa kuṭumpatiṉa viḻā”, Ceyticcuṭar 27, Jan-Apr 2002: 7; 
“Kuṭumpa uṟuppiṉarkaḷukku Intirāṇi vēṇṭukōḷ”, Ceyticcuṭar 26, Aug-Dec 2001: 17. 
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Funding 
As becomes clear from the above discussion, associations play an important role in 
providing religious and social services for the Tamil Muslim community in 
Singapore. Yet most of these activities require funding to pay teachers and counselors, 
cover the rental of rooms (both for occasional functions as well as for offices and 
classes) and buses, or the provision of food and drinks. The question of funding has 
an important impact on the way associations relate to state agencies and the wider 
Tamil Muslim society in Singapore. 
Subscription fees tend to be very low, and in some cases, they hardly contribute to 
the funding of the association at all.478 Furthermore, subscriptions in some 
associations, like SKML, tended to be collected personally until recently. This was 
viable in the early days as members of the associations resided in close proximity to 
each other, but with the dispersal of people on account of the housing programs this 
became increasingly difficult as well as uneconomic. Members were thus encouraged 
to pay their dues via giro, in order to streamline the inflow of subscription fees.479
In any account, the associations are not able to function solely on the basis of 
subscription fees. The biggest problem for them, as the treasurer of SKML succinctly 
put it in an article is “[l]ack of cash, cash and more cash!”480 Some funds can be 
raised through donations, which is probably the most common way of funding 
activities among the smaller associations. In addition, there are fees for madrasa 
classes and other services. Participation in family days is also not free of cost (a ticket 
                                                 
478 Thus, in 2005, UIMA gained a meager S$48 from subscriptions. Given that subscriptions for UIMA 
are S$12 per annum (S$6 for retirees) it follows that not more than eight members paid subscriptions! 
Cf. United Indian Muslim Association 2006c; United Indian Muslim Association 2006b: 5. 
479 Cf. Abdul Kader 2000; Raja Mohamad 2000; United Indian Muslim Association 2006a: 5. Cf. 
Meytīṉ 1989: 13-4 regarding funding and expenses of the Muslim Improvement Association in the 
1930s. 
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for SKML’s 2003 family day cost S$10). MUIS is another source of funding, 
especially for larger associations, as shall be discussed below. 
As SKML is the largest kin-center association in Singapore, taking a look at its 
sources of income and its expenditures will provide us with a clearer picture of a 
Tamil Muslim association’s role in financing religious services. Table 1 and Table 2 




2000 2001 2002 
Grants from 
govt. orgs. 
$20,000.00 62% $25,000.00 60% $0.00482 0% 
Donations $8,000.00 25% $11,500.00 28% $14,900.00 52% 
Members’ 
subscriptions 
$2,271.00 7% $2,879.00 7% $5,871.00 20% 
Total $32,271.00 100% $41,380.00 100% $28,773.00 100% 
Table 1: Main sources of income of SKML, 2000-2002 (Source: Raja Mohamad, treasurer, 
SKML) 
 
Expenditures 2000 2001 2002 
Rental and 
conservancy  
$19,876.00 60% $20,086.00 64% $15,818.00 59% 
Functions $9,200.00 28% $8,387.00 27% $7,000.00 26% 
Newsletter $3,800.00 12% $3,000.00 9% $4,000.00 15% 
Total $32,876.00 100% $31,473.00 100% $26,818.00 100% 
Table 2: Main expenditures by SKML, 2000-2002 (Source: Raja Mohamad, treasurer, SKML) 
 
                                                 
481 I have to thank Mr. Raja Mohamad, treasurer, SKML, for supplying me with these figures. 
482 In 2002, due to a delay in submitting the financial report of the association, no money was disbursed 
to SKML from MUIS, yet the money was granted together with the grant for 2003 a year later. 
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Looking at the income figure first, the importance of government funding becomes 
evident. Yet it should not be neglected that SKML has been able to almost double its 
income from donations within just two years. This is important as the associations 
have few possibilities to influence the amount of government grants received. 
Moreover, lapses in the procedure of appealing for grants may delay their 
disbursement, as happened to SKML in 2002. The donations are thus an important 
security if for some reason the association should be unable to procure a sufficiently 
large government grant. In contrast, the subscriptions are much lower, though even 
here SKML was able to enlarge the amount in 2002 by almost $3000. 
On the side of expenditure, the largest share is taken up by rental and conservancy 
charges. The lower expenditure in this category in 2002 was due to a government 
subsidy. At the same time, less money has been spent for functions in recent years, 
though this is probably the most elusive figure, as it can easily go up again when the 
association decides on organizing a seminar or similar event. 
The picture presented by the sources of income and expenditures of SKML seem 
to correspond roughly with that of the other large Tamil Muslim associations in 
Singapore. STMWS for example has the same sources of income as well as the same 
types of expenditures.483 Yet it should be noticed that some of the larger associations 
expand rapidly. UIMA was able to receive a net surplus of $96,586.00 in 2005, with 
most of the money coming from funds raising collection ($204,350.00) and the net 
income from operating a child care center ($52,573.94). Bursary expenses made up 
the largest point of expenditure ($80,238.89).484 UIMA plans to change its 
constitution in order to create an economic unit to fund its social activities and 
become “…a social provider organization contributing to the larger Singapore 
                                                 
483 This rough outline was supplied to me by Mr. A.S. Sayed Majunoon, STMWS. 
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mainstream society”.485 UIMA’s case may be special, but it shows that the larger 
associations are capable of raising considerable amounts of money for their activities. 
On the other hand, many of the smaller associations have much lesser 
expenditures, as their activities are more limited and they usually have no separate 
offices for which rent would have to be paid. Conversely, these associations do not 
receive any government grants at all. The ThuMA, for example, has two main points 
of expenditure annually, namely the celebrations for the Prophet’s birthday and a 
function marking the ‘urs of Pīr Muḥammad, Thuckalay’s patron saint. For each 
function about $700-800 are needed, which can usually be raised through donations. 
If this should not be enough, committee members supply the balance. The total annual 
budget of ca. $1500 is thus a far cry from the budgets of the larger associations like 
UIMA or SKML.486
The role of donations for the funding of associations should not be overlooked. 
This is especially important as it may be assumed that these funds would not be 
available for religious activities at all if the associations would not exist, as the ability 
to mobilize these funds depends largely on the personal networks of the associations 
involved. It is highly improbable that an organization like MUIS would be able to tap 
this resource, both because of its impersonal character and the fact that the donors 
(who are usually Tamil Muslims) might fear that their donations will be of no benefit 





                                                 
485 United Indian Muslim Association 2006b: 4; cf. United Indian Muslim Association 2006a: 2. 
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The Federation of Indian Muslims (FIM) 
Prior to 1992, the different Indian Muslim associations operated independently from 
each other. There was no attempt to coordinate activities, nor any forum that might 
have facilitated contact and exchange between the associations. The lack of 
cooperation and unity among Indian Muslims was repeatedly criticized by Malay 
Muslim leaders and the government, who called for Indian Muslims to adopt a 
common agenda and speak with one voice.487 The registration of the FIM on 18th of 
April 1992 came at a time when discussions about the identity of the Indian Muslims 
and their relation to the wider Indian and Muslim communities in Singapore had 
gained greater salience in the wake of the establishment of SINDA. The FIM was 
originally conceived by six associations, but these were joined by three further groups 
while the registration process was going on. In 2005, the number of members rose to 
sixteen; most of the new members are recently formed associations. 
The FIM is run by a group of 23 officials, headed by a president, who is elected 
from representatives of those associations that have not yet held the post for a two 
year term. This modus of determining the leadership of the FIM has been criticized by 
many of my respondents, among them some former presidents of the FIM, as the 
constant change of leadership was said to prevent any long term policies to be 
implemented. In addition to the officials, the FIM is supported by a board of advisers, 
which includes important community leaders and government officials.488 Funds for 
the FIM come from the affiliated associations, which have to contribute membership 
fees. In addition, MUIS irregularly grants S$10,000-20,000. 
                                                 
487 “Work together, Dr Mattar urges Tamil Muslims”, The Straits Times, 27 Mar 1983; “Indian 
Muslims urged to reconcile their feelings about identity”, The Straits Times, 24 Feb 1992. 
488 Cf. “9 Indian Muslim groups form own federation”, The Straits Times, 22 Apr 1992; Yayasan 
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The FIM was formed with the aim to represent Indian Muslim interests and to 
coordinate MENDAKI and SINDA policies towards the community. Education has 
been the prime focus, even though the FIM did not aim to duplicate any of the 
existing self-help organizations. The FIM also publishes a biannual newsletter for 
Indian Muslims in Tamil on behalf of MUIS, called Ceyticcuṭar, which covers 
information of particular interest for the Indian Muslim community.489 Yet while the 
FIM has become the prime interface between the Indian Muslim community and 
official bodies like MUIS, MENDAKI and SINDA, it has not been able to replace its 
constituent associations as the prime source of religious services and activities for 
Indian Muslims in Singapore. Most activities are still organized by the associations 
themselves, and even high-ranking members of the FIM considered its programs and 
functions to be unproductive. Much of this seems to be due to frictions and debates 
among the constituent associations. The acceptance of the seven new members to the 
FIM was in fact delayed for more than a year as some of the older members felt that 
the admission of new groups would just increase factionalism. In addition, some of 
my respondents voiced the suspicion that the recent increase in newly registered 
associations was politically motivated. As only associations can be members of the 
FIM, any individual wishing to participate in it has to be part of an association. 
Whatever the reasons, the FIM has until now largely failed in providing the Indian 
Muslim community in Singapore with a united leadership, despite its support from 
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INFORMAL INDIAN MUSLIM GROUPS 
 
All of the institutions and associations surveyed so far are official in that they are 
either maintained by the state or registered as associations according to Singaporean 
laws. Yet even though they are by far the most important agencies for the 
organization of religious life among Tamil Muslims in Singapore, there exist also a 
number of unofficial, informal groups which come together for the purpose of various 
religious activities.  
Due to their informal nature, it is impossible to say how many of these groups 
exist in Singapore. The members of one particular Sufi brotherhood estimated that 
their shaykh alone had roughly 100 followers in Singapore, divided into about seven 
to eight different branches. The total number of informal religious groups in 
Singapore may thus be rather high. 
The activities of such groups are quite diverse. Some may meet to discuss 
religious topics with each other and their friends. Others organize cultural activities, 
such as music concerts. Quite a few Tamil Muslims seem to be engaged in the 
Tablīghī Jamā‘at, a lay-missionary movement aiming at deepening piety and the 
proper performance of religious practice among Muslims, which was founded in the 
late 1920s in India and has since become a worldwide mass movement.490 This 
movement has adherents among Singaporean Muslims of all ethnic backgrounds, and 
groups of adherents will often reflect this ethnic mix. Yet the vast majority of 
informal groups among Tamil Muslims in Singapore are branches of Sufi 
brotherhoods, and the following discussion of such brotherhoods may be taken as one 
example of informal Muslim groups in Singapore. 
                                                 
490 See Syed Mohamed 1973: 69-72 for an overview of the movement among Singaporean Tamil 
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Allegiance to a Sufi shaykh is not uncommon for Muslims in Singapore, and even 
some of the larger associations, such as Jamiyah, have connections to Sufi 
traditions.491 Such brotherhoods are common among all the different ethnic groups in 
Singapore, even though there are clear ethnic preferences for various brotherhoods. 
Many of my Indian informants claimed that the Malays actually prefer the 
Naqshbandiyya; among South Indians the Qādiriyya, Rifā‘iyya and Shādhiliyya are 
common, among North Indians the Chishtiyya, and among the Arabs groups like the 
‘Alawiyya.492 The historical spread and influence of various brotherhoods in different 
parts of the Muslim world is certainly one of the factors that have contributed to these 
ethnic preferences. Linguistic preferences and family ties to specific brotherhoods 
furthermore help to perpetuate the connections between ethnicity and membership in 
a brotherhood. 
The exact size, composition and organization of informal groups vary. Sufi 
brotherhoods are hierarchically organized, with usually one member leading the group 
who is either the immediate shaykh of the group or a person close to the shaykh and is 
regarded by the members of the group as being spiritually accomplished. Many of the 
brotherhoods among Tamil Muslims in Singapore actually owe allegiance to a shaykh 
back in India. Indian shaykhs regularly visit Singapore and Malaysia, and initiate new 
disciples there. Interestingly, in the cases I am familiar with, the headquarters of the 
brotherhood or branch-brotherhood are actually not located in Tamil Nadu, but in the 
Deccan, and the respective shaykhs spoke Urdu as their mother-tongue. 
Branches of Sufi brotherhoods usually meet at least once a week for dhikr, lit. the 
‘remembrance’ of God through communal recitation of certain formulas. On such 
occasions, eulogies (mawlid) on the Prophet may also be recited. In some cases, 
                                                 
491 Admittedly, since the change of leadership in the 1970s, Jamiyah has no obvious links with Sufi 
traditions anymore; cf. Weyland 1990: 248. 
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groups also read and discussed Islamic books together. Such meetings may be 
attended from five to twenty people, at a variety of venues ranging from private 
homes to tomb-shrines or offices. Members of such Sufi groups are also likely to 
assemble when the shaykh comes over from India, and may even accompany him on 
tours to Malaysia. 
The only Indian Sufi group which is registered is, as mentioned, the RTA. Other 
groups keep a lower profile, which may give them slightly greater freedom in 
organizing their activities, but also severely circumscribes the kind of activities which 
can be pursued at all. Some of the groups interact with registered associations, while 
others remain outside such interaction. Nevertheless, due to their grassroots character, 
such informal groups cannot be simply ignored by the registered associations, but 
have to be engaged at different levels. 
 
NETWORKS OF ASSOCIATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS 
 
Official Relations of Religious Organizations 
The different agencies and associations involved in the organization of religious life 
among Tamil Muslims in Singapore do not operate in isolation. While it was 
necessary to detail the institutional setup and the activities of different groups and 
institutions separately, in reality government bodies, associations and informal groups 
are involved in a complex web of relationships. Groups engage each other at various 
levels, at times cooperating and supporting each other in their activities, at other times 
contesting each other’s claims at representing various sections of Tamil Muslim 
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The most salient and most regulated form of official networks and relationships is 
that between various associations on the one hand, and government bodies, primarily 
MUIS and individual mosques, on the other. Tamil Muslim associations have much to 
gain from good relations with MUIS. Support from MUIS does not only take the form 
of funding, but also validates the propriety (in an Islamic sense) and legality (in a 
secular sense) of the associations’ activities, as well as providing the association with 
greater publicity. Conversely, cooperating with Tamil Muslim associations allows 
MUIS to demonstrate both its willingness to support the Tamil Muslim community 
and its suzerainty over the Muslim public sphere in Singapore.493
The most immediate benefit to be accrued by associations in linking up with 
MUIS is funding. As Muslim associations can be recipients of zakāt, good relations 
with MUIS may allow associations to draw upon considerable funds from this source. 
Many Muslim associations in Singapore receive part of their funding from MUIS. 
Unfortunately, MUIS’s annual reports do not identify individual Muslim associations 
as recipients of zakāt. The published data is sketchy, and is only able to convey a 
general idea of the amounts paid to Indian Muslim associations. Sometimes, tables 
which offer a more detailed breakup of organizations funded are published in the 
MUIS-newsletter Warita Kita. I have come across three such lists that are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
 
                                                 
493 Cf. the message by the MUIS President on the occasion of the organization of an Islamic song 
festival by SKML, contained in Mashuthoo 2000: [page nos. not indicated in source]. This is the only 
of sixteen messages contained in the souvenir magazine to stress not only the entertainment value and 
the fund raising potential of the festival, but also its “…wholesome and educational” character. This 
statement not only legitimizes the festival from the religious point of view, but also bolsters MUIS’s 
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 AH 1417494 AH 1419494 AD 2001 
Total amount given to 
Muslim associations 
S$582,620 S$1,671,520 S$1,536,012 
Total amount given to 
Indian Muslim associations 
S$22,000495 S$45,000495 S$120,000496
Percentage of total amount 








Table 3: Zakāt received by Indian Muslim organizations from MUIS497
 
It is difficult to draw any conclusions from such sketchy figures. It remains to be seen 
whether the relatively greater share received by Indian Muslim organizations in 2001 
is indicative of a larger trend or a singular event. What can be said, though, is that the 
absolute amount of money received by the organizations has risen considerably. In 
1996-97 (AH 1417), the three funded associations received on the average about 
S$7,000 each, while in 2001 this figure had risen to S$24,000 each for five 
associations. These figures indicate that Indian Muslim associations are increasingly 
able to draw more and more funds from zakāt payments, and thus are able to expand 
their programs and activities. 
On the other hand it should be noticed that only three to five Indian Muslim 
associations did receive any funding from these sources, which means that most 
associations are not accessing MUIS’s zakāt funds. Among these are mainly smaller 
groups with more limited activities, which are able to raise the funds needed for such 
activities on their own accounts. 
                                                 
494 Until AD 2000, MUIS’s annual reports related to the Islamic Hijri era. AH 1417 relates to the period 
from the 19th of May 1996 to the 7th of May 1997, AH 1419 to the 28th of April 1998 to the 16th of 
April 1999. 
495 For three Indian Muslim associations (SKML, STMWS, UIMA). 
496 For five Indian Muslim associations, no details given. 
497 Figures taken from Warita 110, May-Jun 1997: 13; Warita Kita 120, Mar-Apr 1999: 4; and 
http://www.muis.gov.sg/english/zakat/zakat_recipients/Zakat_Disbursements.aspx?pMenu=3#fisabilill
ah [accessed in March 2004; page has since been removed; the page gave slightly varying figures, but 
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To be recognized by MUIS and to receive its support and assistance may also 
assist Indian Muslim associations to advance their own claims at representing a 
specific segment of Singaporean Muslim society. MUIS’s interaction with Indian 
Muslims in matters where ethnic identity has played a role has made substantial use of 
the mediation of associations and ‘community leaders’. Cooperating with MUIS 
allows associations to project themselves as legitimately representing the Indian 
Muslim community, or a section thereof, and to be recognized by MUIS for this.  
Yet cooperation between MUIS and the associations also holds benefits for the 
former. Already in 1978, the Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs noted in a 
parliamentary speech that only by maintaining good relations could MUIS be kept 
informed about the operations and problems of the associations and be able to utilize 
them for explaining government policies to the Muslim public.498 This point is of 
particular importance with regard to Indian Muslim associations, as the networks of 
the non-Indian Muslim elites of Singapore usually do not extend to the general Indian 
Muslim population. 
As has already been mentioned above, Indian Muslims have repeatedly been 
criticized for lack of unity and have been urged to adopt a common agenda by 
politicians and Muslim community leaders. Apart from the ideological ramifications 
of such an appeal, this call for unity among Indian Muslims by Malays and Arabs also 
reveals the difficulties government bodies face when dealing with Indian Muslims. 
Due to the limited influence of MUIS leadership among Indian Muslims, the Indian 
Muslim associations emerged as the prime mediator between government agencies 
and the larger Indian Muslim communities. This enables MUIS to address Indian 
Muslim grievances more effectively, while at the same time establishing its authority 
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over religious activities by Indian Muslims. At the same time, however, MUIS had to 
acknowledge the diversity of associations and community leaders among Indian 
Muslims, for no single association can reasonably claim to have the support of all 
Indian Muslims in Singapore. 
The foundation of the FIM in 1992 has certainly simplified the situation from 
MUIS’s point of view. The FIM has become MUIS’s prime link to the Indian Muslim 
communities in Singapore. Prior to the establishment of the FIM, MUIS risked getting 
involved in the squabbles between various Indian Muslim associations if it appointed 
a member of one of the associations to the executive council. Now, with the FIM in 
existence, one of its members is usually appointed to represent the interests of Indian 
Muslims in the executive council. This has not brought quarrels between associations 
to an end, but now the task of choosing the representative falls to the members of the 
FIM, not MUIS, which can thus stay aloof from inter-association hostilities. 
Nevertheless, the foundation of the FIM has not relieved MUIS of the need to deal 
with particular associations. This is mainly due to the fact that the FIM is a federation 
of associations, with little independent funds and personnel. This severely limits the 
sphere of influence of the FIM, and makes it necessary for MUIS to turn to the 
constituent associations if it wants work to be done at grassroots level. Indeed, even 
though the FIM has simplified procedures for MUIS, one may argue that it has also 
removed MUIS from the Indian Muslim base by yet another level of mediation. 
An overview over official relations between Tamil Muslim associations and 
government bodies would not be complete without mentioning the links associations 
maintain with individual mosques. We have already noted that mosques may permit 
registered Muslim associations to use their facilities. Especially the ‘new-generation’ 
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activities, like auditoria, class-rooms, and the like. Associations draw on these for 
conferences, speeches or religious classes they organize, rather than using similar 
facilities in community centers. STMWS has in the past cooperated with several 
Indian mosques, such as the Masjid Abdul Gafoor and the Masjid Jamae (Chulia), in 
organizing religious classes.499 Yet such official links between mosques and Indian 
Muslim associations are not limited to Indian mosques. For instance, there is an 
especially close relationship between SKML and the Masjid Mujahidin in 
Queenstown, and the association uses the mosque and its facilities for a number of 
activities, from conferences to ifṭār (‘fast breaking’) receptions [Figure 13].  
 
Figure 13: Ifṭār reception organized by the Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim League at Masjid 
Mujahidin in 2003 (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
                                                 
499 “Religious Knowledge Upgrading Course for Indian Muslims”, Warita 92, Jan-Feb 1994: 16; cf. 
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In contrast to the often substantial cooperation between government bodies and 
individual associations, there is almost no cooperation amongst the associations 
themselves outside the FIM. To the contrary, there exist considerable rivalries 
between associations over policies and activities, some of which will be addressed in 
chapter 6. Official friendly relationships between different associations outside the 
forum offered by the FIM tend to be minimal, and limited to the president or secretary 
of one association attending another association’s functions and conferences. 
Furthermore, in many cases these contacts are precipitated on private links between 
the leaderships of the associations involved, and are thus difficult to distinguish from 
the personal networks of individuals. 
In the case of interactions between registered associations and informal groups, it 
is even more difficult to distinguish between official links between groups and 
informal, private links between individuals. Very often, members of a Sufi 
brotherhood may also be engaged in an association, or have ties of kin- and friendship 
to those active in a specific association. It is thus difficult to talk of ‘formal’ or 
‘informal’ ties between associations and informal groups, as the line between the two 
types of links is blurred.500 At times, though, associations may recognize ‘informal’ 
groups in a more public way. For example, such groups may be asked to recite 
mawlid on the occasion of important holidays, or to participate in other ways in an 
association’s functions. Conversely, associations may support informal groups in 
certain ways. In at least one case an association allows a branch of a Sufi brotherhood 
to use its premises for its dhikr sessions. Yet in many cases, informal groups operate 
without any support from an association, and most associations may not even be 
aware of the existence of such a group. 
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Informal Networks and the Role of the Individual 
Despite the fact that it is officially associations and other public institutions that enter 
into relations with one another, the precise nature of these relations is strongly 
influenced by the networks and actions of individuals. In some cases, these 
relationships become so important that the line between official and informal, 
corporate and individual networks becomes blurred. The strength of an association is 
at least partly determined by the type of personal networks its leadership has been 
able to establish. Individual networks can provide an association with political 
leverage, funding, administrative benefits, and popular support; on the other hand, an 
individual may be able to derive considerable advantages through the manipulation of 
these networks. Such informal, private linkages are themselves of various types. 
Kinship, friendship, patronage, or business acquaintances may all be involved. 
Furthermore, individuals may hold office in more than one group, especially since the 
establishment of the FIM; thus, it is not always possible to tell in what capacity a 
person acts at a certain moment, and indeed, the person may not be able to tell him- or 
herself. 
As mentioned, the nature of networks across institutions and associations can be 
of various types. Kinship is one of these linkages that tie individuals active in 
different institutions together. Given the fact that a large number of Tamil Muslim 
associations are kin-center based, kinship linkages are more common ‘vertically’, i.e. 
tying an association to an informal group or a government institution, though there are 
of course cases where members of different associations are tied by kinship. Thus, I 
know of several cases where the leadership of associations is linked by kinship to 
members of Sufi brotherhoods. In some cases, it seems that such linkages help to 
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mentioned case of a Sufi brotherhood’s branch which uses the premises of a kin-
center association, some of the members of the Sufi group are fairly closely related to 
persons among the association’s leadership, though I am not able to say whether this 
fact has motivated the association to allow the Sufi group to use its premises. The 
same association also maintains links with another Sufi group, which similarly 
includes members of the association’s kin-center community. Interestingly, in this 
case the Sufi group also has members which are closely linked by kinship ties to 
another kin-center association, yet these ties apparently have not led to any 
cooperation between that association and the Sufi group. 
Perhaps even more important than ties of kinship are friendships established 
across organizational boundaries, for such links are in a way much more facilely 
established than kinship linkages. Such ties can operate in a variety of ways. On the 
most basic level, they may be expressed by individuals attending the functions and 
activities of other associations, sometimes as representatives of their associations, 
sometimes simply as private individuals. Yet such connections of friendship can have 
a much greater impact on the associations that the respective individuals are involved 
in. Let us take the example of two individuals, Shaik Omar and Ashfaq Naina.501 Both 
are high-ranking members of their respective kin-center associations. The two are 
close acquaintances, and commonly visit each other on the occasion of holidays and 
other functions; this sometimes includes functions organized by their respective 
associations. Yet the relationship does not end there. At times, Ashfaq Naina, who 
belongs to a merchant family, financially supports events organized by Shaik Omar’s 
association. At other times, Shaik Omar mobilizes his own professional networks for 
the benefit of Ashfaq Naina or his relatives.  
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Conversely, of course, the relationship between associations can also suffer from 
rivalry or enmity between high-ranking members. Indeed, in some cases it seems that 
it is primarily personal rivalry rather than differences between the associations as such 
that cause tensions. This type of negative relationship appears to be the stronger the 
more influence an individual wields in an association, as the interest of individual and 
association overlap in these cases to a considerable degree. As such individuals often 
have connections not only with other associations, but also with high-ranking 
functionaries in government bodies, rivalries between the leadership of various 
associations can lead to considerable tensions as the competing individuals mobilize 
their respective networks of support. 
Organizations can not only be linked by the personal networks of their individual 
members, but also by one person holding offices in multiple associations and 
institutions. In some cases, this multiple office-holding is directly linked to the nature 
of the post. The President of the FIM naturally has to be a member of one of the 
member-associations, and usually he502 will be a leading member of his association. 
Similarly, there is usually a representative of Indian Muslim associations on the 
MUIS executive council, who nowadays usually represents the FIM, leading to a 
triple engagement of the individual with various organizations: as member of an 
Indian Muslim association, as representative of the FIM, and as member of the MUIS 
executive council. Whereas in case of MUIS and the FIM, such multiple office-
holding is unavoidable, there are also other cases where individuals are 
simultaneously members of several official bodies. Thus, there are cases where 
individuals hold positions both in an association and a mosque’s Board of 
Management, which is certainly a boon to the association if it needs to make use of 
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the facilities offered by mosques. Yet there is only one case that I am aware of, viz. 
that of the Masjid Malabar and the Malabar Muslim Juma-ath, where the link between 
mosque and association is so close that the association actually helps in facilitating 
the mosque’s administration. In some cases, an individual may even hold high-
ranking positions in several associations. For example, there are close connections 
between SIJU and TMJ, due to the fact that SIJU split from TMJ in the late 1950s, 
and I have talked to several respondents who are or have been members of both 
associations. The leadership is still closely linked, which explains the close 
cooperation between the two associations during the Taláq-controversy.503
It is interesting to note that most of the last mentioned cases of multiple 
membership in Indian Muslim associations and other Muslim bodies apart from FIM 
and MUIS involve members of non-kin-center associations. As has been mentioned in 
chapter 2, it was largely the kin-center associations that had survived the war, and the 
postwar period saw a steady rise in the influence of such associations and former 
laborer communities on the religious life of Tamil Muslims in Singapore, with a 
simultaneous decline of ‘big men’ represented by individuals like Kader Sultan or 
Karim Ghani, who had dominated the organization of Tamil Muslim religious life 
until the early 1950s. Yet it is important to stress that this does not mean that 
individual initiatives play no longer a role in the religious life of Singaporean Tamil 
Muslims. Rather, individuals had to adapt to the wider changes taking place in the 
landscape of religious organizations. While lacking the broad support that larger kin-
center associations derive from their communities, groups that were not linked to a 
specific kin-center community still allowed individuals to impact on the organization 
of religious life. It seems that these individuals make up for the often rather small size 
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of their associations through diversifying their activities by participating in the 
organization of multiple religious institutions, thereby preserving a role for the 
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Chapter 5 








It has been claimed that “[l]anguage is always involved in ethnic relations…”.504 
Given that the section of Muslim society we are concerned with is defined through the 
use of a common language, viz. Tamil, we will have to consider what role language 
plays in the religious life of Tamil Muslims in Singapore, and how it affects the 
ability of Tamil Muslims to participate in the Muslim public sphere. We shall 
consider three aspects of the role of language in the religious domain. The first aspect 
concerns the relation of language and community for Tamil Muslims. What needs to 
be considered in this context is in how far Tamil Muslims’ relationship with their 
religion as well as the larger non-Muslim Tamil society is reflected in the imagination 
of the Tamil language. Furthermore, it is necessary in this context to consider the role 
of other languages for the Tamil Muslim community, viz. Malay, Urdu, and English. 
Secondly, we will have to address a vital point of Tamil Muslim religiosity, viz. 
the use of Tamil for religious purposes. There are three main domains where the use 
of Tamil is conspicuous in the religious sphere – teaching, preaching, and publishing, 
ultimately all related to the transmission of religious knowledge. Preaching in Tamil 
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is common in a number of contexts, most notably of course in the weekly Friday 
sermon, and less commonly on religious holidays or during functions and ceremonies. 
The formalized transmission of Islamic knowledge in religious teaching is a central 
issue in demands made regarding Tamil Muslims’ capacity to participate in the 
Muslim public sphere in Singapore, and religious classes are among the most 
common activities organized by Indian Muslim associations and mosques. Finally, 
Tamil is also used in transmitting religious information through publications, whether 
as journals, books, or more recently through audio recordings. Furthermore, in this 
section we have to address the problems that Tamil Muslims face in employing Tamil 
for the abovementioned purposes. In particular, what needs to be addressed is the 
reliance on Indian religious scholars and publications. 
The final section shall take up the last point, and address the question in how far 
the use of Tamil impacts Tamil Muslim involvement in Muslim discourse in the 
Republic. This shall be accomplished by briefly considering two debates that 
originated among Tamil Muslims, and evaluate their impact on wider Muslim 
discourse in Singapore. The two debates to be considered are the so-called ‘Singapore 
Muslim Libel Case’ of 1925-6, and the ‘Taláq-Controversy’ of 1999-2000. By 
contrasting these two debates, it will be possible to assess under what conditions and 
in which ways debates within Tamil-speaking Muslim society have been able at 
various points in time to permeate the wider Muslim public sphere in Singapore, and 
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LANGUAGE AND COMMUNITY 
 
In has been stated that fluency in one or the other language impacts ideas about 
‘community’ among Indian Muslims in Singapore. Noorul Farha comments: “The 
language one can speak may…influence one’s choice of ethnic affiliation”.505 As the 
ability to communicate is an important aspect of interacting meaningfully with other 
persons, it is hardly surprising that proficiency in a given language also gives access 
to networks composed of the speakers of that language. Furthermore, inability to 
speak a certain language may raise the awareness of difference on part of a person 
when faced with the need to communicate. As we shall see in this and the next 
chapter, language is an important part of the problems faced by Tamil-speaking 
Muslims in Singapore.506 But it is important to avoid determinism when discussing 
the relationship of language-use and images of community – various factors constrain 
and influence identification with a given speech community. In this section, we will 
therefore outline the role Tamil and other languages have played in imagining 
community among Tamil-speaking Muslims in Singapore. 
Tamil Muslims have actively participated in the Tamil public sphere in Singapore, 
and it is not uncommon to encounter statements to the effect that the shared language 
would naturally predispose Tamil-speaking Muslims to identify with the wider non-
Muslim Tamil ‘community’.507 As one respondent put it: “I am very proud I am, still I 
am a Tamilian. My mother-tongue is Tamil, my religion is Islam”.508 Fakhri has 
claimed that the diaspora-situation has been conducive to the creation of a Tamil 
Muslim identity through print-media in 19th and early 20th century Singapore and 
                                                 
505 Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 60; cf. Bibijan 1976/77: 101-2. 
506 Cf. also Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 60. 
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1992: 352. 
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Malaya.509 Furthermore, according to him a salient feature of this early print-culture 
was “…the primacy of language as a cultural signifier and the consigning of religion 
to the margins of social relations”, i.e. that ‘Tamilness’ superseded ‘Muslimness’ in 
this context.510 Indeed, the editors of Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ in the 1880s clearly aimed to 
address both Hindus and Muslims among the Tamil-speakers. Thus, the title-page of 
the first issue proclaimed in English that the newspaper was started by “…the 
Mohamedan and Hindoo residents in [sic] Singapore…”, and even claimed that 
‘Allah’, ‘Shiva’, ‘Vishnu’ and ‘God’ were just different names for the same 
divinity.511 Yet at the same time, pace Fakhri, the religious differences remained 
salient, and while Tamil-speaking Muslims were perceived as part of a wider Tamil-
speaking community, they were similarly seen as part of larger Singaporean Muslim 
community which included “…Arabs, Malays, Bengalis, Klings, and others…”.512
Tamil Muslim participation in various Tamil-nationalist movements as well as in 
anti-Hindi agitation has received some attention in recent years.513 Tamil nationalist 
leaders generally exhibited a rather positive attitude towards Muslims and Islam.514 
Similarly, Tamil Muslims in Singapore participated in nationalist associations and 
movements. Thus, in 1956, a Muslim was the Vice-chairman of the Tamils [sic] 
Reform Association (Tamiḻar Cīrttiruttac Caṅkam), which was one of the main Tamil 
associations in Singapore at that time.515 Muslims also participated in the Singaporean 
DMK (Tirāviṭa Muṉṉēṟṟak Kaḻakam, Dravidian Progress Association), the local 
avatar of Tamil Nadu’s prime nationalist political party. One respondent, who had 
                                                 
509 Fakhri 2002: 7. 
510 Fakhri 2002: 8. 
511 “Dedication” & “Kaṭavuḷvāḻttu”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 27 Jun 1887: 1; cf. also “Paḷḷivāyilkaḷum 
tēvālayaṅkaḷum”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 25 Feb 1889: 134. 
512 “Cavuttu piriṭciṟōṭ kuttupāp paḷḷivāyilaippaṟṟiya potuviṣayam”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 15 Aug 1887: 29. 
513 Cf. More 1993; Ramaswamy 1997: 174-6. 
514 Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1984: 105-6; Ramaswamy 1997: 191. 
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earlier been member of the Tamils Reform Association, joined the Singaporean DMK 
when asked by a Hindu friend. The respondent stressed that the Singaporean DMK, in 
contrast to the Indian DMK, was “…not a political association”, and that he 
participated primarily in cultural activities.516 Another example of active identification 
with a wider Tamil community would be the establishment of the Umar Pulavar 
Tamil School by SKML in 1946, especially as there were latent conflicts within the 
association over transforming the school into a madrasa for the teaching of Arabic 
and religious education. Interestingly, it had been a non-Muslim, Ca.Cā. Ciṉṉappaṉār, 
who had suggested naming the school after the most important Muslim poet in 
Tamil.517 Nowadays, there are still Muslims active as teachers for Tamil at several 
schools. According to one respondent, there are currently (2006) about twenty 
Muslims among the Tamil teachers in Singapore. 
Yet the example of the Umar Pulavar Tamil School also reveals that Muslims did 
not always feel comfortable with non-Islamic aspects of Tamil language and culture. 
Besides the controversy over funding religious rather than secular education, the 
school had to face a controversy with the newspaper Malāyā Naṇpaṉ, which alleged 
that Muslim pupils had been made to participate in ‘un-Islamic’ activities during the 
Educational Week celebrations of 1952, such as greeting with folded hands like 
Hindus, using the greeting vaṇakkam, and having Muslim girls perform on stage.518 
Earlier, the handbill of 1925 that caused the ‘Singapore Muslim Libel Case’ advised 
Muslims to use the Arabic rather than the Tamil script when translating the Koran into 
Tamil in order to “…obviate the possibility of the Tamils with Tamil script slighting 
our religion”.519 While there was support for Tamil nationalism from some quarters 
                                                 
516 Cf. Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1984: 193-4. 
517 Meytīṉ 1989: 55-7. 
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among the Muslims, others remained critical about it. One issue between Tamil 
Muslims and non-Muslim nationalists was the latter’s elevation of the Tirukkuṟaḷ, a 
highly popular collection of moral maxims possibly dating to the 5th-6th century, over 
the Koran.520 A controversy ensued in the mid-1950s when the then editor of Malāyā 
Naṇpaṉ, Em.Em. Tāvūtu, published a tract written by a Hindu with the title 
Tirukkuṟaḷ apattak kaḷañciyam, ‘Storehouse of the Tirukkuṟaḷ’s Mistakes’.521 The 
tendency of Tamil nationalists to promote the Tirukkuṟaḷ as a moral work on par if not 
superior to the Koran definitely concerned some of my respondents, who expressed 
their doubts about these claims in informal conversations. One of them even supplied 
me with a Muslim refutation of the nationalists’ claim entitled ‘Which is the 
Universal Scripture? The Kuṟaḷ or the Koran?’.522 Another issue mentioned by my 
respondents was that at least until the 1980s, special programs on Muslim holidays 
were only broadcast in Malay radio and television stations, while the Tamil stations 
only broadcast Hindu programs. One Indian respondent commented on the issue: 
 
We cannot meet, eh, mix [sic] with the Malay program, because of the 
language, different language. So we want separate. Suppose we go this 
side, means Tamil program, […] they celebrate only Deepavali and Pongal, 
their own festivals. […] They cannot spare for us […] separate time. I think 
that’s a problem. 
 
By now, the two Muslim holidays have become more conspicuous on Tamil 
television in Singapore, and the local Tamil radio station actually has several 
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programs on each of the holidays, so that is seems that a solution has been found in 
this regard. As we shall see in chapter 6, such frictions are often seen as signs of a 
supposed tension between being ‘Muslim’ and being ‘Indian’ or ‘Tamil’.523 Yet I 
would rather suggest that the tensions arose over conflicting perceptions of what it 
means to be Tamil, with Muslims protesting any move that may make Tamil culture 
appear as if it was in opposition to Islamic principles. The frictions thus arise in order 
to avert creating tensions between being ‘Muslim’ and being ‘Tamil’ rather than from 
a primordial identity conflict, and are an expression of Tamil Muslims’ desire to 
identify as Tamil.524
In everyday life, though, there seems to be little need for most Tamil Muslims to 
actively project or contest their ‘Tamilness’. Most comments from my respondents 
regarding that matter did occur in the context of discussing the role of other languages 
in their religious life, where the contrast with Tamil would become most obvious.525 
To be an Indian and to speak Tamil is often seen as interchangeable by Singaporean 
Tamils, especially given Tamil’s official status in Singapore. It is this tendency to use 
‘Tamil’ and ‘Indian’ interchangeably that gives rise to the tendency to speak about 
‘Indian Muslims’ when one actually addresses Tamil-speaking Muslims.526 When 
asked about how far FIM could represent all Indian Muslims in Singapore given its 
strong South Indian character, one community leader expressed it in exactly these 
terms: 
 
                                                 
523 Cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 37-9. 
524 Admittedly, this may not be true in all contexts, as the refusal of Mariam’s respondents to call 
themselves ‘Tamil Muslims’ suggests, but as mentioned in the Introduction, I have not encountered 
such sentiments; cf. Mariam 1989: 102. 
525 Similarly, Mariam discusses the role of Urdu, Malay, and English for Tamil Muslims, but not of 
Tamil itself; cf. Mariam 1989: 108-10, 120-2. 
526 Cf. “I’m flattered Indian Muslims like me were counted in”, The Straits Times, 25 Mar 1992; 
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It’s because Tamil is one of the major language[s] and primary speaking 
[sic], and government has emphasized [it] and we felt that the Tamils, eh, 
Tamil-speaking [sic] in the Federation of Indian Muslims is a majority. So 
I think it is fair that, you know, they have a better say. 
 
Given that my research concentrated on Tamil-speaking Muslims, it is not surprising 
that I rarely encountered statements to the effect that people felt inadequate as 
‘Indians’ because they did not speak Tamil well as related by Noorul Farha.527 Yet as 
mentioned in chapter 3, the perceived quality of the Tamil spoken by various groups 
within Tamil Muslim society was considered as a marker of refinement and status, 
though of course it was usually the respondent’s own variety of Tamil that served as a 
marker to judge the quality of Tamil spoken by others. On the level of the individual, 
being able to employ different registers of the language was a highly regarded skill. 
The Tamil language is characterized by diglossia, i.e. there is considerable difference 
between the language of everyday communication and the language of literature, 
speeches, and other ‘higher’ discourse. To be able to give speeches in Tamil, or even 
more importantly, as we shall see, to preach, is a skill that not every Singaporean 
Tamil possesses. This is furthermore compounded by the fact that the modern literary 
language furthermore differs from the language employed for literary works until the 
19th century, making the latter unintelligible for Tamil-speakers without proper 
training. The members of a branch of a Sufi brotherhood told me that they had 
originally planned to read Umaṟuppulavars Cīṟāppurāṇam, the most important 
Islamic poem in Tamil dating to ca. 1700, together, but even years later were not 
capable to do so, as they did not understand the poem. For those people who do 
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situate themselves in a Tamil discursive tradition, such linguistic skills are highly 
desirable, even though only a limited number of people possess them. 
To understand the patterns of use of and identification with Tamil in an Islamic 
context in Singapore, one also has to take account of those languages that in a sense 
compete with the use of Tamil in these contexts. In Singapore, these are mainly 
Malay, Urdu, and English. Malay is of course ubiquitous in the Muslim public sphere 
in the republic. Religious education, preaching in mosques, publications, as well as 
communication among Muslims is predominantly carried out in Malay, prompting 
Clammer to call it the ‘Muslim vernacular’.528 It is in this context that some authors 
have located the tendency of Tamil Muslims to ‘Malayize’, to adopt the Malay 
language and with it also aspects of Malay culture.529 It should be noted that adoption 
of Malay by Tamil Muslims was and is not always made unconstrained. The wish to 
grant children access to a wider range of religious education may influence parents to 
have their child take Malay in school. Similarly, difficulties in finding a marriage 
partner, and even the mundane fact of living in a predominantly Malay neighborhood, 
act as constraints to ‘Malayize’.530 One of my elderly respondents related why his 
mother, who grew up in a Malay kampung, did not speak Tamil with her children, 
though both her parents were from India: “It is shameful for us to talk in our own 
language in a Malay kampong in those days. Unprestigious, to talk our language in 
the midst of Malay [sic]. […] As a result, my mother forgot the language [Tamil; 
T.T.]”. 
The tendency to identify Islam and the Malay language is widespread in 
Singapore and is perceived by some to be commonsensical.531 It is not surprising that 
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this identification and the resulting pressure to conform is strongly resisted by many 
Tamil-speaking Muslims. One of my respondents noted his annoyance with 
constantly facing the question in school why he, as a Muslim, did not speak Malay. 
Similar complaints were made by other respondents, and were also noted by 
scholars.532 Often these complaints were coupled with pointing out how the emphasis 
on Malay in the Muslim public sphere disadvantages Tamils in the fulfillment of their 
religious duties. It is also in this context that protests by Tamil Muslims regarding the 
choice of Malay as the medium to teach Islam at schools in the Religious Knowledge 
program in the 1980s should be seen.533 Generally, negative reactions to Malay by 
Tamil Muslims are perceived as attempts to safeguard their ‘Tamil’ identity against 
being assimilated into the Malay community.534 While there is no reason to contest 
this assertion, one should also note another dimension. In contrast to the tendency by 
some, usually Malay-speaking, Muslims who consider this behavior as a sign that for 
Tamil Muslims, ‘Indian’ identity is more important than ‘Muslim’ identity,535 the 
contestation of Malay in the Muslim public sphere by some Tamil Muslims should 
rather be seen as motivated by the wish not to build up an opposition between ‘Tamil’ 
and ‘Islam’, which inevitably results when ‘Islam’ is being too closely identified with 
‘Malay’. It may thus be a reaction paralleling the contestation over certain aspects of 
Tamil identity such as the evaluation of certain texts which were discussed above. 
Another possible linguistic choice for Tamil Muslims, and for an even larger 
Indian Muslim community, would be Urdu. Urdu is often considered to be “…a 
symbol of cultural and religious identity” of South Asian Muslims,536 and is even 
claimed to have “…become the culture language and lingua franca of the South Asian 
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Muslim diaspora outside the subcontinent”.537 While the last statement needs to be 
strongly modified in the Singaporean context, the perception of Urdu as the language 
of South Asian Muslims is certainly present. When asked what were in his opinion the 
main differences between Indian and Malay Muslims, a Malay respondent pointed out 
that “…of course, the Indian Muslims have their own language – Urdu”, even though 
most of the Indian Muslims around us at the time were Tamil-speaking. While some 
Tamil Muslims have not much regard for the language, as mentioned in chapter 3, 
Urdu seems to command a certain amount of respect among Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore. One respondent noted that more and more Tamil Muslims were trying to 
learn Urdu, in order to access Islamic literature written in that language. The members 
of the Sufi-group mentioned above who had originally wanted to learn how to read 
the Cīṟāppurāṇam had found a substitute in learning Urdu. 
Yet there seems to be some ambiguity in the attitude towards Urdu among many 
Tamil Muslims – while the language is respected and studied, there is no move 
towards pushing the language as a medium of communication for Indian Muslims in 
Singapore as a whole. As mentioned, Tamil is seen by most Tamil Muslims to be the 
proper language for Indian Muslims in Singapore. The same community leader who 
had defended the dominance of Tamils in the FIM noted that the Malabar Muslim 
Juma-ath and the Dakhni Urdu Association were included mainly because “…more or 
less, these people would understand Tamil”. Indeed, as mentioned in chapter 3, the 
South Indian speakers of Dakhni-Urdu are perceived negatively by some Tamils, who 
see them as Tamils who adopted Urdu due to pretensions to higher status. At the same 
time though, these Urdu-speaking South Indians do not threaten the hegemony of 
Tamil among Singaporean Indian Muslims, as on the one hand their Urdu is perceived 
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to be substandard – even one Dakhni respondent claimed that, in contrast to Dakhni-
Urdu, North Indian Urdu was “…so pure you can’t understand it!” – and on the other 
the speakers of Dakhni-Urdu seem to be content to use Tamil in the wider Indian 
Muslim public sphere, knowledge of which gives them an advantage over Urdu-
speaking North Indians lacking that skill.  
The most recent addition to the languages competing with Tamil in the religious 
life of Singaporean Tamil Muslims, yet possibly the most challenging, is English. 
Twenty years ago, Clammer considered it to be unlikely that Indian Muslims would 
turn to English, but this has become increasingly the case in the last two decades.538 
Two factors favor the increasing use of English for religious purposes among Tamil 
Muslims in Singapore. Firstly, the majority of Singaporeans, especially the younger 
ones, know some English, and almost all younger Tamils have gone through English-
medium education.539 To judge from the census figures, English is more readily 
available to Tamil Muslims than Malay.540 Secondly, Nielsen has recently pointed out 
that “…English is becoming an Islamic lingua franca”.541 Muslim intellectuals have 
been turning to English to an increasing extent lately, and there are several English 
Islamic bookshops in Singapore which sell not only original works on Islam in 
English, but also translations into English of works originally written in other 
languages. The increasing use of English in the Muslim public sphere is also signaled 
by the decision of MUIS to have the Friday sermon read in English in selected 
mosques. MUIS explained the move by pointing out that there was a significant 
number of Muslims in Singapore who do not understand Malay, obviously 
                                                 
538 Cf. Clammer 1985: 42. 
539 Cf. PuruShotam [1998] 2000: 113-7. 
540 Leow 2001b: 81. 
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anticipating resentment on part of the Malays.542 Many of my Indian respondents, in 
contrast, welcomed the increasing use of English. A substantial number advocated 
that English rather than Malay should be the main language of the Singapore Muslim 
community, as English was more widely understood. This opinion was not only 
voiced by Indian Muslims who spoke languages other than Tamil but also by Tamils. 
For these respondents, English has the advantage of being the ‘mother-tongue’ of only 
a small number of Muslims in Singapore, and is therefore untainted by any ethnic 
parochialism. In addition, of course, English’s image to be a ‘modern’ and ‘universal’ 
language may make it appear more favorably as a language of Islamic discourse than 
Malay or Tamil. Yet despite this positive attitude by many Indian Muslims towards 
English, very little is done on the side of Tamil Muslim associations and informal 
groups to encourage the use of English rather than Tamil in the Muslim public sphere, 
and it seems that to many Tamil Muslims, a model that favors Tamil among Tamil 
Muslims and English in interaction with non-Tamil Muslims seems to be preferred to 
the wholesale replacement of Tamil by English.543
 
PREACHING, TEACHING, PUBLISHING – THE USE OF LANGUAGE IN RELIGION 
 
By focusing on language as a marker of identifying with a given speech community, 
one easily overlooks a much more basic aspect of religious language use, viz. that the 
transmission of religious knowledge largely happens through language. What type of 
religious knowledge an individual is able to access depends on what language(s) he or 
she is proficient in. Similarly, ignorance of a certain language makes it difficult, if not 
impossible for an individual to access knowledge transmitted through that language. It 
                                                 
542 Metzger 2003: 44. 
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is my contention that this simple aspect is more important to understand Tamil 
Muslim religious life in Singapore than the question of identity. As Malays form the 
largest ethno-linguistic group among Singaporean Muslims, it is understandable that 
Malay is the most salient language in the Muslim public sphere in the Republic. It is 
the main language of preaching, formalized religious education, and religious 
publishing, and widely used by MUIS, MENDAKI, and other Muslim institutions and 
organizations. Yet there is a significant section among Singaporean Tamil Muslims 
which is not or only rudimentarily proficient in Malay. The Census of 2000 only gives 
figures on literacy rather than general competence in different languages, and even 
these figures are not particularly clear with regard to our question, but it may not be 
too far fetched to assume that probably less than half of the Tamil-speaking Muslims 
in Singapore have enough proficiency in Malay to be able to utilize it for the 
transmission of religious knowledge.544 There is therefore a need for Tamil Muslims 
in Singapore to rely on their own networks and initiatives in order to attain religious 
knowledge, as they are unable to participate in the wider Malay speaking Muslim 
public sphere. 
The focus in this section will be on language use in the transmission of religious 
knowledge in public. Most of this transmission takes place through three types of 
activities: through sermons and lectures, through formal religious education, and 
through religious publications, mostly in print, but increasingly utilizing the potential 
of new media. Of course, the family and other social networks also act as conduits for 
                                                 
544 Cf. Leow 2001b: 81; these figures seem to be contradicted by figures from the 1970s according to 
which 95.9% of all Indians could understand Malays; cf. Clammer 1985: 34. But these figures are 
highly problematic – apart from the time gap between the two sets of figures, it is not clear what ‘to 
understand’ Malay means in this context – understanding a fruit vendor and understanding theological 
discourse are two different things. Many of my respondents stated that they were not proficient enough 
in Malay to participate in religious activities that required use of Malay, and the continued existence of 
‘Indian mosques’ is a clear indicator that there is a demand for the transmission of religious knowledge 
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the transmission of knowledge in certain circumstances, such as the elementary 
education of children. But it is in the Muslim public sphere that language use in the 
transmission of religious knowledge becomes a salient marker of difference between 
ethno-linguistic groups, and it is here that exclusion from formalized transmission of 
knowledge has the greatest impact on the religious life of individuals.  
Sermons and lectures are an important part of this formalized transmission of 
religious knowledge. The Friday sermon (khuṭba, Ta. piracaṅkam), as well as 
sermons and talks delivered on other occasions, performs a variety of functions, such 
as reminding Muslims of and exhorting them to perform their duties towards other 
human beings as well as God, recall the sacred history of Islam, interpreting scripture 
and providing Muslims with guidelines of how to respond to the world around them 
as Muslims. Mariam noted with a hint of disapproval that the devotees at the Nagore 
Durgah in 1986 exhibited “…a general lack of interest in listening to the sermon (that 
is, to learn about Islam)…”.545 As has been mentioned in chapter 4, the general topic 
of the weekly Friday sermon, as well as the basic text in Malay and English, is 
provided by MUIS. In ‘Indian’ mosques, this basic text of course needs to be rendered 
into a South Asian language, a task that requires a certain amount of religious 
knowledge as well as rhetorical skills. The preacher also has to be careful in 
recreating the basic sermon in a South Asian language because, though he has some 
freedom in embellishing it, he has to avoid sensitive issues – the Singaporean state is 
deeply aware of the political and disruptive potential of sermons and lectures, which 
is obviously the reason why MUIS provides the basic text in the first place.546
Apart from the sermons, delivered every Friday and on the important holidays in 
the ‘Indian’ mosques, religious lectures in Tamil (caṉmārkka urai, coṟpoḻivu) have 
                                                 
545 Mariam 1989: 45. 
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for a long time formed an important part of the activities organized by mosques and 
associations.547 Such lectures may be delivered by both laypeople and religious 
scholars, though the latter are commonly regarded to have greater rhetoric skills, 
which seems to be justified from my own experience. To understand the role played 
by lectures and sermons in the religious life of Tamil Muslims, one has to take note 
not only of the content of the talk, but also the different techniques used by the 
preacher or speaker to transmit the intended information. Knowledge about Islamic 
values, doctrines, practices, and history is communicated to the audience by using 
scriptural exegesis, storytelling, exhortation, and explanation. This does not only 
require a sound knowledge of Islam, but also, as mentioned, considerable rhetorical 
skills. Preachers are expected to employ different registers of the Tamil language, e.g. 
literary Tamil when rendering verses from the Koran or colloquial Tamil when 
reporting conversations. As anecdotes and stories form an important part of Tamil 
preaching, the preacher also needs to be a good storyteller. Stories serve not only the 
transmission of religious knowledge, but also edify the audience, and the preacher 
needs to know a large number of episodes from the sacred history of Islam for his 
lectures and sermons. Humor is an important part of such storytelling, and the 
capacity of a preacher to include humorous yet still religiously edifying episodes in 
his lecture is greatly appreciated. In one instance, the person sitting beside me turned 
to me after the preacher had told a particularly amusing anecdote and commented: 
“That’s what I like [that particular preacher] for”. Finally, other rhetorical skills, such 
as modulating volume and speed of the voice or the use of gestures and facial 
expressions, are employed in preaching [Figure 14]. It is thus important to keep in 
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mind that lectures and sermons are performances, and that the performative aspects 
play an important role in the transmission of knowledge in these speeches.548
 
Figure 14: Moulana Moulavi Hafiz Qaari Ha Meem Uthman Faizi speaking at a function 
organized by the Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim League on the occasion of Islamic New Year 
AH 1427 on 30th of January 2006 (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
If religious lectures and sermons provide the most frequent opportunities for 
Singaporean Muslims to acquire religious knowledge, religious education provides 
the most comprehensive transmission of such knowledge. Generally, the literature 
distinguishes full-time and part-time Islamic education in Singapore. Full-time 
Islamic education is offered at six ‘madrasahs’ in Singapore. Students at these 
institutions do not attend secular schools – they receive training that enables them to 
become “…religious teachers, religious officials and religious leaders for the Muslim 
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community”.549 These full-time Islamic schools play an important role in providing 
Singaporean Muslims with a religious elite. Yet the main language of instruction in 
these institutions is Malay – none employs Tamil or any other South Asian language. 
The results of this are far-reaching, as South Asian Muslims without knowledge of 
Malay are excluded from studying at these institutions, and those who do know Malay 
do not receive any training that would allow them to employ South Asian languages 
effectively in Islamic contexts. Consequently, South Asian Muslims are lacking a 
locally trained body of religious scholars conversant in their own languages and are 
largely excluded from the religious (in the more narrow sense) elite of Singapore. 
This makes them dependent on religious scholars from South Asia, as we shall discuss 
below. 
In contrast to full-time Islamic education, part-time religious classes offered by 
mosques and associations are available to South Asian Muslims. The existence of 
Tamil religious schools before World War II has been mentioned in chapter 2. In the 
1970s, only the TMJ and some of the mosques offered religious classes.550 The move 
towards introducing more religious classes seems to have come during the 1990s, 
when the question of education for Indian Muslim children had gained in salience 
through Indian Muslim dissatisfaction with the exclusive use of Malay in the classes 
on Islam under the Religious Knowledge program in the 1980s and the debates 
surrounding MENDAKI, SINDA and the FIM around 1990. In addition to classes 
offered at mosques, such as the Masjid Abdul Gafoor,551 more and more associations 
came to offer such classes when the demand for religious education in Tamil was 
realized. By 2005, religious classes in Tamil were offered by seven different 
institutions at twenty different venues, catering to almost 1,700 students, both minors 
                                                 
549 Chee 2006: 6; cf. also Metzger 2003: 127-30. 
550 Cf. Syed Mohamed 1973: 35, 77. 
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and adults (cf. appendix 7). Teachers are usually hired from India, supplemented, as 
mentioned in chapter 4, by assistants trained locally by organizations such as 
PERGAS. Commonly taught subjects were the reading of the Koran and the recitation 
of Arabic prayers supplemented by basic religious practices and explanation of 
fundamental doctrines. While some rely exclusively on Tamil, other classes also 
employ English beside Tamil. The classes at the now demolished Masjid Naval Base 
for example made use of English publications approved by MUIS for teaching the 
basics of Islam. As one of the coordinators explained to me, this was done in order to 
enable children to explain Islam to their non-Indian friends. 
The success of these religious classes underscores the importance attached to 
religious education by many Tamil Muslims in Singapore. The need to have proper 
knowledge of religious matters was stressed by many of my respondents. One 
respondent noted that the lack of religious education exacerbated social problems 
such as an increased rate of divorces: 
 
The reason [for divorce] is lack of religious studies. […] So we have to 
educate them. Indian Muslim [sic] – Tamil; Malay Muslim in Malay; Urdu 
Muslim in Urdu; […] Everybody can read Koran, but they must know the 
meaning. Then they know how to go by sharī‘a. Then the divorce won’t be 
there.  
 
Religious education also has led to increasing interaction between MUIS and Indian 
Muslim associations. Offering religious classes allows associations to tap into MUIS 
funding out of zakāt funds. Conversely, MUIS has raised its involvement in Islamic 
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common curriculum for Islamic religious education in Singapore.552 This has led to 
the formulation of a plan for Indian Muslim religious classes by MUIS and FIM.553 
Yet it is unclear how effective such policies can be as long as they fail to tackle the 
main problem: the absence of facilities for training religious scholars (‘ulamā’) 
conversant in Tamil locally and the resulting dependence on India for the supply of 
such scholars. 
The topic of a Tamil-speaking religious elite needs some elaboration. ‘Ulamā’ 
from India have apparently served the needs of the Tamil Muslim community in 
Singapore for a long time. There is little information extant on the topic, but mosques 
like the Masjid Jamae (Chulia) would obviously have a Tamil-speaking Imam 
attached to them. Furthermore, scholars on a visit from India would be asked to 
preach and deliver speeches, as evinced by the report of such a visiting scholar giving 
the Friday sermon in the Masjid Jamae (Chulia) during Ramadan in 1889; similarly, 
Daud Shah delivered four lectures and three Friday sermons while being in Singapore 
in April and May 1925.554 At the same time, as mentioned in chapter 2, the Indian 
Muslim Society employed a religious teacher from Vellore. Even though 
progressively more ‘ulamā’ settled down in Singapore in the postwar period, they had 
still received their education in India.555 Most ‘ulamā’ serving the religious needs of 
Indian Muslims in Singapore are still hired from India. The Imam as well as the bilāl, 
i.e. the person calling to prayer, in ‘Indian’ mosques is generally brought from India, 
                                                 
552 Cf. Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 2004. 
553 “Intiya muslim amaippukaḷiṉ mukkiya ceyal tiṭṭaṅkaḷukku Muyis ātaravu”, Ceyticcuṭar 35, Nov 
2005: 2-3. 
554 “Kōṭṭār, Hāji Ceyku Mukiyittīṉ Ālīm ipuṉu Ceyku Mukammatu Leppai Ālīm Cākipu”, Ciṅkai 
Nēcaṉ, 13 May 1889: 178 [mistakenly given as 179]; “Malāy nāṭṭil namatu āciriyar”, Tārul Islām 7-6, 
Jun 1925: 275 & Tārul Islām 7-7, Jul 1925: 326-7. 
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as are the teachers for the religious classes offered by Indian Muslim associations.556 
Currently, there may be about twenty to thirty Indian nationals serving in Islamic 
religious occupations in the Republic. 
This arrangement of having Indian nationals serve the religious needs of the 
community is highly problematic. First of all, the Singaporean state is obviously wary 
of foreign preachers. Several times during the 1970s and 1980s, Indonesian and 
Malaysian preachers who had delivered inflammatory speeches on sensitive issues 
were barred from ever reentering Singapore.557 Consequently, all ‘ulamā’ from India 
are tested by Singaporean officials before they receive employment passes, and even 
those visiting only temporarily have to sign a declaration that they will not preach 
about political and sensitive matters. If they are found to have violated any of these 
rules, they can be deported and barred from entering Singapore again.558 Employers of 
Indian ‘ulamā’ also have to justify why they can not hire religious scholars locally. 
The lack of facilities for training ‘ulamā’ in the ḥanafī law-school is one reason 
generally accepted for bringing ḥanafī ‘ulamā’ to Singapore. In contrast, language 
seems to be perceived to be a weaker justification – as mentioned in chapter 3, in one 
case Singaporean Tamil Muslims agreed to hire a ḥanafī Imam for a shāfi‘ī mosque 
because they wanted to make sure to get a Tamil-speaking Imam, but feared that no 
permit would be given solely for that justification.559
Apart from these official barriers, the hiring of ‘ulamā’ from India creates 
difficulties both for the scholars as well as the Singaporean community. Housing is 
                                                 
556 A respondent claimed that the reason why the bilāl, who does not require a religious degree, is hired 
from India is simply that it is difficult to find Singaporean Indian Muslims to do the job, whereas in the 
Malay community it would mainly be done by old men after retirement. 
557 Kuah-Pearce 2003: 149-50. 
558 One respondent pointed out that due to these regulations, the Singaporean government is actually 
able to exert a much greater control on foreign ‘ulamā’, who can be easily disciplined, than on local 
scholars. 
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provided by the employer, in case of mosques usually a small and simple room on the 
mosque’s premises. Financial constraints do not permit the ‘ulamā’ from India to 
bring their families along, so that they are separated from kith and kin for long periods 
at a time. Furthermore, the lack of integration of the Indian ‘ulamā’ into Singaporean 
society was a concern brought up by several respondents, and also recognized by 
MUIS.560 During one dialogue session between MUIS and Indian Muslim community 
leaders, the suggestion was made to consider ‘ulamā’ from India as ‘talents’, i.e. as 
migrants possessing skills desirable for the Singaporean state, yet it is rather unlikely 
that this proposal will meet with success, given the official distrust of the government. 
Those ‘ulamā’ employed by associations to teach elementary religious knowledge 
furthermore have to come to terms with the rather unchallenging nature of their 
occupation – as one of them admitted, he would prefer to teach higher aspects of 
doctrine and theology rather than training children in reading the Koran. 
It should also be noted that the relationship between Indian ‘ulamā’ and 
Singaporean Indian laymen is not without frictions. In 1958, such frictions led to the 
‘ulamā’ splitting off from TMJ to form SIJU. A respondent who was a member of 
TMJ at that time commented: 
 
‘Ulamā’ is entirely different. […] Actually we give respect that one. 
Because they know religious [sic]. […] But all the time he cannot manage 
us. What he like [sic], we cannot do that one. That time we are young also, 
we know what’s good, what is bad. […] But those people are like old time 
people, conservative. They say: “Only this way only we can go”. That time 
we cannot obey to them. 
                                                 
560 Cf. http://www.muis.gov.sg/english/media_releases/presspeech_perwakafanbencoolen_may04.aspx 
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Almost fifty years later, some of my respondents similarly lamented the conservative 
attitude of many of the ‘ulamā’ hired from India, which in their opinion was not 
feasible in the Singaporean environment. It was also mentioned that the scholars from 
India had difficulties in relating to the problems faced by Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore, being used to Indian rather than Singaporean discourse. Some associations 
have become more reluctant to employ ‘ulamā’ from India, though they are still 
dependent on them for their religious classes. Tensions between STMWS and a 
scholar employed by them over the links this scholar had established with individuals 
outside the association’s sphere of influence led to a split between the association and 
the scholar, who went on to form IMSSA. As a result, an increasing number of local 
Tamil Muslims are advocating a break with religious scholars from India.561
Despite such tensions, Tamil Muslims in Singapore are still dependent on ‘ulamā’ 
from India, primarily for linguistic reasons. While several local Tamil Muslims have 
attained religious degrees and are capable of teaching in English or Malay, they often 
feel that they are not able to transmit knowledge properly in Tamil. In the case of 
preaching and delivering lectures, they plainly lack the rhetoric skills necessary to 
effectively convey religious information to Tamil-speaking audiences, as many 
readily admitted. Similarly, in order to teach Islam in Tamil, scholars need not only 
have a good grasp of Islamic principles but also need to know how to translate these 
principles properly into Tamil. Consequently, Tamil Muslims in Singapore are caught 
in a difficult situation. On the one hand, more and more Singaporean Tamil Muslims 
advocate a break with ‘ulamā’ from India and Indian discourse. This is also the 
ultimate goal of MUIS and the public administration of Islam: none other than the 
Mufti of Singapore plainly told Indian Muslims in a dialogue session that the 
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recruitment of ‘ulamā’ from India could not go on forever. Yet on the other hand, 
Indian Muslims in general and Tamil Muslims in particular are dependent on such 
Indian ‘ulamā’ as long as no facilities for the training of Tamil religious scholars exist 
in Singapore. Without them, Tamil Muslims would be excluded even further from 
religious knowledge – the lack of local Tamil-speaking scholars already means that 
Tamil Muslims are largely excluded from the religious elite among Singaporean 
Muslims. To remedy this situation, some associations have recently developed plans 
to train proper ‘ulamā’ locally by employing their Indian-recruited teachers. SKML 
has begun such a course in 2005. The course follows the syllabus employed in most 
Arabic Colleges in Tamil Nadu leading to the ‘ālim- (pl. ‘ulamā’) degree.562 Over 
twenty students, both minors and adults, have enrolled for the course, yet as the 
course takes several years to complete, its impact remains to be seen. 
In order to round out our discussion of the use of the Tamil language in the 
transmission of religious knowledge in Singapore, mention has to be made of 
religious publishing. This includes the publication of journals and religious books, 
including literary works in a more narrow sense, as well as the increased use of new 
media during the last five to ten years. As already mentioned in chapter 2, religious 
publications in Tamil from Singapore are extant from the late 19th century onwards. 
Tamil Muslims were pioneers in the establishment of Tamil-language newspapers in 
Singapore. The earliest two Tamil newspapers from Singapore that we know of were 
Ciṅkai Varttamāṉi and Taṅkai Nēcaṉ in the 1870s, the former published by the same 
press as Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ in the 1890s, the latter by the publishers of the Malay-language 
journal Jawi Peranakan – in both cases, the publishers were Muslims.563 Ciṅkai 
                                                 
562 Cf. Tschacher 2006a: 204-7, 212-5. 
563 Birch 1979: 51; Jāpar Muhyittīṉ 1990: 118; cf. also “Kaṭitam”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 2 Jul 1888: 4; this 
letter also mentions a Singaporean journal called Ñāṉacūriyaṉ, which according to Cāmi 1994: 206 
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Nēcaṉ, the oldest extant Tamil newspaper from Singapore, regularly published 
articles of religious interest for Muslims, e.g. by providing special coverage of 
Muslim holidays,564 and even republished articles from Muslim Nēcaṉ, a well-known 
reformist weekly published in Kandy, Ceylon,565 thereby participating in what Fakhri 
has called a ‘transnational social field’.566 Tamil Muslims continued to be active in 
publishing. Cāmi mentions twelve Tamil journals and newspapers published from 
Singapore between 1900 and 1990, though most of them existed only for a short time, 
and little information is available on them.567 In 1984, the then Acting Minister of 
Social Affairs, Ahmad Mattar, urged Tamil Muslims to publish a magazine in Tamil, 
Malay, and English to strengthen brotherhood among Singaporean Muslims, but such 
a plan did not materialize.568 For some time in 1990-1991, Tamil items were 
published in the MUIS-newsletter Warita, but with the establishment of FIM, the task 
of publishing a Tamil Islamic newsletter was passed to that organization. This 
newsletter, Ceyticcuṭar, is currently the only Islamic journal in Tamil published in 
Singapore, apart from the newsletters published by the associations for their members, 
such as SKML’s Nam Kural. Apart from these newsletters, the only other Islamic 
Tamil journals available in Singapore are published in India, and even these are not 
easily procured. A survey conducted on 27 April 2006 at newspaper sellers in 
Singapore’s Little India turned up copies of only one Islamic journal, Camanilaic 
Camutayam. Notably, the editorial board of that journal includes Singaporean resident 
                                                 
564 “Ītul aluhā veṉṉum hajjup perunāḷ”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 29 Aug 1887: 37; “Ītul aluhā veṉṉum hajjup 
perunāḷ”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ Anupantam, 5 Aug 1889; the first few paragraphs of the two articles are 
identical. 
565 E.g. “Kiyāl”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 11 Mar 1889: 141-2. 
566 Fakhri 2002: 18. 
567 Cf. Cāmi 1994: 109, 122, 152, 260, 271, 295, 302, 314, 320, 337, 389. Some more journals are 
mentioned in Jāpar Muhyittīṉ 1990: 119-22.  
568 “Tamil Muslims urged to publish bulletin”, The Straits Times, 6 Feb 1984; I am not aware that 




CHAPTER 5: LANGUAGE AND RELIGION 
J.M. Sali (Jē.Em. Cāli) and features a column by S.M. Rafiuddeen Baqawi (Es.Em. 
Rafīuttīṉ Pākkavī), who was Imam of the Masjid Bencoolen until 2005. 
The situation regarding the publication of literature in the more narrow sense is 
similar to that exemplified by the journals. Islamic Tamil literature began to be 
produced in Singapore from the late 19th century onwards. Some of the works 
produced in Singapore actually show the extent to which Tamil Muslims had 
integrated the city into their ideas of home. A collection of religious songs called 
Kīrttaṉattiraṭṭu published in 1896 does not only include hymns to the triad Prophet 
Muhammad, ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, and Shāh al-Ḥamīd of Nagore, but also to a 
number of saints from various towns in the Kaveri-delta as well as three Singaporean 
saints: a Tamil buried on the compound of the Masjid Jamae (Chulia), Habib Nuh of 
Tanjong Pagar, and Sikandar Shah of Fort Canning Hill – the latter poem in Malay 
using Tamil letters!569 Yet since the late 19th century, the number of Islamic Tamil 
literature produced in Singapore has steadily gone down.570 Even though the local 
Muslim community includes some well known writers such as K.T.M. Iqbal, J.M. 
Sali, or A.R. Mashuthoo, these writers either focus on secular literature, or tend to 
publish their works in India. A biography of A.N. Maideen recently commissioned by 
SKML similarly got published in India.571 Currently, it seems, Singaporean Tamil 
Muslims are greatly dependent on India when it comes both to the supply of religious 
publications as well as finding outlets for their own Tamil writings. Yet this situation 
may improve in years to come not by an extension of print-culture, but by increasing 
                                                 
569 Cf. Mukammatu 1896: 45-8; J.M. Sali informed me that the collection had already been published 
in 1872 under the title Muṉājāttuttiraṭṭu, but I have until now only seen a copy of the title-page of that 
publication. Incidentally, this title page proves that Muṉājāttuttiraṭṭu was published in Singapore 
fifteen years before Ilaṅkaic Catācivap Paṇṭitar’s Ciṅkai nakar antāti (1887), often claimed to be the 
first work of Singaporean Tamil literature; cf. Tiṇṇappaṉ 1999: 223. 
570 Cf. Jāpar Muhyittīṉ 1990, whose account mentions progressively more special issues of journals and 
souvenirs in comparison to books and collections of poems in the postwar period. 
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use of new media, like audio recordings or the internet. Several associations have 
their own internet pages now, which sometimes serve not only to represent the 
association on the web, but also link up to other Islamic web-pages and offer 
information on Islam.572 Some associations also have started to produce audio 
publications. Thus, SKML has produced not only recordings of sermons of its Indian-
hired religious teacher, but has also recently released a recording of questions and 
answers on Islam in Tamil and English.573 While it is too early to comment further on 
the role new media a going to play in the religious life of Singaporean Tamil 
Muslims, the potential of these media for furthering the transmission of Islamic 
knowledge in Tamil has to be noted. 
 
DEBATES AND THE SPEECH COMMUNITY 
 
The differences in language between various sections of Singaporean Muslim society 
raise the question in how far discourse concerning issues connected with Islam is able 
to permeate these linguistic boundaries. More specifically, what role do debates and 
tensions among Tamil-speaking Muslims play in Singaporean Muslim society at 
large? This section will therefore focus mainly on the issue in how far debates among 
Tamil Muslims have been able to spread to the wider Muslim society in Singapore. 
Asking the question about the impact of debates among Tamil Muslims on the wider 
Muslim public allows us to investigate in how far debates among Tamil Muslims are 
perceived as part of a common Muslim discourse or as peculiar problems of a sub-
community. Given the current state of research, especially with regard to historical 
developments, the question shall be addressed by looking more closely at two 
                                                 
572 Cf. e.g. http://web.singnet.com.sg/~tenkasi/index.html; http://www.skml.net [accessed on 8 May 
2006].  
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exemplary debates which originated among Tamil Muslims: the so-called ‘Singapore 
Muslim Libel Case’ of 1925-6 and the ‘Taláq-Controversy’ of 1999-2000. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the ‘Singapore Muslim Libel Case’ was a direct result 
of Daud Shah’s visit to Singapore in 1925. Daud Shah’s links with the Aḥmadiyya 
movement had become the object of intense debate in Singapore, and some of his 
supporters found it necessary to defend him publicly: a notice and a handbill in Tamil 
were published by Meeran Lebbaik Muallim and K.C. Marican, respectively, and 
Bashir A. Mallal, nowadays praised as one of the pioneers of the Singapore legal 
system,574 wrote a letter in English in defense of Daud Shah to the Malaya Tribune.575 
In answer to these three publications, a Tamil handbill was written by ‘ulamā’ from 
India calling these three supporters of Daud Shah kāfirs, ‘infidels’. Yet the handbill 
was published under the name of a Singaporean merchant named J. Mohamed Ismail 
Marican, against whom Meeran Lebbaik Muallim and K.C. Marican initiated a suit of 
libel. Mohamed Ismail Marican was personally acquainted with both plaintiffs, and he 
happened to be the brother-in-law of the cattle-trader who had hosted Daud Shah in 
Singapore.576
It is thus clear that the origins of the dispute lay in two social contexts rather 
removed from that of the general Singaporean Muslim society – on the one hand, the 
theological disputes among ‘traditionalist’ and ‘reformist’ ‘ulamā’ in South India, and 
on the other the frictions in the social networks of some Singaporean Tamil Muslim 
traders. Yet the trial came to involve large numbers of Singaporean Muslims from 
various ethnic groups. During the trial, twelve Muslim witnesses were heard, among 
them four Tamils, three Gujaratis, two Punjabis, two Malays and one Arab. The 
                                                 
574 Bartholomew & Tan 2005: 157. 
575 Mallal 1928: 11-19; a Tamil translation of Mallal’s letter was published in “Malāy nāṭṭil namatu 
āciriyar”, Tārul Islām 7-6, Jun 1925: 276-7. 
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majority of them were merchants, religious scholars or legal professionals, all 
obviously respectable members of their societies. This ‘internationalization’ was a 
result of the Defense’s strategy to prove that the Aḥmadiyya movement and its 
followers were indeed ‘infidels’, and that the handbill’s statement thus was not 
libelous, but simply true. In addition to the mentioned witnesses, the Defense also 
marshaled Urdu books for its cause as well as legal opinions from respected Islamic 
educational establishments, thereby completely removing the case from the context in 
which it had originally developed. In the end, the Judge found the Defendant guilty.577 
The importance of the case for the development of Singaporean Islam still needs to be 
investigated further, but it becomes clear from the trial that the Aḥmadiyya movement 
was hotly debated at that time in Singapore, quite independently from the trial.578 The 
trial also addressed the tricky question of authority among Singaporean Muslims. In 
the process of the trial, the authority of most traditional institutions, such as the 
Islamic educational institutions mentioned above, was as much undermined as that of 
the Mohammedan Advisory Board – the latter’s opinions on banning the Aḥmadiyya 
movement were not admitted into court because the chairman of the Board was a 
European rather than a Muslim.579 In the end, it was the British secular court and a 
few English-educated Muslims who were able to establish themselves as authorities in 
Islamic matters.580 While the supporters of the Aḥmadiyya celebrated the judgment as 
“…so admirable a decision…” and a “…deterrent to others who might have the 
intention of condemning the Ahmadies…”,581 in the long run, the opposition to the 
movement triumphed. It is possible that the establishment of the All-Malaya Muslim 
Missionary Society in 1932 was partly inspired by countering the influence of the 
                                                 
577 For a transcript of the trial proceedings cf. Mallal 1928. 
578 Cf. e.g. Mallal 1928: 78-9, 84-96, 129. 
579 Cf. Mallal 1928: 129. 
580 Cf. Mallal 1928: 65-77, 122-5. 
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Aḥmadiyya; in contemporary Singapore, the Aḥmadiyya is not accepted as a Muslim 
community.582
In contrast to this case, the ‘Taláq-Controversy’ did not lead to a court-case, but it 
occupied a much more visible space in the public sphere nevertheless. Taláq is a 
Tamil drama that combines the stories of twelve Tamil Muslim women who were 
subject to severe abuse and rape by their husbands into the story of a single woman, 
who was played by one of the twelve women themselves. Not only did the play depict 
the abuse and maltreatment of the women, but also pointed to the complicity of the 
husbands’ male and female kin in the abuse, and the failure of community elders to 
help the victims.  The drama was first staged in Tamil in 1998, and already generated 
a great amount of interest and controversy. The actress and the author of the play 
received death threats. MUIS expressed its concerns about the play, and some Tamil 
Muslim associations, most prominently SIJU and TMJ,583 called for a ban or at least a 
substantial rewriting. Matters came to a head when English and Malay translations 
were about to be staged in October 2000. In the end, the Public Entertainment 
Licensing Unit (PELU) refused to grant a license for the staging of the translated play. 
The reactions and interpretations of this controversy were highly variegated. The 
Western media largely reported the controversy as an example of “…the repressive 
policies of the authoritarian Singapore government”.584 More importantly for our 
purposes are the tensions about community identity that the play generated. On the 
Muslim side, “MUIS had strongly objected to the play as it contained Quranic 
references and religious connotations that might give the audience a wrong 
                                                 
582 Mariam 1989: 37; Yegar 1979: 103 n. 29. 
583 Incidentally, both associations are under the leadership of the same person. 
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impression of Islam”.585 Opposition to the play often claimed that Indian Muslims 
were unfairly singled out as abusive, and that the play tarnished the image of the 
community. One of my respondents, who was directly involved in the affair, stated: 
“That particular man [the husband as depicted in the play; T.T.] may be a beast. That 
doesn’t reflect all the people”. One of the more restrained objections to the play by 
one Faris Osman noted: 
 
 […] It may not have been the intention of the playwright of the play but by 
making the subject the Indian Muslim community, the impression thus 
formed by the audience is that the problems of marital violence is [sic] 
pandemic in that community and the cause is religious.586
 
A Malay observer replied to Osman’s objections by pointing out “…that in the 
anxiety to suppress the ossification of stereotypes…another stereotype appears: that of 
a community that is intolerant and censorious”.587 Indeed, already in the play itself, an 
elderly man (periyavar) is quoted as saying: “You are an Indian Muslim girl. Don’t 
bring any shame to our community”, in order to convince the main character to 
abstain from bringing the matter of her husband’s infidelity to the Shariah Court.588 It 
is important to note that the author and the actress of the play both denied that the 
play criticized Islam, but rather that it was directed against an interpretation of Islam 
that subordinates women to men.589 The Association of Women for Action and 
Research (AWARE) pointed out in a press statement that in the case of Taláq, 
                                                 
585 http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/detailed.jsp?artid=385&type=4&root=0&parent=0&cat=0&mode=arc 
[accessed on 9 May 2006]. 
586 Quoted in Focas 2001: 203-4. 
587 Quoted in Focas 2001: 202. 
588 I use the author’s translation rather than my own; Elangovan 1999: 42; original Tamil ibid.: 84. 
589 Cf. “The Rights of Marriage”, Asiaweek, 26 Mar 1999, 
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“…men have used race and religion to silence…” women’s rights.590 Indeed, many 
aspects of the play remained undiscussed, not only the general question of gender 
oppression, but also the way Singaporean families exploit and mistreat Indian-born 
wives.591 Yet the main question for us in this context is in how far one can compare 
the controversy that developed around the play with the earlier one around the Libel 
Case, and how it relates to the question of the role of language communities in such 
debates. 
In comparing the two cases, several parallels become obvious. First of all, even 
though the controversies originated in Tamil-speaking communities about Tamil-
language documents, they could permeate a wider public only through the medium of 
English. In the Libel Case, these were the translations of the allegedly libelous 
handbill. They completely replaced the Tamil original to such a degree that the 
translation became the sole point of reference even for the Tamils involved in the 
issue, thereby obliterating certain aspects of the original documents. For example, 
during the Libel Case, there was a debate among the British legal experts on whether 
it is permitted in Islamic law to translate the Koran into another language. Yet the 
handbill had nowhere raised that issue – in the handbill, not the language of the 
translation was the issue, but the script used to publish a Tamil translation, i.e. 
whether in Tamil or Arabic script. This becomes clear even from the two English 
translations – the Tamil original has not been published anywhere – but it obviously 
escaped the British lawyers and judges; a closer look at the original handbill, 
especially given the fact that it was itself published using the Arabic script, might 
                                                 
590 Quoted in http://www.newsintercom.org/index.php?itemid=141 [accessed on 9 May 2006]. 
591 Cf. Elangovan 1999: 83-6; translation ibid.: 42-4; the translation of the term ūrkkāri, which is used 
several times by Singaporeans to abuse the Indian-born wife, as ‘country-girl’ rather misses the tension 
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have cleared the issue.592 In the case of Taláq, it was largely the English-medium 
press reports through which the controversy reached a wider audience.593 
Furthermore, it is perhaps not incidental that the matter came to a head not during one 
of the Tamil productions of the play, despite the already considerable amount of 
tension, but when it was about to be staged in English.  
In both controversies, questions of who has the right and authority to represent a 
community are prominent. In the Libel Case, this community was plainly the world-
wide Muslim community. One of the most important questions during the trial was 
who in the Muslim world possessed the authority to declare somebody an ‘infidel’. 
The Judge made this objective clear when he asked impatiently on the ninth day of the 
trial: “You must have a person like the Pope…to decide such questions?”,594 even 
though he had been told already on the sixth day that such an authority did not 
exist.595 Documents from all over the Muslim World were presented as evidence for 
the alleged ‘infidelity’ of the Aḥmadiyya movement, only to be summarily rejected as 
immaterial by the Judge, who was obviously waiting for the opinion of the ‘Muslim 
Pope’.596 ‘Mohamedan Tamils’ were only mentioned when the background of the case 
was recounted, but they played practically no role in the context of authority and 
representation of Muslims.597 Indeed, they were rather demoted – even the Tamil 
religious scholar who was called as a witness and authority on the first day was not 
referred to again in the course of the trial, even though his answers had largely been 
sound and reasonable.598 On their part, the plaintiffs and defendant similarly seem to 
                                                 
592 Cf. Mallal 1928: 19-22, 171. 
593 Presumably, these were at least partly based on the English translation, which was published in 
January 1999; cf. Focas 2001: 183. 
594 Mallal, 1928: 104. 
595 Mallal, 1928: 66. 
596 Cf. Mallal, 1928: 43, 79, 88. 
597 Cf. Mallal 1928: 154-5. 
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have been content to see the whole issue solely as a Muslim one. The handbills, 
notices and articles that created the controversies all addressed themselves simply to 
‘Muslims’ – the Tamil aspects of the dispute were only of interest as background 
information.599 It is at present not possible to assess the impact of the debate on 
Malay-Muslim society, though the fact that it is mentioned either only in passing or 
not at all in accounts of Islamic society and law in the Singapore of the 1920s may 
indicate that it did not have much impact on Malays.600
In contrast, in the Taláq-controversy, the question of community representation 
was much more muddled. The problem was not so much about who was the main 
authority for Muslims – this was obviously MUIS – but about which ‘community’ 
needed representation here. Both Muslims in general and Indian Muslims in particular 
were presented as having been portrayed negatively by the play. The result was that 
both MUIS as well as SIJU claimed to represent communities which had allegedly 
been offended by Taláq. The president of the theatre group staging the English 
translation actually pointed out the paradoxical nature of the situation – that SIJU as a 
religious group was on the one hand undermining the authority of MUIS, which alone 
was the authority regarding questions of Islam, and that it on the other hand claimed 
to represent Indian Muslims tout court, including women, though it had no women 
members.601 The claim that the play misrepresented Indian Muslims, made parallel to 
and partly independent from the claim that it had misrepresented Islam, paradoxically 
seems to have had the opposite effect in public that its proponents wished for: for 
many, it was a clear endorsement that the play was really about Indian Muslims, and 
                                                 
599 Cf. Mallal 1928: 11-23. 
600 Cf. Yegar 1979: 101 n. 23; other authors simply ignore the issue, e.g. Hickling 1986. 
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not about domestic violence, as AWARE had argued.602 It may also have had another 
effect, for though MUIS reacted sharply to the play, the response from the Malay-
Muslim community seems not to have been overly strong, despite the fact that some 
of the themes of the play would have had the potential to generate such a response. 
An example would be the final scene, when the protagonist takes of her headscarf and 
black overcoat to reveal a white dress below.603 Yet even though the ‘tudung- (Ma. 
‘headscarf’) controversy’ was to erupt in 2002, showing that the topic had 
controversial potential, this scene did at that time not cause as much trouble outside 
the circle of MUIS and some Indian Muslim associations.604 In this case, the strong 
emphasis on ‘Indian Muslim’ sentiments in the response to the play may have 
prevented Malays from identifying to closely with the issue – in any case, it shows in 
how far a debate on the identity of ‘Indian-Muslims’ had at that time attained 
discursive dominance in the debates on ethnic difference within a religious 
community, if compared with the Libel Case in the 1920s. It is these debates that shall 
concern us in the next chapter. 
                                                 
602 Cf. “Silenced Cries”, Asiaweek, 10 Nov 2000, 
http://www.pathfinder.com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/1110/as.arts_sb1.html [accessed on 9 May 2006]. 
603 Cf. Elangovan 1999: 50, 91. 
604 The issue needs further investigation, but I have found little evidence that the controversy had much 
of an impact on Malay society. One of the most recent publications on Muslim society in Singapore 
also fails to mention it altogether; cf. Metzger 2003. For the tudung-controversy, cf. Gabrielpillai 2004; 
Metzger 2003: chapter 6; Narayanan 2004: 52-5; admittedly, this controversy occurred in the context of 
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Chapter 6 








As the last chapter has shown, the religious life of Singaporean Tamil Muslims is no 
seamless and harmonious whole. Rather, religious life is contested and negotiated 
between various groups among Tamil-speaking Muslims as well as among Tamil 
Muslims and various external agencies, most importantly the institutions which 
administer Islam in the Republic. It is in discourses about Islam and Islamic practice, 
that ideas and concepts of religion, ethnic identity, and their relation with each other 
are formulated, challenged, and (re-)negotiated. It is also in these discourses that the 
difficulty to clearly separate the religious and ethno-linguistic domains becomes 
salient, and where the impact of the latter on the former becomes most apparent. This 
chapter will therefore attempt to describe these discourses and to contextualize them. 
There are two aspects to this contestation of ethnic difference in the religious 
sphere, one concerned with the impact of ethnic difference on the practicalities of 
religious life, the other with the formulation of that difference. The first of these 
aspects relates to the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of institutions to deal with ethnic 
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Muslims have increasingly lamented since the 1980s that their access to religious 
services and funding is inadequate. It has been contended that the official bodies 
charged with the administration of Islam in Singapore have not taken proper account 
of the needs of Tamil and other Indian Muslims in the state. Tamil Muslims are 
contesting the specific institutional setup within the community and its linkages to 
government institutions. This involves in particular the workings of the associations 
and informal groups, and the way this work is perceived by the public as well as rival 
groups. 
The second aspect of the contestation of ethnic difference among Singaporean 
Muslims relates to the formulation of that difference. While certain religious practices 
are perceived to be fundamental to Islam and performed more or less homogeneously 
across the Muslim World, other practices are more localized in character, and it is 
these practices that can act as ethnic-boundary markers in certain contexts. It thus 
comes as no surprise that religious practice and the formulation of ethnic difference 
are closely connected. But ethnic difference is not only formulated in practice, but 
also in discourses about identity. There has been a tendency among Indian Muslims, 
public institutions, and also among scholars of Singaporean Islam to assume a degree 
of homogeneity in the formulation of an ‘Indian-Muslim’ identity in Singapore. What 
I will attempt in this section is not so much to describe this formulation of a common 
identity, which has been accomplished elsewhere,605 but rather to show how the tacit 
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RELIGION AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
Access to Services 
As has been outlined in chapter 4, the practice of Islam in Singapore involves a 
number of institutions and organizations, run by both the government and private 
individuals. It is hardly surprising that the performance and legitimacy of these 
institutions is commented upon and contested in public and private. Such debates are 
of course not confined to Indian Muslims alone; Muslims of any racial or ethnic 
background may voice discontent, critiques, and suggestions for improvement of 
specific institutions or the general institutional setup. What shall concern us in this 
section are not these general challenges to religious institutions, but the particular 
debates and contestations among Tamil Muslims regarding the peculiar challenges 
faced by Tamil Muslims in the context of Muslim religious institutions in the 
Singaporean context. More general debates, controversies and critiques concerning 
the Muslim institutional setup in Singapore, such as the controversy around the Fateha 
webpage or Rahim’s criticism of MENDAKI are largely outside the scope of this 
discussion.606
There are predominantly two types of criticism that are raised by Tamil Muslims 
in connection with institutionalized religion. One type of criticism concerns the 
particular problems that Tamil Muslims face when interacting with religious 
institutions in Singapore; the other type aims more generally at the institutional setup 
itself. Most of the criticism of the former type is directed at the government 
institutions, and in particular at MUIS, while the second type of criticism commonly 
concerns the various Indian Muslim associations, their interaction and their 
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performance. Whereas the general framework for the administration of Islam in 
Singapore is largely accepted as instituted by the state, the non-official nature of most 
Indian Muslim institutions exposes them to debates over the ideal setup and purpose 
of these institutions. 
As has been shown in the last chapter, language is a central factor in determining 
a Muslim’s access to religious services of many kinds; most notably, proficiency in a 
certain language, or lack thereof, is crucial for an individual’s ability to obtain 
religiously relevant knowledge through education, lectures and sermons. It is thus 
hardly surprising that the most commonly voiced criticism of the Islamic 
administration in Singapore by Tamil Muslims is that it does not provide enough 
opportunities for Tamil Muslims to obtain the necessary religious knowledge. This 
includes the lack of higher Islamic education for Tamil Muslims in Singapore and the 
resulting dearth of Singaporean Tamil Muslim ‘ulamā’; the concentration of mosques 
employing Tamil in the center of the city and the concomitant absence of the use of 
Tamil in the mosques in the housing estates; the problems faced by the Tamil ‘ulamā’ 
brought over from India, such as separation from their families or lack of integration 
into Singaporean society; and the tensions between laymen and ‘ulamā’ resulting 
from this lack of integration. These issues were brought up both by my respondents as 
well as by representatives of various Indian Muslims associations in question-and-
answer sessions with MUIS representatives that I was able to attend. There was a 
common feeling among my respondents that MUIS only concentrates on Malays and 
neglects the needs of Muslims speaking Tamil and other South Asian languages.607
Most of the Tamil Muslims who were not actively involved in one of the 
associations or any other community institutions saw the issue mainly as a simple 
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impediment on their daily religious practice. One respondent told me that he had to 
attend Friday services in his local neighborhood mosque as journeying to the city-
center to attend service in one of the Indian mosques there would be too time 
consuming. Yet as he was unable to understand Malay, he was not in a position to 
benefit from listening to the sermon. Significantly, this respondent advocated the 
general use of English rather than any of the Asian ‘mother-tongues’ of Singaporean 
Muslims in the local Muslim public sphere. Other respondents contended that 
translations of the basic text of the sermon into languages other than Malay could be 
supplied by MUIS, as sermons everywhere in Singapore are based on this basic text. 
In fact, English translations of the sermons are by now available on the internet, so 
that to supply translations into other languages, including Tamil, should not be too 
difficult a task.608 Some respondents were concerned that Indian Muslim children had 
little access to proper religious education, though, as has been discussed in chapter 5, 
there is by now a burgeoning number of institutions offering basic religious education 
for children and adults in Tamil. In any case, the general tenor of respondents not 
directly involved in the organization of religious life in the community was that in the 
current situation, Tamil Muslims faced more difficulties than Malays in equipping 
themselves with the required religious knowledge, something that, as some 
respondents feared, could lead to a decrease in spirituality and a concomitant increase 
in crime and immorality among Tamil Muslims. 
Only rarely did my respondents note that their disadvantages in obtaining 
religiously relevant knowledge also decreased their ability to contest the Singaporean 
Muslim public sphere at a wider level. The lack of facilities for the training of Tamil-
speaking ‘ulamā’ means that there are very few Tamil-speaking Muslims in 
                                                 
608 The texts of Friday sermons in Malay and English are available at: 
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Singapore who would be eligible for important positions in the religious 
administration or who could participate in larger religious debates. On the whole, the 
opportunity for Tamil Muslims to contribute to the debates of the wider Muslim 
society in Singapore is limited, and strengthens Malay hegemony over the Muslim 
public sphere in the Republic. Simultaneously, it leads to further isolation of Tamil 
Muslims and to a strengthening of an image of Tamil Muslims as religiously less 
knowledgeable. Noorul Farha concedes that the issue of language has led to some 
marginalization of Tamil Muslims in Singapore, though like many of my respondents 
she mentions the obvious impediments on day-to-day religious practice that Tamil 
Muslims face on account of their language, but then limits her discussion to the 
impact this has on identity formation, while not considering the structural disparities 
that result from this situation.609
In contrast to the average Tamil Muslim and most scholars, the criticism of those 
respondents involved in associations and other public institutions takes on a further 
dimension: from the point of view of these respondents, not only are Tamil and other 
South Asian Muslims at a disadvantage when it comes to accessing religious services, 
but the administration is also criticized for the way it has addressed these 
disadvantages and what impediments Tamil Muslims face to redress it. This critique 
mainly notices two aspects: the administrative measures taken by MUIS and other 
institutions to redress the disadvantages faced by Indian Muslims, and the way funds 
are allocated to this purpose. Much of this criticism is directly related to the critique 
of the institutional setup, and seems in many cases to be directed as much at rival 
associations who compete for the same funds as it is at the official administrative 
bodies. 
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Indeed, the important role that disaffection with official bodies has played in 
galvanizing Indian and especially Tamil Muslim opinion can best be illustrated by 
taking a look at the events preceding the formation of the FIM 1992, which were 
precipitated by the foundation of SINDA just a year prior to the founding of the FIM. 
As has been outlined in chapter 4, the nine years between the setup of MENDAKI in 
1982 and that of SINDA in 1991 saw a gradual shift in MENDAKI’s public image 
from an organization catering to ‘Muslims’ to one supporting ‘Malays/Muslims’. This 
shift did not go unnoticed among Indian Muslims, and when the plans to form a self-
help organization for Indians on the model of MENDAKI became public, a debate 
ensued whether Indian Muslims should back MENDAKI, SINDA, or both. Many 
Indian Muslims at that time declared that they would be ready to pay contributions to 
both organizations, but it was demanded that religion (referring in all likelihood to 
Hinduism) should be kept out of SINDA. More importantly, a sizeable number of 
Indian Muslims used the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with 
MENDAKI’s policies. It was noted that no Indians were on MENDAKI’s Board of 
Directors, and many took exception to a statement of an official to the effect that 
MENDAKI would focus predominantly on the needs of the Malays, even though it 
was an organization for all Muslims.610
The debates did not end with the formation of SINDA. In March 1992, one Indian 
Muslim named Mohd Nasser Abu Bakar complained in a reader’s letter that Indian 
Muslims were automatically included as contributors to SINDA and would have their 
contributions deducted from their CPF accounts if they did not opt out of the scheme. 
The author of the letter contended that most Indian Muslims “…had adopted the 
                                                 
610 “Indian Muslims ready to back both Sinda and Mendaki”, The Straits Times, 21 Jul 1991; cf. also 
“Join Sinda or Mendaki? Identity crisis facing Indian Muslims could be boon or bane”, The Straits 
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Malay culture”, and that “…my relatives and Indian Muslim friends…were angered 
by Sinda’s approach…”. More significantly, he complained:  
 
How many Indian Muslims here can read either Tamil or English, the two 
languages used in the letter? How will Sinda explain its move to those in 
the community who know only Malay? I can understand the shock that my 
fellow Indian Muslims felt when they received the letter from Sinda. 
 
He concluded the letter by wishing “…Sinda every success in its mission of helping 
Hindus”,611 thereby confusing ‘Indian’ and ‘Hindu’, which is rather common in 
Singapore. 
The letter caused a sharp rejoinder by another Indian Muslim, Ninarpillai Ibrahim, 
a few days later: 
 
[Mohd Nasser Abu Bakar] seems to assume that the whole Indian Muslim 
community has embraced the Malay culture and thus should not be 
bothered about the problems of Indians per se. It is alarming to imagine 
that his views could be taken by the public to be representative of the 
sentiments of the Indian Muslim community at large. 
 
Ninarpillai Ibrahim also rebuked Mohd Nasser for complaining about the use of Tamil 
and English by SINDA:  
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I know Mendaki addresses its newsletters in Malay and English. I am not 
overly proficient in Malay, but I do not make it an issue when letters from 
Mendaki are not written in the languages that I am proficient in. 
 
In contrast to the claims of Mohd Nasser, he noted: 
 
Though a minority [of Indian Muslims] has embraced the Malay culture…a 
vast majority of us are still culturally Indians – that is, we speak Tamil, we 
eat Indian food and we dress in the Indian style. 
 
Ninarpillai Ibrahim also chided Mohd Nasser for his imputation of an “…unnecessary 
religious bias…” to SINDA and his confusion of ‘Indian’ and ‘Hindu’. The letter 
concluded: “I am proud to be an Indian and a Muslim, but most of all, an Indian 
Muslim”.612 These two letters are significant as they illustrate yet again that any 
discussion of Indian Muslims in Singapore necessarily has to take account of the 
language question, especially of the way that different mother-tongues condition 
different responses. While the author of the first letter was obviously not used to be 
linguistically excluded in matters of concern to him, the second, Tamil-speaking 
author was clearly familiar with such a situation. 
Negative attitudes towards MENDAKI are still not uncommon among Tamil-
speaking Muslims in Singapore. Respondents commonly expressed their frustration 
that though they had contributed to MENDAKI since its inception, they had not been 
able to reap any benefit from their participation in the MENDAKI scheme. It is of 
course difficult to ascertain whether this is actually the result of conscious or 
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unconscious neglect of Tamil Muslims by MENDAKI, whether it is due to other 
factors, or whether it is just the unsubstantiated feeling of a section of the population. 
That the evaluation of MENDAKI’s policies was not always unbiased can be gleaned 
from the fact that some respondents contended that they were not able to benefit from 
MENDAKI because MENDAKI neglected Tamils in favor of Malays, while they 
attributed the reason why they did not receive any funds from SINDA to the fact that 
their children did not fit the profile that SINDA applies to determine which students 
are eligible for funding. As SINDA and MENDAKI apply largely similar standards to 
determine eligibility for funding, a student not eligible for funding by SINDA would 
also have a hard time receiving funding from MENDAKI. Nevertheless, the 
respondents ascribed to MENDAKI an ethnic bias. This does not mean, however, that 
criticism of MENDAKI’s policies vice versa Indian Muslims are completely 
unwarranted. A survey by Rahim carried out in 1992 of 158 students in MENDAKI’s 
MEP (Mendaki Enrichment Programme) and S1 Project turned up only a single 
student from a household using Tamil, clearly below the percentage of the Tamil-
speaking segment of Singaporean Muslim society.613 In any case, it is clear that the 
claim made by some Indian Muslims at the time of the inception of SINDA and 
recently restated by Metzger to the effect that Indian Muslims were actually at an 
advantage, as they could profit from two ethnic self-help associations, is a patent 
oversimplification.614 As the standards of eligibility for funding applied by both 
MENDAKI and SINDA are largely the same, contributing to both organizations does 
little to raise the chances of Indian Muslim children to be selected for funding. Double 
funding by both organizations, which could be another advantage, is presumably also 
out of question, as one organization would probably refuse to fund a child already 
                                                 
613 Cf. Rahim 1998: 220-3, tables 10.2 & 10.5. 
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supported by the other organization. Thirdly, in order to profit from many of the other 
activities offered by these organizations, the question of language comes into play 
again, severely restricting the possibility of Tamil-speaking Muslims to participate in 
programs employing Malay, and of course conversely for Malay-speaking Muslims to 
profit from Tamil programs. Obviously, there is little benefit that individuals could 
gain from funding both organizations, apart from asserting their identities as both 
Indians and Muslims. 
It was in the context of heightened sensitivity regarding the problems faced by 
Indian Muslims in the wake of the formation of SINDA that the FIM was set up. The 
plan dates back to 1990, when at first six associations joined together with the 
objective of forming “…a federation with similar objectives to Mendaki…”.615 Yet 
both when the plan was first mooted in 1990 and when FIM was formed in 1992, it 
was denied that FIM would duplicate MENDAKI’s and SINDA’s programs, and 
indeed criticism was voiced regarding such duplication from within the Indian 
Muslim community.616 Since its inception, FIM has moved away from providing 
tuition programs to facilitate interaction between Indian Muslim associations and 
official bodies, especially MUIS rather than MENDAKI and SINDA. FIM’s 
inauguration in the wake of the public debates about MENDAKI’s performance with 
regard to the Indian Muslims clearly shows how much the issue has helped to 
galvanize Indian, and particularly Tamil Muslim opinion, even if Rahim’s statement 
that the formation of FIM amounted to “…a vote of no-confidence by the Indian 
Muslim community in Mendaki’s ability to fairly represent the interests of all 
                                                 
615 “6 Indian Muslim groups to set up federation to boost community’s lot”, The Straits Times, 9 Aug 
1990: 27. 
616 “6 Indian Muslim groups to set up federation to boost community’s lot”, The Straits Times, 9 Aug 
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Muslims” may be exaggerated.617 At the same time, not too much should be made of 
public statements by FIM members that Indian Muslims were content with 
performance of official bodies and organizations catering to Singapore’s Muslims; 
given the occasions on which such public statements were made, their uncontroversial 
character should not be surprising.618 In interviews carried out by me, many past and 
present FIM members voiced their own discontent with these institutions. 
In recent years, some official bodies, most notably MUIS, have started to respond 
to the criticism they face from Indian Muslims in a more proactive way. At the 
inauguration of the redeveloped Masjid Bencoolen in May 2004, the MUIS President 
Alami Musa announced the preparation of “…a plan to further enrich the 
development of the Indian Muslim community”.619 On the religious side, the plan was 
conceived to cover development of the educational facilities for the religious 
education of Indian Muslims, the creation of religious elites, and matters relating to 
resident foreign ‘ulamā’. For the formulation of this plan, MUIS would consult with 
community leaders among the Indian Muslims, a process that was scheduled to be 
completed by the end of 2004, after which the plan would be presented. The 
announcement of this plan was greeted with mixed reactions by my respondents. 
Some respondents were generally positive about MUIS’s initiative. As one respondent 
put it: 
 
I think MUIS is trying to cooperate more and trying to help out the Indian 
Muslims. I think they are positively coming up [with] programs for the 
Indian Muslims. It’s now on the onus [sic] of the Indian Muslims to take 
                                                 
617 Rahim 1998: 236. 
618 Cf. Metzger 2003: 86. 
619 http://www.muis.gov.sg/english/media_releases/presspeech_perwakafanbencoolen_may04.aspx 




CHAPTER 6: CONTESTING AND REPRESENTING DIFFERENCE 
ownership and participate. […] So I think more and more it’s been 
benefiting for Indian Muslims in general…620
 
Yet not every respondent evaluated the MUIS proposal so optimistically. What was 
criticized by these respondents was not the proposal as such, but the context in which 
it came about and how it was formulated. One respondent noted: “Don’t think that 
I’m blaming MUIS, [but] MUIS doesn’t come up with that kind of ideas without our 
[the Indian Muslims’; T.T.] voice, you see”. But it was not only the fact that MUIS as 
an institution had failed to see the needs of Indian Muslims for so long that bothered 
these respondents. Another interviewee was particularly skeptical of a passage in the 
MUIS President’s speech that the plan would be implemented “…once a clear and 
unified resolution of support is obtained from the various leaders of the Indian 
Muslim community”.621 The respondent remarked that this amounted to saying that it 
would never be implemented, as the in his opinion notoriously quarrelsome 
community leaders would never agree on anything unanimously. This critique 
obviously was aimed at the Indian Muslim community leaders as much as at MUIS, 
but it did not absolve MUIS from taking more proactive steps if it was really serious 
about the enrichment plan. 
As befits a bureaucratic institution, MUIS actually took until the end of 2005, one 
year later than planned, to announce further details of the plan. An article in 
Ceyticcuṭar identified five general points that needed immediate attention: the 
construction of a multipurpose hall for Indian Muslims on the grounds of the Masjid 
Jamae (Chulia), religious education for Indian Muslims, the necessity to formulate a 
development plan for the next three to five years, a reduction in the rate of divorce 
                                                 
620 A similar comment was made by the then General Secretary of UIMA in 2002; cf. Saat 2002: 159. 
621 http://www.muis.gov.sg/english/media_releases/presspeech_perwakafanbencoolen_may04.aspx 
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among Indian Muslims, and the need to conduct more dialogue sessions between 
MUIS and Indian Muslim associations. In particular, the article dwelt at length about 
the need to streamline and coordinate the various religious schools run by associations 
and mosques for Indian Muslim children.622 Funding for children studying in these 
schools is supposed to come from MENDAKI, thereby addressing the challenge that 
MENDAKI has until now done very little to support religious education among 
Indians. The publication of a ‘guidebook’ for marriages by MUIS was also 
mentioned.623 Even though this plan still is in need of more elaboration and 
formulation of concrete policies by which the various objectives are going to be met, 
it signifies a large step ahead in the administration of Indian Muslim affairs in 
Singapore. How affairs are going to develop from here remains to be seen. 
 
Administering Religion 
Most of the criticism considered in the last section concerned the performance of 
various institutions involved in the administration of religion. In a way, this form of 
criticism and contestation, though often incisive and massive, nevertheless is a 
criticism that does not contest the general framework in which those institutions 
operate. In other instances, though, my respondents did not only contest the 
performance of various institutions, but indeed challenged the very raison d’être of 
these institutions. Most of this criticism was directed at the voluntary sector of Indian 
Muslim associations and informal groups. When criticism was voiced regarding the 
wider administrative framework, it was usually criticism either of the way 
                                                 
622 That religious education should be singled out as a domain needing urgent attention is certainly not 
only due to the importance attached to religious education in Tamil by Tamil Muslims, but also has to 
be seen in the light of public debates about Islamic education in Singapore in the last 15 years, as well 
as MUIS’s development of a Singapore Islamic Education System; Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura 
2004; cf. Metzger 2003: chapter 5. 
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government-backed institutions interacted with Indian Muslim associations or of the 
way funds were allocated by these larger institutions to Indian Muslim institutions. 
But even in these cases the criticism was usually linked implicitly to the contestation 
of the character of various Indian Muslim institutions. The various arguments and 
criticism will in the following be discussed with regard to the target of the criticism, 
viz. Indian Muslim associations in general, various types of associations and informal 
groups, the FIM, and the institutions of the wider Muslim public sphere. 
Despite the fact that many of the religious services offered by Indian Muslim 
associations would be even more difficult to access by Tamil and other Indian 
Muslims if the associations were not around, this does not mean that the associations 
were generally perceived to be a positive force in the Islamic public sphere in 
Singapore. Indeed, many of my respondents were highly critical of the work done by 
the associations, and these sentiments were not only voiced by those who remain 
outside the associations, but also those who participated in them. One commonly 
voiced criticism was that the associations were ineffective and that their performance 
was less than satisfactory, especially when considering the large number of 
associations catering to Indian Muslims. Many respondents considered this large 
number of associations to be limiting the effectiveness of the associations, especially 
as it contributed to divisiveness and rivalry between associations. At the same time, 
one respondent glibly remarked that the “…associations do so little that you need to 
have many to do much”. Many respondents active in Indian Muslim associations 
conceded that such criticisms were at least partly true. Divisiveness and rivalry 
between associations were widely seen as debilitating the capacity of the associations 
to deliver to the community, a line of argument that we will encounter again. Another 
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associations, and even MUIS, were by nature social rather than religious 
organizations, which lacked spirituality and focused unduly on non-religious issues. 
This type of criticism was most commonly voiced by members of branches of Sufi 
brotherhoods. It should be mentioned that such views are themselves subject to 
criticism by other Tamil Muslims, who consider the members of Sufi brotherhoods to 
be overly narrow-minded and traditional. Yet such debates are probably not limited to 
Tamil Muslims, and I assume that they may take place among Malays and other 
Singaporean Muslims, too, so that this type of contestation need not concern us here. 
While sweeping dismissals of the usefulness of Indian Muslim associations are far 
from uncommon, an equally contested issue is the nature of the claims of various 
Indian Muslim associations to represent certain putative ‘communities’. 
Consequently, this is a debate about the typology of Indian Muslim association that 
was discussed in chapter 4. The respective debates center predominantly around the 
‘pan-Indian’, ‘ethnic’, and ‘kin-center’ types of associations. Interestingly, the 
‘religious’ associations seem to be much less the focus of attention, perhaps because 
the religious groups they claim to represent somehow remain peripheral to the project 
of constructing an Indian Muslim identity, neither furthering nor threatening it. 
Indeed, most of the debate around the typology of associations relates directly to 
questions of which level of ‘community’ is addressed by an association and which 
sections of society it claims to represent. 
Given the dominance of kin-center associations among the Indian Muslim 
associations in Singapore, it is little wonder that the concept of the kin-center 
association is one of the most contested among Tamil Muslims. As kin-center 
associations ostensibly address themselves only to particular segments of Tamil 
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parochial, being interested only in the advancement of their own peculiar 
communities at the expense of Tamil Muslim and indeed Indian Muslim unity. Such 
criticism was commonly voiced by both, respondents of non-kin-center associations, 
as well as those not engaged in associations at all. One respondent, who had married a 
woman from one large kin-center group which was represented by its own 
association, lamented that these associations were directing their energies only at their 
own communities, thereby contributing to the fragmentation of Tamil Muslim society. 
Another respondent noted: 
 
We all have come from 300 villages from India. […] So you can say there 
is [sic] now about 16, [but] there will come about 300 Indian village 
associations. How to accommodate them? How to progress? So I have 
something like pride of my village, I say your village useless [sic]. […] 
Destructive! 
 
Noorul Farha quotes the MUIS Secretary as saying that MUIS had problems with this 
situation because it made it difficult to select an Indian representative for the MUIS 
Council, for members of the kin-center associations would only be representative of 
their kin-center, not Indian Muslims at large.624 Another respondent who was active 
both in an Indian Muslim mosque and an association said that he was not opposed to 
the kin-center associations, but that they should have no say in issues pertaining to the 
whole Tamil or Indian Muslim community. 
The kin-center associations are very much aware of these challenges to their very 
raison d’être, not the least because the kin-center model is becoming less attractive 
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for Singaporean Tamil Muslim youth, and these youth tend to be attracted by other 
types of associations.625 Yet the ways in which kin-center associations have reacted to 
this challenge vary. Some kin-center associations, most notably large associations like 
SKML, have opened themselves to other Tamil Muslims and invite them to 
participate in their activities. This is most notable in the area of religious education, 
where students are recruited not only from kin-center communities. Yet members and 
leadership of these associations are still overwhelmingly drawn from the respective 
kin-center community, showing that these associations have failed to project 
themselves as representatives for the wider Tamil Muslim community.626 There have 
been debates in the associations about changing the associations’ names to reflect a 
more inclusive approach, but this has been resisted on various grounds. On the one 
hand, association leaders told me that this change would have alienated and hurt the 
older members of the community, who still identify strongly with the kin-center. 
Furthermore, as the treasurer of SKML put forward in an article, it allows the 
associations to continue their programs “…without having to reestablish credibility 
and network”,627 and thus be of more use to anyone joining the association. But many 
in the kin-center associations are conscious of the fact that the names of these 
associations with their obvious references to the kin-center could serve as disincentive 
for people from other kin-centers to join the association. One respondent suggested 
using only abbreviations like ‘SKML’, in order to make the reference to the kin-center 
less obvious. 
Such initiatives meet with a variety of problems and criticisms. Members of non-
kin-center associations tend to ignore the opening up of kin-center associations to 
                                                 
625 Cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 48. 
626 In part, the failure of SKML and STMWS to attract much participation from outside their kin-center 
communities may also be due to the negative attitudes towards ‘Tenkasis’ in the wider Tamil Muslim 
society, as described in chapter 3. 
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members from outside the kin-center and proceed to claim that these groups only 
represent parochial interests. For the non-kin-center associations, large kin-center 
associations like SKML or STMWS could emerge as competitors, as these 
associations usually conduct a broad range of activities. Therefore, it is prudent for 
these associations to continue projecting kin-center associations as representing only a 
narrow section of society. Interestingly, some of the non-kin-center associations have 
noted the problems kin-center associations have regarding their names, and are for 
obvious reasons highly critical of any move by the kin-center associations to ‘conceal’ 
or change their names. But criticism does not come only from the non-kin-center 
associations. The President of one kin-center association stressed that his association 
would only take donations from members of its own kin-center community. Widening 
the base of a kin-center association can also be seen as threatening by other kin-center 
associations, as they may loose their social base to such an expansive association. 
But it is not only kin-center associations that meet with criticism regarding their 
operation in Tamil Muslim society. Associations which claim to speak for Tamil or 
Indian Muslims in general are similarly subject to contestations, though in their case, 
these contestations address the performance of these associations more than the 
reason for their existence. As we have seen in chapter 4, it is particularly the non-kin-
center associations that still enable individuals to impact the organization of religious 
life of Tamil Muslims. It is thus not surprising that the role of such ‘big men’ in some 
associations is evaluated negatively by others, who claim that such individuals use the 
associations to further their own personal ambitions instead of the well-being of the 
community at large.628 One of course has to be careful with such claims, as personal 
rivalries may be the main motivation for them. But such criticism points to a major 
                                                 
628 As Chua has noted, the recognition of race- and community-based associations and activities has 
“…provided various opportunities for those who hold political aspirations of “community” leadership”; 
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weakness in the way that Tamil Muslim associations connect to the wider Tamil 
Muslim public. Given that any group of individuals can form an association, as long 
as they confirm to the laws that govern the formation of such associations, and that 
any association can claim to represent a specific group of people, it is actually not too 
difficult to form an association claiming to represent a major segment if not all of 
Tamil or even Indian Muslim society in Singapore. While the kin-center associations 
can usually count on the support of the wider kin-center community, and thus claim to 
represent these communities quite convincingly, the gap between claim and reality is 
much greater in the case of ethnic or pan-Indian Muslim associations, even large ones 
like UIMA.629 This gap makes any claim to represent the Tamil or Indian Muslim 
community at large precarious, as became visible during the Taláq-controversy, when 
the president of the theatre group which staged the play challenged, albeit 
unsuccessfully, the claims of two SIJU members to represent Indian Muslims and 
especially Indian Muslim women.630
This question of representation brings us to the FIM and the critique of that 
institution’s role in Tamil Muslim society. At the first glance, the FIM seems to be the 
most practical solution to the problem of representation by forming a federation of 
associations. Yet to the contrary, the FIM is seen by many to have failed deliver. The 
problems of the FIM are largely perceived to be due to the interrelated factors of 
conflicts over leadership, the fragmented nature of the Indian Muslim public sphere, 
and the continued identification of members of the FIM with their respective 
associations. If any two themes dominated interviews with respondents active in 
                                                 
629 An example of the considerable conflicts such claims over representation can produce is provided 
by the prolonged conflict between the president and one of the vice-presidents of the TMJ between 
1989-1992; cf. “Tamil Muslim chief has no right to make stand”, The Straits Times, 24 Aug 1989; 
“Tamil Muslim chief defends right to participate in subsidy debate”, The Straits Times, 5 September 
1989; “Tamil Muslim group goes to court to settle leadership row”, The Straits Times, 17 May 1992. 
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Indian Muslim associations, it was the connected issues of fragmentation and lack of 
leadership. One respondent identified lack of leadership to be the most important 
problem Indian Muslims in Singapore were facing: “We don’t have a proper 
leadership, okay, to guide us in a proper way. We got a big […] sickness or something 
like ego. You know, each and everybody want[s] to become the leader”. Besides ego, 
the main reason given for this was the supposedly fractious nature of Indians.631 One 
respondent claimed: “…they are [sic] inherited certain culture from India; 
argumentative culture; destructive culture”. This supposed argumentativeness was 
seen as the root cause of the problems the Indian Muslim community was facing. 
In an almost paradoxical way, the majority of my respondents agreed to this 
characterization of the Indian Muslim community as fragmented by its own 
argumentativeness and the ego of its leaders. Admittedly, it also became clear that 
several of my respondents obviously had their own opinion about who would be the 
proper leader, and who was the main culprit for the current situation, thereby 
demonstrating the very problem they had just identified. Some respondents felt that 
from the very beginning, there should not have been anything like the FIM, but rather 
one single association representing Indian Muslims. The rivalry and debate in the FIM 
was seen as debilitating. One respondent lamented that “[i]n the case of [the] 
Federation of Indian Muslims, 23 people you have to consult, and the debate – you 
will be killed, you know”. The fact that the presidency rotates among the associations 
was similarly seen as problematic, as it precluded the implementation of long-term 
policies and meant that most of the Federation’s energies went into “unproductive 
functions”, as one respondent put it.  
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It is hardly surprising that given this situation, the extension of the FIM from nine 
to sixteen associations in 2005 was seen as exacerbating the problem.  Some 
respondents suspected that the main reason for these new associations to join the FIM 
was to take advantage of the rotating presidency. One respondent claimed openly: 
“All the outsider[s] want to be the president”. Indeed, a mistake in the proceedings at 
the time when the decision to admit the new members was first taken in 2004 led 
some members to challenge the decision and delayed the admission for more than a 
year. Yet not everyone considered the decision to enlarge the FIM to be bad. In the 
eyes of one respondent, “…now with more association[s] coming in, and more 
businessmen on board, and more professionals on board, I think it might change the 
whole thing, and it might be a very good prospect”. What this respondent was 
referring to was the fact that the FIM had problems in raising funds for its activities. 
The members are supposed to pay an annual fee, and MUIS does at times support the 
Federation, but the total amount available for such activities was not much. One 
respondent explained this with the lack of identification with the FIM on part of the 
member-associations. As a consequence, associations are reluctant to strengthen FIM, 
and rather keep on supporting their own programs rather than those of FIM. 
While the role and performance of Indian Muslim associations may be contested 
by any Indian Muslim, fundamental criticism relating to the way FIM and MUIS 
administer religious life among Singaporean Tamil Muslims is largely limited to those 
individuals actively engaged in associations, as they have the deepest insights into the 
workings of these two institutions. As already mentioned, practically nobody I talked 
to challenged the role MUIS played in the administration of Islamic affairs in 
Singapore as such. Yet what was criticized was the way MUIS engaged with Indian 
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Indian Muslim associations to MUIS. Given the competing claims over which 
association represents whom, it is not surprising that some individuals are unhappy 
with the way that MUIS relates to the associations. There appears to be some 
resentment especially among the non-kin-center associations that MUIS tries to 
interact with all the associations via FIM, rather than limit itself to those associations 
claiming to represent the whole Indian or at least Tamil Muslim community. As one 
respondent contended: 
 
Majlis Ugama made a great mistake. Majlis Ugama thinks cat and the tiger 
are the same. They don’t understand village associations, and so they 
opened the door [to kin-center associations; T.T.]. […] Some village only 
twelve people, so they form an association. So the government think[s] 
they have a big power; super-power.  
 
The respondent went on to name some associations he considered to be ‘super-
powers’, all of them non-kin-center associations, while contending that even large 
kin-center associations should not be recognized in this way. This opinion is of course 
part of the discourse challenging the role of kin-center associations in the religious 
life of Tamil Muslims in Singapore, directly criticizing MUIS for providing these 
associations with recognition. One respondent even claimed that the formation of the 
FIM had been particularly engineered to undermine the role of the TMJ, which was at 
that time the only association claiming to represent Tamil Muslims in Singapore in 
general. But the way MUIS interacts with the associations was also criticized in 
general, barring the question of kin-center or non-kin-center association. Another 
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and they put a dialogue section [sic] once a year, and they ask each and everybody, 
everybody like [sic] to hold the mike, they talk, that’s all. Nothing materialized”. 
The central question in all these debates about recognition by MUIS is funding. 
As has been discussed in chapter 4, only relatively few associations receive funding 
from MUIS. Individuals active in those associations that did not receive funds at times 
expressed their discontent with this situation in interviews: “Particular people are 
getting money, only three or four associations. Not all the associations. Why don’t 
[sic] MUIS come to FIM? ‘FIM, please identify the Indian Muslim associations, what 
are they doing?’”. Yet when this question was raised at one of the dialogue sessions, 
the MUIS President made it clear that Indian Muslim associations can not just expect 
to be funded by MUIS. They have to apply for funding, and their programs have to be 
evaluated, before MUIS can fund them.  
Another contested aspect of funding related to the religious endowments created 
by Indian Muslims or for the benefit of Indian Muslim mosques. As has been 
mentioned in chapter 2, quite a number of such endowments were created in the 
colonial period, and practically all of them ultimately passed to MUIS. The existence 
of these endowments was constantly stressed by my respondents and apparently 
generated a good deal of pride. Given that the properties attached to these 
endowments are largely located in central Singapore, it is not surprising that they are 
capable of yielding a lot of revenue given proper management. This is readily seen 
from the MUIS annual reports. Thus, the Jamae Fund which supports the Masjid 
Jamae (Chulia), the Masjid Al-Abrar, and the Nagore Durgah, produced the second 
largest net surplus ($556,610) of all endowments in the Wakaf Fund in 2004, while 
the Masjid Abdul Gafoor produced the fourth largest net surplus ($62,000). A similar 
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count, the top three endowments were all created by Indian Muslims, with the MSE 
Angullia Fund topping the list with a value of $19,812,387, followed by the Kassim 
Fund ($11,523,716) and the Jamae Fund ($9,811,513).632 Yet many of my 
respondents felt that despite having created these endowments and resources for 
Muslims in Singapore, Indian Muslims do not benefit from these. Some funds, such as 
the Kassim Fund, have completely passed beyond the control of Indian Muslims. 
Some respondents demanded that the money generated by these endowments should 
be utilized by MUIS to support the development of the Indian Muslim community. 
MUIS was criticized to not properly utilize funds for this purpose. What gets 
generally overlooked in this criticism is that MUIS is constrained in its use of funds 
from the endowments by the terms and conditions set out in the trust deeds. 
Furthermore, the substantial surplus that some of these endowments produce is due in 
large part to the recent redevelopment of these endowments by MUIS, meaning that 
MUIS has actually done a lot to enhance the value of such properties, as becomes 
readily apparent when tracing the development of e.g. the Jamae Fund in MUIS 
annual reports since the 1980s. At the same time, developing endowments is actually 
MUIS duty; given that Indian Muslims lost control over most of the endowments due 
to allegations of mismanagement, it is fully understandable that they critically monitor 
the performance of MUIS as the institution responsible for the management of these 
endowments. 
                                                 
632 All figures from MUIS Annual Report 2004: electronic version, available at 
http://www.muis.gov.sg/English/publications/annual_report/others/all.pdf [accessed on 19 June 2006]; 
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Figure 15: Tablet recording the endowment of a religious school in Kadayanallur by 
Singaporeans (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
Concluding this summary of contestations over the administration of Islam in 
Singapore, note has to be made of one aspect that has the potential to challenge the 
financial administrative setup, even though it is hardly perceived as such – the 
question of zakāt. As mentioned in chapter 4, payment of the ordinary zakāt in 
contradistinction to the zakāt al-fiṭra is not statutory in Singapore. This means that 
Muslims can choose to pay their zakāt to recipients of their choice, or even not to pay 
it at all. One recent study found that a majority of Singaporean Muslims interviewed 
claimed to pay zakāt; interestingly, the author of the study argued that this may be due 
to the respondents considering their contributions to MENDAKI and the MBF as 
zakāt.633 Whatever the case, it became clear in the course of my research that the 
majority of my respondents preferred to choose the recipients of zakāt on their own, 
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and that many considered their donations to Indian Muslim associations or mosques to 
constitute their zakāt. This also included the financing of Islamic institutions back in 
India, such as mosques, shrines or religious schools [Figure 15]. This means that 
Indian Muslims are still quite autonomous in deciding who and what to support by 
donations, without being constrained in their options by MUIS or other official 
bodies. 
 
DIFFERENCE IN PRACTICE AND IDENTITY 
 
Popular Practice and the Formulation of Difference 
Whereas the debates and contestations about Tamil Muslims’ relationship to official 
religious institutions in Singapore are concerned with aspects of religious life which 
are largely shared among Singapore’s Sunnite population, another set of debates 
concerning the relationship between religion and ethno-linguistic identity relate to 
practices that are often in themselves contentious and only practiced by some 
Muslims. For want of a better term, I will describe these as ‘popular Muslim 
practices’, though I am fully aware of the problems attached to both the terms 
‘popular’ and ‘Muslim’. When I characterize a practice as ‘Muslim’, I do not intend to 
make a statement about the propriety of the practice in reference to a putative divine 
and eternal order, but rather to express the fact that the practice, whether endorsed as 
religiously proper or resisted as un-Islamic, is part of Muslim discourse.634 Even more 
problematic is the term ‘popular’, given that it can signify different things. Practices, 
beliefs and discourses permeating society on a large scale could be understood to be 
‘popular’, and some discussions of ‘popular religion’ in an Islamic context certainly 
                                                 
634 Cf. Roff 1987: 31-2, 48; I have avoided dubbing these practices explicitly as ‘religious’, because, as 
will be discussed below, the question of whether they are characterized as ‘religious’ or ‘cultural’ is 




CHAPTER 6: CONTESTING AND REPRESENTING DIFFERENCE 
do so.635 At the same time, ‘popular’ often evokes beliefs and practices “…distinct 
from, if not in opposition to, that defined by scholars, jurists, and well-respected 
mystics…”,636 positing an essentialized dichotomy between elite practices based on 
scriptural injunctions carried out by fairly educated individuals, and popular practices 
based on extra-scriptural custom carried out by the uneducated masses, somewhere 
along the lines of Gellner’s poles or syndromes of religious tradition.637 For the 
purpose of this section, I will define ‘popular Muslim practice’ in a Sunnite context 
tentatively as those practices which are not unambiguously perceived by Muslims to 
be enjoined by scripture and the sources of Islamic tradition. This allows us to 
consider both those practices that are generally accepted not to be enjoined by 
scripture, e.g. the practice of employing CDs of Koran-recitals as amulets in cars, as 
well as those which are considered to be enjoined by some and resisted by others, e.g. 
certain practices connected with the veneration of Muhammad. Finally, it allows us to 
see popular practice as an extension of the enjoined practices, not an opposition to 
these.638
Given that popular practices are not universally perceived as prescribed by the 
sources of tradition, it is not surprising that they are more likely to differ along 
regional or ethnic lines. Such differences can be manifested in a variety of ways. The 
most obvious difference is of course when a practice is common in one ethnic or 
regional group but unknown among another. An example of this would be the annual 
ritual of anointing the grave of a saint with sandal-paste (cantaṉakkuṭam) which is 
practiced among South Indians. In other cases, the details of performing a certain 
                                                 
635 Cf. Hammond 2005:194-234. 
636 Berkey 2003: 248; cf. Möller 2005: 51-3. 
637 Gellner 1969: 130. 
638 This is in my opinion the advantage over Möller’s concept of ‘lived Islam’, which is based solely on 
a dichotomy of ‘normative Islamic’ and ‘non-Islamic’, overlooking the practices and beliefs which 
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practice or set of practices may vary, e.g. by reciting different poems on the occasion 
of mawlid. Finally, ethnic variation can become salient in the relative importance that 
different ethnic groups may attach to a certain practice. For example, one of Noorul 
Farha’s respondents claimed that Indians are more particular than Malays about 
observing minor holidays such as the Islamic New Year on the 1st of Muharram.639
The number of popular practices is large, and it is not possible to discuss them in 
any detail here. In order to discuss the contestations regarding popular practice and 
Tamil ethnicity, it will suffice to focus on one particularly contentious issue, viz. the 
practices relating to the veneration of saints. Focusing on this complex of practices 
(and beliefs) has several advantages. On the one hand, the veneration of saints640 is a 
practice found practically everywhere in the Muslim World. At the same time, despite 
the “…astonishing homogeneity” of this complex of practices across the Muslim 
World,641 there is still considerable regional variation. This means that the complex of 
saint-veneration allows Muslims and scholars alike to identify differences as well as 
similarities in the practice across ethnic boundaries more easily, and thus offers 
favorable conditions for the study of ethnic difference in religious practice. 
Saint-veneration is a conspicuous practice among Tamil Muslims, and few aspects 
of Muslim practice in South India and Ceylon have received as much attention by 
scholars.642 Saint-veneration among Tamil Muslims is usually centered on a shrine, 
called taikkā or tarkā, that contains the tomb of a saint. Tombs can vary in size from 
simple graves to large shrine complexes like the Dargah of Nagore [Figures 16-7].  
                                                 
639 Noorul Farha 1999: 64; from my personal attendance of a function for ushering in the year AH 1427 
on 30th of January 2006 at a Singaporean mosque, though, I cannot concur with this observation. 
640 The English word ‘saint’ is the most common translation of Arabic walī, pl. awliyā’, literally a 
‘friend’ of God. This translation has been challenged on various grounds by a number of authors; cf. 
Baldick 1989: 7-8; Turner [1974] 1998: 56-62. Yet other scholars have argued for the continued 
usefulness of the term, and I largely concur with their views; cf. Chodkiewicz 1995: 13-22. 
641 Chambert-Loir & Guillot 1995: 389. 
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Figure 16: The Dargah of Shāh al-Ḥamīd in Nagore, South India's most important saint-shrine 
(Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
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There are also shrines that commemorate a miracle performed by the saint on the site, 
but sometimes also only the visit of a saint or even just his (or rarely her) appearance 
in the dream of a devotee. Shrines commemorating the visit of the most important 
Muslim saint of Tamil India, Shāh al-Ḥamīd of Nagore, can be found in many places 
in South India, such as at Tenkasi, where Shāh al-Ḥamīd is supposed to have relieved 
the people from a drought by miraculously causing rain [Figure 18].643 As in many 
parts of the Muslim World, people attend the shrines of saints to get cured from 
diseases and find solutions for many other problems by praying for the saint’s 
intercession with God and sharing in the baraka, God’s ‘blessing’ that is transmitted 
through the saint and his or her shrine.644 At popular sites, substantial crowds may 
gather for the annual festival of the shrine, commonly called kantūri or ‘urs. 
 
Figure 18: Shrine in Tenkasi commemorating the visit of Shāh al-Ḥamīd to the town (Photo: 
Torsten Tschacher) 
                                                 
643 Cāli [1981] 1985: 13; Kulām Kātiṟu Nāvalar [1963] 1997: 87. 
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When Tamil Muslims came to Singapore in the 19th century, they entered a world in 
which the veneration of saints was as prevalent as in their own homeland. Some 
shrines, or keramat as they are known in Malay, existed on the island even before the 
foundation of the British settlement in 1819.645 Similarly, saint-veneration was also a 
common practice in Ḥaḍramawt, the region of Yemen that most of Singapore’s Arabs 
hailed from.646 Tamil Muslims adopted as well as contributed to the existing 
landscape of shrines on the island. Tamil Muslim saint-veneration in the colonial 
period has already been discussed in chapter 2, so it suffices here to stress that such 
practices integrated Tamil Muslims into Singapore Muslim society of the times rather 
than setting them apart. 
I have elsewhere distinguished between two modes or trajectories of saint-
veneration among Singaporean Tamil Muslims, viz. the ‘diasporic’ and the 
‘integrating’ mode.647 The former refers to the continued veneration of saints back in 
India by Singaporean Tamil Muslims, while the latter indicates the veneration of local 
Singaporean and Southeast Asian saints, Tamil or otherwise. It is the latter mode 
which is more salient in everyday life. Many respondents told me that they regularly 
visit shrines, often on a weekly basis. The Keramat Habib Nuh was singled out as a 
particularly important place. A Tamil Muslim foreign worker told that he visited 
Habib Nuh’s shrine weekly because the latter was the supreme saint of the island, 
echoing an idea common in medieval Central and South Asia of the saint as a 
sovereign of a specific territory, resulting from the double meaning of the term wilāya 
as ‘sanctity’ and ‘sovereignty’.648 In terms of the practices performed at shrines in 
Singapore, there seems to be little difference between devotees of different ethnic 
                                                 
645 Cf. Abdul Wahab 1999/2000: 61; Suen-Oltmanns 1993/94: 33. 
646 Cf. Knysh 1993. 
647 Cf. Tschacher 2006b: 230. 
648 Cf. Bayly 1989: 179-86; Digby 1986: 62-3. Cf. Tschacher 2006b: 237-8 for the veneration of Habib 
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backgrounds. On the whole, those practices and ceremonies which I observed can also 
be encountered in other parts of the Muslim World, such as the strewing of the tomb 
with flowers, or the raising of flags to mark the annual holiday of the saint. In fact, the 
celebration marking the annual holiday of Habib Nuh on the 28th of May 2005 was 
one of the most multi-ethnic Muslim functions that I witnessed.649
The situation is slightly different when we look at the other, ‘diasporic mode’ of 
saint-veneration among Tamil Muslims in Singapore. Popular Muslim practices 
relating to this mode are much less salient than those that relate to Singaporean saints, 
as they are rarely carried out in the public sphere in Singapore. Most conspicuous and 
public are recitations of mawlid-poetry or even poems written by the saint himself, 
usually to mark the annual holiday. Other practices may be carried out in private, or 
only when visiting the saint’s shrine in India, and are thus hidden from public view 
and of little consequence for debates about ethnic difference and religion in 
Singapore. As mentioned in chapter 3, Singaporean Tamil Muslims may make 
pilgrimages to shrines in India, both to shrines of the kin-center as well as those of 
important saints in other parts of the country. 
The most salient case of ‘diasporic’ saint-veneration among Tamil Muslims in 
Singapore is also the most relevant for a discussion of debates over the relationship of 
ethnicity and religion. This is the Nagore Durgah, the replica of Shāh al-Ḥamīd’s 
shrine in Nagore that we have encountered in chapter 2. The activities and rituals 
performed at that shrine during the colonial period have already been outlined. What 
needs to be added is that there is currently no evidence available to suggest that the 
practices connected with the shrine were in any way regarded improper in the prewar 
period. This does not mean that everyone agreed with these practices, but it seems that 
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either was such criticism never put to writing, or it still remains to be discovered. It is 
also important to note that the Malay population in Singapore never seems to have 
developed any kind of attachment to the saint, and the shrine is generally not 
mentioned in studies regarding saint-shrines in Singapore.650 Nevertheless, even in the 
postwar period, Malays seem to have participated in the annual holiday at the shrines, 
as one respondent now living in India reported: “All Muslims come [there]. Malay 
Muslims come, Tamil Muslims come, and there are Chinese Muslims, they also 
come”. When Mariam visited the annual holiday in 1986, she mentioned only “…very 
few Malays” attending the proceedings, something that she attributed to the fact that 
the shrine was a ḥanafī mosque, rather than to assume that the saint was simply less 
popular among Malays.651
Yet since the 1970s, the Nagore Durgah has been a contested site. As mentioned, 
the shrine was part of the Masjid Jamae (Chulia) endowment and thus inherited by 
MUIS from the Muslim and Hindu Endowments Board. In what Mariam interpreted 
as “…an attempt to control saint worship among Muslims”, MUIS is said to have 
demolished a concrete structure in the shrine that stood as a proxy for the tomb of the 
saint in the early 1970s.652 Furthermore, MUIS transferred the management of the 
shrine to the TMJ, although under the condition that it would observe the annual 
holiday.653 Furthermore, the shrine was officially converted into a mosque, apparently 
on the grounds that prayers were offered there, and the structure could not really 
qualify as a shrine as there was no tomb there; one of my respondents, who was close 
to MUIS, emphatically asserted that the Singapore Nagore Durgah never was a shrine. 
                                                 
650 E.g. Abdul Wahab 1999/2000; Suen-Oltmanns 1993/94; Siddique 1979. 
651 Mariam 1989: 42; cf. also Bibijan 1976/77: 118; on the Nagore Durgah as a mosque see below. 
652 Mariam 1989: 42-3, quote on p. 43. 
653 Mariam 1989: 120; interestingly, Mariam claims to have attended the holiday during the month of 
Muharram, while usually the holiday of Shāh al-Ḥamīd is held in Jumādā al-Ākhira, five months later; 
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While these may be valid reasons from the perspective of MUIS, the matter is less 
clear when looked at from the angle of South Indian devotees. Firstly, it does not 
seem to be uncommon to offer prayers in a shrine. While most shrines in South India 
have a separate mosque attached to them, it is not uncommon to find shrines where 
the distinction is less clear.654 Secondly, as indicated above, a shrine need not 
necessarily be the tomb of a saint, but any place that comes to be associated with 
baraka.655 Mariam contended that her respondents denied that the Singapore Nagore 
Durgah was a mosque. While my respondents did not deny this claim, it appeared that 
the distinction between mosque and shrine was not clearly made by them. Whatever 
the case may be, it is clear that certain practices linked to saint-veneration were 
continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s.656
 
Figure 19: The Nagore Durgah in Singapore after closure (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
                                                 
654 Cf. Schomburg 2003: 42-3; Tschacher 2006b: 233 n. 7. 
655 Cf. Gonella, 1995:153-260, esp. nos. 9, 48, 68-9; von Denffer 1976: 170. 
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The Nagore Durgah was finally closed in 2001, officially because the structure had 
become so dilapidated that it threatened to collapse [Figure 19]. Nevertheless, it was 
not before 2004 that MUIS carried out strengthening works on the structure, after the 
Preservation of Monuments Board had requested it to do so.657 Yet according to 
practically all my Tamil Muslim respondents, the immediate reason for the closure 
was a conflict between MUIS and an individual who claimed to be the caretaker of 
the shrine. Few of my respondents even mentioned the dilapidated condition of the 
Nagore Durgah, and then mainly in connection with what they perceived to be the 
failure of MUIS to preserve the shrine properly, something interpreted by a number of 
them as a sign of disrespect by MUIS towards Tamil Muslim traditions. Yet it appears 
that there were considerable tensions within the Tamil Muslim community regarding 
the shrine. Respondents were only giving evasive or vague answers when asked 
directly about the issue, but several comments in casual conversations revealed that 
there were actually debates about the propriety of the shrine going on. One respondent 
had sought for information on the main shrine in India early in 2004, in order to prove 
to MUIS that the tradition was properly Islamic. It should be stressed that this conflict 
over the shrine appears to have been an internal issue of the Tamil Muslim 
community; the slow response by MUIS regarding the necessary structural 
strengthening may have been due to reluctance on behalf of MUIS to interfere in 
internal matters of the Tamil Muslim community. 
Finally, a compromise seems to have been reached in resurrecting a plan 
formulated already in 1994 to transform the shrine into a heritage center for Indian 
                                                 
657 http://www.muis.gov.sg/english/media_releases/speech_jaleel.aspx [accessed on 20 March 2006]; it 
is slightly surprising that it took so long to carry out the needed structural works. In 2001, the 
accumulated fund of the Jamae endowment had recovered from the burden of redevelopment, as 
becomes clear from the MUIS annual reports, so that delay in carrying out structural strengthening can 
hardly have been due to financial constraints, especially as the structural works carried out in 2004 cost 
only about $30,000; cf.  MUIS Annual Report 2001: 132; MUIS Annual Report 2003: 130; 
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Muslims.658 The $1.8 million needed for the project are largely going to be raised 
through donations, while MUIS is going to contribute an initial $270,000 from the 
endowment towards this purpose.659 Yet tensions are still simmering. At a dialogue 
session held by MUIS to present the plan to Indian Muslim community, MUIS 
announced that no rituals will be conducted in the renovated Nagore Durgah, and that 
it aims at gradually removing the perception that the structure is a shrine. Even while 
nobody objected during the session, respondents told me about their unhappiness with 
this decision in the aftermath of the meeting. At the same dialogue session, in 
contrast, representatives of the Masjid Jamae (Chulia), which belongs to the same 
endowment as the Nagore Durgah, requested that the name of the Nagore Durgah be 
simply changed to ‘Indian Muslim Heritage Center’, in order to obliterate any 
connections with the past of the structure, yet this proposal was declared to be not 
feasible by MUIS, as the name of a protected monument could not simply be changed. 
The conflict over the shrine should not obscure the fact that Shāh al-Ḥamīd is still 
venerated by many Tamil Muslims in Singapore. One reason for the decline of the 
local shrine replica may well be the improved modes of transport to India. Planes link 
Singapore with Chennai several times a day, and a devotee leaving Singapore in the 
morning can be at Nagore in the late afternoon. Several respondents expressed 
skepticism regarding the Singapore Nagore Durgah, mainly on the basis that as Shāh 
al-Ḥamīd was neither buried there nor had visited Singapore, they were unsure 
whether the place could really be a source of baraka, which was necessary to qualify 
it as a shrine. At the same time, the sanctity of the main shrine in India was 
                                                 
658 “Nākūr Tarkā marapuṭaimai maiyamākiṟatu”, Tamiḻ Muracu, 20 May 2005: 6; cf. “Indian Muslim 
Heritage Centre”, Warita 95, Jul-Aug 1994: 16. 
659 http://www.muis.gov.sg/english/media_releases/speech_jaleel.aspx [accessed on 20 March 2006]; 
that MUIS is going to contribute only about 15% of the total cost of the transformation of the Nagore 
Durgah again indicates that a simple lack of funds cannot have been the sole reason for the delay in 
carrying out needed repairs; if most of the funds were to be raised through donations anyway, 
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emphatically confirmed by these respondents, and a group of Singaporeans annually 
donates one of the five flags which are raised during the annual festival [Figure 
20].660
 
Figure 20: The chariot transporting the Singapore Flag from Nagapattinam to Nagore for the 
annual flag-raising ceremony on 30th of July 2003 (Photo: Torsten Tschacher) 
 
How do such debates over popular Muslim practice as encountered in the Nagore 
Durgah relate to the formulation of ethnic difference among Singaporean Muslims? 
Before this question can be addressed, a note on the participants in these debates is in 
order to avoid overgeneralization. It is fairly easy with regard to debates over popular 
Muslim practices to present the matter as a conflict between two clearly defined 
parties, viz. those who attack popular practices and those who support it. This 
dichotomy is found in the literature as well as among my respondents. The ‘critics’ 
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are variously termed ‘fundamentalist’,661 ‘reformist’,662 ‘orthodox’,663 or ‘wahhābī’, 
the latter being the preferred term by most of my respondents who in some way 
defended popular practices, and even some of those who were opposed to them.664 
The supporters of popular practices are less clearly labeled, though terms like 
‘traditionalist’,665 ‘syncretic’,666 or ‘Sufi’ are occasionally used;667 some of my Tamil 
Muslim respondents employed the term ‘barelwī’, which is often used in South Asia 
as an umbrella term used pejoratively for supporters of popular practices.668 Yet it is 
important to bear in mind that the differences between critics and supporters of 
popular practices are less clear-cut than these terms suggest.669
A second methodological problem relates to the assumptions about the place of 
popular Muslim practices in Islamic tradition made by many students of Singaporean 
Islam. Some scholars right away call practices such as saint-veneration ‘un-Islamic’ 
or in “…doctrinal contradiction…” to Islam.670 Even authors sympathetic to various 
popular practices are often unable to escape the dominant discourse. Thus, while 
Siddique stresses that the concept of baraka is part of what she calls ‘Islamic folk 
religion’, she qualifies this by claiming that this ‘Islamic folk religion’ actually 
derives from pre-Islamic Arab or Indian ‘folk religion’.671 Many authors also notice 
that there is little “…logical consistency between action and belief or practice and the 
                                                 
661 Siddique 1979: 2. 
662 Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 64; Peacock 1978: 145-74. 
663 Abdul Wahab 1999/2000: 53; Suen-Oltmanns 1993/94: 7-8; significantly, Peacock reserves this 
term for the ‘supporters’ rather than the ‘critics’ of popular practice; Peacock 1978: 146, 152. 
664 For the use of the term ‘wahhābī’ in colonial India, cf. Sanyal 1996: 240-4; for some of the dangers 
implicit in the use of the term as an umbrella category, cf. Knysh 2004. 
665 Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 64. 
666 Peacock 1978: 146. 
667 Knysh 2004: 4-9. 
668 Cf. Geaves 1996: 170. 
669 Cf. Möller 2005: 111-2. 
670 Abdul Wahab 1999/2000: 51; cf. Bibijan 1976/77: 118; Shankar 2001: 49; Syed Mohamed 1973: 
84-6. 
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doctrine”,672 or that justifications for popular practices were “…not…well argued”.673 
Yet these scholars generally fail to spell out what they consider to be proper doctrine, 
and in what way the answers of their respondents were inconsistent with these 
doctrines, making it impossible to evaluate the statements. 
There is no need to go into most of the debates concerning popular practices in 
detail. What is interesting for our purposes in these debates is what impact the 
perception of ethnic difference has on the discourse and arguments. It has been argued 
in the context of Muslim diasporas in the West that culturally or ethnically specific 
practices tend to get discarded in order to create a homogenized set of Muslim 
practices when Muslims of different ethnic groups come to live together in the same 
place.674 We may thus expect that ethnic difference does impact the discourse about 
popular Muslim practice in Singapore. This is primarily apparent in two aspects: in 
the claims regarding putative ‘Hindu’ origins of many popular practices among Indian 
Muslims, and in Indian Muslim being perceived as more receptive to popular 
practices than Malays. 
It is not at all uncommon to encounter statements to the effect that one or the other 
popular Muslim practice is derived from pre-Islamic practice.675 Given the strong 
tendency to identify ‘Indian’ and ‘Hindu’ in Singapore, it is hardly surprising that 
popular practices peculiar to Indian Muslims in Singapore are often ascribed to Hindu 
influence.676 One of my respondents noted with regard to the practices at the Nagore 
Durgah: “As I understand it, they [the Tamil Muslims; T.T.] brought a lot of Hindu 
baggage along”. It should be noted that such statements are usually based on noting 
                                                 
672 Mariam 1989: 46. 
673 Bibijan 1976/77: 118; cf. also Abdul Wahab 1999/2000: 52-3. 
674 Gibb 1998: 260-1; Vertovec 2003: 317-20; cf. also Peacock 1978: 155. 
675 Cf. the literature given in Tschacher 2006b: 225-6 n. 2; for Tamil Nadu, the most accessible 
statement of the argument is Bayly 1989: chapter 3. 
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similarities between ‘Hindu’ practice and certain popular Muslim practices. Yet most 
respondents possessed only superficial knowledge of ‘Hinduism’ and simply assumed 
that a practice performed by Indians must be ‘Hindu’ if it was not perceived to be 
‘Islamic’. Thus, the kariyamaṇi or karicamaṇi, a necklace of black beads worn by 
married women to indicate their marital status, was identified by some respondents as 
‘Hindu’.677 Yet even though a similar type of necklace has “…become one of the 
predominant symbols of marriage worn by Hindu women…” India-wide, the notions 
of auspiciousness that attach to this ‘Hindu’ necklace were on the whole not shared by 
my Muslim respondents, making it difficult to see what should be peculiarly ‘Hindu’ 
about the indication of marital status through a necklace.678 Whatever the case may 
be, the claim that a certain practice is ‘Hindu’ was generally understood by 
respondents to be sufficient to indicate that it contradicted Islamic precepts. Such 
arguments remind one of the facile ascription of a caste-system to Indian Muslims 
that we encountered in chapter 3. 
This tendency of identifying popular practices as ‘Hindu’ of course generated 
responses from those who perceived such practices to be proper and wanted to 
continue performing them. While some respondents tried to argue that a certain 
practice was in full conformity with the precepts of Islam, most respondents tried to 
defend a practice by ‘culturalizing’ it, i.e. by claiming that the practice was ‘cultural’ 
rather than ‘religious’. Such tendencies have been noted also in Muslim diasporic 
societies in the West, and Vertovec has even argued that the religion/culture 
                                                 
677 Cf. also Bibijan 1976/77: 113; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 62; these sources call the necklace manik 
sendrum. None of my respondents used this term, which seems to be at least partly Malay, though I am 
unable to comment on the word sendrum. 
678 McGee 2004: 351; it should also be noted that this necklace is not in any way mentioned in 
canonical texts on marriage ritual, making it a ‘popular practice’ in the ‘Hindu’ tradition as well, quite 
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dichotomy is typical of diasporic societies.679 ‘Culturalization’ generally seems to 
involve a situation where ethnic differences are salient, though it is not necessarily 
limited to diasporic communities.680 It is important, though, to distinguish between 
various types of such ‘culturalization’-processes. In most of the cases noted by 
students of diasporic societies, the relegation of certain practices from the domain of 
‘religion’ to that of ‘culture’ took place in order to dispense with these practices and 
retain only the ‘religious essentials’.681 In this regard, they come closer to those of my 
Tamil Muslim respondents in Singapore who preferred to dispense with everything 
‘Indian’ because it was considered to be improper in the Singaporean context.682
Yet in contrast, some respondents used the same ‘culturalization’-argument to 
claim that there was nothing wrong in performing certain practices. To these 
respondents, such practices were positive expressions of their ethnic and cultural 
identities which were completely removed from the domain of religion and therefore 
not relevant to concerns over religious propriety. Respondents usually asserted that 
critics of the practice in question were simply implying too much when condemning it 
as un-Islamic. At the same time, this strategy required that any element that might be 
interpreted to be ‘religious’ in a practice needed to be removed or at least 
reinterpreted, in order not to cast the neat separation of ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ into 
doubt. A Malaysian Tamil Muslim whom I had met at the annual holiday in Nagore in 
2003 eloquently argued that the ceremonies were “just culture” and thus completely 
proper. The same individual became extremely upset when the devotees scrambled to 
touch the flags that were to be hoisted on the minarets of the shrine to get into contact 
with the baraka contained in them, as this behavior implied that there was more than 
                                                 
679 Vertovec 2003: 316-7; cf. Gibb 1998: 260-1. 
680 Cf. Harnish 2006: 6-7, 193-6. 
681 Cf. Vertovec 2003: 316-7; Gibb 1998: 260-1. 




CHAPTER 6: CONTESTING AND REPRESENTING DIFFERENCE 
just ‘culture’ to this ceremony. Similarly, practices have to be kept clearly separate 
from anything which could imply a Hindu background. Thus, MUIS has been 
requested to reform the antiquated spelling ‘Nagore Durgah’ to ‘Nagore Dargah’, as 
the former spelling might lead people to confuse it with the Hindu-goddess Durgā. 
From this debate over the relationship between popular practices, ‘religion’ and 
‘culture’, it is just a small step to the claim that Islam as practiced among Indians is a 
distinct entity in itself. This ‘Indian Islam’ is supposedly, as Mariam put it, ‘saint-
centered’,683 puts more stress on rituals and ceremonies, is more influenced by ‘Sufi’ 
brotherhoods, emphasizes hierarchies, and tends to be ‘syncretic’.684 Furthermore, it is 
closely linked with the ḥanafī law-school. It is indeed fairly common even among 
scholars to see these elements as typical of Islam in South Asia, ascribed variously to 
the supposed advantage of ‘tolerant’ Sufi traditions in the multi-religious environment 
of South Asia or to the similarly unsubstantiated valorization of hierarchy among 
South Asians.685 At the first glance, this construction of an ‘Indian Islam’ follows a 
common tendency to distinguish between various forms of ‘ethnic Islams’, generally 
considered to be Sufi-inspired, saint-centered, and accommodative of non-Islamic 
practices on the one hand, and a transnational, austere and exclusivist ‘universal 
Islam’ on the other. In many ways, this distinction mirrors the dichotomy of 
‘supporters’ and ‘critics’ of popular Muslim practices mentioned in the preceding 
section.686
What is unusual in the Singaporean context is not so much the dichotomy as such, 
but the fact that the supposedly transethnic category of ‘universal Islam’ is identified 
with peculiar ethnic groups, viz. Arabs and Malays. Some respondents felt that 
                                                 
683 Mariam 1989: 113; cf. ibid.: 112-7. 
684 Cf. Mariam 1989: 112-7; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 63-4. 
685 For the former argument, cf. Geaves 2005; for the latter, cf. Lindholm 1998: 224-9. 
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‘Malay Islam’ was less tainted with pre- and therefore un-Islamic practices. 
Furthermore, ‘Indian Islam’ was associated with mindless ritualism, a trait that is 
generally perceived as negative not only among Muslims in the Singaporean 
context.687 Finally, the continued performance of practices peculiar to Tamil Muslims 
was seen as a threat to the supposed unity of the Muslim community or umma. On the 
other hand, this discourse could also be reversed; some respondents saw ‘Indian 
Islam’ coming closer to what they considered to be fundamental Muslim values. One 
respondent claimed that ‘Indian Islam’ was more tolerant, and thus by implication 
closer to Islamic core values, than ‘Malay’ or ‘Arab Islam’; tellingly, the respondent 
connected this feature with the supposedly more tolerant nature of the ḥanafī law-
school.688 It also became clear that many respondents did not consider ‘Indian Islam’ 
to be in any way different from the Islamic ‘mainstream’, even while they considered 
Malay practice to be deviating. One Tamil respondent claimed that “…the 
Naqshbandiyya [a Sufi brotherhood; T.T.] has done a lot to counter the bomoh- 
[‘medicine-man’] culture of the Malays”. In this view, it was Sufi practices that 
helped reform what was perceived as improper Malay custom. 
It hardly needs mention that there is a high degree of essentialism involved in the 
construction of categories like ‘Indian’ or ‘Malay Islam’. Facts that could be 
perceived as challenging the dichotomy, such as the presence of a ‘reformist’ 
discourse among Indian Muslims or Malay participation in saint-veneration and other 
popular practices, are integrated into the discourse. The presence of ‘reformist’ 
discourse among Indian Muslims is interpreted by some respondents and scholars 
alike as result of an exposure of these ‘reformed’ Indian Muslims to Malay networks, 
conveniently ignoring the presence of such discourse in Tamil Nadu and other parts of 
                                                 
687 Cf. Kuah-Pearce 2003: 54, 217, 271; Tong 2004: 299. 
688 In a similar vein, the UIMA-newsletter of April 1994 called the shrine of Shāh al-Ḥamīd in Nagore 
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South Asia for at least a century, and the important role played by Indian Muslims 
among early ‘reformists’ in the Malay World.689 An even more curious argument is 
sometimes encountered regarding Malay popular practices, viz. that such practices 
were introduced by Indian Muslims into ‘Malay Islam’. While Indians may well have 
transmitted some popular practices from India as well as other parts of the Muslim 
World,690 they have also been charged with transmitting practices that clearly 
originated in Malay societies themselves. This discourse seems to have started among 
British administrators, but obviously offered a convenient way for some sections of 
Malay society to free themselves of the taint of ‘un-Islamic’ practices.691 A good 
example is provided by the Malay practice of mandi safar, the tradition of taking a 
purificatory bath in a stream or the sea during the month of Safar. This practice is 
often claimed to be Hindu-derived, apparently solely on the basis of its resemblance 
with purificatory bathing at pilgrimage sites in India. Yet even though scholars and 
some respondents link mandi safar to Indian Muslims,692 it has to be noted that the 
custom is unknown in India. In 1889, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ mentioned only Malays and 
Javanese participating in this practice.693 Similarly, Daud Shah explained it to his 
Indian readers in 1925 together with the ronggeng-dance as a Malay custom, without 
mentioning any Indian involvement in it, and concluded: “It goes without saying that 
there is no Muslim seeing the disgraceful things going on at this [mandi safar] who 
does not shed blood from [his] eyes”.694
                                                 
689 Cf. Mariam 1989: 116-7; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 46-9, 64. Regarding Indian Muslims’ 
participation in ‘reformist’ activities in the 19th and early 20th century, cf. Khoo 1993: 268-70; More 
2004: 122-31; Peacock 1978: 145-6. 
690 Cf. Siddique 1979: 14 n. 5. 
691 Cf. Nagata 1993: 521. 
692 Cf. Bibijan 1976/77: 115; Nagata 1993: 521. 
693 “Ciṅkappūr”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 28 Oct 1889: 66. 
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It has been suggested that the formulation of either support or opposition to 
‘Indian Islam’ is related to the degree of ‘Malayization’ and integration into Malay 
networks.695 While there seems to be some support for such a contention, one has to 
be careful not to award the dichotomy of ‘Indian’ and ‘Malay Islam’ any explanatory 
value outside the discourse in which it is formulated. In addition, not every Muslim in 
Singapore subscribes to this dichotomy. Several of my respondents located the 
emergence of ‘reformist’, ‘wahhābī’ discourse not among Malayized Indian Muslims, 
but rather among recent migrants from India. When I asked one respondent who made 
that claim why in his opinion it was mainly recent migrants from India who espoused 
such views, the respondent blamed migrant workers from the Gulf States for 
spreading ‘wahhābī’ discourse after their return from the Gulf: “So these fellows are 
trying to be too smart, come back to India, they act like Arabics [sic]”. This way, the 
discourse spread among the younger generation of Indians who are now migrating to 
Singapore. This respondent was not the only one who noted an upsurge in ‘wahhābī’ 
ideas among recent migrants. Several respondents claimed that MUIS was oblivious 
to the problem and predicted that it may lead to severe tensions among Tamil 
Muslims in Singapore. It is difficult to assess the extent of this phenomenon, but it 
should be clear that it is not possible to understand the debates about popular Muslim 
practice in Singapore solely through the dichotomy of ‘Indian’ and ‘Malay Islam’. At 
the same time, the dichotomy is pervasive enough in public discourse to raise the 
question why it has been so appealing despite its obvious shortcomings. This leads us 
to the formulation of identities among Singaporean Tamil Muslims and the impact the 
resulting discourse has on religious life among them. 
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The Fallacies of the Identity Discourse 
Few questions relating to Indian Muslims in Singapore have received more attention 
in scholarly as well as public discourse than that of identity. It is generally assumed 
that Indian Muslims form a community that straddles the boundary, or falls into the 
gap, as the case may be, between Indians and Malays. One of my respondents stated 
that Indian Muslims do not know who they are, being caught between Indians and 
Malays while being neither fully. Noorul Farha, whose thesis is the most detailed 
investigation of the issue so far, posits an identity-continuum of ‘Indian-Muslimness’: 
 
At the…ends of the continuum are the individuals who have almost 
completely integrated into the wider Indian and Malay communities. In 
between are those who wish to see the Indian-Muslim community as a 
unique one… In most cases, being ‘Indian-Muslim’ requires one to 
negotiate…their [sic] way along the continuum…696
 
Noorul Farha employs the concept of ‘hyphenated identities’ to explain identity-
formation among various groups of Indian Muslims in Singapore. According to her, 
two identity-processes, viz. ‘Indianness’ and ‘Muslimness’ join in every Indian 
Muslim individual, who may then “…choose to live life largely to the right or left side 
of the hyphen”.697 Though individuals are free to manipulate aspects of their identity 
in different situations, they are at the same time constrained in their choices by factors 
such as language, physical features, stereotyping, or popular practices.698 There can be 
little doubt that this is indeed the dominant model according to which the identity of 
Indian Muslims in Singapore is perceived and articulated, and there is little need to 
                                                 
696 Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 69. 
697 Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 9. 
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repeat Noorul Farha’s arguments here or to reiterate statements by my respondents 
that echo similar sentiments expressed by hers. Rather, it is necessary to investigate 
what impact this debate has had on Indian, and more specifically Tamil Muslim 
religious life in Singapore. As I want to argue, the relative unanimity of respondents 
on the issue is deceptive; rather, fundamental contradictions in the way Islam is 
organized and conceived of in Singapore are obscured by the identity discourse in a 
way that has disadvantaged Indian Muslims. 
One obvious characteristic of the discourse about Indian Muslim identity is the 
considerable amount of tension over what being an ‘Indian-Muslim’699 means. During 
the debate occasioned by the formation of SINDA, vastly different visions of being an 
‘Indian-Muslim’ were put forward, as has been shown above. These tensions were 
generally seen as an endorsement of the ‘Indian-Muslims’’ position in-between 
Indians and Malays, and also to reveal what was considered to be an ‘identity 
crisis’.700 Yet these claims raise a simple question: why would somebody speaking 
either Malay or Tamil and adopting either Malay or Tamil culture not simply be 
Malay or Indian? Furthermore, how meaningful could an identity as ‘Indian-Muslim’ 
be, given the substantial differences within the category in terms of language, regional 
background, or affiliation to various religious subdivisions? It becomes obvious that 
the category of ‘Indian-Muslim’ cannot be understood in isolation, but has to be 
related to the construction of identity categories in the wider society. 
Any understanding of the discourse about ‘Indian-Muslim’ identity in Singapore 
has to take account of the construction of ‘races’ and ‘religions’ in this state. One of 
                                                 
699 I will use ‘Indian-Muslim’ in inverted commas to indicate the imagined homogenous ‘community’ 
created in public discourse, as opposed to individuals who just happen to be Indian and Muslim. 
700 Cf. “Join Sinda or Mendaki? Identity crisis facing Indian Muslims could be boon or bane”, The 
Straits Times, 26 Jul 1992; “Abdullah to help Indian Muslims in identity conflict”, The Straits Times, 
31 Oct 1993; Noorul Farha allows for more agency by recognizing Indian Muslims as projecting 
different aspects of identities at different times, but she still sees these different aspects as being in 




CHAPTER 6: CONTESTING AND REPRESENTING DIFFERENCE 
the more problematic aspects of this identity as formulated by Noorul Farha is the 
claim that the identity of Indian Muslims is “…necessarily hyphenated…”.701 The 
problem with this statement is that it assumes that there is a natural tension between 
‘Indian’ and ‘Muslim’;702 else, most Singaporeans would have hyphenated identities – 
Malay-Muslim, Indian-Sikh, Chinese-Buddhist, etc. Yet there is no rational reason 
why an identity as Indian should necessarily get into conflict with an identity as a 
Muslim – after all, one is a ‘racial’ and the other a ‘religious’ identity. The problem 
lies in the fact that the categories of ‘race’ and ‘religion’ get confused and identified 
in public discourse in Singapore, as mentioned in chapter 2. Thus, ‘Indian’ comes to 
imply ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ ‘Malay’. Only once the categories are thus 
‘contaminated’ with each other does a tension between them become conceivable. 
This ‘contamination’ of ‘race’ and ‘religion’ is part of the process of ‘cultural 
involution’ as identified by Benjamin, in which “…each ‘culture’ turns in on itself in 
a cannibalistic manner, struggling to bring forth further manifestations of its 
distinctness”.703 In this sense, being simultaneously an Indian and a Muslim threatens 
the boundaries of ‘race’ and ‘religion’, for there are suddenly ‘Indians’ who are 
‘Malay’ by religion and ‘Muslims’ who are ‘Hindu’ by race, so to speak.704 This 
threat to the ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ categories that structure much of Singaporean 
cultural and administrative life needs to be controlled and disciplined. To achieve this, 
the threat is homogenized and naturalized by the creation of the category of ‘Indian-
Muslims’, a category that is not defined primarily through the realities on the ground, 
                                                 
701 Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 9, 38. 
702 Cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 37-8, 70; at some points, Noorul Farha acknowledges that this 
proposition is problematic; ibid.: 49-50. 
703 Benjamin 1976: 122. 
704 One might argue that ‘Indian Islam’ as discussed in the last section is the conceptual equivalent in 
the domain of ‘religion’ to ‘Indian Muslimness’ in the domain of ‘race’ – in both cases, the distinctness 
of ‘religious’ or ‘racial’ categories is perceived to be threatened by the presence of an apparent 
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which would only reveal the meaninglessness of the category, but through recourse to 
the common Singaporean categories of Indian/Hindu and Malay/Muslim. 
It is this imagining of ‘Indian-Muslims’ through existing categories that actually 
creates the identity crisis often ascribed to Indian Muslims in Singapore, and it is 
through this supposed identity crisis that Indian Muslims are disciplined.705 To begin 
with, the category of ‘Indian-Muslim’ obscures the heterogeneity of this putative 
‘community’. Consequently, even legitimate claims made by a particular group of 
Indian Muslims can be delegitimized as the parochial claims of just one section in a 
larger ‘community’, and countered with the calls to unity that are common in 
speeches addressed by Muslim community leaders to ‘Indian-Muslims’. Differences 
between various Indian Muslim groups thus come to be seen not as the legitimate 
expression of diversity but as a communal pathology, symptom of a primordial 
identity crisis compounded by the supposed ‘argumentativeness’ of Indians. 
Furthermore, by claiming an inherent tension between being ‘Indian’ and being 
‘Muslim’, it is possible to mark certain behaviors and identities as improper in a given 
setting. The criticism of popular practices and ‘Indian Islam’ is part of this 
disciplining process; by admonishing Indian Muslims not to ‘contaminate’ Islam with 
‘Indian’ practices and identities, it is possible to obscure just how much the 
hegemonic construction of Islam in Singapore draws on the beliefs and mores of the 
elite of Malay and Arab community leaders. I was told several times during my 
fieldwork by high-ranking Muslim community leaders that Indian cultural practices 
such as the annual holiday for the Nagore saint could not be replicated in the 
Singaporean setting, though without giving reasons why this was not possible. 
Similarly, in a recent publication by MENDAKI, Muslim was unabashedly identified 
                                                 





CHAPTER 6: CONTESTING AND REPRESENTING DIFFERENCE 
with Malay, and Tamil-speaking Muslims were singled out as those preferring to 
maintain a distinct identity, implicitly criticizing them for threatening the unity of the 
Muslim community.706 Furthermore, I was told that Indian Muslims should stop 
identifying themselves with India, an almost paradoxical proposition given that until 
recently little was done by public institutions to enable Tamil-speaking Muslims in 
Singapore to organize their religious life without recourse to preachers, teachers, and 
publications from India. This discourse obviously forced Indian Muslims to react. 
Thus, during a dialogue session with MUIS, one community leader proposed that 
instead of ‘Indian-Muslim’, the term ‘Muslim of Indian origin’ should be employed, 
obviously to deemphasize the identification with India suggested by the former term. 
This discourse about and disciplining of ‘Indian-Muslim’ identity further serves to 
obscure any problems sections of Indian Muslim society may be facing in Singapore. 
Firstly, problems encountered by one section of Indian Muslims can be downplayed 
by pointing out that the problem is not faced by all ‘Indian-Muslims’. An example 
would be the statement of the MUIS Secretary quoted by Noorul Farha, in which he 
quipped at complaints by Tamil-speaking Muslims by pointing out the problems faced 
by Malay-speaking Indian Muslims.707 Rather than conceding that the problems of 
diverse Indian Muslim groups need separate attention, they are qualified and 
relativized by playing one against the other. This is also echoed in Noorul Farha’s 
conclusion: “Structurally, they [the Indian Muslims; T.T.] may be marginalized…and 
might be unhappy about that. But not all are”.708 Secondly, primordializing the 
supposed tensions between being ‘Indian’ and being ‘Muslim’ allows to obscure the 
context in which statements about identity and problems faced by Indian Muslims are 
made and to reinterpret such statements as expressions of a timeless identity crisis. As 
                                                 
706 Saat 2002: 159. 
707 Quoted in Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 56. 
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mentioned in chapter 5, many of my Tamil-speaking respondents noted their 
exasperation when it was assumed that all Muslims would speak Malay; similarly, 
they were incensed by the facile equation of ‘Indian’ and ‘Hindu’. Similar statements 
were apparently made by Noorul Farha’s respondents; yet even though one of them 
explicitly noted that the problem lay with the fact that other people “…mix up race 
and religion”,709 Noorul Farha preferred to read them as statements reflecting tensions 
underlying the ‘hyphenated’ nature of ‘Indian-Muslims’ rather than as problems 
imposed on Indian Muslims by other Singaporeans confusing the categories of ‘race’ 
and ‘religion’, such as the MENDAKI publication noted above.710 One respondent 
noted: “The question ‘who do we align ourselves with – the Indians or the Malays?’ 
always bothers us”. But the fact that Tamil and other Indian Muslims are supposed to 
‘align’ with one or the other ‘racial’ group is not a commonsensical process, but due 
to the imposition of specific structural constraints on them in the Singaporean context. 
Similarly, the debates over whether to support MENDAKI or SINDA in the early 
1990s were claimed to reflect “…the underlying tension among Indian Muslims…” 
regarding “…their cultural and religious identity…”,711 rather than MENDAKI’s own 
confusion about its identity as either Muslim or Malay. Thirdly, as the latter example 
shows, not only are problems that Singaporean Indian Muslims may be facing 
obscured. As they are claimed to result from a putative identity crisis, the onus to 
resolve this crisis – and therefore, according to this logic, the problems – is placed 
squarely on the Indian Muslims themselves, while public institutions are absolved 
from any responsibility.712 What is most paradoxical about this is that as long as the 
                                                 
709 Quoted in Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 37. 
710 Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 37-8; cf. Saat 2002: 159. 
711 “Join Sinda or Mendaki? Identity crisis facing Indian Muslims could be boon or bane”, The Straits 
Times, 26 Jul 1992. 
712 Cf. “Indian Muslims urged to reconcile their feelings about identity”, The Straits Times, 24 Feb 
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tacit identification of ‘Indian’ with ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ with ‘Malay’ is in place in 
Singapore, Indian Muslims will never be able to resolve this ‘identity crisis’ 
themselves, unless they are willing to sacrifice their identity completely by either 
converting to Hinduism or by identifying themselves as Malays.713
As Noorul Farha noted, “[i]dentity is first and foremost a historical creation of the 
group and must be understood as such”.714 Yet placing the formulation of various 
Singaporean Indian Muslim identities in their historical contexts is a difficult 
undertaking, as our knowledge of these contexts is sketchy at best; furthermore, few 
of the commentators until now have been able to access Tamil language primary 
sources, which would be the most important source for the formulation of ‘identities’ 
among the Tamil-speaking section of Indian Muslim society in Singapore. As 
mentioned in chapter 5, there is little evidence that Tamil Muslims perceived a 
fundamental as opposed to a circumstantial tension between being ‘Tamil’ and being 
‘Muslim’. Similarly, there is as little evidence that they saw a close connection 
between being ‘Muslim’ and being ‘Malay’. When reporting his experiences in 
Malaya back to India in 1925, Daud Shah included a long diatribe against the Malays 
that could have sprung from the pen of a British administrator, dubbing them 
‘sluggards’ (cōmpēṟikaḷ) who lived ‘carefree’ (niscintaiyāy) by squandering 
money.715 Even worse, Daud Shah noted that “…Malay and Javanese women, even 
though they are all Muslim women, are very careless in the matter of chastity”.716 As 
noted with regard to the practice of mandi safar, Malay customs were also not spared 
from criticism. Slightly earlier, in 1923, Indian Muslims had opposed the plans of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Straits Times, 26 Jul 1992; “Abdullah to help Indian Muslims in identity conflict”, The Straits Times, 
31 Oct 1993. 
713 Cf. PuruShotam [1998] 2000: 152-3; given the fact that ‘race’ is ascribed by the state rather than 
chosen by the individual in Singapore, the latter would in any case be difficult to achieve. 
714 Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 70. 
715 Tāvutṣā 1925: 342-3. 
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government to appoint specifically a Malay as Muslim member of the Legislative 
Council, suggesting that a non-Malay could also be appointed because “…to a 
Moslem, nationality is not as strong as religious ties”.717 This case is particularly 
interesting as it seems to mirror the contemporary situation, just that it is nowadays 
the Indian Muslims who are criticized for placing their ethnic identity over their 
feeling of community with other Muslims. 
This is not to suggest that there was a fixed and undisputed ‘Indian Muslim’ or 
even ‘Tamil Muslim’ identity in the prewar period.718 Indeed, writers shifted with 
considerable facility from one identity category to the other; this element of 
situational identities has of course been stressed for both the past and the present.719 
Rather, what should be noted is that the postulated identity crisis did not seem to have 
existed in this period; indeed, it seems to have been the Indians who criticized Malays 
for ‘un-Islamic’ behavior and their growing emphasis on being ‘Malay’ rather than 
Muslim in the 1920s,720 reversing the respective positions taken by Malay and Indian 
Muslims in contemporary debates. This should alert us to the fact that the current 
public formulation and contestation of ‘Indian-Muslim’ identity is the result of 
historical contingency caused by several factors. I would argue that most important 
among these factors are a) the growing institutionalization of ‘race’ as an ascribed 
rather than a chosen category, leading to the creation of a large Malay-speaking 
Indian Muslim community which now competes with those Indian Muslims speaking 
South Asian languages in representing ‘Indian-Muslims’;721 b) the increasing use of 
‘religion’ to define ‘race’ and vice versa, as described in chapter 2 and 3; and c) the 
                                                 
717 Quoted in Yegar 1979: 101. 
718 Cf. Fakhri 2002: 4. 
719 Cf. Fakhri 2002: 13, 16; Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 70. 
720 Cf. Khoo 1993: 269. 
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establishment of hegemony over the Muslim public sphere in Singapore by several 
public institutions lead largely by Malay-speaking individuals, as described in chapter 
4. The resulting confusion over issues of language, ‘race’, and ‘religion’ came to the 
foreground when the formation of SINDA made these confusions glaringly apparent 
in MENDAKI in the early 1990s. It was in this context that an ‘Indian-Muslim’ 
identity, rather than various Indian Muslim identities, were increasingly formulated 
and contested in public, as a reaction to structural problems these groups were 
facing.722 As Mani has pointed out: “…the dual orientation of Tamil Muslims is often 
guided by events outside their own group”.723
Even while the presentation of these contestations as an identity crisis were 
certainly advantageous to the existing Muslim community leadership, as suggested 
above, one should not overlook that many Indian Muslims in Singapore seem to share 
the general understanding of the relationship of ‘Indian’ and ‘Muslim’ as partly 
antagonistic. Furthermore, the formulation of a hyphenated ‘Indian-Muslim’ identity 
has been more advantageous to some sections of Indian Muslim society than to others. 
Given that ‘Indian’ in Singapore is not only often identified with ‘Hindu’, but also 
with ‘Tamil’, the formulation of a common ‘Indian-Muslim’ identity makes it easier 
for Tamil-speaking Muslims to press their claims to represent ‘Indian-Muslims’ in 
Singapore, at the expense of those speaking other South Asian languages.724 
Furthermore, the common identification of ‘Indian-Muslims’ as belonging 
predominantly to the ḥanafī law-school obviously benefits ḥanafī Indians, as is 
evinced by the patterns of law-school affiliation of ‘Indian’ mosques as discussed in 
chapter 3. Finally, as one of my respondents claimed, it has also strengthened the 
                                                 
722 A glance over the newspaper clips collected by Noorul Farha reveals an interesting endorsement of 
this thesis: prior to 1989, The Straits Times tended to use primarily the term ‘Tamil Muslims’; after 
1989, ‘Indian Muslims’ becomes the most common term; cf. Noorul Farha 1999/2000: appendix D. 
723 Mani 1992: 355. 




CHAPTER 6: CONTESTING AND REPRESENTING DIFFERENCE 
position of those Malay-speaking Indian Muslims who continued to claim to represent 
‘Indians’ vice versa those Malay-speaking Indian Muslims who happen to be 
classified as Indians, but who publicly identify as Malays, as the greater visibility of 
an ‘Indian-Muslim’ community could lead the Malays themselves to challenge this 
‘Indian’-Malay leadership.725 The greater attention that MUIS has paid in recent years 
to the needs of Indian Muslims has also resulted from the greater salience of an 
‘Indian-Muslim’ identity discourse in the public sphere and the formation of groups 
like FIM. Still, if the structural problems faced by Indian Muslims in organizing their 
religious life in Singapore are to be tackled, further attention needs to be paid by 
public institutions to distinguish more clearly between ‘race’ and ‘religion’ as well as 
between different Indian Muslim groups and the challenges faced by them. 
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Chapter 7 








Having reviewed various aspects of religious life among Singaporean Tamil Muslims 
and the connected discourses, we may return to consider the three questions posed in 
the Introduction: In which context does ethnic difference become salient in the 
religious domain? What practical impact does ethnic difference have on the 
organization and practice of religious life? And what discourses arise from the 
salience of ethnic difference in the religious domain? I attempt to provide some 
answers to these three questions and derive some conclusions from them in this final 
chapter. 
In identifying the contexts in which ethnic differences become salient in the 
religious domain, we have to begin by pointing out an obvious precondition for such 
salience: in order for differences in religious life to be perceived, they must be public 
to a certain degree, so as to allow Muslims of different ethnic backgrounds to notice 
them. This may of course happen in a private context, e.g. when a Malay Muslim is 
invited to a function in a Tamil Muslim household or vice versa, but generally ethnic 
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practice.726 Domestic practices, such as housewarming rituals and similar functions 
generally occur in ethnically more homogenous contexts or, to the contrary, can 
involve so many different ethnic as well as religious groups among the participating 
guests that any religious character of the function may be toned down to such a degree 
that it is not recognizable anymore. In any case, these practices are unlikely to make 
ethnic difference salient within a recognizable Islamic setting. 
The evidence presented in this thesis points to two main areas in which ethnic 
differences play a role in Muslim religious life. One is the area of public religious 
practice; the other the area of language use. Differences in the first area pertain 
largely to the field of what I have termed ‘popular practice’, i.e. all practices that are 
not unanimously agreed to be normative. Obviously, these practices allow greater 
variation than the normative practices, such as congregational prayer, which are 
largely standardized. The main area where ethnic difference becomes salient with 
regard to normative practice is the adherence to a specific law-school – as Malays 
usually belong to the shāfi‘ī law-school, and most adherents of the ḥanafī law-school 
in Singapore are of Indian background, this difference between law-schools lends 
itself to an interpretation of ethnic difference, and it has definitely influenced the 
discourse on ‘Indian-Muslim’ identity, as shall be discussed below.727 Yet it should 
not be forgotten that the actual situation with regard to Tamil Muslims is more 
complicated. As Tamil Muslims are the only Muslim group in Singapore that includes 
substantial followers of both law-schools, adherence to one or the other of these 
schools does signify different things to different individuals. While belonging to the 
                                                 
726 An interesting exception may be the situation in households consisting of both Malay- and Tamil-
speaking Muslims, where differences in practice may become obvious even in the domestic sphere; yet 
since in most of these households Malay is the primary language and I focused particularly on Tamil-
speakers, I have not come across such a case. 
727 Of course, the differences in practice between law-schools have no connection to ethnicity, only the 
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ḥanafī law-school may be an indicator of ‘Indianness’ in the eyes of a Malay, it 
connotes specific regional and possibly class-differences to a shāfi‘ī Tamil Muslim. 
Conversely, for a ḥanafī Tamil Muslim, adherence to the shāfi‘ī law-school on part of 
another individual has different meanings depending on whether that individual is 
Tamil or Malay. 
In terms of popular practice, ethnic differences are more salient than with regard 
to normative practice, yet some qualification is in order to put these differences into 
proper perspective. Thus, the main differences between various ethnic groups with 
regard to popular practice are differences in detail rather than in the actual practices 
performed, i.e. Tamil and Malay Muslims recite different poems in honor of the 
Prophet Muhammad, or commemorate the holidays of different saints; but there seem 
to be no ethnic differences with regard to whether such practices are carried out at all. 
Among both Tamils and Malays, there are those who support these practices and 
those who do not. Those who do participate in these practices in principle do not find 
it difficult to join members of another ethnic group in performing them. During the 
recitation of mawlid in honor of Shāh al-Ḥamīd of Nagore, most Malays may not 
participate in reciting the poems, primarily because they may not be familiar with 
them. But some Malays nevertheless listen to the recitation and share in the food and 
flowers that are distributed at the end. Similarly, saint-shrines are attended by 
Muslims of diverse ethnic backgrounds, much as opposition to such shrines also cuts 
across ethnic boundaries. The continued performance of popular practices like visits 
to saint-shrines in the multi-ethnic environment of Singapore for almost two centuries 
suggests that the observation that such practices tend to disappear in diasporic settings 
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society.728 It should also be noted that the few cases of practices which are performed 
by one ethnic group but which differ visibly from those performed by Muslims of 
other ethnic backgrounds tend not to be conspicuous publicly. The main example of 
such a practice would be the sandal-paste ceremonies (cantaṉakkuṭam) performed 
until recently by some Tamil Muslims in the Nagore Durgah, where apparently only 
very few non-Tamils would have been present.729 More conspicuous practices such as 
processions seem to have been banned as public disturbances already in the colonial 
period by the British, and thus play no role in Singaporean Muslim society anymore, 
nor are we able to assess their perception by the Malay or Arab population in the 19th 
century. On the whole, the salience of ethnic differences in the carrying out of popular 
practices appears to have surprisingly little practical impact for the religious life of 
Tamil Muslims in Singapore; all the more surprising is that they do play a role in the 
discourse about ethnic difference among Singaporean Muslims, an aspect that will be 
discussed below. 
Yet ethnic differences in Muslim religious life become most salient and 
pronounced when language is involved. This is in itself hardly remarkable – language 
is fundamental in communicating about Islam, whether in the form of the 
transmission of religious knowledge, in discourse, or in public debates. Which 
language(s) an individual is fluent in determines what information she or he is able to 
access, in what way, and from whom, in which debates the individual participates, 
and in which religious networks she or he partakes. At the same time, the lack of 
linguistic skills can also exclude individuals from access to religious services and 
participation in religious practices, when these are only offered in a language that 
individual is not proficient in. All these aspects are highly visible in the Singaporean 
                                                 
728 Cf. Gibb 1998: 260-2; Vertovec 2003: 316-8; for a critique, cf. Tschacher 2006b: 238-9. 
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context. As Malay serves as the predominant medium of the transmission of Islamic 
knowledge in Singapore, Muslims not proficient in Malay have to tap into alternative 
networks to satisfy their religious needs. An emerging Muslim public sphere using 
English is the most readily available alternative for smaller ethnic groups among the 
Muslims, as well as for increasing sections among the larger groups as well, 
suggesting that its importance will grow in the future. But for Tamil Muslims, these 
alternative networks are still largely Tamil-speaking and include mosques, 
associations, and a number of informal religious groups. It is most likely that the 
preferences for specific Sufi brotherhoods among different ethnic groups in 
Singapore, which was mentioned in chapter 4, has as much to do with the languages 
used at the meetings of particular Sufi groups as with any cultural or historical 
predilections towards a specific brotherhood, though these two processes obviously 
go hand in hand. On the whole, language use has a much greater practical impact on 
religious life among Tamil Muslims in Singapore than peculiarities of religious 
practice; when I attended the ceremonies marking the Islamic New Year on the 1st of 
Muharram AH 1427 (30th of January 2006), Malays and Tamils recited mawlid 
together before the night (‘ishā’) prayers, yet afterwards separated, with the Tamils 
shifting to another hall in the mosque to attend a religious lecture in Tamil, which 
obviously would have been unintelligible for most Malays. Given this importance for 
language in the organization of religious life, it is highly surprising that the topic 
seems to be hardly ever addressed in the secondary literature on diasporic and many 
other multi-ethnic Muslim societies, Singaporean Muslim society included.730 The 
relationship between linguistic and religious communities in any case needs to be 
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investigated further, as it has an obvious influence on the way religious life is 




The salience of ethnic difference in religious life in itself of course just means that 
such differences become obvious to the participants in religious activities, but it does 
not tell us much about the practical consequences of these differences. As just 
outlined, the two main areas of religious life in which ethnic differences become 
salient are religious practice, mainly popular rather than normative, and religious 
language use. Of these, ethnic differences regarding the religious practice have 
comparatively few practical consequences. The reason is simple – as participation in 
popular practices is usually voluntary, an individual is free to choose whether to 
participate or whether to abstain form participation. Furthermore, popular practices 
are usually organized privately, with little outside involvement, thus leaving little 
scope for tensions to occur between different ethnic groups or between the organizers 
and official Muslim administrative bodies. Practically the only case in contemporary 
Singapore that I am aware of where such frictions occurred was in the context of the 
Nagore Durgah, but even here, there was little involvement by non-Tamils in the 
issue. It is well possible that the generally cautious approach by MUIS to the issue 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s was precipitated partly by the fact that MUIS did not 
want to appear as intervening in Tamil Muslim traditions, and that action was taken 
only because of the exacerbating tensions over the practice within the community.731 
In contrast, there is little evidence that ethnic difference in popular practice had any 
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visible impact on Muslim religious life in the colonial period. While such differences 
were occasionally remarked on, for example with regard to the practice of mandi 
safar by Daud Shah, these discourses seem to have had no practical impact. Even the 
ban of various religiously motivated processions was due to concerns over public 
peace by the Government rather than objections raised by other Muslims. 
Only with regard to the one difference in normative practice that is linked to the 
ethnic background of Muslims, viz. the adherence to the ḥanafī law-school, is it 
possible to claim that ethnic differences have practical consequences for the 
organization of religious life, as the differences between the law-schools have led to 
the establishment of separate mosques. More importantly, as outlined in chapter 3, 
ḥanafī mosques were largely protected from the process of ‘Malayization’, so that 
none of the original ḥanafī mosques ever came to be Malay-dominated. While this 
perception of a strong correlation of ‘ḥanafī’ with ‘Indian’, and of ‘Indian’ and 
‘Tamil’, has benefited the ḥanafī section of the Tamil-speaking Muslims in 
Singapore, it has destabilized the situation of shāfi‘ī Tamils as well as that of non-
Tamil ḥanafīs, whose mosques were in a more precarious situation – most shāfi‘ī 
mosques employing Tamil have either become ‘Malayized’ or have shifted to ḥanafī 
practice, while no ḥanafī mosque of an unambiguously non-Tamil character survives. 
The example of mosques leads us to the practical consequences of language use in 
the religious sphere. There are two important impacts that linguistic differences have 
on religious life. Firstly, linguistic differences exclude certain sections of society from 
practices that are conducted in a language that section is not or only insufficiently 
proficient in. Many Tamil Muslims are excluded from Muslim activities which utilize 
Malay, ranging from more narrowly religious practices such as attending sermons and 
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tuition schemes for Muslims. Even though there are attempts to mitigate some of 
these exclusions, e.g. by providing English translations of sermons, on the whole, 
linguistic exclusion has served as a catalyst for the formation of separate Tamil 
Muslim institutions as well as the public formulation of a Tamil or even Indian 
Muslim identity. This has assumed an even greater significance in the context of the 
contemporary administrative setup, which will be considered below. Linguistic 
exclusion has also had the effect of marginalizing the role Tamil Muslims can play in 
the Muslim public sphere in Singapore. As higher religious education in Tamil is 
unavailable in Singapore, Tamil Muslims have little capacity to participate in those 
domains of Muslim society that require such skills, e.g. in questions of Islamic law. 
Furthermore, the resultant reliance on religious scholars from India makes Tamil 
Muslims more dependent on religious discourses from India; coupled with the fact 
that most Malay Muslims do not speak Tamil, and are thus themselves excluded from 
certain debates current among Tamil Muslims, this reliance on discourse derived from 
India helps to further set Tamil Muslims apart and to deepen the salience of ethnic 
difference. 
Secondly speakers of different languages may form separate institutions for these 
purposes, provided there are enough speakers of a specific language present and the 
legal framework permits such separate institutions. As should have become clear in 
the course of our discussion, there is a surprisingly large number of institutions 
catering to Tamil Muslim religious needs if compared to the actual size of Tamil 
Muslim society in Singapore. Most of these institutions are either mosques or 
associations, and they provide Tamil Muslims with many services that they might 
otherwise be excluded from, such as religious education, sermons and lecturing in 
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Muslim institutions to the linguistic exclusion they were faced with in Malay-
speaking institutions, though the evidence is not quite so clear-cut. Linguistic 
differences were probably not the only factors behind the foundation of the earliest 
Tamil mosques in Singapore, especially as many of the early Tamil Muslim traders 
would have known Malay. While the establishment of these mosques attests to the 
general identification with Tamil-speaking networks by the early Tamil Muslim 
traders, and thus casts doubts on the occasionally voiced claim that these early traders 
were more ready to ‘Malayize’ than Tamil Muslims who came to Singapore a century 
later,732 there is no reason to suppose that an actual feeling of exclusion from Malay-
speaking environments caused the setup of separate institution. With regard to the 
formation of Tamil Muslim associations, their role as providers of services that Tamil 
Muslims might be excluded from on the basis of language is similarly the result of a 
historical process rather than the original purpose of most of these associations. With 
regard to the few general Indian Muslim associations that existed before World War 
II, it is very difficult to establish the role language played in these associations, due to 
the scarcity of information on them. The Indian Muslim Association may have 
focused primarily on one linguistic group, in this case Tamils, but other associations, 
like the Anjuman-i-Islam, drew their membership from various ethnic and linguistic 
groups. In contrast, the kin-center associations that developed from the 1920s 
onwards were established largely for the purpose of supporting members of the kin-
center community, and while religious services were sometimes part of this support, 
they seem to have been more an incidental part of it rather than an active response to 
the problems faced by Tamil Muslims as a whole in Singapore. The first and for a 
long time only association that particularly concentrated on supplying religious 
                                                 
732 Cf. “Join Sinda or Mendaki? Identity crisis facing Indian Muslims could be boon or bane”, The 
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services to Tamil-speaking Muslims was the TMJ, and to a lesser degree its split-off, 
SIJU. 
On the other hand, the ‘Indian’, i.e. in most cases Tamil, character of certain 
mosques and associations seems to be much more pronounced at present. The reason 
for this is probably to be sought in the development of the administration of Islam in 
Singapore since about the 1920s. As establishment of Muslim institutions was largely 
independent from government interference in the colonial period, the responsibility to 
form such institutions lay solely with the respective linguistic communities; failure to 
establish them could not be blamed on the hegemony of another group. This situation 
still pertains for example in the domain of religious publishing in Tamil. The growth 
of institutions responsible for the administration of Islam brought with it a rise of 
Malay influence on the organization of Muslim religious life in Singapore, for a 
variety of reasons, such as the British preference of Malay candidates for posts 
reserved for Muslims, seen in the insistence to appoint a Malay as Muslim member of 
the Legislative Council in 1923, or the growing influence of independent Malay(si)a 
on Muslim affairs in Singapore before 1965. The decisive period seems to have been 
the 1970s and 1980s. This period saw the rise of the hegemony of MUIS over Muslim 
religious life and institutions in Singapore. The dominance of Malay-speakers in 
MUIS, as well as the understandable focus on establishing hegemony first over the 
larger Malay dominated institutions, had a double impact on Tamil Muslim 
institutions. On the one hand, the religious needs of Tamil-speakers did not rank high 
on the agenda of the newly created statutory board. On the other hand, MUIS appears 
to have been unwilling to interfere with the affairs of Indian Muslims, perhaps 
because it preferred to avoid conflict with Indian Muslims at a time when its position 
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had been catering to specific sections of Tamil Muslim society increasingly came to 
offer religious services, which gave especially kin-center associations the opportunity 
to legitimize their existence to a community for whom the kin-center was becoming 
less important. This process was no doubt aided by the official recognition of 
‘Indians’ as one of the constituent ‘races’ of Singapore, thereby lending the endeavor 
legitimacy also in the wider public sphere. 
On the one hand, this seems to have allowed Indian and especially Tamil Muslim 
associations to maintain a greater autonomy vice versa MUIS in religious affairs by 
claiming representation of ‘Indian-Muslim’ interests. Yet at the same time, the 
situation also had negative effects. While in the wider Muslim public sphere a general 
framework for interaction was imposed via legislation, this was not the case among 
the various Indian Muslim groups, which had to come to an agreement on common 
procedures and interaction themselves. While the formation of the FIM has helped to 
mitigate the rivalries among groups somewhat, the FIM is still not much more than 
the sum of its parts. Thus, while the FIM has become MUIS’s main contact among 
Indian Muslims, associations can still sidetrack the FIM and engage directly with 
MUIS. There is no institution that could act as arbiter or mediator between various 
competing Indian Muslim associations. This situation is actually exacerbated by the 
frequent exhortations to Indian Muslims to ‘speak with one voice’ – after all, every 
group wants to ensure that this ‘one voice’ is its own. This situation of unmitigated 
rivalry has furthermore served to inhibit the tackling of important issues, such as the 
training of local religious scholars conversant in Tamil. One of the greatest needs of 
Tamil Muslims in the institutional field is the establishment of such an arbitrating 




CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS – ETHNIC DIFFERENCE IN RELIGIOUS LIFE  
being independent of the associations themselves. Whether the FIM can transform 
into such a mediating body remains to be seen. 
 
TALKING ABOUT DIFFERENCE 
 
The salience of ethnic difference has not only practical effects on the religious life of 
Tamil Muslims in Singapore, it also influences the way Singaporean Muslims 
conceptualize ‘community’. As mentioned several times in the preceding discussion, 
‘Muslim’ and ‘Malay’ are facilely equated in Singapore. Being ‘Muslim’ is usually 
seen as a precondition of being ‘Malay’, and there is a clear tendency to assume that 
the opposite is equally true, viz. that to be ‘Muslim’ means to be ‘Malay’. The 
presence of Muslims who are manifestly non-Malay obviously challenges this 
perception. The salience of ethnic difference in a religious context therefore compels 
Singaporean Muslims to engage with and conceptualize these differences. As these 
conceptualizations are discussed in detail in chapter 6, we shall concern ourselves 
here with putting these conceptualizations in a wider perspective. 
One common way of conceptualizing ethnic difference in religious life is the 
distinction between religion and culture which we encountered in chapter 6 with 
regard to popular religious practice. Thus, respondents often concluded that I was 
studying ‘culture’ rather than ‘religion’, as it was assumed that differences existed 
only in culture, for the ‘religion’ of Malay and Tamil Muslims is the same. Similarly, 
I was told by a Tamil Muslim in Malaysia that I should rather study ‘religion’ than 
‘culture’.733 This distinction, as mentioned, has been noted with regard to Muslim 
societies in several parts of the world, including, but not limited to, the Muslim 
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diaspora in western countries. The observations of several scholars raise the question 
in how far this religion/culture dichotomy may draw upon the distinction in Islamic 
jurisprudence between legal practices derived from normative religious sources on the 
one hand, and local ‘custom’ (‘āda [Ma. adat] or ‘urf) on the other.734 In contrast to 
what has been reported by other scholars, my respondents did not use these Arabic 
terms, but rather Tamil terms like kalāccāram, ‘culture’, or simply the English 
equivalent, depending on what language was spoken. Furthermore, it appears that to 
respondents, ‘culture’ was a domain completely separate from and sometimes in 
contradiction to ‘religion’, rather unlike the classical Islamic concept that “…‘āda is a 
jurisprudentially cognizable if subsidiary element within the legal systems of all 
Muslims [sic] societies…”.735 More important for the religion/culture dichotomy than 
any ‘Islamic’ understanding seems to be the Singaporean ‘racialization’ of ethnic 
difference. 
The separation of ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ allows conceptualizing Muslims of a 
South Asian ethnic background as people who share ‘religion’ with the Malays and 
‘culture’ with the Indians. It is hardly surprising that ‘Indian-Muslims’ are 
consequently perceived as hybrids straddling the boundary between Indians and 
Malays. Yet problematically, this neat distinction fails to account for the salience of 
ethnic differences in the religious domain; the problem lies in the fact that these 
differences should according to the model be part of ‘Indian culture’. But many 
popular practices performed by Tamil and other South Asian Muslims are too 
obviously ‘Muslim’ to be part of ‘Indian culture’. Indian Muslims thus come to 
threaten not only the conceptual divide of ‘Indian’ and ‘Malay’, as discussed in 
chapter 6, but also that of ‘culture’ and ‘religion’. The solution to this potential 
                                                 
734 Cf. Gibb 1998: 261; Harnish 2006: 194. 
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disruption of the conceptualization of ‘racial’ differences in Singapore is to assume 
that ‘Indian-Muslims’ have their own ‘Indian-Muslim culture’, which, much like 
‘Indian-Muslims’ as a whole, is perceived as a hybrid, not quite Indian anymore and 
not quite Malay yet. Paradoxically, the supposed hybridity of ‘Indian-Muslims’ then 
forms the basis for the formulation of a distinct identity, which, like the formulation 
of other ‘racial’ identities in Singapore, has to struggle to prove its own distinctness 
from other ‘cultural’ formulations.736 This explains the focus on popular practices and 
the ḥanafī law-school in the discourses about ‘Indian-Muslim’ distinctiveness, as 
these features differentiate ‘Indian-Muslims’ most clearly from other Indians and 
other Muslims in Singapore, even though they are not shared by all, or even a 
majority of Singaporean Muslims of South Asian background. On the other hand, the 
use of South Asian languages like Tamil, while differentiating ‘Indian-Muslims’ from 
Malays, is easily subsumed under the heading ‘Indian culture’, and thus offers less 
differentiating potential. 
It thus appears that, even if terms like ‘āda or ‘urf are used by Singaporean 
Muslims to refer to the religion/culture dichotomy, it seems to be the peculiarly 
Singaporean understanding of the English terms that informs the ‘Islamic’ vocabulary 
rather than vice versa. Thus, even while this dichotomy appears to be employed in 
many contemporary Muslim societies, local conceptualizations of the meanings of 
these terms may differ. Both the pervasiveness of these distinctions as well as their 
meanings in different local contexts warrant more attention in future studies – in the 
diasporic context(s), this furthermore raises the question of how different 
conceptualizations of the religion/culture dichotomy by various migrant Muslim 
groups are harmonized or contested in these contexts.  
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A further important aspect of the discourse about ethnic difference in Muslim 
religious life in Singapore is the tension between a primordialist view of ethnic 
identity and the actual context in which formulations of ethnic identity take place. 
Primordialism is an established component of the Singaporean conceptualization of 
culture, religion, ethnicity, and ‘race’ – the cultural and religious elements that define 
a ‘race’, as well as ‘racial identity’, are presumed to exist a priori; an individual can 
either comply with or deviate from these defining characteristics, but the 
characteristics themselves can be challenged only with great difficulty.737 ‘Hybrid’ 
groups such as ‘Indian-Muslims’, which appear to be defined by characteristics linked 
to two different ‘racial’ groups, are thus generally assumed to be trapped in a timeless 
identity crisis. Yet the evidence presented in this thesis points to the rather 
unsurprising fact that formulations of identity are contextual rather than primordial. 
Thus, the increased public visibility of an ‘Indian-Muslim’ identity from the late 
1980s onwards was in no way due to any primordial identity crisis, but arose directly 
from the structural impediments Muslims of South Asian background where facing 
with regard to policies framed by the CMIO-paradigm and the concurrent association 
of Islam with the Malay ‘racial’ category, whether these impediments related to issues 
of language use in Islamic institutions under the hegemony of Malay-speaking 
Muslims, the confusion of ‘race’ and religion by MENDAKI, or the protection of 
‘Indian-Muslim’ popular practices from the encroachments of ‘reformist’ discourse. 
There is little evidence for a particular salience of ethnic identity in discourses prior to 
this period, and in any case in these earlier discourses, the identity formulated would 
be ‘Tamil’ rather than ‘Indian’. The adoption of the latter term appears more as a 
concession to public discourse in Singapore, referring as it does to one of the official 
                                                 




CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS – ETHNIC DIFFERENCE IN RELIGIOUS LIFE  
‘racial’ categories, than to a particular feeling of unity among various South Asian 
Muslim groups. The adoption of the designation ‘Indian-Muslim’ certainly had some 
advantages – apart from being more meaningful to people unfamiliar with ethnic 
divisions among South Asians, it allowed Tamil Muslims to present themselves as the 
quintessential ‘Indian-Muslims’, due to the close conceptual connection between 
‘Indian’ and ‘Tamil’ in Singapore. It also appears to have given South Asian Muslims 
greater license in preserving certain contentious popular practices as ‘cultural’ 
practices, an option not viable to Malays due to the near-identification of ‘Malay 
culture’ with Islam in the local context. Yet at the same time, I would contest Noorul 
Farha’s evaluation that “…most Indian-Muslims have made full use of their hybrid 
identity and engage in negotiation of their identity”,738 for at least with regard to most 
Tamil Muslims, this identity and the very ‘hybridity’ that it supposedly entails has 
been imposed on them. The majority of my respondents seemed to prefer an identity 
that was simultaneously Tamil (or Indian) and Muslim by eliminating from these 
identity formulations the very elements that made them appear to be in tension in the 
popular view, i.e. the notions of ‘Hinduness’ with regard to a Tamil and/or Indian 
identity, and the notions of ‘Malayness’ with regard to a Muslim one. 
This brings us to one last interesting point. For whereas ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ 
are perceived to be clearly demarcatable with regard to Muslims of South Asian 
background in Singapore, the two concepts appear to be fused in case of Malay 
Muslims. In contrast to the term ‘Indian-Muslim’, the term ‘Malay-Muslim’ seems to 
make much less sense in Singaporean discourse, and is commonly used only when 
contrasted to ‘Indian-Muslim’. Elsewhere, only either ‘Malay’ or ‘Muslim’ appear, 
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and then these terms generally seem to be interchangeable.739 The effect this usage 
has is to obscure that ‘Malay-Muslims’ are as much ‘hyphenated’ Muslims as ‘Indian-
Muslims’; accordingly, they emerge in the literature as the ‘real’ Singaporean 
Muslims, apparently unqualified by any ethnic or cultural baggage. This fusion of 
‘Malay’ and ‘Muslim’ has far-reaching consequences. On the academic side, it 
occasions the neglect and sometimes explicit exclusion of non-Malay Muslims from 
studies on Singaporean Islam.740 But more importantly, it allows to brand the 
complaints by South Asian Muslims regarding the problems they face in a Malay-
dominated Muslim public sphere as potentially threatening the unity of the Muslim 
‘community’ or umma and to accuse South Asian Muslims of putting their ‘Indian’ 
identity above their ‘Muslim’ one.741 Conversely, the Malay ‘colonization’ of Islam 
by identifying ‘Malay’ and ‘Muslim’ seems never to be regarded as illegitimate, 
despite the fact that, while to be Muslim may be a necessary precondition to be 
Malay, ‘Malayness’ has no special claim on Islam. This discourse, viz. the playing 
down of ethnicity by a dominant ethnic group in a multiethnic Muslim society, has 
some interesting parallels. Earlier in the century, it appears to have been the strategy 
of the then dominant ethnic groups in Singapore’s Muslims society to de-emphasize 
the role of ethnicity for a Muslim – significantly, these dominant Muslims were 
Indians and Arabs, faced with an increasing assertiveness on part of Malay 
Muslims.742 A similar discourse appears to be employed by Turkish Islamists with 
regard to the formulations of their Kurdish counterparts, as described by 
                                                 
739 For example, ‘Malay’ food-stalls on the campus of the National University of Singapore are all 
designated as ‘Muslim’ food-stalls, while ‘Indian’ stalls are always ‘Indian’, even if the proprietor is a 
Muslim. 
740 E.g. Mak 2000. 
741 Cf. Saat 2002: 159; cf. also Noorul Farha 1999/2000: 46-51; PuruShotam [1998] 2000: 151-2. 
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Sakallioglu.743 These examples suggest that the imagination of a unified Islamic 
umma may in certain context actually be a discourse aimed at maintaining the 
hegemony of a specific ethnic group or groups. While there is no space to develop this 




In his recent study of Ramadan in Java, Möller cautioned that in studying Muslims 
and their societies, “…it is all too easy for an outsider to focus on their differences at 
the expense of their similarities”.744 Even though Möller was referring to dogmatic 
differences among Muslims rather than ethnic differences, his caution nevertheless 
also appears to apply to this study. As mentioned, some respondents were puzzled 
what differences between Tamils and Malays could be studied in ‘religious’ life, as 
after all, the two groups shared the same religion. In a way, I would agree with these 
respondents – there is certainly little difference in the way Tamil or Malay Muslims 
carry out almost all of the normative (barring differences due to adherence to a 
particular law-school), and also most popular practices. With regard to the latter, the 
differences appear to be much less salient among various ethnic groups than among 
supporters and opponents of a particular practice within one of these groups. Yet at 
the same time, the impact of ethnic difference was obvious nevertheless, as Tamil and 
Malay Muslims employed different languages for the same purpose, congregated at 
different mosques, and had different opportunities of access to certain services. What 
was surprising for me, even though it appears as quite commonsensical in hindsight, 
was that the greatest salience of ethnic differences, and thus the greatest potential for 
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tensions, occurred precisely with regard to the normative practices. As the 
performance of these practices is incumbent upon Muslims, the feeling that one is 
excluded from performing them properly due to lack of proficiency in a certain 
language can lead to a feeling of alienation much more profound than the differences 
in the carrying out various popular practices could ever engender. 
One respondent noted in an email which he sent to me after a long conversation 
on Tamil Muslims that, despite feeling “…like a laboratory mouse whose slivers of 
self [were] being meticulously sliced for scrutiny under a microscope”, it was 
nevertheless heartening for him “…to hear…of some redeeming qualities of my 
community and the sense of relief that comes with the realisation that after all not 
everything is lost”. Indeed, I do not think that anything is lost; despite the factionalism 
evident among Indian Muslim associations, and the obvious fault-lines running 
through the putative ‘community’, there are nevertheless many institutions in place 
that could address problems faced by Tamil Muslims. MUIS has proven to be a highly 
efficient institution as far as the affairs of Malay Muslims are concerned, and the 
multitude of Tamil Muslim associations and mosques attest to a vibrant religious life 
as well as providing a pool of committed volunteers. The most important tasks are the 
regulation of relations between associations, facilitating their interaction amongst 
each other as well as with MUIS, and the recognition that ethnic differences cannot 
simply be wished away from religious life. Ultimately, it is necessary to recognize 
that ‘Muslim’ and ‘Malay’ are in no way synonymous, and that assuming them to be 
is at the root of many Tamil Muslims feeling like ‘beached whales’, as the above 
mentioned respondent put it in his email. This would entail the rephrasing the 
question of whom Tamil Muslims should align with, Indians or Malays – once the 
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the question simply becomes meaningless. Admittedly, many Muslims in Singapore 
seem to be so used to this ‘identity discourse’ that changing or even simply 
recognizing this aspect will be a difficult task, yet I am nevertheless convinced after 
reviewing the evidence that it is time to shift from focusing on identity to focusing on 
the structural problems Tamil and other South Asian Muslims face in the Singaporean 
Muslim public sphere. As one MUIS publication acknowledged: 
 
Are we Muslims? Or Malays and Indians? Or Singaporeans? Even as these 
identities may be fused, each component will have its own pull in the 
actions and attitudes of each Singaporean Muslim.745
 
As its recent initiatives regarding Indian Muslims suggest, MUIS has begun acting on 
that principle. After all, as one observer noted with regard to the Koranic verse which 
was quoted at the commencement of this thesis: 
 
Far from seeking to abolish ethnic feelings and identity from the human 
consciousness, which would be practically impossible, Islam prefers giving 
recognition to their usefulness in serving religion’s higher spiritual and 
moral purpose as embodied in the above quoted Qur’anic verse [49.13].746
                                                 
745 Zuraidah 1994: 116. 
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PROPERTY OWNED OR RENTED BY TAMIL MUSLIMS IN LAW REPORTS 
 
The following list is compiled from cases reported in the Law Reports as well as 
Mallal 1928. The table lists the location of the property, the nature of the property, 





102, Arab St. Residence unknown Mallal 1928: 37 
294-5, Beach Rd. Business (cloth) yes S.S.L.R. 1928: 83 
261, Beach Rd. House yes 
S.S.L.R. 1933: 74-
6 
46-51, Buffalo Rd. Unknown yes S.S.L.R. 1933: 74 
60-2, Bussorah St. Houses yes 
S.S.L.R. 1931: 
122-8 
7, Chancery Lane Residence probably Mallal 1928: 60 






?, Japan St.747 House ¼ share 
S.S.L.R. 1895-6: 
24 
5, Malay St. Unknown yes S.S.L.R. 1933: 74 
65, New Bridge Rd. House yes 
S.S.L.R. 1929: 
143 
?, North Bridge Rd. Business (café) unknown 
S.S.L.R. 1933: 
518 
                                                 
747 Nowadays Boon Tat St.; cf. Savage & Yeoh 2003: 59. 
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?, Prinsep St. Unknown ¼ share 
S.S.L.R. 1895-6: 
24 
Land adjoining Race 
Course 
Land yes S.S.L.R. 1893: 89 
?, Sago St. & Sago Lane Unknown yes S.S.L.R. 1933: 74 
22, Sungei Rd. Residence probably Mallal 1928: 129 
102-6, Victoria St. Shops share S.S.L.R. 1940: 75 
237-9, Victoria St. Houses yes 
S.S.L.R. 1931: 
122 
18-2, Wilkie Rd. Residence probably Mallal 1928: 110 








 APPENDIX 2: TOWNS OF ORIGIN OF TAMIL MUSLIMS IN THE PREWAR PERIOD 
 
Appendix 2 
TOWNS OF ORIGIN OF TAMIL MUSLIMS IN THE PREWAR PERIOD 
 
The table includes towns of origin of Tamil Muslims mentioned in primary and 
secondary sources for the prewar period, together with the District they belonged to 
(taking the British District divisions and names as a basis rather than the 
contemporary ones), whether the information relates to individuals or an association, 
as well as the source from which the information is taken. This list is not 







Adirampattinam Tanjore Individuals Syed Mohamed 1973: 92 
B & C Mutlur South Arcot Both 
Syed Mohamed 1973: 28-9, 45-
7 
Kadayanallur Tinnevelly Both 
Meytīṉ 1989: 3; Syed Mohamed 
1973: 28-9 
Karaikal French India Individuals 
Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 24 Feb 1890: 
134; Muslim Missionary 
Society Singapore 1985(b): 25; 
Siddique & Puru Shotam 1982: 




S.S.L.R. 1940: 250; cf. Mallal 
1928: 18 
Kottakuppam South Arcot Individuals Sankaran 2003: 30 
Koothanallur Tanjore Individuals Meytīṉ 1989: 7 
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Martandapuram Tinnevelly748 Individuals Meytīṉ 1989: 3 
Melappalaiyam Tinnevelly Individuals Pate 1917 (Vol. 1): 485 
Nagapattinam Tanjore Individuals 
Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 24 Feb 1890: 
134; Mallal 1928: 20; Meytīṉ 
1989: 7 
Nagore Tanjore Individuals 
Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 24 Feb 1890: 
134; Meytīṉ 1989: 7; S.S.L.R. 
1940: 75; cf. Lee G.B. 2002: 
80-1 
Pondicherry French India Individuals Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 24 Feb 1890: 134 
Porto Novo South Arcot Individuals 
Mallal 1928: 63; Meytīṉ 1989: 
7 
Pulicat Chingleput Individuals Pandian 1978: 149. 
Sathankulam Tinnevelly Individuals Syed Mohamed 1973: 87 
Shenkottai Tinnevelly Individuals Meytīṉ 1989: 3 
Tenkasi Tinnevelly Both 
Meytīṉ 1989: 3; Syed Mohamed 




Individuals Syed Mohamed 1973: 48-9 




Association Syed Mohamed 1973: 28-9 
Thiruvarur Tanjore Individual Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 10th Oct 1887: 61 
Vanjoor French India Individuals 
Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 22nd Aug 1887: 
33 & 12th Dec 1887: 97; 
S.S.L.R. 1893: 6-7 
                                                 
748 There seems to be a village of the same name near Muthupettai in erstwhile Tanjore District 
(modern Thiruvarur District), but the context makes clear that the one in former Tinnevelly District is 
meant. 
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Appendix 3 
TAMIL MUSLIM SUBSCRIBERS TO CIṄKAI NĒCAṈ FROM SINGAPORE 
 
Between August and December 1887, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ published lists of its subscribers 
in Singapore and elsewhere, the majority of whom were Muslims. The following table 
was compiled from these lists by extracting all obviously Muslim subscribers from 
Singapore. A few subscribers were also located in other, mainly Southeast Asian 
towns such as Penang, Batu Pahat, Kuala Lumpur, or Medan, and in a few cases in 
India, predominantly in Porto Novo (Parangipettai), but these outside subscribers have 
been ignored in the compilation of the following list. 
The first column gives the individual’s name. In a few cases, the word ‘Company’ 
(kampaṉi) or a shortcut (ka, kam, kampa) indicates that the subscriber was a company 
rather than an individual. The second column shows the individual’s occupation or the 
company he was working with. Due to the common occurrence of English and Malay 
terms and names written in Tamil script in this section it is sometimes difficult to 
interpret certain words. In cases where I have not been able to interpret a word, I have 
left it in transcription and italics as part of the translation. When my interpretation is 
doubtful, it is marked by a question-mark. In all cases, the Tamil original is given in 
transcription. It is also not always easy to determine when a place name refers to the 
location or the name of a business. Thus, pōṭkī puṭaivaikkaṭai could mean a garment 
store at Boat Quay, or the ‘Boat Quay Garment Store’. I have generally assumed that 
these cases refer to the location. The common occurrence of the Malay term kampong 
probably indicates that a business was located in Kampong Glam, though only in one 
case is this actually spelled out. The ubiquitous word kaṭai, ‘shop’, has more 
commonly been rendered as ‘dealer’, or, in the case of kācukkaṭai, as ‘money-
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changer’. I also assume that puṭaivai refers to garments or even cloth in general rather 
than specifically to saris.749
Finally, the third column gives the date in 1887 when the list in which the name 
appeared was published. In one case, a crease in the newspaper obscured the 
occupation and partly the name of a Muslim subscriber. This individual is given first 
in the table. 
Name of Individual or Company Occupation or Business 
Date of 
Publication 
[…]ṉ Ṟāvuttar Illegible 15th Aug 
A. Akamatu Maraikkāyar money-changer (kācukkaṭai) 8th Aug 
Ce. Aptulkātiṟu 
skipper & clerk (clerk for 
skippers?), Vanjoor (caṟāṅku 
kiṟāṇi vāñcūr) 
12th Dec 
Ma. Vi. Aptulṟakimāṉ 
clerk for John Little (jāṉleṭṭil 
kiṟāṇi) 
15th Aug 
Mu. Ce. Aptul Vāhitu 
clerk for Lawyer Donaldson 
(lāyar ṭōṉālcaṉ kiṟāṇi) 
22nd Aug 
Mu. Cāyapu Tiruvārūr 
kampong garment dealer 
(kampaṅ - puṭaivaikkaṭai) 
10th Oct 
Ci. Ceyku Apatulkātiṟu broker (taraku) 19th Sep 
I. Ceyku Aptulkātiṟu Company cattle dealer (māṭṭukkaṭai) 8th Aug 
Pa. Pa. Ceykumatārucāyapu 
pilot for John Little (jāṉleṭṭil 
campāṉōṭṭi) 
12th Dec 
A. M. Ceykumukammatu broker (taraku) 5th Sep 
Tu. Mu. Ceyyatumukammatu 
kampong garment dealer 
(kampaṅ - puṭaivaikkaṭai) 
15th Aug 
I. Ciṉṉattampi 
kampong garment dealer 
(kampaṅ - puṭaivaikkaṭai) 
8th Aug 
                                                 
749 Cf. “Ciṅkappūril nayamuṇṭā? (Ceṉṟavārat toṭarcci.) Viyāpāramakattuvam”, Ciṅkai Nēcaṉ, 24 Feb 
1890: 133-4. 
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I. Cittimukammatu 
kampong garment dealer 
(kampaṅ - puṭaivaikkaṭai) 
10th Oct 
Kā. Mī. I. Cultāṉ and others 
kampong money-changer 
(kampaṅ - kācukkaṭai) 
15th Aug 
U. Hājimukammatu pāñcār dealer (pāñcār viyāpāri) 15th Aug 
Pa. Kā. Irakamattullācā pilot (campāṉōṭṭi) 15th Aug 
Mu. Ishākkujakkariyyā 
kampong garment dealer 
(kampaṅ - puṭaivaikkaṭai) 
22nd Aug 
Ce. Ismāyīl 
Kelang, Burma, Holland 
steamer agent (kilēṉ, parmā, 
ulāntā sṭīmar tuppāṣ)  
12th Dec 
I. Jeyiṉulāptīṉ Company cattle dealer (māṭṭu viyāpāram) 22nd Aug 
Cā. Kaṉicāyapumaraikkāyar 
Company 




ūrkappal āṭāttu money-changer 
(ūrkappal āṭāttu kācukkaṭai) 
19th Sep 
Mu. I. Kātarmastāṉ agent/interpreter (tuppāṣ) 8th Aug 
Ne. Kātirumeyicāyapu 
meṉcipīl (?) Company ocean 
steamer agent (meṉcipīl 
kampaṉi ōṣiyaṉ sṭīmar tuppāṣ) 
12th Dec 
Cā. Kulāmukiyittīṉ merchant (cavutākar) 8th Aug 
Ce. Kā. Kulāmukiyittīṉ provision-store (vaṅkucālkaṭai) 22nd Aug 
A. Maraikkāyarcāyapu 




Ladies-lō-ṭē Club (lēṭīs-lō-ṭē 
kiḷap) 
17th Oct 
Mu. Tā. Mīṟācākipu 
kampong gem trader (kampaṅ - 
irattiṉaviyāpāram) 
8th Aug 
Ṟā. Ma. Mīṟācāyapu 
head peon at Singapore Club 
(ciṅkappūr kiḷap periyatampi) 
12th Dec 
Ma. Mukammatu pilot 22nd Aug 
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Ce. Mu. Ka. Mukammatu Ali 




Cu. Mukammatu Apūpakkar provision-store (vaṅkucālkaṭai) 5th Sep 
Mukammatu Carīpumaraikkāyar 
Cā. Ku. Company money-
changer (cā. ku. kampaṉi 
kācukkaṭai) 
8th Aug 
I. Mukammatu Cultāṉ money-changer (kācukkaṭai) 8th Aug 
Je. Mukammatu Ismāyīl 
head peon at Borneo Company 
(pōrṉiyōkampaṉi periyatampi) 
8th Aug 
A. S. M. Mukammatu Ismāyīl 
Maraikkāyar 
cow merchant (kāli cavutākar) 22nd Aug 
A. Mukammatukkaṉi 
kampong garment dealer 
(kampaṅ - puṭaivaikkaṭai) 
8th Aug 
A. Mukammatu Kavus 
Mason(?) Company (mēṣaṉ 
kampaṉi) 
15th Aug 
Mī. Mukammatuleppai and others cow merchant (cavutākar kāli) 5th Sep 
Ce. Mukammatumatārucāyapu money-changer (kācukkaṭai) 8th Aug 
Nu. Mukammatumeyitiṉ 
pilot for Steven Company 




garment dealer (puṭaivaikkaṭai) 8th Aug 
Kā. Mukammatumīṟāṉcākipu 
garment dealer at Boat Quay 
(pōṭkī puṭaivaikkaṭai) 
5th Sep 
Va. Mukammatu Ucaṉ provision-store (vaṅkucālkaṭai) 10th Oct 
Kā. Mukammatu Yūcup 
skipper at Tanjong Pagar 
(tañcam pākār caṟāṅku) 
15th Aug 
Kā. Mukammatu Yūcup and others 
Cā. Ku. Company garment 




Kampong garment dealer 
(kampaṅ - puṭaivaikkaṭai) 
8th Aug 
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Le. Pa. Neyiṉāmucāyapu 
peon at Katz Brothers’ 
warehouse (kāts paratar kiṭaṅku 
tampi) 
17th Oct 
Nū. Kā. Neyiṉāmucāyapu 
peon at Edgar’s(?) warehouse 
(ēṭkar kiṭaṅku tampi) 
22nd Aug 
A. Nūṟumukammatu 




cashier at Desker(?) Company 
(ṭeyiskār kampaṉi kēṣiyar) 
17th Oct 
Ṟe. Pakkīrmālīṉ cattle dealer (māṭṭu viyāpāram)  12th Dec 
Kā. Pāvacāyapu 
kampong garment dealer 
(kampaṅ - puṭaivaikkaṭai) 
10th Oct 
A. Tīvāṉ Mukiyittīṉcāyapu 
Madurai piece-good dealer 
(maturai javaḷiviyāpāri) 
19th Sep 
Ce. Ucaṉcāmaraikkāyar agent/interpreter (tuppāṣ) 8th Aug 
Yū. Vañcūṟupakkīr 
merchant at Kampong Glam 
(kampaṅkaḷāṉ viyāpāri) 
22nd Aug 
Ki. Yāṟacūlullāpiccai Company 
kampong garment dealer 
(kampaṅ - puṭaivaikkaṭai) 
15th Aug 
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Appendix 4 
LAW REPORTS MENTIONING TAMIL MUSLIMS 
 
The following is a list of cases decided in Singapore and in some instances in Penang 
which involved or may have involved Tamil Muslims. The list was compiled from 
Kyshe (Ky) 1885 & 1890, Leicester 1877 (Lei), and the Straits Settlements Law 
Reports (S.S.L.R.). The list is not claimed to be comprehensive, but merely records 
those cases that I have perused in the writing of the thesis, even though not each case 
has been quoted in the thesis. 
In the following list, the first column gives details on the source, with cases being 
sorted according to the date of their publication. The case is recorded in the second 
column. In the third column, information is given as to why the court case has been 
considered as involving one or several Tamil Muslims. Finally, the last column gives 
a short description of the issue the suit arose from. 
As the identification of a Tamil ethnic background was crucial in selecting the 
cases, a short note is in order on the various indicators of ‘Tamilness’. The most 
common indicators are names. Titles such as Lebbai, Marican, Mustan, Naina, 
Rowter, Saiboo, or Tamby for men and Ammal and Nachial for women in their 
various orthographic variants fairly clearly point to a Tamil background, as do, to a 
lesser degree, names such as Mydin or Nathersahib, referring to saints popular in 
Tamil-speaking South India. Another marker is a peculiar way of recording initials by 
taking the first Tamil letter or letters of a name and adding -na or -ena, such as 
Moona, Kavena, etc. In some cases, indicated by a question-mark, the name cannot be 
said for certain to indicate a Tamil Muslim, though in some cases (i.e., the use of the 
title Khan) it is at least possible to be sure about an Indian background. 
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Another common indicator is the involvement of Chetties in the case. Of course, 
this does not automatically signify that the involved Muslims were also Tamils, but 
especially in the case of business contacts, it is not unlikely, and often corroborated by 
other indicators. The use of the Tamil language in documents such as wills is another 
clear marker of ethnic background. Sometimes the original language of a document is 
explicitly stated; in other cases the presence of Tamil vocabulary betrays a translation 
from Tamil. In a few cases, it has to be deduced from other features that a document 
was originally written in Tamil, such as translations (“brother-in-law (cousin)” 
indicating original Tamil maccāṉ) or orthography (“Achee” instead of “Haji” 
indicating underlying Tamil orthography āccī or ācci rather than Arabic ḥājjī). Other 
indicators such as references to people, places and property in India, certain 
ceremonies, Tamil Hindu lawyers, and the like also provide hints to the ethnicity of a 
person involved in the court case. Finally, in some rare cases individuals are actually 
identified as ‘Chulia’, ‘Kling’, or ‘Tamil’. 
Source Case 
Reason for Classifying 










Tamby, Golam Kadir) 
[Penang] Negligence of 
captain and crew of a 






Fatimah & Ors. v. 




Testator’s signature in 
Tamil 
[Penang] Validity of 
testament and certain 
trusts contained 
therein; validity of a 
divorce 
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Syed Abbas bin 
Hussein Aideed v. 




[Penang] Dispute about 
sale of a barque 
Ky 1885: 
201-4 




involvement of Chetty 
[Penang] Chetty sold 
carriage mortgaged to 






Names (Shena Shinna 
Meera Lebby, Sultan 
Meracayar); 
involvement of Chetty 
[Penang] Muslim ship-
captain failing to go to 






by their next 
friend Shaik Omar 
v. Soolong 
Person called a “Kling 
Mahomedan” 
Arab girl changing law-
school to marry Tamil 





v. Narainan Chetty 
Ship belonging to 
Muslim of Porto Novo 




Mustan Bee & 
Ors. v. Shina 
Tomby & Anor. 
Name (Shina Tomby) 
[Penang] Validity of 













Ashabee & Ors. v. 
Mahomed Hashim 
& Anor. 
Name? (Pakir Mydin) 
[Penang] Validity of 




Merican v. Kader 
Meydin 




indebted to plaintiff 
residing in Johor 
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In the matter of 
Vanjoor Mustan  
Names (Savena Gulam 
Meydin, Vanjoor 
Mustan) 

















Marican & Mana 
Noordin v. Hadjee 
Ismail bin Kassim 
Names (Madinasah 
Marican, Syed Marican)
Dispute on leases of 




Regina on the 
prosecution of 






Involvement of Chetty 
Muslim using 
promissory note to 
induce woman to return 




A.P. Ismail Saiboo 
v. Quah Beng Kay 
& N.R.M.N. 
Raman Chetty 
Name (Ismail Saiboo); 
plaintiff going to India 
to settle family affairs; 
involvement of Chetties 





Saiboo Tamby v. 
Chop Kim Chin 
Bee 
Name (Saiboo Tamby) 
Defendant failing to 
deliver 30 bags of 









Name (Mana Noordin); 









Guffoor v. Chop 
“Yong Nam 
Hong” 
Name? (Abdul Guffoor) 
Cost of execution of 
action taken by Sheriff 
S.S.L.R. 
1911: 74-83 
Re Hadjee Esmail 
bin Kassim, 
deceased 
Testator having siblings 
in India; involvement of 
Chetty 




Ebrahim v. The 
British India 
Steam Navigation 




called a “Chulia” 











Layna Jackiria Hussain 
bin Layvusah) 
Dispute over 




Balkis Nachial v. 
Achi Thayar 
Ammal & Ors. 
Names (Balkis Nachial, 
Achi Thayar Ammal, 
Ahna Mohamed 
Tamby, etc.); executor 
and his wife in India; 
executor’s wife has 
separate estate in India; 
translation of will 
suggests Tamil original 
Dispute over 
possession of property 
S.S.L.R. 
1929: 3-22 
Balkis Nachial v. 
Achi Thayar 
Ammal & Ors. 
Names (Balkis Nachial, 
Achi Thayar Ammal, 
Ana Mohamed Tamby, 
etc.); executor in India; 
executor’s wife has 
separate estate in India 
Appeal against 
judgment in dispute 
over possession of 
property 
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Maricar v. Haji 
Mohamed Eusope 
& Ors. 
Name (Shaik Lebbai 
Maricar); plaintiff & 







Re The estate of 
Tambi bin Osman, 
deceased  
Name (Tambi bin 
Osman); involvement of 
Chetty 
Sale of property in 
Malacca by 
administrator of estate 
S.S.L.R. 
1930: 212-6 
Re Ena Jainab 
Abdeen, deceased 
Names (Ena Jainab 
Abdeen, Juliah Ammal, 




beneficiaries of estate 
S.S.L.R. 
1931: 3-12 
In the estate of 
Ena Mohamed 
Tamby, deceased  
Names (Ena Mohamed 
Tamby, Moona Jana 
Shaik Allaudin, Kavena 
Haji Maidin Saibu); 
will in Tamil; grandson 
of testator in India; 
translation of copy of 
memorandum showing 
Tamil orthography 




Balkis Nachial v. 
Achi Thayar 
Ammal & Ors. 
Names (Balkis Nachial, 
Achi Thayar Ammal) 
Appeal for payment of 






Ammal & Ors. v. 
Balkis Nachial 
Names (Achi Thayar 
Ammal, Balkis Nachial, 
Ahna Mohamed 
Tamby, etc.); executor’s 
wife living in India  
2nd appeal against 
judgment in dispute 




Rex v. Miskin bin 
Mustapha 
Name? (Miskin bin 
Mustapha) 
Defendant falsely 
claimed to be able to 
procure employment on 
ship 
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Re Ena Mohamed 
Tamby, deceased 
Names (Ena Mohamed 
Tamby, Moona Jana 
Shaik Allaudin) 





Rex v. Mohamed 
Ali 
Defendant keeper of 
“Madras Café” 




In the matter of 
the estate of Haji 
Tamby bin Haji 
Mohamed Saleh 
deceased 
Name (Haji Tamby bin 
Haji Mohamed Saleh) 





Purshotam v. Ena 
Mohamed Ismail 










Names (Vavena Katha 
Pillay Marican, Vavena 
Mohamed Naina 
Maricar, Vavena Gulam 
Mohaideen Saiboo 
Maricar); will left in 
India 
Petition for assignment 


















Re Abdul Guny 
Abdullasa, 
deceased 
Name (Fatima Beebee 
Amal); testator had 
property in Penang and 
India; Tamil vocabulary 
in will; ceremony for 
Nagore saint; trust for 
mosque in 
Nagapattinam; testator 
“…not a Malay”; Tamil 
Hindu lawyers for 
plaintiff and defendant 
[Penang] Validity of 
trusts in will 
S.S.L.R. 
1937: 1-7 
Re Ena Mohamed 
Tamby, deceased 
Name (Ena Mohamed 
Tamby); translation of 
copy of memorandum 
showing Tamil 
orthography 











Nachial, Abdul Hamid 
Maricar, Mahamood 
Maricar); appellant in 
India at time of 
testator’s death; 
hostility of Indian 
branch of family to 
Malayan branch 




Rex v. Kavena 
Ismail Sahib 
Name (Kavena Ismail 
Sahib); involvement of 
Chetties; boat called 
Siru Medina (‘Little 
Medina’) 
Boats repainted to 
avoid confiscation 
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Vappoo Maricar, etc.); 
will executed in 
Karaikal; several people 
said to be “Chulia by 
caste”; properties in 
Karaikal and Nagore 





Re K. Mohamed 
Ibrahim & 
Company 
Names? (K.M. Shaik 
Mohamed; K. 
Mohamed Ibrahim); 
business partners in 
India 









Name (K.E. Mohamed 
Sultan Maricar) 




J.M. Abdul Kader 
v. Shaw Brothers 
Ltd. 
Name? (J.M. Abdul 
Kader) 






















known as A. Kadir M. 
Saiboo and Company; 
wife of testator resident 
of Karaipakam 
Enangudi 








Name (K.E. Mohamed 
Sultan Maricar) 








Chettiar v. Haji 
Ibrahim 
Name? (Haji Ibrahim); 
Involvement of Chetty 
Dispute over defendant 
failing to quit land 




Ghouse bin Haji 
Kader Mustan v. 
Rex 
Names (Ghouse bin 
Haji Kader Mustan, 
Isah binte Shaik 
Buramdeen); girl “…of 
the Hanafi Sect…” 
Dispute over minority 





Cader v. Frederick 
Smith 
Names (Mohamed 
Abdul Cader, Nee Aya 
Abdul Karim); man 
called a “Tamil 
Mohammedan”; man 
born in India 
Quantum for damages 
of loss of expectation 
of life 
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Appendix 5 
INDIAN MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS 
 
The table was compiled from the information included in Government of Singapore 
2005. Information regarding the FIM-status was supplied from interviews. 
Name of Association Registered in: Joined FIM in: 
Pan-Indian Association 
Indian Muslim Social Service Association 2004 Not member 
United Indian Muslim Association 1964 (1991)750 1992 
Ethnic Associations 
Dakhni Urdu Association 1998 2005 
Malabar Muslim Juma-ath 1937 1992 
Tamil Muslim Jama‘at 1950 Not member 
Thiruvithancode Muslim Union 1952 1992 
Religious Associations 
Rifayee Thareeq Association of Singapore 1965 1992 
South Indian Jamiathul Ulama 1958 1992 
Kin-center Associations 
Cuddalore Association 2002 2005 
Jameyathul Muslimeen of B & C Mutlur 1936 1992 
Kayalpatnam Welfare Association 2004 2005 
Kilakkarai Welfare Association (Singapore) 1999 2005 
Koothanallur Association 1996 2005 
Muthupettai Association (Singapore) 2001 2005 
Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim League 1941 1992 
Singapore Tenkasi Muslim Welfare Society 1940 1992 
(Thiruvithancode Muslim Union) 1952 See above 
Thopputhurai Muslim Association (Singapore) 1948 2005 
Thuckalay Muslim Association 1939 1992 
                                                 
750 According to Government of Singapore 2005: 259, the Pasir Panjang Indian Muslim Association, 
UIMA’s forerunner, was registered in 1964. Yet the association celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2002; 
cf. “Aikkiya Intiya Muslim Caṅkattiṉ muppatām āṇṭu viḻā”, Ceyticcuṭar 28, May-Oct 2002: 5. 
 317
 APPENDIX 7: RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OFFERED BY TAMIL MUSLIM INSTITUTIONS 
 
                                                
Appendix 6 
EXCERPT FROM A TAMIL RELIGIOUS LECTURE 
 
The following translation of an excerpt of an Islamic Tamil lecture may serve as an 
example of Tamil Muslim preaching. The excerpt is taken from an audio recording of 
a lecture given by M. Mohamed Mohideen Faizi, one of the religious scholars 
employed as teacher (ustādh) by SKML. A compact disk of the recording was sold by 
SKML in 2003.751 The Tamil portions of the lecture were kindly transcribed for me 
by M. Saravanan. The lecture was given at a ‘Koran Conference’, as becomes clear in 
the introductory passage of the lecture (not translated below). Obviously, a translation 
of a lecture given in Tamil is unable reproduce many of the performative devices used 
by the lecturer, quite apart from the fact that certain devices, such as gestures, were 
already lost when recording the speech. I have used punctuation and capital letters in 
order convey a bit of the speed and volume of the presentation. 
Yet the translation can serve as an example of the techniques used to transmit 
religious knowledge. This particular excerpt deals with the conversion to Islam of 
‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, a noted companion of the Prophet and later the third caliph of 
the expanding Muslim empire. It tells of the impact that the recitation of Koranic 
verses had on ‘Umar, which he heard recited first by the Prophet himself, and a few 
days later by another companion of the Prophet at the house of his sister, who had 
herself just converted to Islam. This short anecdote, apart from serving as a piece of 
information about an important personality of Islamic history, allows the lecturer to 
engage his audience at different levels, viz.: 
 
751 Faizi n.d. 
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1. Storytelling – By telling the story about ‘Umar’s conversion, the lecturer is 
able to connect and embed various arguments into a single narrative, leading 
his audience from one point to the next through the unexpected turns of the 
anecdote – the Koranic ‘answers’ to ‘Umar’s thoughts, his resolve to kill the 
Prophet despite the impact the Koran had on him, the unexpected news of his 
sister’s conversion, his own conversion after his second encounter with the 
Koran – providing a red thread and keeping the audience interested. 
2. Exegesis – As becomes obvious, the anecdote serves as an opportunity to give 
translations and elucidations of Koranic verses as well as to embed them in a 
Tamil cultural understanding, e.g. by linking up the Arabic shā‘ir, ‘poet’, and 
kāhin, ‘soothsayer’, with the Tamil kaviñar and cōciyakkārar. 
3. Exemplum – Given that the excerpt is part of a lecture given at a ‘Koran 
Conference’, it also serves as an example of the power the Koran and its 
recitation can exert on an individual’s life, and the importance the recitation 
thus assumes, for if he had not heard the Koran being recited, ‘Umar would 
not have embraced Islam. 
4. Exhortation – Following from this last point is an exhortation to the audience 
to engage in the recitation and study of the Koran, which is reinforced by the 
twist the lecturer gives to the second part of Koran 69.41, which literally 
means ‘how little you believe’, but which is interpreted as indicating the 
deficiency of knowledge about the Koran. 
5. Edification – Apart from the storytelling itself, the anecdote is also edifying in 
the way the story works out to a good end, i.e. ‘Umar’s conversion, allowing 
the audience to take solace in the way that the Koran, i.e. God’s word, turns a 
potentially catastrophic situation (after all, ‘Umar is out to kill the Prophet 
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when he learns of his sister’s conversion) into a benefit for the Muslim 
community. 
I have left most of the Arabic words and phrases in Arabic in the translation, to show 
the profusion of these phrases and also how they are elucidated for a Tamil audience. 
Most Arabic phrases are translated immediately in the course of the lecture. In my 
English version, I have translated these ‘translations’ from Tamil, only indicating the 
meaning of the Arabic phrase when the Tamil explanation differs substantially from 
the Arabic one. Thus, the phrase hādhā shā‘irun – literally ‘this is a poet’ – is 
translated below as ‘it is as if he is a poet’, a rendering of Tamil ivar oru kaviñar pōl 
irukkiṟatē. Some commonly employed Arabic words have been translated, e.g. nabī, 
‘Prophet’. Similarly, benedictory phrases uttered after the names of certain individuals 
have been translated. Even though the phrase raḍiya 'llāhu ‘anhu, ‘may God be 
pleased with him’, uttered after the names of the Prophet’s companions, is often 
shortcut by the speaker to raḍiya 'llāhu or simply raḍi (pronounce rali in Tamil), I 
have nevertheless always translated it in full. In one instance, where I was not able to 
identify an Arabic word used by the speaker clearly, I have indicated this with [?]. 
Finally, I have sometimes indicated the original Tamil word in brackets, to show how 
certain Arabic terms are rendered into Tamil. 
The story begins near the ka‘ba, the cubical central sanctuary of Islam in Mecca, 
with Muhammad being engaged in glorifying God by repeating the phrase Allāhu 
akbar, ‘God is most great’, called takbīr in Arabic: 
 
The Messenger of God – may God bless him and grant him peace – who is 
as dear, even dearer to us than our own life, was worshipping near the 
ka‘bat Allāh, repeating takbīr by saying Allāhu akbar. That being the time 
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when ‘Umar had not yet adopted Islam, he wanted to listen to what 
Muhammad was reciting in prayer. Hiding on the other side close to the 
ka‘ba, he eavesdropped. The Lord of the Prophets – may God bless him 
and grant him peace – was reciting the chapter (attiyāyam) al-Ḥāqqa [of 
the Koran]. It occurred in that; it occurred in verses (vācaṉaṅkaḷ) 
forty…forty, forty-one, forty-two and forty-three. 
‘Umar said: wa mā huwa bi-qawli shā‘irin – ‘it is as if he is a poet’.752 
Hearing the Prophet’s recitation of the beginning of the chapter al-Ḥāqqa, 
‘Umar said to himself: “This is not the speech of an ordinary man 
(cātāraṇa maṉitar)! As the verses recited by him are excellent, in a way 
suitable to attract the hearts of people, he cannot be an ordinary man. 
hādhā shā‘irun – ‘it is as if he is a poet’”! Our Master (emperumāṉār) – 
may God bless him and grant him peace – recited the next verse. ‘Umar 
heard it just as he had said in [his] mind: “No, no”! The next verse in the 
chapter al-Ḥāqqa included it as truth in this manner: wa mā huwa bi-qawli 
shā‘irin (Koran 69.41, first part) – ‘it is not the word of a poet! IT IS NOT 
THE WORD OF A POET’! qalīlan mā tu’minūn (Koran 69.41, second part) 
– ‘but your study and pondering of the Koran is very deficient’!753 
Immediately ‘Umar said: “No, no. It is not the word of a poet! huwa [?] 
kāhinun – perhaps it is as if this Muhammad is a soothsayer (cōciyakkārar). 
That’s why the verse: ‘it is not a poem (kavitai)’ came up! Therefore it is as 
if he is a soothsayer”! Thus he spoke. The next verse came: wa mā huwa 
bi-qawli kāhinin (Koran 69.42, first part) – ‘this is not the word of a 
 
752 This seems to be a slip on part of the speaker – as it stands, the Arabic phrase is a quote of Koran 
69.41, ‘[these are] not the words of a poet’, yet the translation makes clear that the speaker intended the 
affirmative wa huwa bi qawli shā‘irin, ‘these are the words of a poet’. 
753 Literally the Arabic phrase means: ‘how little you believe’. 
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soothsayer’!754 tanzīlun min rabbi 'l-‘ālamīn (Koran 69.43) – this is a 
heavenly scripture (vāṉmaṟai) sent down by God, the Truth (ḥaqq) – 
praised is He and exalted – who creates and rules the people of the world. 
When ‘Umar – may God be pleased with him – heard the Lord of Prophets 
– may God bless him and grant him peace – recite the verse containing the 
meaning ‘this is a heavenly scripture’, the verses brought about an 
enormous impact on his mind. However, because he thought: “I do not 
want to loose money, influence and rank”, he did not immediately accept 
the Lord of Prophets – may God bless him and grant him peace –, he did 
not believe the Koran instantly. 
Therefore, a few days later he took his sword and set out, saying: “I am 
going to kill Muhammad”. En route, he was stopped by a friend. When [the 
friend] said: “Go and see your sister and her husband, they have accepted 
Islam”, ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, who had said: “I am going to kill the Lord of 
Prophets”, – may God bless him and grant him peace – now turned his 
steps to the house of his dear sister. There, the companion (ṣaḥābī) called 
Khabbāb b. al-Aratt was reciting the Koran for ‘Umar’s sister and her 
husband. He recited verses gathered in Sūrat Ṭā-hā. Just before he entered 
the house, these words fell on ‘Umar’s ears: lā ilāha illā anā fā‘budnī wa 
aqimi 'l-ṣalāta li-dhikrī (Koran 20.14) – ‘there is no deity except for me, 
Allah; worship me in order to remember me’. Khabbāb b. al-Aratt – may 
God be pleased with him – recited the words containing this meaning 
which are included in Sūrat Ṭā-hā. ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, who earlier at the 
ka‘ba got attracted on hearing the verses of the Noble Koran through the 
 
754 Here, the speaker slightly misquoted the verse Koran 69.42, obviously influenced by the preceding 
verse. Actually, the verse is wa lā bi-qawli kāhinin, with identical meaning. 
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sweet voice of the Lord of Prophets – may God bless him and grant him 
peace – now heard the divine verses (iṟai vācaṉaṅkaḷ) of divine scripture 
(iṟai maṟai) emanate from the tongue of Khabbāb b. al-Aratt. Was it not for 
this very reason that he adopted Islam immediately? 
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Appendix 7 
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OFFERED BY TAMIL MUSLIM INSTITUTIONS 
 
The following list of religious classes organized by different institutions was 
compiled by MUIS and presented at a Dialogue Session on 14th of August 2005. I am 
indebted to MUIS and in particular to Mr. Mohd Nazirin Abu Bakar for his kindness 
and promptness in supplying me with the figures and granting me the permission to 
use them. To this I have added information regarding the classes offered by the 
ThoMA, which were supplied to me by the association’s president, Mr. K.M. Deen, 
on 18th of August 2005. Some of the smaller associations are also running religious 
classes nowadays, and this may have been the case also in August 2005, but I am not 
aware of further classes. Only religious classes organized by associations that are 
predominantly Tamil speaking have been included, so that similar activities 
conducted by e.g. the Malabar Muslim Juma-ath are not mentioned. The list mentions 
the institution, the venue, and the number of teachers (ustādh, pl. asātidha), 
facilitators, and students (student nos. are rounded). 
Institution Venue No. of Teachers No. of Students 





Gafoor & Masjid 
Jamae (Chulia) 
Masjid Abdul Gafoor 6 asātidha 400 
SKML 














Masjid Kampong Delta 




Planned as home 
teaching 
1 ustādh 55 
TMU 
Masjid Al-Ansar 






Masjid Haji Mohd Salleh
Masjid Hajjah Rahimabi 
(Kebun Limau) 
3 asātidha 250 
UIMA 
Masjid Darul Aman 
Masjid Hajjah Fatimah 
Masjid Tentera Di Raja 
1 ustādh 120 
                                                 
755 This venue was passed on by the ThoMA to the Kilakkarai Welfare Association, which is now itself 




(Ar.=Arabic; Ma.=Malay; Ta.=Tamil) 
ācci  (Ta.) ‘elder sister’; also term of address to women of higher 
rank or position. 
‘āda (Ar.) ‘custom’. 
adat (Ma.) →‘āda. 
Aḥmadiyya Muslim reform movement founded by Ghulām Aḥmad 
Qādiyānī (1839-1908); considered to be ‘heretic’ by many 
Muslims. 
‘ālim (pl. ‘ulamā’) Muslim religious scholar. 
asātidha →ustādh. 
awliyā’ →walī. 
baraka (Ar.) ‘blessing’; God’s blessing power transmitted through 
saints or shrines. 
Barelwī Supporter of a nineteenth century Muslim reform movement; 
general term for a supporter of saint-veneration. 
Bengalee In British colonial parlance in the Straits Settlements: any 
North Indian. 
bilāl The person calling for prayer in a mosque; muezzin. 
Bohra Shiite community from Gujarat. 
caṉmarkka urai (Ta.) ‘religious lecture’. 
cantaṉakkuṭam (Ta.) ritual of anointing a grave with sandal paste.  
cāyapu (Ta.) a Muslim holy man. 
Chulia Term denoting South Indians, specifically South Indian 
Muslims; used by Europeans in Southeast Asia. 
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Cīṟāppurāṇam Tamil poem on the life of the Prophet by →Umaṟuppulavar. 
coṟpoḻivu (Ta.) →caṉmarkka urai. 
Dakhni-Urdu South Indian variety of Urdu. 
Dargah Muslim saint-shrine. 
Deepavali A Hindu holiday. 
dhikr (Ar.) ‘remembrance’; practice of remembering God by 
chanting certain formulas. 
Dhoby Washer-man. 
fatwā (Ar.) ‘formal legal opinion’. 
fitrah (Ma.) →zakāt al-fiṭra. 
Hajj Pilgrimage to Mecca 
ḥalāl (Ar.) ‘permissible’, according to Islamic law. 
ḥanafī (Ar.) one of the Sunnite schools of law. 
hypergamy Practice of barring women from marrying below their social 
rank. 
‘Īd al-Fiṭr Muslim holiday at the end of →Ramadan. 
ifṭār (Ar.) first meal after sunset during →Ramadan. 
Jawi Pekan (Ma.) Person of mixed Indian and Malay parentage 
Jawi-Peranakan (Ma.) →Jawi Pekan 
kafā’a (Ar.) ‘equality, suitability’; principle legitimizing the practice 
of →hypergamy in Islamic law. 
kāfir (Ar.) ‘infidel’. 
kampong (Ma.) ‘village, settlement’. 
kantūri (Ta.) feast on a holiday. 
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karicamaṇi (Ta.) necklace of black stones worn by married Muslim 
women. 
kaṭci (Ta.) ‘party, faction’. 
kattikaṭai (Ta.) ‘knife-shop’; general store. 
Kĕling (Ma.) a person from South India. 
kĕnduri (Ma.) →kantūri. 
keramat (Ma.) →Dargah. 
kēvalam (Ta.) ‘low status, meanness, shame’. 
khuṭba (Ar.) the Muslim Friday sermon. 
Kling →Kĕling 
Labbai Religious title; a sub-community of Tamil Muslims. 
maccāṉ (Ta.) ‘cross-cousin, brother-in-law’. 
madrasa (Ar.) a Muslim religious school. 
mandi safar (Ma.) bathing ritual in the Muslim month of Safar. 
manik sendrum (Ma.) →karicamaṇi. 
Marakkayar A sub-community of Tamil Muslims. 
masjid (Ar.) ‘mosque’. 
mastāṉ (Ta.) a holy man. 
mawlid (Ar.) ‘birthday’; recitation of panegyric poetry. 
muftī (Ar.) official deliverer of →fatwā. 
nĕgĕri Kĕling (Ma.) ‘the →Kĕling country’. 
Panchayat Assembly. 
Pathan Term used in South India to denote local speakers of Urdu. 
piracaṅkam (Ta.) ‘sermon’; →khuṭba. 
Pongal A Tamil holiday. 
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Qādiyānī Term for a follower of the →Aḥmadiyya used by its 
opponents. 
Ramadan Muslim fasting month. 
Ravuttar A sub-community of Tamil Muslims. 
saudagar raja (Ma.) ‘royal merchant’. 
sayyid (Ar.) a descendant of the Prophet. 
ṣēk mantiram (Ta.) formula whose recitation was believed to ensure 
attainment of paradise after death. 
shāfi‘ī (Ar.) one of the Sunnite schools of law. 
sharī‘a (Ar.) the revealed law of Islam. 
shaykh (Ar.) preceptor of a Sufi brotherhood. 
Syce groom looking after draft-horses. 
Tablīghī Jamā‘at Muslim lay-missionary movement. 
tābūt (Ar.) ‘coffin’; miniature representation of the tomb of Hussein, 
the Prophet’s grandson, carried in processions to 
commemorate his martyrdom. 
taikkā (Ta.) →Dargah. 
Taláq Title of a controversial Tamil drama on violence against 
women in Muslim families; literally (Ar.) ‘divorce’. 
taṅkaḷ (Ta.) a holy man. 
Tarakanar A sub-community of Tamil Muslims. 
tarkā (Ta.) →Dargah. 
ta‘ziya (Ar.) ‘consolation, solace’; →tābūt. 
Tenkasis Contemptuous term for Tamil Muslims from Tenkasi and 
neighboring towns and villages. 
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tiṇṇaip paḷḷi (Ta.) ‘verandah school’; simple elementary school. 
Tirukkuṟaḷ Highly venerated Tamil collection of moral maxims. 
‘ulamā’ →‘ālim. 
Umaṟuppulavar Poet of the →Cīṟāppurāṇam. 
umma (Ar.) the community of all Muslims. 
ūr (Ta.) ‘village, town, city, place’; specifically a person’s 
hometown or place of origin. 
‘urf (Ar.) →‘āda. 
‘urs (Ar.) ‘wedding’; holiday in honor of a saint. 
ustādh (pl. asātidha) (Ar.) ‘teacher’; in Singapore used for teachers of religion. 
vaṇakkam (Ta.) ‘adoration’; common Tamil greeting. 
Wahhābī Supporter of an eighteenth century Muslim reform movement; 
contemptuous term for an opponent of saint-veneration. 
wakaf (Ma.) →waqf. 
walī (pl. awliyā’) (Ar.) ‘friend’; a Muslim saint. 
waqf (Ar.) ‘religious endowment’. 
zakāt (Ar.) Muslim alms tax. 
zakāt al-fiṭra (Ar.) obligatory gift made annually on the occasion of →‘Īd 
al-Fiṭr. 
 
 330
